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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1969, Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA)' with the objective of causing governmental agencies to consider
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environmental impact in their decision-making. Questions arose early
regarding who had standing to initiate judicial review under the Act, and
what the proper scope was for consideration of environmental effects of
agency actions. A line of cases provided some guidance regarding these
issues in the domestic context. When the same questions arose in the
context of government action having impact outside the sovereign territory
of the United States, the analysis became even more complex.
Part II of this article outlines the underlying tenets of the NEPA
and the modifications of the NEPA at the executive and administrative
level. Part III examines the judiciary's interpretations of the NEPA's
application internationally to direct government agency actions. Part IV
examines NEPA application stemming from indirect or collaborative
government action. Part V sets out a framework for analyzing the
competing factors which may affect future cases concerning the application
of NEPA abroad. Part VI concludes that until a statutory amendment is
approved, or NEPA's Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) mechanism
becomes a general principle of customary international law, the
extraterritorial application of NEPA will likely remain an open question.
Since weighing of the competing factors is the province of the judicial
branch, this will likely mean continued deference to the executive branch's
view with respect to foreign policy.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEPA INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION
A. Outline
A summary of the main issues confronted when applying NEPA
domestically is useful for considering their impact in the international
context. Under NEPA, federal agencies are required to act in an
environmentally responsible manner, 2 yet they must also comply with other
1. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-70d (West 1994).
2. Section 102(2)(c) of NEPA reads as follows:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: . . . (2) all
agencies of the federal government shall...
(c) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a
detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal
be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
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governmental policies., This cross-policy coherence obligation is especially
important with respect to agency activities abroad. As a threshold, to trigger
the necessity of an EIS a proposed federal agency action must qualify as
major and having a significant environmental impact.4
If the threshold is met, the next step is to determine the scope,
timing, and content of the EIS. The Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ) regulations contain a detailed description of the procedural
requirements for the preparation of an EIS.1 To address uncertainty
surrounding the timing of any obligations under NEPA, the CEQ provides a
definition of the proposal for purposes of EIS preparation: "a proposal exists
at that stage in the development of an action when an agency subject to the
Act has a goal and is actively preparing to make a decision on one or more
alternative means of accomplishing that goal and the effects can be
meaningfully evaluated." 6
Since government action in the international sphere is susceptible to
being kept from the purview of the public, the secrecy issue is particularly
relevant when considering NEPA's application abroad. In Weinberger v.
Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project,, the United States
Supreme Court addressed the classified information issue in the domestic
context. The plaintiff challenged the government's creation of nuclear-
capable storage facilities, but because the alleged project was classified, the
plaintiffs were unable to prove the existence of an actual proposal for nuclear
weapon storage! The Court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for failure to
establish a cause of action, but instructed the United States Army (Army) to
prepare a classified EIS if it was in fact storing nuclear weapons at the sites. 9
This holding creates the possibility that an agency's good faith may be the
only impetus to NEPA compliance when the underlying action implicates
national security. This holding also increases the likelihood that courts will
allow a reduced level of review of actions taken under the guise of national
security.
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Id.
3. Id. §§102-4.
4. Id. § 102(C).
5. Because of the importance of the scoping issue, the CEQ established it as a particular
element of the procedure, in order to obtain early participation by other agencies and the public.
6. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.23 (1996).
7. Weinberger v. Cath. Action of Haw. Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139 (1981).
8. Id.
9. Id.
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Once the scope analysis provides the particular matters to be included
in the EIS, the content query asks what must be discussed in relation to these
matters, and in particular, what alternatives should be included.' The test for
determining what alternatives must be considered is the rule of reason,
namely, "whether a reasonable person would think that an alternative was
sufficiently significant to warrant extended discussion."" Of significance to
the international discussion is the District of Columbia Circuit Court's ruling
that the agency discuss alternatives within the jurisdiction of any part of the
federal government, and not just that of the agency in question.' 2 The amount
of detail with which an alternative must be discussed is directly proportional
to the likelihood of its implementation." Under the CEQ regulations a no-
action alternative must be considered in the EIS," but a worst case scenario
discussion requirement was later rescinded.'"
B. Executive Order 12,114
On January 4, 1979, President Jimmy Carter issued Executive Order
12,114 in an effort to clarify the questions surrounding NEPA's international
application. 6 The order was to represent the government's "exclusive and
complete determination of the procedural and other actions to be taken by the
federal agencies to further the purpose of the National Environmental Policy
Act, with respect to the environment outside the United States, its territories
and possessions. "'1 The actions covered in the Order include major federal
actions significantly affecting the environment "of the global commons
outside the jurisdiction of any nation (e.g. the oceans or Antarctica)" or "of
a foreign nation not participating with the United States and not otherwise
involved in the action."' 9 Actions which provide the foreign nation with a
10. See40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1996).
11. NRDC, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (setting forth the test originally);
See also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, (1978) (upholding the
D.C. Circuit Court test).
12. Morton, 458 F.2d 827.
13. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2 (1996).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ABROAD OF MAJOR FEDERAL ACTIONS, 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3269, 3271 [hereinafter EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,114].
17. Id. at 3269. Under section 2, every federal agency had eight months to develop
procedures to implement the Order and were to consult with the State Department and the CEQ in
this effort. Id.
18. Id. at 3270.
19. Id.
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product or projects producing a "principal product or an emission or
effluent" which is strictly regulated or prohibited by federal law because of
its toxic effects or radioactivity are also included."0 Finally, the Order covers
major federal actions outside the United States, its territories, and possessions
which "significantly affect natural or ecological resources of global
importance" by declaration of the President or international agreement
binding on the United States.2 '
The documents acceptable in this procedure include EISs, bilateral or
multilateral studies by the United States and one or more foreign nations,
studies by an international organization or body of which the United States is
a member, and concise reviews of environmental issues, including
environmental impact assessments (EIAs), summary analyses, and other
appropriate documents." Section 2-4(b) of the Order calls for a provision in
agency procedures for document preparation according to the environmental
effects involved.2 For actions affecting the global commons, the agency
must prepare an EIS.I For the uninvolved, non-participating foreign nation
situation, and for the toxic effect and radioactivity instances described above,
bilateral or multilateral studies or concise reviews are sufficient., For the
globally important resource scenario, any of the documents mentioned above
are allowed. 26 Thus, the review's type and scope are substantially impacted
by the nature of the action and its effects, the level of coordination with the
foreign nation, and the existence of any obligations stemming from
international organization membership.
The Order also allows for "existing regulations of any agency
adopted pursuant to court order ... or judicial settlement of any case" or for
procedures in addition to those in the Order which "further NEPA's purposes
or those of other environmental laws (with specific laws listed), as long as
they are consistent with foreign and national security policies. 7 When read in
conjunction with the decision in NRDC v. Morton,2 this section seems to
imply that an individual agency's particular provisions, as long as they pass
the foreign policy/national security consistency test, will be triggered when
20. Id.
21. EXECTUTIVE ORDER 12,114 supra note 16, at 3270. Such recommendations should be
accompanied by the views of the State Department and the CEQ. Id.
22. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,114, supra note 16, at 3270.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. NRDC, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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actions have reasonable alternatives within the jurisdiction of any federal
agency.
It is significant to note the Order's Presidential action exemption:
intelligence activities and arms transfers, nuclear activities, actions arising
from membership in international organizations, and emergency relief
actions. 9 Also exempt are actions which, "in the view of the agency," do not
have a significant effect on the environment. 0 Under section 2-5(b) agencies
"may provide for" appropriate modifications in contents, timing, and
availability of documents to fellow agencies or affected nations when
necessitated by urgency, concerns of adverse impacts on foreign relations, or
sovereign responsibilities. 2 Modifications needed to reflect certain factors of
diplomacy, competitiveness, confidentiality, national security, information
collection obstacles, or ability of an agency to affect a decision are also
allowed. Indeed, in emergency circumstances and those involving
"exceptional foreign policy and national security sensitivities," an agency
procedure can even provide for exemptions and categorical exclusions beyond
those listed in the order.3' Section 2-5(d) addresses constitutional issues by
limiting section 2-5's applicability to the extent permitted by law.
Finally, section 3 eliminates the availability of a private cause of
action based on the Order. Furthermore it calls for coordination with the
State Department and, in multi-agency actions, calls on the agencies to
choose a lead agency responsible for implementation of the Order.15 The
definition of environment is restricted to the "natural and physical
environment" and expressly excludes "social, economic and other
environments." 3' Thus, unlike in the domestic context, where the Supreme
Court has not limited consideration to the natural environment, Order 12,114
appears to do just that.3" And section 3-5 seems to say that if an EIS is
prepared because an action affects the United States or the global commons, a
separate EIS need not be prepared concerning the effects of the environment
on foreign nations38
29. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,114, supra note 16, at 3271.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,114, supra note 16, at 3271.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766
(1983); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972); Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.
1972).
38. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,114, supra note 16, at 3272.
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III. NEPA APPLICATION TO DIRECT ACTION BY AGENCIES
A. Pre-Order 12,114
The first case to raise the issue of NEPA's applicability outside of the
fifty states was brought in 1973 by the people of Enewetak, an atoll which is
one of the Trust Territories of the United States. 9 The people of Enewetak
sought a preliminary injunction against the United States government's
program of nuclear blast simulation by means of high explosive detonation.4
The United States District Court of Hawaii held that NEPA did apply to the
Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands," stating that the government's drilling
and seismic studies fell within the scope of the prohibition of the preliminary
injunction requested where its primary purpose was to further the project in
dispute, and where delay would not lead to irreparable injury.'
In analyzing the statute's scope, the court noted that Congress must
"manifest an express intention" that a statute apply to the Trust Territories,
since federal legislation is not automatically applicable there. 3 The court
looked at the language of the statute and pointed out that the legislators used
the broader term of Nation, and used United States only twice, both times in
order to reference certain policies, regulations, and laws which would be
unclear without that modifier." Judge King also pointed to the expansive
language as indicating a concern for all persons subject to federal action
having a major impact on their environment and not merely those located in
the fifty states.'4 He found additional support in the statements of Senator
Jackson, NEPA's principal sponsor, as well as in the Senate Conference
Committee Report."6 The court also cited the House Report as evidence of
Congressional recognition of the worldwide scope inherent in environmental
problems: "[i]mplicit in [U.S. Environmental Policy] is the understanding
that the international implications of our current activities will also be
considered, inseparable as they are from the purely national consequences of
our actions. "4 7
39. People of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811 (D.C. Haw. 1973).
40. Id. at 813.
41. Id. at 815.
42. Id. at 820-21.
43. Id. at 815.
44. Id. at 816.
45. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811, 816.
46. Id. at 817.
47. Id. at 817-18.
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In Sierra Club v. Adams,' the plaintiff environmental group sought to
enjoin the United States construction of the Darien Gap Highway in Panama
and Colombia, alleging that the environmental impact statement was
deficient. 9 The Supreme Court agreed on the issue of the plaintiff's standing
to challenge the EIS based upon concern regarding the spread of aftosa, or
foot and mouth disease, to the United States, and that once standing is found
with respect to one ground, a plaintiff may raise other challenges to the EIS
based upon the public interest in having government officials meet their
duties under NEPA.10 The Supreme Court noted the distinction between the
issues of NEPA applicability to United States' government projects which
involve entirely local environmental impacts, projects with some strictly local
impacts, and some which affect the United States.,' But the Court held that
based on the facts present in Sierra Club, it need only assume NEPA's
applicability to the construction in Panama, and deferred the resolution of the
issue of NEPA applicability to projects with "strictly local impacts." 2
In addressing the adequacy issue, the Court noted that the draft EIS
had been circulated to over seventy officials in the United States, Panama,
and Colombia, and neither the CEQ nor the Environmental Protection
Agency(EPA) raised any objections to the statement." The Court also noted
the significance of the government's response to the adverse comments to the
draft, the level of detail in the discussion concerning aftosa, and the
exploration of alternatives in ruling that the statement met its NEPA
requirements. But the Court's green light was conditioned upon the
Department of Agriculture filing a certification concerning the aftosa control
issue with the court and the appellees before any construction began in
Colombia." The Court found this necessary because the government
appeared too anxious to complete the project. 6  Apparently in the
Congressional Budget request for Fiscal Year 1979 the "certain
environmental requirements" which led to the delay in the Darien Gap
Highway project were described as "[having] been met" despite the fact that
48. Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. 1978).
49. Id. at 390.
50. Id. at 391-92.
51. Id. at 392.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 393-94.
54. Adams, 578 F.2d 389, 394-97.
55. Id. at 397.
56. Id.
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no final decision had been made by the Court on the case when the document
was sent to Congress. 7
In the second 1978 case concerning NEPA's application abroad, the
National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) sought a
declaratory judgment that the government violated NEPA by failing to
prepare an EIS with respect to a joint program of herbicide spraying of
marijuana and poppy plants in Mexico.,8 The plaintiff group alleged that
Mexican grown marijuana consumed in the United States was found to
contain significant levels of the herbicide paraquat, and that this posed a
"serious health hazard" to some of their members who smoke marijuana or
ingest it in food or drink. 9 NORML also claimed that some of its members
visited Mexico for "recreational and professional purposes" and had an
interest in having the food and drink they consume there free from potentially
harmful herbicides. In addition, the plaintiffs asserted a "recreational and
aesthetic interest" that the areas of scenic beauty in Mexico not be harmed by
herbicide usage.60 Finally, the group claimed they had an interest in having
Mexican agricultural imports free from potentially harmful herbicides.6 ' The
United States District Court for the District of Columbia found that at least
some of plaintiffs members had satisfied the minimal standing requirements
set out in Sierra Club v. Adams,6 2 and had at the very least alleged a sufficient
informational interest under NEPA. 6
The court noted that the extraterritoriality of NEPA was still an open
question in the Circuit." But since the defendant agreed to prepare an EIS
regardless of the outcome of the litigation, the Court, as in Sierra Club, did
not have to directly address the issue. 6  The court refused to issue an
injunction requiring the agencies to use their best efforts to dissuade the
Mexican government from continuing the spraying program until the EIS was
prepared, holding this to be a nonjusticiable political question beyond its
powers, and that such relief would infringe upon the foreign relations powers
of the President." The court noted that marijuana and heroin (also affected
by the program) were Schedule I Controlled Substances and that simple
57. Id.
58. National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. U.S. Dep't. of
St., 452 F. Supp. 1226 (1978).
59. Id. at 1228.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1228-29.
62. Adams, 578 F. 2d 389.
63. NORML, 452 F. Supp. 1226, 1230.
64. Id. at 1232.
65. Id. at 1229, 1232-33.
66. Id. at 1234-35.
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possession was a criminal violation.6' Thus, even though NEPA demanded
that federal agencies not rush blindly into major federal actions affecting the
environment, this did not mean that environmental concerns could justify
disregarding the criminal laws created by Congress.6 Because of this and the
fact that the relief sought presented a nonjusticiable political question, all
other aspects of the relief sought by NORML were denied.69
B. Post-Order 12,114
Two years later, an environmental group sought judicial review of
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) approval of nuclear export
applications to the Philippines.0 The petitioners challenged the adequacy of
the review under both the Atomic Energy Act and NEPA." The NRC relied
extensively on generic analyses, Philippine EISs submitted, and other
environmental review information compiled under Executive Order 12,114.2
Officials also stated that principles of national sovereignty constrained them
from insisting on visits to the local sites, such that it did not need to examine
site-specific impacts on the global commons." The Commission also pointed
to several specific efforts undertaken with the Philippines in order to carry
out the NEPA requirement that an agency "maximize international
cooperation" to prevent deterioration of the worldwide environment. 74
The court characterized the NEPA dispute as a legal question
between the plaintiffs claim that NEPA should apply to the foreign effects of
a domestic licensing decision, and the government's response that the
requirement of an EIS, to the fullest extent possible, was narrowly limited to
major federal actions taking place in, or having effects upon, the United
States itself.75 Judge Wilkey referred to the legitimate overlapping of the
regulatory jurisdiction of the United Sates and the Philippines, but remarked
that they were not the same.7 6 While noting that the nature of the program as
one of energy provision made the foreign political interest significant, the
court also said that the "common defense and security" and the "international
67. NORML, 452 F. Supp. 1226, 1234.
68. Id. at 1324.
69. Id. at 1235.
70. NRDC, Inc. v. NRC, 647 F.2d 1345 (1981).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1366.
74. Id. at 1353.
75. NRDC, 647 F.2d 1353, 1355. The opinion contains a parallel analysis of the government's
obligations under the NEPA.
76. Id. at 1356.
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reputation" of the United States were "on the line."" Also of significance
was the court's view that the rule against extraterritoriality, when interpreting
a statute, justified the NRC's refusal to extend the scope of the review to the
impact on American military personnel stationed in the Philippines. 8
Judge Wilkey of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled that
the Commission had acted properly by declining to consider the foreign
impact, and that its deference to the executive's analysis and foreign policy
judgment was "fully consistent" with congressional objectives.79  More
specifically, the court was not able to find that NEPA imposed a requirement
for an EIS where the impact fell exclusively within foreign jurisdictions., In
analyzing the language of the statute, the court felt that deference to the
Presidential authority in foreign relations dictated that NEPA's putative
extraterritorial reach be curbed with respect to nuclear exports.8' The court
concluded that NEPA's legislative history revealed nothing about
extraterritorial application, and that the line of precedent was distinguishable
from the case at hand, such that the holding was entirely consistent with the
NEPA jurisprudence to date. 82 Judge Wilkey did restrict the NEPA holding
to a finding that NEPA was inapplicable to NRC nuclear export licensing
decisions, but that did not necessarily mean that the EIS requirement was
inapplicable to some other types of major federal actions abroad. 3
In Greenpeace v. Stone," a coalition of environmental groups and
individuals contested the government's transportation of the chemical
weapons from West Germany to Johnston Atoll for ultimate destruction.
The United States District Court of Hawaii refused the requested preliminary
injunction. The court held that the Army's environmental impact statement
met its obligations under NEPA, and that any interference with the
stockpiles, which were already in transit, posed serious risks to both people
and the environment. 6 Furthermore the court ruled that the transportation of
the weapons within the Federal Republic of Germany did not fall within
NEPA's scope because the action was pursuant to a presidential agreement
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1364-65.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. NRDC, 647 F.2d 1353, 1364-65.
82. Id. at 1368.
83. Id. at 1366.
84. Greenpeace v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749 (D.C. Haw. 1990).
85. Id. at 755.
86. Id. at 754.
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between President Bush and Chancellor Kohl.8 Additionally, the court ruled
that the government's failure to consider the transoceanic shipment segment
of the project in the same comprehensive EIS as regarding the eventual
incineration did not constitute a NEPA violation.u
In the decision, Judge Ezra pointed to the unique nature of the
challenged federal action extending from the Federal Republic of Germany to
Johnston Atoll.89  The plaintiffs' standing was complicated by the
geographical nexus requirement of the Ninth Circuit, especially the
transoceanic portion of the program.9 Plaintiff Walter Paulo, a Hawaiian
native, stated that "he fished in the vicinity" of the Johnston Atoll and will
likely be affected by the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal
System(JACADS) project." 9' The court saw this fact as conferring upon
Paulo standing to challenge the weapons storage and destruction on the
Johnston Atoll, but that he was without standing to challenge the weapons
movement within Germany, or across international waters.9 Plaintiff
Greenpeace International claimed members within Germany, and in particular
those along the stockpile transport route, would likely satisfy the procedural
and geographical nexus test.93 But despite the group's claims of members
residing throughout the world, the court considered it "impossible [to]
conclusively presume" whether any members were geographically in the
vicinity or would potentially be affected since the actual shipment route had
not yet been determined.94
The court noted that despite the complexities in the analysis of
standing, in ruling on the motion, it could still rule on whether substantial
questions had been raised on the merits and whether the balance of hardships
favored granting relief.9' The first NEPA claim was that the Army's
segmentation of the project and failure to develop a comprehensive EIS
violated the Army's statutory duties.9 The Court opined that NEPA did not
87. Id. at 757-58. Plaintiffs disputed the existence of an actual agreement. The court, while
recognizing that no written agreement was actually executed between Bush and Kohl, still found
sufficient evidence to show that Secretary of State Baker did enter an actual agreement with
Chancellor Kohl on behalf of President Bush. Id.
88. Id. at 763.
89. Stone, 748 F. Supp 749, 756.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 756-57.
94. Id. at 757. Cf. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Ed. Project, 454 U.S. 139
(1981).
95. Greepeace v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749 (D.C. Haw. 1990).
96. Id. at 757.
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apply extra-territorially to the movement within Germany and shipment to the
Johnston Atoll. This conclusion was based largely on the political question
and foreign policy implications which would result from applying "a United
States statute to joint actions taken on foreign soil based on an agreement
made between the President and a foreign head of state. "' While it noted the
Executive Order 12,114 requirement that federal agencies consider
environmental impacts of actions undertaken outside sovereign United States
territory, the court pointed out that the assessment requirement only exists
when the "foreign nation [was] not participating with the United States and
[was] not otherwise involved in the action." 8 The court pointed out that the
plaintiffs' reliance on CEQ comments regarding application of NEPA abroad
was misplaced. Not only did they predate Order 12,114, but the CEQ
worked with the State Department in drafting the Order "in a way sensitive to
both environmental and foreign policy concerns.""
The court did not favorably consider the second NEPA claim that the
Army failed to adequately consider alternatives.100 The court found that the
Army's consideration of alternatives was sufficient, even though it recognized
that the facility on the Johnston Atoll was, at that time, the only incinerator of
its kind capable of destroying the weapons in question.'°' Also, the no-action
alternative and interim storage or disposal in the United States, mentioned in
the Supplementary Impact Statement(SEIS), were not real options in light of
the Presidential agreement and of a law passed by Congress which had
specifically prohibited the Army from shipping a similar stockpile from
Okinawa to the continental United States. '°2 The plaintiffs had pointed to
biodegradation or chemical treatment methods as feasible alternatives, but the
court found the Army's incorporation by reference of such methods sufficient
under NEPA. 03
97. Id. It is worth noting that the court emphasized the fact that this decision was limited to the
specific and unique facts presented by the case. The court felt that under different circumstances,
NEPA may require a federal agency to prepare an EIS for an action undertaken abroad, in particular
if the action would have direct environmental impacts within the United States, or when there has
been a total lack of environmental assessment by the agency or by the foreign country. Id. at 761.
98. Id. at 761.
99. Id. at 763.
100. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749, 764.
101. Id. at 764.
102. Id. Congress passed Public Law 91-672 to specifically prohibit the movement of the
Army's stockpile at Okinawa to the continental United States. In response the Army shipped those
chemical munitions to the Johnston Atoll without any Congressional interference. Thus while the law
is not a direct ban on such shipments, the Army raised the issue to highlight the similar political
problems which could arise from an attempt to bring the European stockpile to the continental United
States. Id. at 764 n.20.
103. Id. at 764.
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The third NEPA claim, that the Army violated NEPA by failing to
supplement the final SEIS in light of alleged new infonnation, was without
merit. The information presented apparently was not new, the argument was
simply a derivation of the alternatives claim.'"
Also, in 1990, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decided a case
which had major implications for plaintiffs suing under environmental
statutes.10 Defenders of Wildlife and other groups challenged a Department
of Interior regulation which provided that the Endangered Species Act did not
create a duty for federal agencies funding projects in foreign countries to
consult with the Secretary of Interior about the project's likely impacts on
endangered species. °'0 The court found the injury in fact requirement was met
on two grounds. First, that the rate of extinction of endangered species was
on the rise in countries visited by its members which were also the site of
specific agency products. Second, the Secretary's refusal to complete
(project review) statutory procedures constituted a violation.107 Judge Gibson
held that the organizations had standing to challenge the regulation, and that
the consultation requirement in the Endangered Species Act extended to all
agency action affecting endangered species, whether within the United States
or abroad."18
Though not a NEPA case, Defenders highlights the importance of the
judicial interpretation of a statute's legislative history. This case also stresses
the importance of a sufficient nexus between the government's activity and
the alleged injury to the plaintiff. One of the plaintiffs visited parts of Sri
Lanka which were sites of development projects funded by the Agency for
International Development (AID).1°9 Another plaintiff went to Egypt and
observed the Nile crocodile habitat which coincided with the huge Aswan
High Dam construction project. 10 Both plaintiffs noted their intent to return
to those areas, and the court found they had standing.", The court felt that
the Defenders members had provided specific facts and not merely use of
"unspecified portions of immense tracts of land upon which governmental
104. Id. at 765.
105. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (1990) (8"' Cir 1990)
106. Id. at 117-18.
107. Id. at 119.
108. Id. at 125. The court found that the statute defined endangered species without any
reference to geographic limitations. The court also noted a section entitled, "International
Cooperation" as evidencing a Congressional commitment to worldwide conservation efforts. NEPA
also has such a section. It emphasized that final authority with respect to statutory construction lies
with the judiciary, which must reject any agency interpretations which it finds contrary to clear
congressional intent. Id. at 123.
109. Id. at 120.
110. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117, 120.
111. Id.
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activity may or may not occur."112 Another plaintiff, however, did not have
standing relating to a construction project in Peru because he only came
within a few hundred miles of the area.' 3
In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey,' the plaintiff
environmental group sought to enjoin the National Science Foundation's
program of food related and domestic waste incineration in the Antarctic
because it had failed to prepare a proper environmental analysis in violation
of NEPA, the CEQ Regulations, and Executive Order 12,114."' The United
States District Court made a rather clear statement regarding the extra-
territorial application of NEPA by stating it could not "ferret out a clear
expression of Congress' intention that NEPA should apply beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States. "16 The court relied substantially
on a 1991 Supreme Court decision that Congressional legislation is meant to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, unless a
clear contrary intent is shown." In construing that case, the court ruled that
it had no choice but to decide that NEPA was inapplicable to the NSF
incineration program in Antarctica." 8 In applying Executive Order 12,114,
the court noted that, based on case law, executive orders without specific
foundation in congressional action are not judicially enforceable in private
civil suits." 9 As a note of caution, however, the court noted its concern with
the manner in which the defendant undertook the EIS, and remarked that if it
had subject matter jurisdiction under NEPA or Order 12,114, the result may
have been different.' 0
IV. NEPA APPLICATION TO INDIRECT UNITED STATES ACTION
ABROAD
The United States is involved in many activities in other countries by
nature of its membership in various international organizations. Sometimes
these efforts are in conjunction with certain programs of administrative
112. This was a reference to the failed challenge in Nat. Wildlife Fed. v. Lujan, 110 S.Ct.
3177, 3187-89 (1990).
113. Id.
114. Env. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 772 F. Supp. 1296 (D.C. 1991).
115. Id. at 1297.
116. Id. at 1297. This statement is difficult to reconcile with the passage quoted from the Laird,
case, 353 F. Supp. at 817-18.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1298.
119. Massey, 772 F. Supp. 1296, 1298. The court based this conclusion on the holdings in In re
Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 627 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1980) and Manhattan-Bronx Postal
Union v. Gronouski, 450 F.2d 451 (D.C. 1965), cert. denied 382 U.S. 978 (1966).
120. Massey, 772 F. Supp. 1296.
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agencies, raising the issue of the extent that NEPA obligations attach to such
joint or parallel activities. Also, many of the international organizations now
have their own requirements with respect to environmentally sound planning,
which are similar but not equivalent to NEPA's requirements. NEPA
section 4332(2)(f) expressly refers to international activities by calling on
agencies to recognize the worldwide and long-range character of
environmental problems and to support [appropriate] initiatives, resolutions,
and programs designed to maximize international cooperation in anticipating
and preventing a decline in the quality of [humankind's] world environment.
A. United States Bilateral Assistance
This is the primary type of United States government assistance to
foreign governments and institutions.'"' It consists of the transfer of financial
and/or technical assistance by governmental agencies, most of which is
coordinated by the AID, an independent organization within the State
Department. 2  After a series of AID projects caused unforeseen negative
environmental consequences in recipient nations,In the Agency improved its
environmental review procedures along the lines of the NEPA model. 2  Even
so, NEPA procedures need only be fully implemented if the AID action
affects the environment of the United States, the global commons, or areas
outside the jurisdiction of any nation.'25 In other words, projects having only
local effects will be subject to a different standard of review.
AID projects falling within this category are governed by Regulation
16, which differs from NEPA in three main respects. 26 First, the Initial
Environmental Examination (lEE), in contrast to NEPA's Environmental
Assessment (EA) procedure, only requires a brief discussion of foreseeable
environmental effects of the action.'27 A discussion of alternatives, including
the no-action alternative, is not required, nor is any participation by the
121. See David Young, The Application of Environmental Impact Statements to United States
Participation in Multinational Development Projects, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 309 (1992).
122. Id.
123. The Center for Development Information and Evaluation reviewed over 200 AID projects
between 1985 and 1986, and reported that 20 percent of the projects had unforeseen environmental
impacts, and of these, most were negative and were not adequately addressed. Siew Tuan Chew,
Environmental Assessments of Development Projects: A Preliminary Evaluation of AID's Experience,
AID EVALUATION OCCASIONAL PAPER 17 (1988).
124. Gary M. Emsdorff, The Agency for International Development and NEPA: A Duty
Unfidfilled, 67 WASH. L. REv. 133 (1992).
125. Id.
126. See Susan K. Selph, Potential Rami fications of Environmental Defense v. Massey
Illustrated by an Evaluation of United States Agency for International Development Environmental
Procedures, 17 WM. & MARY J. ENVTL. L. 123 (1993).
127. Id.
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public required in the IEE preparation process. 28 Second, the scope and
content of the IEE, which is to include "the direct and indirect effects of the
project on the environment," is much less detailed than the guidance provided
by the CEQ Regulations.' 29  Finally, the IEE is not circulated for public
comment; only the draft EIS receives public input. 30
B. Multilateral Development Banks
Imposing the relatively stringent requirements under NEPA to
projects undertaken by multilateral banks of which the United States is a
member is complicated by the differing national views with respect to the
environment. Three main factors account for this difficulty: 1) the absence
of a national mechanism suitable to the activities of the banks; 2) the inherent
infringement on the sovereignty of the recipient nation; and 3) the increased
complexity of international development projects.,', But in some situations
the centralized authority of institutions such as the World Bank may actually
facilitate the EIA procedure relative to the United States federal
bureaucracy. '"
In response to a series of environmental disasters resulting from some
of its projects, the World Bank initiated a new policy of environmentally
conscious development in May 1984. " When critics claimed that the policy
was ineffective and merely a public relations ploy, the Bank issued a directive
mandating an EIA for all projects which may have significant environmental
impacts.3 4  But under the Directive, the EIA requirement did not apply to
128 Id.
129. Id.
130. Susan K. Selph, Potential Ramifications of Environmental Defense v. Massey Illustrated by
an Evaluation of United States Agency for International Development Environmental Procedures, 17
WM. & MARY J. ENvTL. L. 123 (1993).
131. See Carole Klein-Chesivoir, Avoiding Environmental Injury: The Case for Widespread
Use of Environmental Impact Assessments in International Development Projects, 30 VA. J. INT'L L.
517 (1990).
132. Id. at 529-35.
133. Id. at 531. In the World Bank project cycle, the EIA process would function as follows.
During the identification phase, environmentally trained bank experts conduct a sectoral analysis in
cooperation with local experts. In the preparation phase, during which project objectives and
timetables are outlined, the identification of potential adverse environmental impacts continues.
These first two stages are the responsibility of the borrower. During the appraisal stage, the Bank
reviews technical, institutional, economic and financial aspects of the project. At this stage Bank
officials balance the short-term resource to use and long-term productivity, and identify any
irretrievable commitment of resources. This is meant to result in an environmentally sensitive cost-
benefit analysis of the project. Id. at 535-36.
134. World Bank Operational Directive on Environmental Impact Assessment. The Bank also
publishes an Environmental Assessment Sourcebook which compiles all of the Bank's environmental
policies and guidelines.
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projects which can be characterized as environmentally beneficial, leaving the
determination thereof to Bank officials. In part to address this issue, in 1989,
Congress passed the International Development and Finance Act, 35 which
prohibits American representatives of any international bank from voting for
any development project unless an EIA has been performed.16 This would
mean a statement following the guidelines set by the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP), and not NEPA.'37
C. The United Nations
The United States and other developed countries provide most of the
funding for the development assistance programs of the United Nations."'
The 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in
Stockholm led to the creation of the UNEP.'3 9 UNEP was developed to
create an action plan for the implementation of a set of environmental
principles signed by 113 nations, and also to coordinate future United Nations
activities concerning the environment.'14 UNEP encourages the development
and use of the environmental impact assessment mechanism for all of its
projects.''
The significance of the sustainable development issue is reflected in
the drafting of the United Nations Convention on the Environmental Impact
Assessment in a Transboundary Context.'12  The Convention calls for
countries to "[establish] an environmental impact assessment procedure that
permits public participation and preparation of the environmental impact
assessment documentation."' 4 3  The content requirements under the
Convention bear a strong resemblance to NEPA, and include a description of
the project and purpose, reasonable alternatives, the environment affected,
the estimation of the significance of impact, mitigation measures, and criteria
135. David Young, The Applicatiqn of Enviromental Impact Statements to United States
Participation in Multinational Development Projects, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 309 (1992).
136. Id. at 323; 22 C.F.R. § 161.7 (1996).
137. Id. at 323.
138. Id. at 314.
139. See THE EARTH SUMMIT: THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT (UNCED) 3-10 (Graham & Trotman 1992).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. U.N. Convention on the Environmental Assessment Impact in a Tansboundary Context,
Feb. 25, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 800 [hereinafter U.N. Convention on E.I.A.]. The Convention was
approved at a conference in Espoo (Finland) in 1991, but is not yet in force.
143. U.N. Convention on E.I.A., supra note 142, art. 2-2.
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guidelines.'" The appropriate authorities in "parties of origin"" should
provide this documentation to "affected parties" 1'" for comments within a
reasonable time before a final decision is to be made on a proposed activity. '14
Although the Convention is not yet in force, the fact that the EIA serves as
the subject of a United Nations sponsored international agreement is strong
evidence that the development of an EIA statement will eventually be
considered as a general principle of customary international law.'4 8
Consequently, such an obligation may someday be imputed to countries by
nature of developments in the international legal arena.
144. U.N. Convention on E.I.A, supra note 142, app. II, 30 I.L.M. at 814-15: These
following requirements are listed in Appendix II, Content of the Environmental Impact Assessment
Documentation, which reads:
Information to be included in the environmental impact assessment documentation
shall, at a minimum, contain, in accordance with Article 4:
(a) A description of the proposed activity and its purpose;
(b) A description, where appropriate, of reasonable alternatives (for example,
locational or technological) to the proposed activity and also the no-action alternative;
(c) A description of the environment likely to be significantly affected by the
proposed activity and its alternatives;
(d) A description of the potential environmental impact of the proposed activity and
its alternatives and an estimation of its significance;
(e) A description of mitigation measures to keep adverse environmental impact to a
minimum;
(f) An explicit indication of predictive methods and underlying assumptions as well
as the relevant environmental data used;
(g) An identification of gaps in knowledge and uncertainties encountered in
compiling the required information;
(h) Where appropriate, an outline for monitoring and management programmes and
any plans for post-project analysis; and
(i) A non-technical summary including a visual presentation as appropriate (maps,
graphs, etc.).
145. U.N. Convention on E.I.A., supra note 141, art. l(ii), 30 I.L.M. at 802. "Parties of
origin" are defined in the Convention as Contracting Parties (to the Convention) or "[p]arties to this
Convention under whose jurisdiction a proposed activity is envisaged to take place." Id. art. I(ii).
146. "Affected parties" are defined as Contracting Parties (to the Convention) or "[p]arties to
this Convention likely to be affected by the transboundary impact of a proposed activity." U.N.
Convention on E.I.A., supra note 142, art. 1(iii), 30 I.L.M. at 806.
147. U.N. Convention on E.I.A., supra note 142, art. 4, 30 I.L.M. at 806.
148. Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice defines an international
custom as "a general practice accepted as law." Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38
(1)(b). THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §102(2) (1987) states: "Customary
international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a
sense of legal obligation." Thus state practice is key in determining whether a particular custom rises
to the level of international customary law. The significance lies in the fact that neither federal
statutes nor executive orders can contradict a self-executing custom, since these become automatically
a part of the United States federal common law. Frederic L. Kirgis, Federal Statutes, Executive
Orders and Self-Executing Custom, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 371 (1987).
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V. ANALYSIS: MAPPING THE NEPA EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION TERRAIN
The panoply of United States case law, international organization
policies, and regional and international conventions presents a very
complex picture for analyzing the extraterritorial application of NEPA.
Because of disparities in approach, application, interpretation, and
enforcement of the various environmental planning policies mentioned in
this paper, there may still exist incentives to characterize a given activity
so as to bring it within the scope of a desired environmental regime. Some
of the nuances of this analysis are presented below.
A. The Potential for De-Internationalization
In the domestic context, the federal action element in a project may
take the form of a license requirement, funding restrictions, or some other
type of federal participation. 4 9 If only a minor part of a project falls within
federal control, the small handle doctrine states that only impacts stemming
from those minor parts are covered by NEPA. 1' ° Parties would sometimes
attempt to structure a project in order to defederalize it, partially or entirely.
The courts have not looked favorably on such attempts."' Even when an
action involves a nonfederal defendant, at least one court has upheld an
injunction against a private party, where prior approval of a federal agency
was a sine qua non of the initiation and continuance of a non-federal action. 2
149. The CEQ Regulations read, in relevant parts:
Major federal action includes actions with effects that may be major and which
are potentially subject to Federal control and responsibility. Major reinforces but does
not have a meaning independent of significantly (1508.27). Actions include the
circumstances where the responsible officials fail to act and that failure to act is
reviewable by courts or administrative tribunals under the Administrative Procedure
Act or other applicable law as agency action.
Actions include new and continuing activities, including projects and programs
entirely or partly financed, assisted, conducted, regulated, or approved by federal
agencies; new or revised agency rules, regulations, plans, policies, or procedures; and
legislative proposals (1506.8, 1508.17). Actions do not include funding assistance
solely in the form of general revenue sharing funds, distributed under the State and
Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, 31 U.S.C.A. § 1221 et seq., with no Federal
Agency control over the subsequent use of such funds. Actions do not include
bringing judicial or administrative civil or criminal enforcement actions.
40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (1996).
150. See, e.g., Macht v. Skinner, 916 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
151. See San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Tex. Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied 406 U.S. 933 (1972); Scottsdale Mall v. Ind., 549 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied 434 U.S. 1008 (1978).
152. Found. on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 155 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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There is no case law regarding attempts to segment an international
project involving federal agency participation. But certain activities, for
example international construction projects, are potential candidates for
segmentation. If a United States court followed the reasoning in the domestic
defederalization cases, conflicts could arise from any attempts to apply NEPA
to activities in which the United States is not the only participant.
B. Substitutability of Foreign and Multinational Assessments to Meet
NEPA Requirements
A related issue in the bilateral project situation is the extent to which
EIAs or EISs developed by a foreign government or agency may be
substituted for the United States agency's EIAs or EISs. United States courts
have already touched upon this issue in two cases. In NRDC v. NRC, 5 the
District Court for the District of Columbia noted that the federal agency had
cooperated on several specific programs in order to comply with the NEPA
section 102(2)(f)'s requirement that agencies "maximize international
cooperation" to prevent deterioration of the worldwide environment."4  The
government of the Philippines filed an amicus brief to assure the court that it
had "responsibly undertaken to assess and protect the Philippines
environment from the risks associated with the import of the nuclear
reactor."' 5 The brief stated that NRC consideration of impacts in the
Philippines would improperly "substitut[e] United States regulatory standards
for the Republic's own," and that refusal of the license on the grounds raised
by petitioners would constitute an unwarranted intrusion into its internal
affairs.1 6  In Greenpeace v. Stone,"' the District Court acknowledged the
decision of a German court addressing a challenge to the transport of
chemical weapons within the Federal Republic. 8 The Administrative Court
of Cologne analyzed that claim under two statutes specifically covering
chemical weapons transport on German territory. 9 In reviewing the opinion,
153. NRDC v. NRC, 647 F.2d 1345 (1981).
154. Id. at 1354.
155. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Republic of the Philippines, at 23, NRDC v. NRC, 647 F.2d
1345 (1981).
156. Id.
157. Greepeace v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749 (D.C. Haw. 1990).
158. Eric Neumayer v. die BRD, VG Koeln, 4 Kammer, 4 L 1098/90.
159. The rail transport segment of the project was covered by the Verordnung ueber die
innerstaatliche und grenzueberschreitende Befoerderung gefaehrlicher Gueter mit Eisenbahnen
(GGVE) [Regulation concerning the domestic and cross-border movement of dangerous items by
train], v. 1985 (BGBI. I s. 1560). The road transport segment was covered by the Verordnung ueber
die innerstaatliche und grenzueberschreitende Befoerderung gefaehrlicher Gueter auf Strassen
(GGVS), v. 1985 (BGBI. I s. 1550).
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Judge Ezra noted that the request for injunctive relief was denied by the
German court, which found the transport operation consistent with the
applicable West German law.'"0 He remarked that to impose NEPA's
requirements to that operation would "encroach upon the jurisdiction of the
[Federal Republic of Germany] to implement a political decision which
necessarily involved a delicate balancing of risks to the environment and the
public and the ultimate goal of expeditiously ridding West Germany of
obsolete unitary chemical munititions."161
It would seem that when an American court is faced with such a
scenario, four alternatives exist. The first, when available, would be to find a
sufficient ground for applying NEPA which addresses the foreign policy
sensitivity problem (e.g. argue that the potential effects on American service
persons in the Philippines and Germany require application). 62 The second
would be for a court to review, or to order an agency to review, the affected
nation's environmental planning procedures and determine whether they are
sufficient to satisfy NEPA's requirements. This might at least reduce any
negative foreign policy reverberations compared to the outright preemption
alternative. It would, however, place a possibly greater administrative
burden on the agency (or court) than would ordering the routine NEPA, EIA,
or EIS. The third alternative is for the agency to work with the local officials
and thereby ensure that NEPA-type standards for statements were met. Some
commentators argue that this approach would have positive foreign policy
consequences and would enhance the local environmental regime. 163
Detractors argue just the opposite. Such cooperation would be viewed as
paternalistic meddling and also point to the increased costs which this
approach would entail.'," Finally, the court could simply defer to the foreign
EIA or EIS and follow a presumption of sufficiency approach. A sliding-scale
evaluation here would run the risk of insulting foreign nations perceived as
maintaining inadequate environmental policies, while complete deference
160. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749, 760 (1990).
161. Id.
162. Interestingly enough, this was argued in the Philippines case, but the court stated that "the
rule against extraterritoriality [of a statute] is applied here to justify the Commission's refusal to
assimilate the American public in America to American armed forces in the Philippines [or in the
many other places around the globe where the United States has military personnel]." NRDC v.
NRC, 647 F.2d 1345, 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1980). This rationale is somewhat curious in light of the
holding in the Defenders case.
163. See M. Diane Barber, Bridging the Environmental Gap: The Application of NEPA to the
Mexico-United States Bilateral Trade Agreement, 5 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 429 (1992).
164. Scott C. Whitney, Should the National Environmental Policy Act Be Extended to Major
Federal Decisions Significantly Affecting the Environment of Foreign States and the Global
Commons?, 1 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 431 (1990).
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could increase the risk of some of the problems, including disasters, which
the statement is meant to aid in avoiding.
C. The Blurring of NEPA
At first glance, it appears that Executive Order 12,114 aims to
occupy the field with respect to the extraterritorial application of NEPA. The
wording of many of the provisions of the Order are troublesome when
applied to actual agency actions abroad. In relation to the actions included
under the order, it is difficult to imagine a situation where a foreign nation's
cooperation or communication with a United States agency would be so
minimal as to qualify it as "not participating" or "not otherwise involved.""'
The discretion left to the agency in determining actions not having a
significant effect on the foreign environment raises questions about what it
must do to backup such a determination. The apparently liberal
substitutability of documents in sections 2-4 raises the possibility of deviation
from the NEPA/CEQ requirements. The lead agency mechanism,
authorization of agency modification regarding contents and timing of the
statement, and the exclusion of "social, economic and other environments"
from consideration all raise the issue of whether this can be done legitimately
by executive order.'" Since the scope of the Order represents the
government's "exclusive and complete determination of the procedural and
other actions" of agencies,167 and does not create a cause of action,' it must
be read to the extent it is consistent with NEPA, whose policy goals it is
meant to further.
So far courts have not viewed the Order as preempting application of
NEPA to all federal agency actions outside of the United States.' 69 In the
Greenpeace case, the court relied on the NEPA statute itself, and gave little
attention to the Order in the holding or in dicta.76 Some commentators
attribute this to the lack of a statutory basis for the Order, and the lack of a
framework upon which courts could rely."'
Other developments have led to the decreased likelihood that NEPA
will be applied equally, or even at all, in the international sphere. These
include express exemptions from NEPA coverage and the primacy of foreign
165. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12, 114, supra note 16.
166. Order 12,114 perhaps anticipated these issues by its limiting applicability of its provisions
as "permitted by law." Id.
167. Id. at 3269.
168. Id.
169. See M. Diane Barber, (citing Greenpeace v. Stone case).
170. Id.
171. Id.
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policy considerations in the administrative agency scheme. On both the
multinational institution and agency level, commentators warn of the inherent
project biases which exist once action on a proposal is taken which may
prevent any post facto evaluation. This is particularly problematic given the
traditional grand scale on which many of the development projects have been
undertaken.
D. Judicial Balancing of Competing Objectives
Post-Executive Order 12,114 courts have tended to rely on a
balancing of NEPA's goals with the particular foreign policy concerns arising
from the federal action at hand. 7 2 In particular, when a NEPA plaintiff seeks
an injunction, even courts acknowledging environmental concerns may be
forced by equity considerations to favor foreign policy implications. The
court in Wisconsin v. Weinbergert7" held:
NEPA cannot be construed to elevate automatically its
procedural requirements above all national considerations.
Although there is no national defense exception to NEPA.
. . the national well-being and security as determined by
the Congress and the President demand consideration
before an injunction should issue for a NEPA violation.
Accordingly, courts have undertaken an evaluation of
competing public interests in molding permanent injunctive
relief for NEPA violators. A court should tailor its relief
to fit each particular case, balancing the environmental
concerns of NEPA against the larger interests of society
that might be adversely affected by an overbroad
injunction. '7
Some commentators argue that the global nature of environmental
problems necessitate resolution by diplomatic means.'" They argue that
extraterritorial application of NEPA would be an attempt to supplant existing
international law mechanisms, some of which, such as improved multilateral,
development bank environmental policies, stem from successful persuasion,
and not unilateral demand.'7 6  There may still be a role for NEPA
internationally, since the agreements reached by consensus are often vague
172. Id.
173. Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1984).
174. Id.
175. Whitney, supra note 164.
176. Id.
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and indefinite.'" Such agreements often take years to reach, and proponents
of extraterritorial application point to NEPA as a ready solution."8
VI. CONCLUSION
Most industrialized nations already have policies similar to those
entailed in NEPA. Thus, it is mainly in the industrialized/donor country-
undeveloped/recipient country scenario that the issue of disparate
environmental regimes arises. Developing nations are faced with a bit of a
conundrum in formulating their development programs. Essentially, only
three strategies are available to these countries with respect to compliance
with environmental protocols, whether they stem from application of NEPA
or some obligation under domestic or international law. These options are to
simply ignore any environmental obligations, to borrow in order to afford the
added costs of compliance with a regime such as NEPA, or to finance
compliance through internal growth. Since environmental standards will have
a direct impact on the goods and jobs which would stem from a development
project, as well as the level of foreign exchange required, relatively weak
environmental regimes may foster robust economic growth."' Case law
shows that application of NEPA does not necessarily mean that more
stringent environmental guidelines become part of the planning process.
The extraterritorial application of NEPA is still unclear. Case law
gives more guidance with respect to issues of standing than it does to NEPA's
reach. Executive Order 12,114 did not adequately clarify the situation and
raised certain constitutional issues which must be worked out. An outright
amendment to NEPA would achieve a definite answer, but in recent years
such efforts have been unsuccessful. Consequently, the evolution of NEPA's
extraterritorial reach will probably take the form of continued Congressional
tinkering with the CEQ requirements. The EIA Convention signifies that at
some point, both the utilization of the EIA mechanism and standards thereof
will become a general principle of customary international law, hence binding
on all nations. Until that time, however, the courts must perform complex
analysis of the competing factors outlined in this paper. This will most likely
mean continued deference to the foreign policy views of the State Department
and of the Executive Branch over the environmental concerns addressed in
NEPA.
177. Stanley W. Spracker & Ethan S. Naftalin, Applying Procedural Requirements of U.S.
Environmental Laws to Foreign Ventures: A Growing Challenge to Business, 25 INT'L L. 1043
(1991).
178. Id.
179. Extraterritorial Environmental Regulation, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1609 (1991).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Slovak Republic is a microcosm of the political and economic
transformations occurring in Central and Eastern Europe following the
1989 collapse of the Soviet Union.' Although the change of political
systems in the region occurred quite rapidly, it is clear that democratic
states are not born overnight. Slovakia's tribulations underscore the stark
choices that confront states of the former Soviet Block: whether to head
down the difficult route of building a capitalist democracy or return to
Soviet-style principles of a command economy and central political
control. As the former communist countries evolve socially, politically,
economically and legally, these challenges are coupled with international
scrutiny of each state's domestic affairs. The prospect of accession into
the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) has forced former Soviet states to forego sovereign prerogatives
and make way for increasing international influences and directives.
Torn between adopting western norms and adhering to familiar
comforts of the past, the Slovak government has been much more reluctant
than its Czech counterpart to adopt a system of pragmatic capitalism and to
decentralize state administration.' The ruling coalition government, headed
by Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, has sent conflicting signals to Western
officials regarding the state's aspirations to intergrate into the EU and
NATO. The government's general commitment to democratic values has
also been questioned.
The presence of a substantial Hungarian minority in Slovakia
serves as a present day reminder of historical territorial disputes between
1. The names Slovak Republic and Slovakia are used interchangeably throughout this
document and refer to the same entity.
2. References to the Slovak government are to the ruling governmental coalition, not the
president. The government is comprised of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, a populist
party headed by Prime Minister Meciar, the Slovak National Party, a nationalist party, and the
Association for Slovak Workers, a party largely representing communist adherents. The Slovak
President is Mr. Michal Kovac. See also SLOVAK. CONST., ch. 2, pt. VI, art. 108.
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the republics of Slovakia and Hungary.' The Treaty of Trianon, which left
a substantial number of ethnic Hungarians on the Czecho-Slovak side of
the Danube River, is debated within the political arena as if it were written
in 1990, not 1920. Misrepresentation of history and the impoverishment
of political life have resulted in a civil society where ethnic politics are at
the forefront of the national consciousness. The Slovak government has
effectively defined Slovak national culture predominantly along ethnic
lines. Doctrinal and policy debates have incorporated powerful nationalist
interests and, as a result, such concerns are reflected in government policy.
One of the three parties comprising the government coalition is manifestly
nationalistic and it has had a disproportionate influence on government
policy since the legislative elections in the fall of 1994. This nationalist
force is a source of many measures aimed directly at reinforcing the
Slovak nation in Slovakia, often to the detriment of ethnic minorities.
It is premature to characterize the current legal position of the
Hungarian minority as an emergency. Yet, given Slovakia's unproven
economy and unstable political scene, the potential for the eruption of
ethnic tensions between the Slovak majority and the Hungarian minority is
clear., In the three years since the birth of the Slovak Republic, policies
and practices unbecoming of a democratic and ambitious Central European
state have surfaced. The legislative measures analyzed in this document
have aroused strong emotions and constitute a potential cause for conflict
among Slovak and Hungarian citizens, as well as between the Slovak
Republic and the Republic of Hungary. Ethnic Hungarians perceive their
language and culture as being under attack by the Slovak government.
Surveys reveal that a significant number of Slovak citizens fear the
3. For simplicity, the terms ethnic Hungarians and Hungarian minority are used
interchangeably to refer to Slovak citizens of Hungarian origin. Where the term Hungarians
refers to Hungarian citizens living in Hungary, this will be made clear in the text. The issues
presented in this report are of equal importance to the numerous other minorities within the
Slovak Republic, as the principles involved are general and universal. The emphasis,
nevertheless, is on the Hungarian minority. This focus is in accordance with the current political
climate where the issue of minority rights is equivalent to the question of rights for ethnic
Hungarians. All other minorities are either well off or poorly organized and geographically
dispersed. An example of the first is the Ukrainian minority. An example of the second is the
Roma minority.
4. Surveys used for this report are the following: RASIZMUS, XENOPHOBIA,
ANTISEMITISMUS, A INTOLERENCIA VEDOMI OBYVATELOW SLOVENSKJ REPUBLIKY [RACISM,
XENOPHOBIA, ANTI-SEMITISM, AND INTOLERANCE IN THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC], Statisticky urad
Slovenskej Republiky, Bratislava (Mar. 1995)[hereinafter RASIZMUS, XENOPHOBIA, etc.];
AUGUSTIN MAROK ET AT., SLOVAK-MAGYAR RELATIONS (1995); Sandor Marai Foundation &
the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, Selected Issues Viewed by Slovaks and Hungarians
Living in Ethnically Mixed Regions of Southern Slovakia, Bratislava (July 1994); PETER HUNCIK,
ET AL., COUNTERPROOF (1994); PAVOL FRIC ET AL., THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY IN
SLOVAKIA (1993).
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outbreak of violence similar to that experienced in the former Yugoslavia.
Ethnic tensions have dramatically heightened since 1993, with incidents of
intimidation, verbal threats, and harassment of ethnic Hungarians
increasing in frequency.
The purpose of this study is to assess whether the Slovak
government is creating or aggravating a climate that is inimical to the
Hungarian minority. This atmosphere may actually be conducive to an
ethnic conflict or refugee situation. For this report, international
agreements and standards are used to evaluate the situation. No lower
standard than those set by the international community should be accepted
in the Slovak Republic.
II. THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY IN THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC
The historical presence of Hungarians in what is now recognized
as the Slovak sovereign state has strongly influenced present relations
between the Slovak majority and the ethnic Hungarian minority. The
social status of Hungarians in Slovakia's southern region has drastically
shifted with the relocation of Hungary's northern border. Tracing the
Hungarian presence over the years reveals that Hungarians formed part of
the Hungarian Empire until 1918; constituted an ethnic minority in
Czechoslovakia through the 1920s and 1930s; and comprised part of a
majority group during the Hungarian occupation of southern Slovakia
between 1938-1945. After World War II, Hungarians were either forced
from the territory of Czechoslovakia or remained within the state and
experienced severe discrimination for their affiliation with a foreign power
during the war years. Historical factors that led to ethnic and geographic
borders that do not correlate continue to serve as the impetus for conflict
between ethnic Slovaks and Hungarians living in Slovakia. Mr. Gyozo
Bauer, President of the Hungarian cultural organization, CSEMADOK,
added:
[m]y father never moved from Samorin [a predominantly
Hungarian town located in the south-west of Slovakia], but
he lived in five countries due to border changes. No one
asked him in his whole life which country he wanted to
live in. No one has asked us to this day. It is not my
decision and I have no power to change it. I do not wish
to change it. All we want is the power to keep our
community and our culture alive.,
5. Interview with Mr. Gyozo Bauer, President of the Hungarian cultural organization,
CSEMADOK, in Samorin, Slovakia (July 16, 1996).
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The historical volatility in the region has greatly contributed to shaping
domestic legislative decisions and foreign policy choices of the government
coalition ruling Slovakia today.
A. The History of Hungarians in the Slovak Republic
A brief historical discussion of the region is necessary in order to
understand present day ethnic relations in Slovakia. Hungarians, who call
themselves Magyars, arrived in Central Europe in the ninth century as one
of many tribes from Asia, and they settled on the plains of Central and
Eastern Europe.6  The Hungarians adopted Catholicism around the
beginning of the twelfth century and founded a kingdom with frontiers that
were to remain largely unmodified until 1918. The Hungarian Kingdom
encompassed what is now recognized as Slovakia, which was then referred
to as Upper Hungary. Slovaks, who had arrived in the region in the fourth
and fifth centuries A.D., were subjects of the Hungarian Kingdom for
centuries who were ruled by a predominantly Hungarian nobility. When
the Ottoman Empire included large parts of Hungary, the Hungarian
capital was moved to Bratislava, then called Pozsony, and ethnically
dominated by Hungarians., By the end of the nineteenth century, Slovaks
were essentially an illiterate and impoverished people. Ethnic Slovaks
were underrepresented in government and plagued by Magyarization, the
Hungarian government's plan to force the assimilation of ethnic Slovaks
into Hungarian society. Economic life was dominated by ethnic Germans
and Jews while political life was dominated by Hungarians.
During the twentieth century, Slovakia's southern region was
governed by numerous sovereigns, including the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, the independent Czechoslovak state, the Socialist Republic of
Czechoslovakia, and the independent Slovak state. On October 28, 1918,
the first Czechoslovak Republic was established. The Treaty of Trianon
on June 4, 1920, designated the southern border of Czechoslovakia.
Strategic and economic considerations led to a border set partly to coincide
with the Danube River, creating a significant Hungarian minority within
the new state.9 In 1938, the Vienna Arbitration Accords again attributed
the southern part of Slovakia to Hungary. In 1939, Slovak leaders
proclaimed an independent Slovak state. During World War II, Slovakia
was under fascist rule, resulting in the Slovak National Uprising against
6. MAROK ET AL., supra note 4, at 5.
7. Id. at 6.
8. In 1914, 27% of Slovaks were illiterate compared with three percent of Czechs. See
ANDRt & JEAN SELLIER, ATLAS DES PEUPLES DE LEUROPE CENTRALE (1993).
9. This border was not officially recognized by Hungary until the bilateral friendship
treaty between Hungary and Slovakia was ratified in 1996.
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Nazi forces in August 1944. After World War II, Czechoslovakia was
recreated in the shape of the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia (CSSR)
to include the Hungarian dominated territory, again partly delineated by
the Danube. Following the Prague Spring uprising against the communist
regime in 1968, Hungarian troops were among the Soviet forces that
entered the CSSR to suppress the rebellion. Some ethnic Hungarian
inhabitants welcomed the Hungarian troops as liberators.
In 1990, the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic (CSFR) were
formed to the displeasure of Slovak nationalists who hoped for the creation
of an independent Slovak state. In 1992, Slovak nationalists won the
parliamentary elections and voted to secede from the CSFR. They formed
the Slovak Republic now in existence. Resistance to secession existed
primarily in the Czech Republic and among ethnic Hungarians in the
Slovak Republic.' 0 The current Slovak Republic is still delineated in part
by the Danube, thus including in some regions a population of more than
eighty percent Hungarians. In these regions, Slovaks constitute an ethnic
minority. Since the Velvet Divorce, as the separation of the Slovak and
Czech Republics has been coined, tensions between ethnic Hungarians and
Slovaks have steadily increased in intensity. Mr. Ondrej Dostal, an expert
on minority rights in Slovakia, noted that:
[d]ue to the split with the Czech Republic and thanks to the
cultivated way of division, the Slovak nationalists have lost
their main enemy, which until then used to be Prague.
The nationalist part of the Slovak political scene has then
logically opted for the Hungarian minority and its political
representatives as its new target of confrontation policy
making. . . . Slovakia has entered its first year of
existence with the burden of an unsolved relationship -
[the] relationship with its largest minority."
10. According to one survey, 81% of ethnic Hungarians opined that they would have voted
against separation if a referendum had been held before the division of the CSFR. See FRIC ET
AL., supra note 4, at 77.
11. DOSTAL, OD KONFRONTACIE K REZERVOVANOSTI, QUO VADIS SLOVENSKO 107
(1995).
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B. Recent Developments Concerning the Situation of Ethnic
Hungarians in Slovakia
In the days of socialist rule, Slovaks and Hungarians coexisted
successfully on Slovak territory.' 2 The fall of the communist regime in
Slovakia, however, sounded the reveille for historic inter-ethnic prejudices.
In light of possible EU and NATO integration, the Slovak government
must develop lasting cooperation with its neighbors as part of the European
Stability Pact. Nationalist politics, however, continue to strain bilateral
relations between the republics of Hungary and Slovakia, thereby
jeopardizing the possibility of western amalgamation.
1. Relations Between Ethnic Slovaks and Hungarians in Slovakia
Hungarians in Slovakia number approximately 600,000,
constituting 11.5% of the population." Hungarians comprise the ethnic
majority in 437 towns and, in another eighty-five communities, they
comprise ten to fifty percent of the population."1 These 522 settlements
form a compact area running along the southern border of the Slovak
Republic, where ninety-eight percent of the Hungarian population in
Slovakia live.' In this area, an average of seventy percent of the local
population is Hungarian.' 6
Surveys show that Hungarians in Slovakia are universally
perceived as a distinct group with a common language, culture, values, and
political interests.' 7 Hungarian political parties generally gather nearly one
hundred percent of the votes of ethnic Hungarians. In issues where ethnic
Hungarians' interests are at stake, the Hungarian vote is practically
unanimous. Over eighty percent of ethnic Hungarians believe that there
should be bilingual road signs. Ninety percent think that both the
Hungarian and Slovak languages should be used in administration. Sixty
percent are in favor of some kind of cultural autonomy. Among Slovaks,
on the other hand, the majority is generally against these proposals.
Sympathy among Slovaks for Hungarian claims is greater in southern
Slovakia (in the ethnically commingled areas) than in northern Slovakia.
Alternative schools, those including instruction in both the Slovak and
12. One survey indicates that this period was the one with the best relations between
Slovaks and Hungarians. Approximately 40% of Slovaks and 20% of Hungarians expressed this
opinion. See PETER HUNCIK ET AL., COUNTERPROOF (1994).
13. Statement Issued on the Occasion of the Hungarian Convention in Komarno (Jan. 4,
1994). These figures are based on the 1991 Slovak census.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See generally supra note 4.
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Hungarian languages, are considered useless by fifty percent of the
Hungarians but useful by sixty percent of Slovaks. Openness for a
neighbor of the opposite ethnicity is also greater in the south than in the
north. Two percent of Hungarians and fifteen percent of Slovaks are
opposed to this prospect.18 While in the north, twenty-six percent of
Slovaks would dislike having a Hungarian neighbor.' 9
The forecast for future relations varies. According to one survey,
more than sixty percent of the population opine that Hungarians and
Slovaks will continue to coexist well in Slovakia. According to another
study, however, more than forty percent of either nationality think
relations may short-circuit into violence similar to that in the former
Yugoslavian territory." Even among those who believe that relations
between the two ethnic groups are presently good, more than thirty percent
expressed such fears. 2 According to a government survey, fifty percent of
respondents perceived Hungarians as the greatest threat to the Slovak
Republic.Y Some of the reasons stated for this perception were that the
Hungarian nature comprises the traits of "desire to rule," "eternal
restlessness," "inability to live in peace with other nations," "do not
respect Slovakia," "hate Slovakia," and "want more rights than Slovaks." 23
Ethnic Hungarians were accused of wanting "a greater Hungary" and of
threatening "[Slovak] sovereignty and territory."2' Others stated that "they
want to Magyarize Slovaks," "they want to break away," "they have
territorial ambitions," "they provoke unrest," "they are ruining good
relations," "they don't recognize tolerance," and "I don't trust them."25
The Slovak government continues to harbor suspicions of
Hungarian territorial claims to Slovakia's southern region. "They would
like to have [the territory of southern Slovakia] back, that's for sure,"
asserted Mr. Juraj Zervan, Director of the Department of National
Minorities at the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "It is the official
policy of Hungary to support [ethnic Hungarian] autonomy in neighboring
countries, and to then have these areas hold a referendum on succession to
Hungary to complete reunification to the motherland. It definitely
18. FRIC ET AL., supra note 4, at 73.
19. Id.
20. HUNCIK ET AL., supra note 4.
21. Id.
22. RASIZMUS, XENOPHIOBIA, etc., supra note 4.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
Haight
[constitutes] a destabilizing factor in Europe. "2 The fear of Hungarian
territorial aggression is deeply imbedded in Slovak consciousness and the
Slovak government has successfully perpetuated this fear among its
citizenry.2 7 According to a 1994 survey, forty-two percent of citizens of
Slovak nationality suspect that the "hidden goal of members of the
Hungarian minority is a change of borders and annexation of southern
areas of Slovakia to Hungary."s In a July 1996 poll, thirty percent of
Slovaks agreed with the assertion that the Hungarian minority supports the
reunification of Slovakia's southern region with Hungary, while sixty-three
percent of Hungarians disagreed with this statement. 29 This survey reflects
the feeling among Slovaks that ethnic Hungarians are not loyal to the
Slovak state. This is a difficult accusation to disprove. "I live according
to the Slovak Constitution. I work here and pay my taxes. I do nothing
against the Slovak government. So, what is the problem? That I speak
Hungarian? The question of loyalty isn't proven because I don't cry at the
Slovak national anthem," asserts Mr. Gyozo Bauer, President of the
Hungarian cultural organization, CSEMADOK.30  Mr. Bela Bugar,
Chairman of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Party (MKDH), echoed
this sentiment. He asserted that the Slovak government "does not say love
your country, but love your state. For me, this is ridiculous. I can love a
country but I cannot love a state.""
Despite this antagonistic and distrustful atmosphere, violent
outbreaks between ethnic Hungarians and Slovaks have been minimal. The
most notable incident occurred on May 5, 1996, when a hand grenade
exploded outside of the home of Mr. Bugar, a leading member of the
26. Interview with Mr. Juraj Zervan, Director of the Department of National Minorities
Division, Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Bratislava, Slovakia (July 11, 1996).
27. It should be noted, however, that Hungarian calls for autonomy in the southern region
of Slovakia have resulted in increased skepticism among the Slovak public. The Hungarian
political party, Coexistence, has been the most vocal proponent of territorial autonomy. Perhaps
as a result, Coexistence Chairman, Miklos Duray, was found to be the most unpopular politician
in Slovakia by a January 1996 poll, gathering sixty-four percent of the most negative responses.
See Sharon Fisher, 13 OMRI DAILY DIG. II, (Jan. 18, 1996) (visited Oct. 27, 1997)
< http://www.omri. CZ/ publications/DD/index.Dhtml >.
28. FOCUS AGENCY, ACTUAL PROBLEMS OF SLOVAKIA: REPORT FROM SOCIOLOGICAL
RESEARCH (Dec. 1994).
29. Dana Soucova, V Obciach Juzneho Slovenska Wadnu Dobre Vzt'ahy, Avsak Tretina
Obyvatel'ov sa Obava Konfliktu [Citizens in Southern Slovakia Perceive a Good Relationship,
However One-Third of Inhabitants Fear a Conflict]; See generally NARODNA OBRODA, July 17,
1996, at 5.
30. Interview with Mr. Gyozo Bauer, President of CSEMADOK, in Samorin, Slovakia
(July 16, 1996).
31. Interview with Mr. Bela Bugar, Chairman of MKDH, in Bratislava, Slovakia (Aug. 1,
1996).
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ethnic Hungarian opposition to the Slovak government. Responsibility for
the bombing has yet to be determined. 32 A previous violent attack occurred
in May 1995 after a soccer match in northern Slovakia. Several ethnic
Hungarians were thrown from a train while traveling home after the
match. 33  Intimidation, threats, and harassment of members of the
Hungarian minority are common. Many ethnic Hungarians are afraid to
speak Hungarian in public when visiting northern areas of Slovakia for fear
of reprisal. At the Hungarian-language high school in the capital city of
Bratislava, attending students complain that they are frequently harassed on
the street when speaking Hungarian. As one student noted:
Once my classmates and I were walking down Obchodna
Ulica [Shop Street] and we were all speaking Hungarian.
Four boys approached us and one of them slapped my
classmate and told her to stop speaking Hungarian. I was
very frightened. I have heard so many stories from
[Hungarian] friends who have been pushed or punched in
public because they were speaking Hungarian.
Sometimes when I walk to school from the bus station with
a friend, people will shout 'Na Slovensku, po Slovensky!
[In Slovakia, in Slovak!]' at us."
Other common nationalist slogans include "Mad'ari za Dunaj! [Hungarians
to the Other Side of the Danube River!]" and "Jete Slovensky Chlieb!
[You Eat Slovak Bread!]," which implies that if one reaps the benefits
from residing in Slovakia, such as consuming its agricultural goods, one
should not complain about conditions within the state. Dislike of the
Hungarian minority is generally higher among Slovak citizens living in the
northern region of Slovakia where contact with members of the minority
group is minimal.3 Relations between Slovaks and Hungarians in the
ethnically commingled areas of southern Slovakia are reportedly less
antagonistic. One ethnic Hungarian observed:
In Samorin [a small town approximately twenty kilometers
from Bratislava], where approximately thirty percent of the
population is Slovak and seventy percent of the population
is Hungarian, there are no problems or conflicts between
us. The conflicts are mainly political. Political rhetoric
32. See generally NARODONA OBRODA, May 6, 1996.
33. UNITED STATES DEPT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 13 (1995).
34. Interview with an ethnic Hungarian student, in Bratislava, Slovakia (July 12, 1996).
35. See generally HUNCIK ET AL., supra note 4; PAVOL FRIC ET AL., supra note 4, at 76-
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causes people who do not know any ethnic Hungarians to
believe what government officials say about us - that we
all want to return to Hungary and that we hate Slovaks.
These accusations are not true. In Slovakia, like
everywhere, there are extremists on both sides. Luckily
this is only a small percentage.36
In the years following the split of the Czech and Slovak Republics,
nationalist forces have played an increasing role in Slovak politics. In the
fall 1994 elections, seven parties or coalitions of parties won seats, but no
party or coalition gained a clear majority. This forced the movement for a
Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), a populist party headed by Prime Minister
Meciar, to form a coalition government with the Slovak National Party
(SNS), a nationalist party. As a result, government policy has been
heavily influenced by the SNS over the past two years." Nationalist views
have been conducive or even instrumental in formulating most of the
government measures passed by the National Council of the Slovak
Republic (Slovak Parliament) in recent months, which seek to assimilate
the Hungarian minority. Nationalist political forces have constructed a
watershed between ethnic Hungarian parties and ethnic Slovak parties so
that the most important political issue has become ethnicity, rather than
concrete issues.,8 Extreme solutions to the problems confronting ethnic
Hungarians have been suggested, such as: Hungarians should leave
Slovakia, they should assimilate into the Slovak nation, or Slovaks in
southern Slovakia should assimilate with Hungarians. All of these
proposals fail to get widespread support, as more than sixty percent of
either nationality opposes them.3 9 As one ethnic Hungarian commented:
36. Interview with an ethnic Hungarian resident, in Samorin, Slovakia (June 28, 1996).
37. SNS stated on January 4, 1996, that it would like to intensify international
cooperation, and that its first step in this direction would be to prepare a meeting with the
chairman of the neo-Nazi Austrian Freedom Party, Jorg Haider. Pending items on the
legislative agenda of the SNS include the passage of a local election law based on the
"proportional principal according to nationality" and the reevaluation of constitutional Articles 15
(which prohibits the death penalty) and 34 (which articulates the rights of ethnic minorities).
Sharon Fisher, Slovak Coalition Party to Initiate Constitutional Changes, 141 OMRI DAILY DIG.
II (July 23, 1996)(last visited Oct. 28, 1997) <http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index
.Dhtml >.
38. An example of how the fear of Hungarian expansion can be used as an argument
against all kinds of international cooperation is the Carpathian Euroregion project of 1994. A
number of regions in northern Slovakia wanted to cooperate with similar regions in other
countries to the north of Slovakia. This was rejected by the government as a step toward a
Hungarian takeover of the southern regions. By rejecting this project, the government prevented
decentralization.
39. See generally supra note 4, for a list of surveys, which support this position.
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[Prime Minister] Meciar often says: 'Those who do not
like it here in Slovakia should leave.' Nobody can tell us
to leave this land because we were born here, our parents
were born here, our grandparents, et cetera. My family
has been living on this land for 1100 years. Personally, I
am not the type of person who could leave and start a new
life somewhere else. I had a chance to leave in 1968, but I
decided to stay. I am a local patriot. I will never leave
here no matter how badly I am treated by my
government.40
Nationalist rhetoric and the implementation of domestic legislation
that negatively affects the Hungarian minority has produced distrust of the
government among ethnic Hungarians. An ethnic Hungarian resident of
Dunajska Streda admitted:
We should have trust in our government, but we don't.
How can we when so many new laws, like the State
Language Law and the Law on Territorial Division, are
passed which are one hundred percent targeted directly
against us. It is nearly impossible for a Hungarian
delegate in Parliament to pass a bill that attempts to
guarantee our rights. So, this is not really a democracy.
HZDS and SNS have their people everywhere, in all the
decision making positions. This makes our voice silent.'
In response, the Slovak government denies allegations that recently
promulgated legislation negatively affects national minorities. Mr.
Branislav Lichardus, Slovak Ambassador to the United States, denied
alleged ill-effects of the State Language Law, discussed infra, and stated
that minority rights in Slovakia were among the highest in Europe. Mr.
Lichardus noted that [ethnic Hungarians] can speak their own language,
elect their own leaders, attend their own schools, read their own
newspapers and attend their own cultural activities.42
Following the split of the Czech and Slovak Republics, ethnic
Hungarians have become politically organized. Ethnic Hungarians are
represented by three political parties in Slovakia: Coexistence, MKDH,
and the Hungarian Civic Party. The parliamentary elections in June 1990
marked the entry of ethnic Hungarian parties into political representation.
40. Interview with an ethnic Hungarian citizen, in Samorin, Slovakia (July 28, 1996).
41. Interview conducted with an ethnic Hungarian citizen, in Dunajska Streda, Slovakia
(July 19, 1996).
42. Branislav Lichardus, Editorial, Slovakia's Minorities, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1996, at
[Vol. 4:27
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During the 1994 elections, the three Hungarian parties joined forces,
forming a broad coalition and gaining 10.18% of the vote and seventeen
seats in Parliament.'3 The legal demands of the Hungarian coalition are
articulated in the Komarno Agreement, a document written as the result of
the controversial meeting of Hungarian representatives in the southern city
of Komarno in 1994. "The Komarno Agreement states the clear legal
demands of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, ranging from local self-
government to education. The Slovak government has largely ignored
these demands and refuses to address the draft legislation proposed by the
Hungarian coalition on these issues," asserts Mr. Bela Bugar of MKDH.
"We would need a different government to achieve any of the goals of this
document. ""
Cooperation and communication between HZDS and the
Hungarian coalition is minimal .' The Slovak government has limited
tolerance for political opposition among both Slovaks and Hungarians, and
has utilized a variety of measures aimed at stifling dissent. In a July 1996
interview with the Hungarian newspaper, Uj Szo, Mr. Dusan Slobodnik of
the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted that the Slovak government
had the right to prohibit the existence of the Hungarian Coalition because
individual Hungarian -parties could form coalitions with other Slovak
opposition groups."6 A majority of legislation drafted by the Hungarian
coalition is ignored and never addressed in Parliament. Mr. Bugar added:
The government takes into consideration the demands of
the Hungarian coalition and they listen to them only as
much as the Council of Europe and other international
bodies are able to force them to listen. The demarches
[concerning the observance of democratic principles] sent
by the European Union and the United States had some
results, but as long as the current government continues to
maintain the same mind set, it is very difficult to get them
to understand democratic rules. This is why we continue to
need directives from [the West] .41
43. In Slovakia, coalitions of two or more parties must receive at least seven percent of the
vote to gain parliamentary representation.
44. Interview with Mr. Bela Bugar, Chairman of MKDH, in Bratislava, Slovakia (Aug. 1,
1996).
45. The same is true of Slovak opposition parties and HZDS.
46. Gabriella Horvath, Ner Masodrendu Allampolgarok a Szlovakiaban elo Magyarok
[Hungarians Living in Slovakia Are Not Second-Class Citizens], UJ SZO, July 17,1996, at 1, 6.
(Julia Domsitz trans).
47. Interview with Mr. Bela Bugar, Chairman of MKDH, in Bratislava, Slovakia (Aug. 1,
1996).
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Opposition members of Parliament are not represented on parliamentary
committees, a phenomenon that prompted the EU to issue a demarche to
the Slovak government in 1995. The European Parliament noted, inter
alia, its concern that "opposition parties represented in the Slovak
[Parliament] are not properly represented in the leading bodies of the
Parliament, as is sound democratic practice in all the Member states of the
European Union and in other countries with democratic traditions." 8 Mr.
Bugar noted:
In a normal parliamentary democracy, there would be a
proportional representation in the parliamentary
committees. For example, the Hungarian coalition
comprises approximately ten percent of Parliament,
therefore, we should make up ten percent of the
parliamentary committees and should hold positions within
these committees .... There is not a single vice-chairman
or chairman on any parliamentary committee from the
opposition. What's more, sometimes a certain party, like
the Hungarian coalition, cannot participate during
negotiations within a committee. For example, the
Security Committee has no Hungarian member. This is
also true of the Television Committee, the Radio
Committee, and the Secret Service Committee.4 9
After pledging to appoint a Hungarian coalition member to the Special
Supervisory Bureau of the Slovak Intelligence Service, Mr. Arpad Matejka
of HZDS said that MKDH Chairman, Bela Bugar, and Coexistence
Chairman, Miklos Duray, were unacceptable candidates because HZDS
holds them responsible for misleading statements made abroad. °
Substantial changes have not yet been made in the composition of
parliamentary committees with regard to adequate representation of
opposition members, despite the urging of numerous Western officials.
The Slovak government is engaged in a struggle not only over the
extent to which minority rights should be granted, but also over the
adoption of basic democratic governing principles. Mr. Laszlo Ollos of
Hungarian Civic Party stated:
48. The European Parliament, Resolution on the need to respect human and democratic
rights in the Slovak Republic. EUR. PARL. DOC. (D) (Nov. 16, 1995).
49. Id.
50. Hungarian Coalition Representatives Meet With HZDS, DAILY NEWS MONITOR/TASR,
June 28, 1996, at 5. See also Joe Cook, Slovak Law Threatens Hunan Rights, GUARDIAN, Apr.
12, 1996, at 013.
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Here in Slovakia, there are not left/right parties. There's
democratic and anti-democratic parties. There is a
constitutional struggle over what type of political system
we want as a nation and, to make things more difficult,
there is a large national minority. Slovakia is located in an
important geopolitical position, yet the people have a low
level of political culture given that we have had little
history of a civil political climate. This is a period of
Enlightenment here. It is the first influx of Western ideas,
culture, political and economic philosophies.,,
The EU and the United States have repeatedly urged the Slovak
government to put greater emphasis on the toleration of diverse opinions
and full support for constitutional rights. Democratic progress and free-
market transformation are vital to the acceptance of Slovakia into the trans-
Atlantic community and other Western institutions.
Discussion of ethnic Hungarian rights frequently returns to a
revision of historic events that have scarred the memories of members of
the Slovak government. When confronted with a question about the use of
the Hungarian language or access to Hungarian language education in
Slovakia, Slovak government officials often reframe the issue as one of
ethnic Slovak rights in Hungary. This sentiment is revealed upon the
expression of dissent or discontentment among ethnic Hungarians. "We
must not forget the forced assimilation of Slovaks into Hungarian society.
There were 400,000 ethnic Slovaks in Hungary at one time. Now there
are only 110,000. There is only one school for Slovaks in Hungary.
There is no reciprocity," commented Mr. Juraj Zervan of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. 2 Evidence of the Hungarian government's mistreatment
of the Slovak minority is used to justify the Slovak government's own
assimilationist policies toward the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. Mr.
Slobodnik evidenced this assumption in a recent newspaper interview:
If Hungary would treat their minorities better and won't
assimilate them as they did in the 1920s and 1930s and will
apologize for this activity, we can discuss the issue of our
[official language policy] with them. . . . There are no
Hungarians in Slovakia that have been assimilated in
southern Slovakia. 33
51. Interview with Mr. Laszlo Ollos, Hungarian Civic Party member and Professor of
Philosophy at the Nitra Pedagogical College, in Samorin, Slovakia (July 23, 1996).
52. Interview with Mr. Juraj Zervan, Director of the Department of National Minorities
Division, Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Bratislava, Slovakia (July 11, 1996).
53. Horvath, supra note 46.
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2. The Relationship Between the Slovak Republic and the Republic
of Hungary
Hungarian and Slovak history places a strain on present relations
between the two states. The end of communism revived historic
animosities between the two neighbors, and ethnic politics have taken
center stage. As stabilization of bilateral relations is a prerequisite to entry
into both the EU and NATO, the two states have attempted to appease
Western officials by entering into a friendship treaty. Historic tensions,
however, have not subsided with ratification of the treaty, and ethnic
politics continue to dominate relations between Slovakia and Hungary.
The issue of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Barrage System continues
to strain the tenuous cooperation established between the two governments
over the past three years. A treaty was signed on September 16, 1977
between the People's Republic of Hungary and the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic to jointly construct a dam and barrage systems on these two
locations.' In the late eighties, Hungary suspended construction at
Nagymaros primarily on economic grounds.55 In chronological order,
CSSR, the CSFR and the Slovak Republic unilaterally pursued the
construction and operation of the systems. On May 19, 1992, Hungary
officially terminated the treaty. The termination was partly due to
ecological and environmental considerations. ' In addition, the Hungarian
government's decision to withdraw from the agreement was influenced by
the fact that large numbers of ethnic Hungarians on the Slovak side of the
Danube River would be displaced by construction of the project." A
breach of contract claim is currently pending before the International Court
of Justice and will be heard in February 1997 unless the two countries
reach an out of court settlement. In the three rounds of negotiations to
date, the two states have not come any closer to reaching an equitable
settlement.5
Between 1990 and 1992, a nationalist regime in the Republic of
Hungary prevented closer bilateral contact,59 and from 1992 onward,
54. See generally Treaty on the Construction and Joint Operation of the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Barrage System, Sept. 16, 1977, Hungarian People's Republic - Socialist Republic
of Czech.
55. MAROK ET AL., supra note 4, at 70.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Sharon Fisher, Slovakia, Hungary, Austria Deepen Ties, 214 OMRI DAILY DIG. II
(Nov. 5, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997)<http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index
.Dhtml>.
59. The Hungarian Prime Minister during this period, Mr. Jozsef Antall, claimed that he
considered himself the Prime Minister of fifteen million Hungarians, five million more than live
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Slovak Prime Minister Meciar was reluctant to negotiate. Tensions
between the two states heightened again in 1993 when Slovakia applied for
membership to the Council of Europe. Hungary threatened to veto
Slovakia's membership in the-Council of Europe, noting that Slovakia had
not ratified several international documents aimed at the protection of
national minorities. Due to pressure from the EU countries and pledges
from the Slovak government that such legislation would be passed,
Hungarian representatives abstained from the vote.60
In April 1994, interim Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik met with his
Hungarian counterpart at the border towns of Komarno and Komarom to
discuss bilateral issues. At this meeting, it was decided that a joint
committee should be set up to identify Slovak-Hungarian bilateral
problems. Drafting of a treaty commenced, resulting in the Slovak-
Hungarian Basic Treaty (SHBT).6' In the treaty, Hungary wanted
guarantees providing for Hungarian minority rights in Slovakia, and
Slovakia sought confirmation of the inviolability of its borders.
After extensive negotiations, Prime Ministers Meciar and Gyula
Horn signed the SHBT on March 19, 1995. Although the Hungarian
Parliament ratified the treaty on June 13, 1995, the Slovak Parliament
repeatedly delayed ratification of the bilateral treaty until March 26,
1996.62 In order to gain sufficient support for the SHBT in the Slovak
Parliament, Prime Minister Meciar's HZDS party succumbed to the
demands of the far-right SNS. The SNS insisted that, in return for the
party's support, a package of hard-line legislation concerning anti-
subversion measures, states of emergency, local elections, and education
would quickly be addressed by the Slovak Parliament. Indeed, shortly
before passage of the SHBT, the Slovak Parliament adopted the Law on the
within the territorial boundaries of Hungary. This prompted outrage from the governments of
both Romania and Slovakia and perpetuated distrust and fear of Hungarian territorial aggression.
See Barry Newman, How to Tether Centuries-Old Hatreds, WALL ST. J., July 17, 1995, at A7.
60. Slovakia became a member of the Council of Europe on June 30, 1993. On January
30, 1996, Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk, accusing the Council of Europe of using a
double standard in evaluating human rights standards, requested that the Council of Europe apply
the same standard when evaluating the situation of ethnic minorities in a new or established
member country. Slovak Parliamentary Chairman Ivan Gasparovic proposed that the Council of
Europe's Parliamentary Assembly compile a "White Book" on standard ethnic rights to ensure
that all member nations are monitored with the same objective criteria. See Sharon Fisher,
Slovak Foreign Minister on Council of Europe, 22 OMRI DAILY DIG., II, No. 22 (Jan. 31, 1996)
(last visited Oct. 28, 1997) < http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index.Dhtml >.
61. Zmluva o dobrom susedstve a priatel'skej spolupraci medzi Slovenskou republikou a
Mad'arskou republikou [Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the
Slovak Republic and the Republic of Hungary], Mar. 18, 1995, Slovak Republic - Republic of
Hung (visited Oct. 17, 1997) < http://law.gonzada.edu/library/ceedocs/slovhvn.htm >.
62. On December 20, 1995, the Slovak Parliament voted to postpone decision until its
January session. On January 30, 1996, ratification was again delayed until March 1996.
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Protection of the Republic. This anti-subversion legislation, reminiscent of
legislation promulgated under the communist regime, provoked a flurry of
international criticism. This action overshadowed the long-awaited SHBT
ratification and, as a result, the bilateral treaty failed to smooth decades of
mistrust and tension between the two states.6 3
In July 1996, a conference in Budapest titled, "Hungarians and
Hungarians Living Abroad," once again illuminated the deep distrust
between the neighboring states. The conference produced a document,
signed by Hungarian officials and representatives of the ethnic Hungarian
minorities in neighboring states, asserted that autonomy is a basic condition
for maintaining the identity of Hungarians beyond Hungary's borders. By
leaving autonomy undefined, the document's ambiguity led to renewed
charges that the Hungarian government was threatening Slovak
sovereignty. Slovak officials interpreted the document as a call for
territorial self-rule in southern Slovakia. SNS members immediately
accused the Hungarian government of "destabilizing the Central European
region" by "supporting minorities' hazardous tendencies toward
autonomy. "6 HZDS parliamentarians sent a written appeal to their
counterparts in Hungary stressing that "Slovakia has had bad historical
experiences from co-existence with Hungarians. In modern times, that was
most pointedly shown between 1938-1945 during the occupation of
southern parts of Slovakia by Hungary. Slovaks on occupied territories
were second-rate citizens, deprived of basic human rights and freedoms. ,,61
Ethnic Hungarian parliamentarians who participated in the conference were
accused of treasonous activity. Mr. Slobodnik of the Slovak Ministry of
Foreign Affairs asserted that the document produced at the conference
spoiled Slovakia's relationship with Hungary and violated the SHBT. Mr.
Slobodnik accused "[tihe five Hungarian minority representatives [who
attended the conference of] commit[ting] a crime by allying themselves
with a foreign power . . . . "66 Ms. Edit Bauer, a parliament member from
the Coexistence party, attended the conference. She was subsequently
63. Some members of the Slovak Parliament wanted ratification of the SHBT conditional
on receiving an apology from Hungary for the occupation of southern Slovakia during World
War II. See generally NARODNA OBRODA, Feb. 8, 1996.
64. SNS Parliamentary Vice-Chairman, Martin Antal, stated that the Budapest conference
was aimed at "causing national disturbances that would ultimately lead to a re-evaluation of
current borders and [was] an effort to resurrect 'Greater Hungary' [in violation of the Treaty of
Trianon]." SNS Wants to Re-Debate Amended Penal Code in Parliament, DAILY NEWS
MONITOR/TASR, July 20, 1996, at 2.
65. The appeal recalled that Hungary has not apologized for Slovak occupation between
1938-1945 and asserted that, given this failure, Slovakia has no assurances that such an event
will recur. Slovak Parliamentarians Appeal to their Counterparts in Hungary, DAILY NEWS
MONITOR/TASR, July 12, 1996, at 2.
66. Horvath, supra note 46.
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accused of treason, and Mr. Slobodnik threatened to remove her
parliamentary immunity from prosecution. 6  Ms. Bauer assessed the
situation as follows:
[The government] used this accusation to frighten and to
threaten us. They know that if you analyze the Budapest
document, you cannot find any evidence of treason ...
They are creating such a hostile environment that people
are becoming afraid to speak their minds in public. We are
returning to the mind set of the communist era where
people can only dissent in private, if at all."
The Hungarian government was quick to respond to Slovak
condemnation of the conference. While asserting that the Budapest
Document had no legal effect and was not intended to cause friction with
neighboring countries, the Hungarian Foreign Ministry denied allegations
that they violated the terms of the SHBT and international legal norms.
"The Slovak reaction [to the Budapest Document] asserts that autonomy
would lead to an ethnically pure region and separatist tendencies which
would have a destabilizing effect on the territory, but other European
examples refute these accusations," said Mr. Laszlo Kovacs, the
Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs.69 Nevertheless, the conference
provided fuel for an already burning fire. Instead of offering concrete
suggestions to the discussion of minority rights, the conference served only
to create alarm among those already afraid of alleged Hungarian
irredentism.
The Slovak government has been criticized by political opponents
and other state governments for limiting political discourse both within and
beyond Slovak borders. In a democratic society, individuals have the right
to communicate freely with citizens of another state. In the case of the
Hungarian minority, this is particularly important, as it allows for the
exchange of ideas and information among members of an ethnic group.
The importance of cross-border contacts by members of minority groups
was specifically acknowledged in the SHBT. SHBT Article 12(2) supports
cross-border contact between organizations and individuals. This provision
states that:
67. Slovak Parliament members are granted immunity from prosecution or disciplinary
sanction without the approval of the Slovak Parliament. SLOVK. CONST. Pt. 5, ch. 1, art. 78, §
2.
68. Interview with Ms. Edit Bauer, Slovak Parliamentarian for the Coexistence Party, in
Samorin, Slovakia (July 16, 1996).
69. Laszlo Kovacs, Statement of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry (July 10, 1996)(Ildiko
Domsitz trans).
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[I]n the opinion of the Contracting Parties, the basic form
of co-operation between their countries in the cultural,
scientific and educational fields is co-operation between
institutions, organizations, associations, unions,
municipalities and local governments, the groups
established on the basis of civic initiatives and co-operation
between individuals based on mutual needs and interests.
On the basis of the respective agreements and programs,
they shall promote initiatives of the state, social and
private institutions, organizations and associations and
natural persons serving to advance their mutual knowledge
and to bring them closer to one another. 0
Given the SHBT's binding nature upon the Slovak government, respect for
members of the Hungarian minority to maintain contacts in Hungary
should be supported absent clear and compelling evidence of subversive
activity. Respect for cross-border contact is also supported in the
Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM).
Article 17(1) states:
The parties undertake not to interfere with the right of
persons belonging to national minorities to establish and
maintain free and peaceful contacts across frontiers with
persons lawfully staying in other states, in particular those
with whom they share an ethnic, cultural, linguistic or
religious identity, or a common cultural heritage.,,
The Council of Europe's European Charter on Regional or Minority
Languages Article 14(a) also encourages trans-frontier exchanges by
"foster[ing] contacts between the users of the same language in the state
concerned in the fields of culture, education, information, vocational
training and permanent education. ,,
Attendance at a meeting in Hungary where some form of autonomy
was discussed does not per se threaten the territorial integrity of the Slovak
Republic. Accusing ethnic Hungarian parliamentarians who attended the
conference with prosecution for treason hardly serves to foster bilateral
dialogue on minority rights. The governments on both sides of the Danube
70. SLOVAK HUNGARIAN BASIS TREATY, art. 12(2), Mar. 19, 1995, SOS (visited Oct. 27,
1997) < http://www.eanet.sk/medza/95/mar/0036.html >.
71. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES, art.
17(1), Exceprts from The Framework Convention (Report 24 Sept. 1, 1997)
<http://www.Cde.Cu5e/raoul/min-iin.html. > [hereinafter FCNM].
72. European Charter on Regional or Minority Languages, 1992 Council of Europe,
Europ. T.S. No. 148.
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violated the spirit of the SHBT, and the conference failed to establish a
constructive platform upon which a reasonable solution to existing ethnic
tensions could be built. Nonetheless, cross-frontier communication should
be encouraged on all levels between governments and individuals in order
to improve transnational relations and cross-cultural understanding.
III. SYSTEM OF MINORITY PROTECTION
During the past three years, Slovakia has struggled to develop a
constitutionally-based legal system. Given its tumultuous history, Slovakia
has little historical guidance to direct its efforts to establish a rule of law
that equally protects each citizen. Furthermore, as a candidate for
membership into both the EU and NATO, Slovakia faces the challenge of
satisfying requirements set by the community of western European states.
Ethnic Hungarians perceive their rights as being under attack by the Slovak
government over the past three years, although the government continues
to assert that Slovakia is one of the most generous states in Europe in terms
of its protection of national minorities. Mr. Slobodnik of the Slovak
Ministry of Foreign Affairs assessed the present situation of the Hungarian
minority as follows:
Slovakia has the highest human rights standard in Europe.
You can't find another country where there are minorities
and they are treated as well as Hungarians are in Slovakia.
Some politicians and journalists from the [Hungarian
Coalition] forget how developed Hungarian schools are
here in Slovakia. Where else can you find such a good
school system? They also have theaters. There are two
Hungarian theaters in Komarno and Kosice. So, what are
they complaining about?71
A. Slovakia's Obligations Under the International System of Human
Rights Protection
In analyzing the legal status of the Hungarian minority in the
Slovak Republic, the minority's rights under the international system of
human rights and Slovakia's municipal law must be evaluated. Slovakia
has undertaken the responsibilities of ensuring internationally recognized
human rights standards through its ratification of numerous international
treaties, declarations and covenants. The effect of these instruments within
73. Gabriella Horvath, Nem Masodrendu Allampolgarok a Szlovakiaban elo Magyarok
[Hungarian Living in Slovakia Are Not Second-Class Citizens), UJ SZO, July 17,1996, at 1, 6.
(Julia Domsitz trans).
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Slovak borders, however, remains somewhat ambiguous and ratification of
these documents has not resulted in the realization of the rights and
freedoms protected therein within the domestic arena.
Slovakia is a state party to most human rights instruments. 74
Several of these documents oblige the Slovak government to take
affirmative steps to protect all individuals within its borders and to make
changes within its domestic arena to conform with international legal
norms. The three most relevant international documents ratified by the
Slovak government with regard to the protection of ethnic minorities are
the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights (ECHR)
(ratified by Slovakia on March 18, 1992)," the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) (ratified by the Slovak Republic on May
28, 1993), and the FCNM (ratified by Slovakia on June 21, 1995).
Despite official proclamations by the Slovak government regarding their
adherence to internationally accepted principles of human rights,
ratification has not resulted in municipal legislation that equally protects all
citizens. In contrast, the current trend of domestic legislation has attracted
international criticism and has brought into question, rather than
confirmed, Slovakia's commitment to the letter and spirit of the various
documents.
Several major achievements of international human rights
instruments in Slovakia must be noted. The most important success is the
ability of the instruments to affect and direct government policy.
Ratification of various international human rights documents from the
Council of Europe and the United Nations forced the Slovak government to
consider the provisions contained in those documents and find arguments to
support facial compliance with their terms. International instruments set
limits on the Slovak government's ability to pass restrictive legislation and
serve to direct foreign policy decisions. For example, the Slovak
government consulted international experts, such as the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) High Commissioner for
National Minorities, to review and comment upon- draft domestic
legislation affecting minorities. An International Law Division within the
Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs was established within the past year to
74. See generally The relevant international documents ratified by the Slovak Republic
include the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights (ratified by Slovakia on
Mar. 18, 1992), the FCNM (ratified by Slovakia on June 21, 1995), and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ratified by the Slovak Republic on May 28, 1993), the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (ratified on Jan. 1, 1993), UNESCO Convention Against
Discrimination in Education (ratified on Mar. 31, 1993), the International Covenant on Social,
Economic and Cultural Rights (ratified on May 28, 1993), and the UN Declaration on the Rights
of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities.
75. ECHR Protocols 1 through 10 have also been ratified.
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evaluate domestic compliance with international obligations. International
human rights instruments strongly influence Slovakia's political climate.
Positive pressure has been exerted upon the government by members of the
Hungarian minority to ensure state fulfillment of its obligations under
ratified human rights documents. Slovak political discourse is consumed
by various, and often conflicting, interpretations of the precise obligations
embodied in these documents and their relation to municipal law. Despite
the lack of consensus, such dialogue is a healthy exercise that encourages
Slovakia's democratic transformation.
The non-realization of the protections granted in the
aforementioned documents is a product of the general ambiguity
surrounding the role of international instruments within the domestic arena.
The Slovak Constitution does not contain a special provision defining the
relationship between ratified international documents in general and the
municipal legal system. The text of international treaties and documents is
published along with all domestic legislation in the Collection of Laws of
the Slovak Republic. 6 Because of this fact, Constitutional Court Judge Jan
Klucka asserts that the relationship between international and municipal
law--is-based on the monistic principle which grants international law
primacy over municipal law and the state constitution in Slovak courts."
Mr. Jozavice of the International Law Department of the Slovak Ministry
of Foreign Affairs is less clear about the status of treaties in Slovak
domestic law. He opined that:
[t]here is currently no answer to whether or not treaties are
self-executing. On one hand, it has been suggested that
they are not because it is only through [municipal] law that
rights can be proscribed to a citizen. It seems necessary,
therefore, to adopt a specific law implementing the
stipulation contained in the treaty. On the other hand, this
interpretation is in conflict with Article 11 of the Slovak
Constitution which stipulates that international treaties take
priority over domestic provisions. In fact, international
legal documents are treated the same as municipal
legislation and published in the Collection of Laws like all
other laws of Parliament.78
76. Collection of Laws of the Slovk. Rep., Law No. 1/1993.
77. Interview with Judge Jan Klucka, Slovak Constitutional Court, in Kosice, Slovakia
(July 18, 1996).
78. Interview with Mr. Milan Jozavice, International Law Division of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, in Bratislava, Slovakia (July 15, 1996).
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Chapter 9, Article 153 of the Slovak Constitution also concerns the
incorporation of international obligations. Article 153 provides that
Slovakia "shall be a successor to all rights and duties ensuing from
international treaties . . . ." The question arises, however, as to whether
this provision is a de facto ratification of international documents.
While not including any express provision on the authority of
international law in general, the Slovak Constitution does provide for the
conditional authority of international human rights instruments. Article 11
mandates that before any state authority determines a question involving
the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens, a comparison of
international and municipal law must be made to determine which system
grants broader rights. If the international document is broader in scope
and encompasses greater freedoms, that provision governs the domestic
decision. Judge Klucka stated that, in this sense, the role international
human rights law plays within Slovak borders is very clear. "There is no
autonomous Slovak approach to defining human rights," asserts Judge
Klucka. "The courts, and presumably the Parliament, must consider
internationally accepted human rights definitions.""9 Mr. Branislav
Lichardus, Slovak Ambassador to the United States, recently opined that
Slovakia "is one of the leading European countries in terms of protection
of the rights of ethnic minorities" because "[i]t is one of the few European
countries where international treaties on human rights take precedence over
its own laws, provided they secure greater rights and freedoms. "10 As Mr.
Bugar of MKDH noted:
The Slovak government has repeatedly asserted that
national minorities living in Slovakia have the highest
standard of minority rights in Europe. How can they say
this when our legislation violates the Articles of our own
Constitution? In Slovakia, the government does not give
rights above the Constitution but rather, they take away
these guarantees through the promulgation of domestic
legislation. So how can they speak about rights above the
standard? [Ethnic Hungarians] are not asking for new,
additional rights. We only want to maintain what we have
79. Interview with Judge Jan Klucka, Slovak Constitutional Court, in Kosice, Slovakia
(July 18, 1996).'
80. Branislav Lichardus, Letter to the Editor, Slovakia's Minorities, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20,
1996, at E14.
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had before. The government is taking away the system of
rights we have had for years.'
One explanation for the present confusion about the role of international
law derives from the fact that Slovakia has only been subject to
international law for three years. As a result, the large majority of lawyers
and judges are unfamiliar with international legal doctrines. Judge Klucka
observed:
There is a need to learn about international standards. We
have a forty year legal gap that we now need to fill very
quickly. Three years is a short time for judges to gain
practical skills in applying international standards. It is
necessary for judges to be aware of [European] case-law in
order to understand the legal meaning of international
human rights provisions. Often there is no Slovak
translation of cases or international materials and this
prevents a deeper understanding of the legal principles
involved. 2
Beyond the need for those working within the legal system to educate
themselves about principles of international human rights law, Slovak
citizens must familiarize themselves with the system of human-rights
protection, as well as their right to take complaints against the government
to the European Court of Human Rights. Mr. Ondrej Srebala of the
Slovak Center for Human Rights noted that:
[t]he legal consciousness [of Slovak citizens] has been very
damaged by the previous communist era. A certain
amount of civic braveness is missing from our citizenry.
The quick leap to democracy has caused some people to
act childish and to retreat from our new democratic
system. Citizens still don't know how to use democratic
legal means. For example, it is considered impolite in
Slovakia to make claims to the European Court [of Human
Rights]. It is felt that our problems should be dealt with
here, not abroad. It will take time for the people to learn
that the European Court is also our court.'3
81. Interview with Mr. Bela Bugar, MKDH Chairman, in Bratislava, Slovakia (Aug. 1,
1996).
82. Interview with Judge Jan Klucka, Slovak Constitutional Court, in Kosice, Slovakia
(July 18, 1996).
83. Interview with Mr. Ondrej Srebala, Director of the Slovak Center for Human Rights,
in Bratislava, Slovakia (July 12, 1996).
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Through ratification of the ECHR, the Slovak government has accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. The
right to individual petition before the European Commission for Human
Rights is also recognized." Slovakia has obliged itself to "secure to
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms" as defined by
the ECHR. Ratification of the aforementioned documents must not be used
as a pretext for state inaction on a domestic level with regard to the
protection of human rights and must not be considered "an accelerated way
of establishing [Slovakia's] democratic credentials." 85 Regarding the rights
of national minorities, no lower standards than those set by the
international community should be accepted in the Slovak Republic.
Municipal enforcement of the provisions of international human
rights provisions is largely defined by the Slovak Constitutional Court.
The 1992 Constitution of the Slovak Republic established a Constitutional
Court which possesses the competence to hear appeals of final decisions by
central government authorities, local government authorities, and local
self-governmental bodies brought by individuals involving violations of
fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens. 86 Cases can be brought before
the Constitutional Court through a variety of means:
1) by one-fifth of the National Council members;
2) by the president;
3) by the government;
4) by any court; or
5) by the Attorney General. 81
There have only been six cases where the Slovak Constitutional Court has
utilized provisions contained in international human rights documents to
formulate its holding. This is out of a total of 2635 total cases heard by
the Constitutional Court since 1993. 8
84. On March 4, 1996, the European Commission for Human Rights declared the
application of Ladislav and Aurel Brezny against the Slovak Republic inadmissible. The
application concerned restitution for property confiscated by the former Socialist Republic of
Czechoslovakia. See generally EUR. COMM'N H.R. 23131/93, 106 (Mar. 3, 1996).
85. Michael O'Boyle, Right to Speak and Associate Under Strasbourg Case-Law with
Reference to Eastern and Central Europe, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 263, 265 (1993).
86. SLOVK. CONST. art. 127.
87. SLOVK. CONST. art. 130. Currently, the constitutionality of the Slovak Language
Law, as described below, is under consideration by the court.
88. Interview with Judge Jan Klucka, Slovak Constitutional Court, in Kosice, Slovakia
(July 18, 1996).
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B. Slovakia's Constitutional Framework for the Protection of
National Minorities
While Slovakia must adhere to the principles of international
human rights standards, its domestic policy must also comply with the
constitution of the Slovak Republic adopted on September 3, 1991. While
the Slovak Constitution confers rights unprecedented in the history of
Slovakia, these rights are not inalienable as they may be amended by law.89
The objective to protect individuals within state borders from arbitrary
state power is not served by such a constitutional framework. The
constitution largely fails to provide any real guarantees that the conferred
rights may not be stripped away at the will of a parliamentary majority
during times of economic hardship or political unrest.
The preamble to the constitution of the Slovak Republic
immediately caused a stir among minority groups in Slovakia. It begins:
"We the Slovak nation . . . . " This expression implies that only ethnic
Slovaks are concerned by and awarded rights under the constitution, rather
than all people residing within the borders of the Slovak Republic. This
impression is confirmed by the following phrase "together with members
of national minorities and ethnic groups," thus relegating national
minorities to a secondary position. Ethnic Hungarians objected to the
Constitution claiming that minorities cannot be said to have an equal
position under the Slovak Constitution.
Chapter 2, Section 4, Article 34 of the constitution articulates the
rights of national minorities and ethnic groups. The first two clauses of
this article concern rights to be conferred upon minorities, and include
provisions for the promotion of cultural heritage and language.Y The
constitution guarantees the right to education and official communication in
minority languages. 91 Both of these paragraphs, however, contain the
89. In the first 54 articles of the Slovak Constitution, guarantees are conferred and then
made amendable by law 42 times. See John A. Young, Human Rights and the Slovak
Constitution, Promoting HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPE NEWSLETrER, Apr. 1994, at 9.
90. SLOVK. CONST. art. 34, para. 1 reads:
Citizens of national minorities or ethnic groups in the Slovak Republic are guaranted
the development of particularly the rights to promote their cultural heritage with other
citizens of the same national minority or ethnic group, receive and disseminate
information in their mother tongues, form associations, and create and maintain
educational and cultural institutions. Details thereof shall be fixed by law.
(paraphrase). SLOVK. CONST. art. 34, para. 1
91. SLOVK. CONST. art. 34, para. 2 reads:
In addition to the right to learn the official language, the citizens of national minorities
or ethnic groups shall, under provisions fixed by law, also be guaranteed: a) the right
to be educated in a minority language, b) the right to use a minority language in
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restrictive "to be fixed by law" phrases, making these provisions rather
feeble constitutional rights. Furthermore, according to the final paragraph
of Article 34, the exercise of the enumerated rights "may not threaten the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Slovak Republic or discriminate
against other citizens."9 This paragraph may provide a legal justification
for any law containing discriminatory measures against minorities. A
request by ethnic Hungarians for more Hungarian language schools or a
plea by Ruthenians for more control of their own cultural affairs could be
construed by some as threatening the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic
and a parliamentary majority could circumvent and prohibit these attempts.
Any measure detrimental to minorities can always be founded in the
promotion of the interests of other citizens. Mr. Laszlo Pirovits of
Hungarian Civic Party opined that:
[i]t is not at all possible to defend article 34 section 3 of
the Constitution of the Slovak Republic[.] The question
automatically arises whether the implementation of rights
of another citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution, may
[threaten the State's sovereignty of territorial integrity].
Since the article concerns individual and not collective
rights, it is not in this context defensible at all. This
codification is in conflict with the individual article 13,
section 3 of the Constitution, according to which the legal
definition of constitutional rights and freedoms must apply
equally. On the other hand, a threat to sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the republic also fulfills the actual
essence of a criminal act, which would be the case for
every subject. Such a provision violates the essence of the
equality of rights before the law[.] 93
Section 34(3) is clearly in conflict with the letter and spirit of Article 34,
which is meant to assure the rights of national minorities. The legislative
and executive branches of government are thus, under the constitution, free
to discriminate against minorities whenever a threat is perceived.
Given the prevalence of restrictive clauses throughout the Slovak
Constitution, ethnic minorities are not ensured constitutional guarantees to
the use of minority languages and their culture. Rather, the Slovak
Constitution establishes a framework of minority protection which can be
official communications, c) the right to participate in decision making in matters
affecting the national minorities and ethnic groups. SLOVK. CONST. art. 34, para. 2
92. SLOVK. CONST. art. 34, para. 3 (1993).
93. Constitutionalism (Transcript of a discussion held on January 28-29, 1993), in
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE 106-7 (1994).
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chiseled away in times of political or economic strife. In a state where
ethnic Slovaks constitute approximately eighty-five percent of the
population, the constitution should serve to safeguard ethnic minority
rights from the will or tyranny of the majority. Given Slovakia's
centralized political system, the potential for constitutional rights being
supplanted by restrictive legislation is clear. This risk is particularly acute
for minority culture and education, as public spending on these activities is
directed from the state. The question is: Which rights are supreme -
constitutional or statutory rights? Mr. Jozavice responds that: "In my
opinion, the [rights granted in the] constitution should be enforced. It
should set forth rights without qualification, without creating room for the
legislature to undermine the role of the constitution itself. It suffers
detail."' A reasonable reading of a state's constitution should lead to a
determination that it is the supreme law of the land to be interpreted by a
court with jurisdiction over such issues. The framework of the Slovak
Constitution makes it unclear as to whether a parliamentary majority may
restrict or even completely eradicate freedoms set forth therein.
C. Slovak Municipal Law Under International Human Rights and
Slovak Constitutional Analysis
Slovak municipal legislation analyzed below calls into question
Slovakia's commitment to democratic principles and internationally
accepted human rights standards. Municipal laws are employed to analyze
Slovak compliance with bilateral treaties and regional and universal human
rights instruments ratified by the Slovak government. In addition,
legislation is analyzed utilizing non-binding international documents that
demonstrate developing custom within international human rights law.
1. The State Language Law
On November 15, 1995, the Slovak Parliament adopted the Slovak
Language Law (The Language Law)." This law regulates the use of the
State Language (Slovak) in Slovakia and provides for the protection of the
language. The law has been perceived by many ethnic Hungarians and
international critics alike, as threatening the future existence of the
Hungarian language in Slovakia. Critics of the Language Law claim that it
takes away the right to use the Hungarian language and other minority
languages. It is important to note that, besides language, members of the
Hungarian minority in the Slovak Republic do not differ greatly from
94. Interview with Mr. Milan Jozavice, International Law Department of the Slovak
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Bratislava, Slovakia (July 15, 1996).
95. Zakon Narodnej rady Slovenskej republiky c. 270/1995 o statnom jazyku. [This law
entered into effect on Jan. 1, 1996.]
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ethnic Slovaks. Ethnic Hungarians do not have any racially distinctive
features nor do they adhere to a different religion. It is language that
unites members of the Hungarian minority. For this reason, any restriction
on the right or opportunity to use the Hungarian language has a great effect
on the cultural identity and integrity of the Hungarian community in
Slovakia.
When the draft of the Language Law was submitted to the Slovak
National Council on October 24, 1995, a justification statement outlining
the objectives of the legislation was attached. This justification reveals that
the Language Law is partly, if not wholly, intended as a means of getting
back at Hungarians for past injustices. For example, the justification
asserts that
[t]he Ancient Slovak language (alongside Hebrew, Greek
and Latin) became the fourth language of liturgy and
diplomacy in Europe. Forced Hungarianization during the
time of historic Hungary, as well as between the years
1938 and 1945, when Hungary occupied a large part of
Southern Slovakia, inflicted wounds that remain open to
this day.9
Mr. Juraj Zervan of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted that
"bilingualism is not usable for our country. It is the responsibility of
persons first to feel part of the whole society, rather than to have
allegiance to only a certain group. "9
Passage of the Language Law created a legal vacuum in relation to
the use of minority languages. The recent legislation replaces the 1990
Law on the Official Language, a law premised upon the Language Law of
the first Czechoslovak Republic of the inter-war years.98 By replacing the
1990 legislation, the Language Law takes away certain rights concerning
minority languages and fails to confer new ones. The disequilibrium
created is not balanced by a corresponding law on minority languages. It
is obscured where and under what circumstances usage of the Hungarian
language is legally permissible. Although the Slovak government assured
96. Text attached to the Draft-law on the state Language as submitted to the Slovak
Parliament, Oct. 24, 1995. Translation of this document was provided by the Hungarian Civic
Party.
97. Interview with Mr. Juraj Zervan, Director of the Department of National Minorities
Division, Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Bratislava, Slovakia (July 11, 1996).
98. See Language Law, para. 12: Law 428/1990 (declaring that "[the law] on the official
language of the Slovak Republic is made void." It is significant to note the change from an
"official" language to the further reaching concept of a state language. This modification
suggests that the Language Law is more encompassing than the Law on the Official Language.
This alteration is questionable in a state that is multi-ethnic.
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the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities that legislation on
the use of minority languages would soon follow passage of the Language
Law,99 such a measure has yet to even be discussed in Parliament despite
persistent urging by all minority communities in Slovakia.' ® As the year
anniversary of enactment of the Language Law passes, there is still no
official government draft for such legislation.101
The Slovak government is considering ratification of the European
Charter on Regional or Minority Languages as an alternative to issuing a
legislative measure on the use of minority languages. 0 2 This document
provides that signatory states will not place obstacles in the way of
promoting minority languages. Provisions for the teaching and studying of
minority languages at all appropriate levels are also included.103  The
Ministry of Culture, however, proposed an alternative to ratification of this
Charter. Rather than a specific law on minority language use, the Ministry
suggested promulgating a law on the relationship between citizens and state
administrative authorities in local offices.'°' The proposal would include a
provision stating that Slovak is the language to be used in official contacts
throughout the state unless a person could prove that he or she was not able
to learn Slovak for an objective reason.03 A definition of an objective
reason was not provided.
In light of the Slovak government's failure to propose a law on the
use of minority languages as it promised last year, many ethnic Hungarians
view the Language Law as the first step toward the elimination of
Hungarian culture in Slovakia. One ethnic Hungarian resident of Zlaty
Klasy noted:
The goal of the Slovak government is first to have us speak
Slovak in official settings and then to have us speak Slovak
in our schools until eventually Hungarian truly becomes a
kuchinska rec [a kitchen language], a language only
99. See generally SME, Jan. 16, 1996.
100. On June 10, 1996, Czech, Ruthenian, Ukrainian, Hungarian and Bulgarian cultural
associations submitted a joint proclamation criticizing the Slovak government for failing to pass a
measure regulating the use of minority languages. See generally DAILY NEWS MONITOR/TASR,
June 10, 1996.
101. In November 1996, the Slovak Nationalities Council rejected a draft law submitted by
the Hungarian opposition parties. See Sharon Fisher, Slovak Nationalities Council Rejects
Minority Language Law, OMRI DAILY DIGEST II, No. 22 (Nov. 22, 1996) (last visited Oct.
28, 1997) <http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index.Dhtml>.
102. See supra note 72
103. Id. art. 8.
104. See generally UJ SZO, Aug. 1, 1996, at 1.
105. Id.
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spoken at home. That is why it is important to use the
Hungarian language in a wider context because, if not, we
will forget words and eventually adopt the Slovak
language. This is what they want, for us to forget our
language, and therefore, forget our culture.1°
The Language Law has been criticized largely due to its
vagueness. The statute's ambiguity provides those who will apply the law
the freedom of interpretation.t 0 For example, Section 1(2) ("The State
Language has a priority over other languages applied on the whole
territory of the Slovak Republic")'1 and 1(4) ("The law does not regulate
the usage of languages of national minorities and ethnic groups. Usage of
those languages is regulated by separate laws") are potentially
contradictory. While clause 1(2) states that Slovak has the priority, clause
1(4) states that other languages are not touched by the law.'1 In what
sense, then, is the Slovak language supreme?
The Language Law does not regulate languages used in religious
ceremonies. Section 1(3) states that "[t]he law does not regulate the usage
of liturgic languages. Usage of those languages is arranged by the
regulations of churches and religious communities." While the Language
Law does not regulate church weddings, it is unclear whether the word
"yes" or "I do" in a civil, non-church wedding ceremony can be spoken in
Hungarian or whether the Language Law mandates that it be uttered in the
state language. On June 26, 1996, when asked by a Hungarian Assembly
member of the Council of Europe whether the Hungarian language could
be used during official marriage ceremonies, Prime Minister Meciar
asserted that marriage ceremonies could take place in any language since
the freedom to speak any language is enjoyed by all."0 This statement
implies that, under the Language Law, an ethnic Hungarian could say the
Hungarian word Igen [yes] during a civil wedding ceremony. The
Ministry of Culture, however, issued a directive stating the opposite
conclusion. The Ministry of Culture asserts that the affirmation must be
106. Interview with an ethnic Hungarian resident, in Zlaty Klasy, Slovakia (June 30, 1996).
107. One local official interpreted the law as giving him the right to refuse an ethnic
Hungarian to send a telegram in Hungarian. See generally Democracy Seen at Risk in
Bratislava, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 26, 1995.
108. The translation of the Language Law quoted in this report was provided by the
American Embassy in Bratislava.
109. Paragraph 2 was added in the final parliamentary debate on the law, which may
explain the lack of reflection. This makeshift drafting style hardly makes for legal credibility.
110. Statement of Mr. Vladimir Meciar, Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic, Council of
Europe Parliamentary Assembly, (June 26, 1996).
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spoken in Slovak."' State interference in one of the most intimate of
ceremonies is viewed as a direct attack on Hungarian culture by ethnic
Hungarians. Mr. Bugar noted that:
This is how [the government] can provoke ethnic
Hungarians. If my daughter wants to have a civil marriage
and if the government forces her to use a language other
than her mother tongue during such an intimate ceremony,
I'm not a radical, but I think I would break the room into
pieces.
Section 2(2) demands that each citizen have knowledge of the
Slovak language as defined by the Ministry of Culture. This approach
places full definitional control with a state organ. The potential for abuse
of governmental discretion in this area may result in discrimination against
Hungarians who may mispronounce words or may not have as extensive a
vocabulary in Slovak as a native speaker.
Section 3(2) makes knowledge of the Slovak language a
prerequisite for government employment. Section 3(1) and (2) indicate
that all communications constituting official transaction, as well as all
communications within government and administration workplaces must be
conducted in Slovak. 1 2 While not precluding the use of other languages,
the wording of Section 3 suggests that supplementary use of Slovak is
compulsory in nearly all official matters. Moreover, Section 3(5) states
that contact with the administration must be conducted in Slovak. 3 This
section mandates that, in order to use Hungarian during an official
111. Ministerstvo Kultury Slovenskej Republiky [Minister of Culture of the Slovak
Republic], Cislo MK 551/96 - SSJaNP, (Mar. 1, 1996).
112. Language Law Section 3 reads:
[1] In the course of accomplishment of their duties, the state authorities and state
organizations, the authorities of territorial self-administration and the authorities of
public and legal institutions . . . the state language shall be, by those authorities, used
compulsorily on the whole territory of the Slovak Republic. Demonstration of
commensurate knowledge of the state language by word of mouth and writing is a
qualification for being taken into service, or for entering a similar occupational
relationship, as well as a prerequisite for accomplishing work agreed within specified
job description at a public and legal authority.
[2] The employees and officials of the public and legal authorities, employees in
transport and communications, as well as the armed forces officers, the officers of
armed security corps, of other armed forces officers, of other armed corps and fire
brigades, shall use the state language in contact on official lines.
Slovak Language Law §(3).
113. Slovak Language Law Section 3(5) states that "[w]ritten appeals addressed to the
public and legal authorities shall be presented in the state language." Slovak Language Law §
3(5).
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meeting, a Slovak interpreter must be present at all times and minutes must
be kept in both Slovak and Hungarian. This requirement will undoubtedly
cause problems in congregations where all participants are Hungarian, as is
largely the case in municipalities throughout southern Slovakia. Section
3(5) also mandates that citizens would be obliged to submit a copy of every
appeal in Slovak, which is an unnecessary obstacle where both the
appellant and the officials have Hungarian as their first language.
In response to Section 3(5) of the Language Law, several mayors
of towns located in southern Slovakia issued directives allowing for the use
of both Slovak and Hungarian in official contacts despite Ministry of
Culture claims that such action is illegal.114 The first local authority to take
such action was Velka Maca, a village with approximately eighty-eight
percent of its 2600 residents of Hungarian nationality. The declaration,
unanimously passed by the local council, allows Hungarian to be used in
official contacts, including at local offices, cultural events, doctor's
offices, and stores. Numerous villages and towns in Slovakia's southern
region have since followed Velka Maca's lead. Mayor Jozsef Szaraz of
Cvory nad Zitavou, where four-fifths of more than 5000 people are
ethnically Hungarian, refuted allegations that such directives were contrary
to the Language Law. Mayor Szaraz asserted that such measures "simply
enable the people to communicate in their mother tongue. ""'
Section 8(5) reads "[iun proceedings with the public and legal
authorities concerning contracts settling the involvement relations [sic],
only the wording in the state language is acknowledged." This section
may put ethnic Hungarian lawyers out of business. If two ethnic
Hungarian business partners want to ensure the enforceability of their
contract in a Slovak court, the Language Law mandates that the document
be drafted in Slovak. Section 8(4), states that "[tihe contact of the medical
care personnel is conducted, as a rule, in the state language; in case of a
citizen or foreigner not having a command of the state language, also in the
language in which mutual understanding with the patient is possible. "11 6
In February 1996, four language consultants began working in
three regional districts and in Bratislava to supervise observance of the
language law, although monetary penalties for violating the law cannot be
114. Pavol Mudry, Slovakia: Ethnic Hungarians Worried By Language Law, INT'L PRESS
SERVICE, Mar. 14, 1996. See also Samorin A Okolie/Somorja Es Videke [Samorin and the
Surrounding Environment], Vseobecne Zavazne Nariadenie Mesta Samorin 0 Pouzivani Jazyka
Narodnostnych Mensin Na Uzemi Mesto Samorin, Jan. 26, 1996. This is law of the town
council of the town of Samorin allowing residents to use either the Slovak or Hungarian
languages in official contacts.
115. Id.
116. For further issues upon which the Language Law touches, see sections below
concerning legislation regulating education, names, road signs, and mass media.
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issued until 1997. On March 12, 1996, the Hungarian daily, Uj Szo,
published an interview with Dr. Andrej, an official language advisor to the
Slovak Ministry of Culture for the Galanta and Dunajska Streda region.
Dr. Andrej found that individuals living in these two regions were well-
informed about the provisions of the Language Law and usually observed
them. He cited only one village where the local chronicles were written
only in Hungarian, and warned the village mayor that the village annals
would have to be recorded in both Slovak and Hungarian.
Passage of the Language Law, with its stiff monetary penalties and
restrictive provisions, has antagonized ethnic Hungarians. The Language
Law has been used by Slovak citizens as a means of harassing ethnic
Hungarians. In the town of Samorin, two individuals pretending to be
language inspectors from the Ministry of Culture threatened local
inhabitants with fines due to their public use of the Hungarian language."7
Although government officials proclaim that such behavior is criminal, no
suspects have been detained. "It is as though the government has
criminalized our language," complained one ethnic Hungarian.", The law
excludes penalizing individuals for violating its mandates, but imposes stiff
monetary fines on businesses. Business owners could be fined up to
50,000 Slovak crowns (approximately $1650) and business entities could
be forced to pay up to 500,000 Slovak crowns (approximately $16,500)."n
The Language Law launched Slovakia into the international
spotlight and provoked questioning of Slovakia's commitment to
democratic principles. A United States Congressional Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe wrote a letter to the Slovak
Ambassador to the United States, Branislav Lichardus, stating that the real
intent of the Language Law is "not merely to regulate the use of the Slovak
language, but to restrict the freedom of speech in Slovakia."12° Hungarian
Ambassador to Slovakia, Mr. Jeno Boros, views the Language Law as the
devaluation of multi- or bilingualism. He stated, "There is an old
expression in this part of the world that says that the more languages you
know, the better person you are. Now you hear a new expression: The
more languages you know, the worse Slovak you are."12' The Slovak
117. See generally NOVY CAS, June 12, 1996, at 2.
118. Interview with an ethnic Hungarian citizen, in Samorin, Slovakia (July 2, 1996).
119. See Pavol Mudry, Slovakia: Ethnic Hungarians Worried By Language Law, INT'L
PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 14, 1996.
120. James Morrison, Selling Slovakia, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1996, at A17. This letter
was signed by Senators Alphonse D'Amato (NY-R), Frank Lautenberg (NJ-D), and
Representatives Christopher Smith (NJ-R) and Steny Hoyer (MD-D).
121. Stephen Kinzer, Democracy Seen At Risk In Bratislava, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec.
28, 1995, at A1, 5.
1997]
62 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
government asserts that the Language Law is compatible with international
human rights standards.'2 The truth is, however, that not many states have
state language laws. Moreover, most of the state language laws in
existence take into consideration the protection of minority languages. 23 In
other multilingual states where one language is dominant in numbers and a
minority language is found primarily in one region, there are other
solutions, such as a special administrative order for that region that do not
require regulations to protect the dominant language. In yet other states,
minority languages are given equal legal status to the dominant language.124
None of these protective measures have been taken in Slovakia.
The Language Law's restrictiveness is contrary to both municipal
legal principles and international norms. Most notably, the Language
Law's prohibition of the use of minority languages in administrative
contacts appears to conflict with both Slovak constitutional guarantees and
express provisions contained in binding international instruments. Section
3 of the Language Law blatantly conflicts with the spirit of Article 34 of
the Slovak Constitution. Article 34(3) reads:
in addition to the right to learn the official language, the
citizens of national minorities or ethnic groups shall, under
provisions fixed by law, also be guaranteed: a) the right to
be educated in a minority language, b) the right to use a
minority language in official communications, c) the right
to participate in decision making in matters affecting the
national minorities and ethnic groups.,,-,
This article clearly provides for the use of minority languages in
administrative contacts. This guarantee, however, is subject to the
restrictive "fixed by law" clause. The Language Law's constitutionality
has been challenged and the issue is currently pending before the
Constitutional Court. Constitutional Court Judge Klucka views the
Language Law as creating a legal gap between itself and the constitutional
guarantees. 26 If the constitution is to be given credibility and weight as the
founding legal document in Slovakia's legal system, the Constitutional
Court should hold that express constitutional guarantees are not to be
122. Justification, end of part II.
123. France, Lithuania, Belgium and Holland have language laws.
124. See, e.g., Finland.
125. SLOVK. CONST. art. 34(3).
126. Interview with Judge Jan Klucka, Slovak Constitutional Court, in Kosice, Slovakia
(July 18, 1996).
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limited, restricted, or eradicated by domestic legislation.'" The right to
use one's mother tongue in administrative affairs is not ensured in Slovakia
because of the absence of any law on minority languages.
Minority language rights within the international human rights
framework emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century and have
increasingly gained recognition as a protected right. In the absence of
provisions relating to the protection of minorities in the League of Nations
era, a series of treaties were established to secure minority status during
the inter-war years. These treaties largely incorporated the principles of
non-discrimination and equality, the right to citizenship, the right of
minorities to establish their own institutions, and a state obligation to
provide an equitable share of financial support toward primary schools in
minority languages when there was sufficient demand for such education."
Minority protection treaties during this period were largely patterned after
the Polish Minority Protection Treaty of 1919. Article 7 of this treaty
provided that "[n]o restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any
Polish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in
religion, in the press or in publications of any kind, or at public
meetings." 129 This provision was also contained in the Czechoslovakian
Minorities Treaty of 1919.'10 Guarantees contained in the treaties pre-
empted municipal legislation that was contrary to the treaty provisions.
Treaty ratification required states to take positive steps to comply with the
rights embodied therein.
Beginning with the Charter of the United Nations (Charter), the
focus shifted from minority protection granting specific rights to
supporting the more general concept of non-discrimination. This concept
is equally applicable to all individuals regardless of ethnic majority or
minority status. Article 1(3) of the Charter provides for "promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to . . . language . . . " in order to achieve
international co-operation.'3 ' The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
127. This statement should hold true unless the activity clearly threatens the sovereignty or
territorial integrity of the state or discriminates against other citizens. See SLOVK. CONST. art.
34, para. 3. The use of the Hungarian language during official contacts does not reach this
threshold.
128. See FERNAND DE VARENNES, LANGUAGE, MINORITIES, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 26
(1996).
129. For the full text of the Polish Minorities Treaty of 1919, see PATRICK THORNBERRY,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES (1991), (Appendix 1 is excerpted from
Protection of Linguistic, Racial, and Religious Minorities by the League of Nations, IB
MINORITIES. 1927.I.B.2. (Geneva, Aug. 1927)).
130. Id. at 41.
131. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para 3.
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(Declaration), in Article 2(1), also states that individuals are entitled to the
rights and freedoms included in the Declaration without regard to
language.'32 Language is a ground upon which discrimination is prohibited
under the ECHR Article 14.13 This principle is again set forth in the
CCPR in Article 2(1), and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights in Article 2(2).
The European Court of Human Rights in the Belgian Linguistics
Case analyzed the general anti-discrimination provision contained in the
ECHR.1'1 The applicants were the parents of families in Belgium who
applied for schooling on their behalf and on behalf of their children. The
gravamen of their complaint was that, as French speakers, they wanted
their children to be educated in French despite living in a region classified
under Belgian law as Dutch-speaking. By law, schooling had to be
conducted in the official language of the region. Thus, the Francophone
applicants alleged, the state was discriminating against them by failing to
provide schooling in their language in violation of Article 14.13- The court
held that legal and administrative distinctions that are objective and
reasonable are not violative of the ECHR's anti-discrimination clause. In
addition, the justifications must be proportional to the purposes of
maintaining such distinctions. In light of this ruling, the Slovak
government must have legitimate and balanced objectives for prohibiting
the use of the Hungarian language in public administration to comply with
Article 14.
International human rights customs with regard to minority
language rights have evolved since the Belgian Linguistics Case was
decided in 1968. Over the past two and a half decades several provisions
have been drafted and ratified that convey to varying degrees the right to
use minority languages in public administration. Legal or administrative
justifications must not only be non-discriminatory, they must also comply
with the terms and conditions of new binding instruments.' 36 The most
132. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., Resolutions, Part 1, at 71 (1948).
133. European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights art. 14 (hereinafter ECHR)
reads: "The enjoyment of rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or
other status." See also ECHR art. 5(2) (right to receive information on the reasons for arrest in
a language one understands), id. art. 6 (the right to a fair and public hearing), id. art. 13 (the
right to an effective remedy before a national authority).
134. Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Usage of Languages in Belgium
[hereinafter the Belgian Linguistics Case], 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1968).
135. The parents also alleged violations of the First Protocol to the ECHR and ECHR
Article 8.
136. The specific instruments are discussed in detail below.
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significant instruments are the FCNM (1995) and the Recommendation of
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe No. 1201 (1993)
(Recommendation 1201). Both of these documents contain provisions
allowing for the use of minority language in contacts with local authorities
in regions where substantial numbers of members of a particular minority
group reside.
In regions where minority language speakers are heavily
concentrated, public authorities should be able to respond to requests and
offer services in the minority language. Failure to do so could constitute a
violation of the right to non-discriminatory treatment by the state.' 37 In
southern Slovakia, speakers of the non-state language are numerous and
some residents may have limited proficiency in Slovak. This is
particularly true for young children or elderly citizens who conducted the
majority of their public and private communication in Hungarian. The
demographic data of the southern region demonstrates that the vast
majority of individuals encountered by public administrators will speak
Hungarian as their primary language. 38 Imposition of a state language
requirement may lead to greater delays in public services to non-native
speakers, higher costs for services if a bilingual public servant is needed,
difficulties in communicating information that could result in the loss of
benefits or services, and additional costs involved with traveling to an area
where bilingual services are available. Local authorities, in line with the
non-discrimination mandate of numerous international documents, should
provide an increasing number of services in the non-state language where a
substantial number of Hungarian citizens reside.' 9
In addition to concerns over discriminatory treatment in public
administration, the prerequisite of proficiency in the Slovak language for
137. In Case 379/87, Groener v. Minister of Educ., E.C.R. 3967 [1989], the European
Court of Justice stated that a state's linguistic policy cannot encroach upon a fundamental
freedom in a discriminatory manner. Any language preference, and the manner in which it is
applied, must be proportionate to the objective sought.
138. See generally AUAGUSTIN MAROK ET AL., SLOVAK-MAGYAR RELATIONS (1995). See
Groener supra note 137, at E.C.R. 3967); Selected Issues Viewed by Slovaks and Hungarians
Living in Ethnically Mixed Regions of Southern Slovakia, Sandor Marai Foundation & the
Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava (July 1994); Statement Issued on the
Occasion of the Hungarian Convention in Komarno (Jan. 4, 1994) (all statistics based on the
1991 Slovak census); PETER HUNCIK ET AL., COUNTERPROOF (1994); PAVOL FRIC ET AL.,
THE HUNGARIAN MINORITZ IN SLOVAKIA (1993).
139. Fernand de Varennes suggests several measures that local authorities could adopt to
conform with the non-discrimination principle including: 1) providing widely used official
documents and forms in minority language or bilingual versions; 2) accepting oral or written
applications in minority languages; 3) requests made in a minority language could be responded
to in the same language by local authorities; and 4) employing sufficient bilingual employees. DE
VARENNES, supra note 128, at 178.
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government employment is also disconcert.'1'  This may lead to
discrimination against members of minorities in employment for
government positions. Economic opportunity and success hinges upon
one's proficiency in the state language. As a result, Slovak native speakers
will benefit by this provision with regard to access to resources and to
public employment opportunities. In Slovakia, the state is a major
purveyor of employment, and ethnic Hungarians may be precluded from
the opportunities made available by the state solely on the basis of
language.
International human rights laws give special consideration to the
use of minority languages beyond protections against discrimination. Most
notably, the Slovak government has undertaken the obligation to respect
minority language usage in the SHBT. SHBT Article 15(4)(b) obliges the
Slovak government to respect the principles set forth in Recommendation
1201 .141 In relevant part the Recommendation states that every person shall
have the right freely to use his/her mother tongue in private and in public,
both orally and in writing. This right shall also apply to the use of his/her
language in publications and in the audiovisual sector. 42 In addition, the
regions in which substantial numbers of a national minority are settled, the
persons belonging to a national minority shall have the right to use their
mother tongue in their contacts with the administrative authorities and in
proceedings before the courts and legal authorities.13  By ratifying this
bilateral treaty, the Slovak government has committed itself to allow
individuals to communicate with administrative authorities in his or her
minority language. The requirement of paragraph 3 that "substantial
numbers of a national minority" group be present within a geographical
location for this right to be invoked is clearly met in the majority of towns
throughout southern Slovakia. In some towns and villages ethnic
Hungarians constitute more than eighty percent of the population. '4 Given
the binding nature of the SHBT, the Slovak government should provide
bilingual services in the majority of towns, cities, and villages located in
the southern region of Slovakia.
The public use of minority languages is also protected in numerous
other international instruments to which Slovakia is a party. The
protection of the use of minority languages is unconditionally provided for
in the CCPR. CCPR Article 27 states, "[iln those States in which ethnic,
140. This prerequisite is contained in section 3(2) of the Language Law.
141. See generally Recommendation 1201 art. 7(1),(3).
142. Id. art. 7(1).
143. Id. art. 7(3).
144. See Statement Issued on the Occasion of the Hungarian Convention in Komarno, by
the Hungarian Coalition (Jan. 4, 1994). These figures are based on the 1991 Slovak census.
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religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities
shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own
religion, or to use their own language." The language of Article 27
indicates that a system of minority language usage exceeds allowance
during criminal proceedings, as this situation is expliciy covered in
Article 14(3). Although unspecific, Article 27 seeks to promote equality
between minority and majority speakers. The provision's terms should
apply to official dealings where minority language speakers are at a
disadvantage, whether it be in law, administration, or in school. The
Human Rights Committee routinely inquires about the situation of minority
language schools, publications, court proceedings, television programs,
and radio broadcasts when member states make their human rights reports
to the Committee to monitor compliance with this article. 4 This
questioning evidences the broad scope of Article 27.
FCNM Article 10 contains a provision for the consideration of the
use of minority languages in official contacts. Article 10 states:
[1] [t]he Parties undertake to recognize that every person
belonging to a national minority has the right to use freely
and without interference his or her minority language, in
private and in public, orally and in writing.
[2] In areas inhabited by persons belonging to national
minorities traditionally or in substantial numbers, if those
persons so request and where such a request corresponds to
a real need, the Parties shall endeavour to ensure, as far as
possible, the conditions which would make it possible to
use the minority language in relations between those
persons and the administrative authorities.'"4
These principles are set forth with some hesitation. Mr. Heinrich Klebes,
Deputy Secretary General of the Council of Europe, opined that although
"the use of the minority language represents one of the principle means by
which [members of national minorities] can assert and preserve their
identity," paragraph 2 does not cover all relations between persons
belonging to a national minority and public authorities. 47 Paragraph 2 does
include communication with administrative authorities, but only if the two
145. See PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES
200 (1991).
146. FCNM supra note 71, art. 10.
147. Heinrich Klebes, Commentary to the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for
the Protection of National Minorities, 16 HUM. RTS. L.J. 92, 105 (1994).
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conditions of substantial numbers and a request for communication in
minority languages are met. This paragraph has been interpreted broadly
to include, for example, ombudsmen.'1 This Article was purposefully
worded very broadly to grant states a wide degree of discretion.
Nevertheless, it urges states to be as generous as possible in this area. As
the two requirements of paragraph 2 are met in Slovakia's southern region,
the Slovak government should provide for the use of minority languages in
relations with administrative authorities. The refusal of the Slovak
government to do so can be characterized as a failure to fulfill its
obligations under the FCNM.
In addition to the FCNM and the CCPR, various international
human rights documents have supported the use of minority languages in
the context of public administration. The Council of Europe's Vienna
Declaration on Human Rights, Appendix II, states:
We, Heads of State and Government of the members states
of the Council of Europe, have agreed as follows,
concerning the protection of national minorities: [P]ersons
belonging to national minorities must be able to use their
language both in private and in public and should be able
to use it, under certain conditions, in their relations with
the public authorities. 141
This principle is again set forth in the Council of Europe's
Recommendation 1134 (1990) on the Rights of Minorities. This
Recommendation enumerates general principles that states should apply to
respect the existence of national minorities within their borders,
specifically addressing principles relating to linguistic minorities.
Paragraph 12 articulates that "persons belonging to a linguistic minority
shall have access to adequate types and levels of public education in their
mother tongue." Paragraph 13 of Recommendation 1134 states:
[a]s far as European states are concerned they should...
ii. [t]ake all the necessary legislative, administrative,
judicial and other measures to create favourable conditions
to enable minorities to express their identity, to develop
their education, culture, language, traditions and customs;
148. Id. at 105.
149. Vienna Declaration on Human Rights, Council of Europe Summit, Vienna, Oct. 9,
1993. Reprinted in DE VARENNES, supra note 128, at 303.
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iv. Abstain from pursuing policies aimed at forced
assimilation of national minorities, from taking
administrative measures affecting the composition of the
population in areas inhabited by national minorities, and
from compelling such minorities to remain confined in
geographical and cultural 'ghettos;'
v. fully implement the provision of Article 27 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which
reads as follows: In those states in which ethnic, religious
or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such
minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own
culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to
use their own language.'1°
The Report of Experts on National Minorities'' by the OSCE states in
paragraph II that "[the participating states] reconfirm that persons
belonging to national minorities have the right freely to express, preserve
and develop their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity and to
maintain and develop their culture in all aspects, free of any attempts at
assimilation against their will." The experts noted, inter alia, the positive
results obtained through the use of education in one's mother tongue, and
funding the teaching of minority languages to the general public and in
teacher training programs.'5 2 Furthermore, the EU's Resolution on the
Languages and Cultures of Regional and Ethnic Minorities ' 3 recommends,
in paragraph 9, that: "[M]ember states . . . take social and economic
measures including: providing for the use of the regional and minority
languages in public concerns [and] providing for consumer information and
product labeling in regional and minority languages."
When a state provides protection to its national minorities, a more
harmonious relationship can develop between the state and the minority
groups found within its borders. Language constitutes the essence of
Hungarian culture and community. Supplying language rights to the
Hungarian minority may be the most effective means of diffusing ethnic
tension in Slovakia. By imposing a state preference for speakers of a
150. Council of Europe's Recommendation 1134 on the Right of Minorities(1990).
151. Report of Experts on National Minorities, Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (now the OSCE), Geneva, July 19, 1991.
152. Id.
153. Resolution on the Languages and Cultures of Regional and Ethnic Minorities
(European Union) European Parliament, Strasbourg, Oct. 30, 1987. Reprinted in DE
VARENNES, supra note at 128, at 26.
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certain language, the potential for discrimination against non-native
speakers of the designated language is great. Those who possess Slovak as
their primary language have a greater advantage for employment,
particularly by the state. Given Slovakia's centralized administration, this
advantage is enormous.The Slovak government must adhere to its obligations under
international human rights law. Specifically, the government agreed to
provide for the use of minority languages with local authorities in the
SHBT. In addition, numerous human rights instruments illustrate that
allowance for the minority language usage is a developing custom to be
respected by states. The politicization of language in Slovakia is not in
response to the inability of minority groups to speak the Slovak language,
because this is not a documented phenomenon. Rather, the government's
involvement with the regulation of language use derives from the desire to
create a common culture in Slovakia by forcing national minorities to
abandon their respective cultures and languages in order to fulfill the
government's nationalist agenda. The Slovak government must exercise
extreme care to balance the right of a state to safeguard the position of the
state language and to ensure that the languages of national minorities are
protected.
2. Minority Language Education
In 1995, the government launched the idea of alternative education
for minority children. The idea behind the plan is to give children,or rather
their parents, the opportunity to choose a Slovak, Hungarian or mixed
language education. The stated purpose of the project is to provide more
subjects to be taught in the Slovak language. This plan was also developed
to improve knowledge of the Slovak language among minority children.
Under the alternative education plan, Slovak is to be the language of
instruction for a certain number of hours each week. Only native Slovak
teachers would be allowed to teach certain subjects, such as history and
geography. - These teachers would be given extra wages in predominantly
Hungarian regions. An alternative education class would be established as
soon as demand was expressed, even if by only one pupil or parent. At
present, ethnic Hungarian children are free to choose an entirely Slovak
language school at every stage in their education. About one third of
ethnic Hungarian children make this choice. 1 4
Concerns about alternative education have been voiced by
members of the Hungarian minority. A prevailing criticism is that
alternative education is intended to eventually subdue all pure Hungarian-
154. The New Law on The State Language of the Slovak Republic, Istvan Lanstyak,
Bratislava 1996.
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language education in Slovakia. The program is perceived as a step
toward the gradual assimilation of ethnic Hungarian children and an
attempt to liquidate Hungarian schools, thereby decreasing the need for and
employment of Hungarian-speaking teachers. Fears are also expressed that
undue pressure would be employed to incite parents to choose the
alternative education form.'" Ethnic Hungarians assert that the term
alternate education is disingenuous, as school budgets may not be
increased adequately to provide for an increase in Slovak classes without a
decrease in Hungarian school budgets.
The government's response to these concerns has been to reiterate
that the educational program is entirely voluntary. This assertion,
however, has largely failed to ease the suspicions of ethnic Hungarians.
Hungarian distrust of the Slovak government's motives is reasonable given
a recent statement by the Minister of Education, Eva Sklavkovska. Ms.
Sklavkovska stated that the government objective was to establish at least
one Slovak class in all municipalities across the territory of southern
Slovakia, a goal independent of actual interest in such classes.5 6 A vast
majority of Hungarian parents, however, continue to reject the plan. An
ethnic Hungarian parent from Samorin expressed:
[flor us, there was no question as to whether we would
send our children to Hungarian schools. I attended a
Hungarian school and so did my husband. I think that, to
preserve our cultural identity, the basis of our children's
education must be in our mother tongue. Having my
children learn Hungarian history and literature is very
important and this information is only taught in Hungarian
schools. Without Hungarian language education, we
would only speak Hungarian at home and our language
would become a 'kuchinska rec,' a kitchen language.17
The decision for an ethnic Hungarian parent whether to send his or her
child to a Slovak or Hungarian school has as much to do with one's
opinions about cultural survival and political affiliation, as it does
educational choices. Mr. Laszlo Ollos of the Nitra Pedagogical College
asks, "[t]he absolute majority of Hungarian parents know that placing their
child in an alternative education school isn't only a decision about
155. See generally Sharon Fisher, An Education System in Chaos, TRANSITION, Sept. 8,
1995.
156. See generally DAILY NEWS MONITOR/TASR, Dec. 9, 1994.
157. Interview with an ethnic Hungarian parent, in Samorin, Slovakia (Aug. 15, 1996.)
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education, but is also a political act in support of the policies of the current
government. Which Hungarian parent is willing to do that?" "
On April 6, 1995, a law giving the Ministry of Education the right
to dismiss and appoint school directors was passed. This authority has
been exercised to dismiss public education officials and replace them with
HZDS and SNS sympathizers. In Hungarian dominated areas, appointed
school-directors have been ethnic Slovaks and government-friendly. 9
Four ethnic Hungarian high school principals were fired after they helped
to organize an opposition to the government's alternative education plan.
Mr. Laszlo Kovacs, one of the principals who was terminated for his
activity, recalled his experience:
It was the government's strategy to wait to announce the
[alternative education] plan until the end of the school year
because they thought that all of the teachers would be too
tired to fight against it. On June 18th [1995], [the
Hungarian school principals] received the plan in the mail.
The letter told us that a meeting was planned for June 20th
to discuss what the plan meant. Well, we all knew what it
meant already!
Since I didn't have much time, I got together with three
other principals on June 19th and we wrote a statement
against the plan. Before the meeting on the 20th, thirteen
of the thirty school directors signed the petition against the
plan. Mr. Peus [the Director of Secondary Education]
read us the plan at the meeting and then [one of the
Hungarian principals] read the opposition statement. Mr.
Peus was angry and the meeting ended abruptly. The next
day, June 21st, I got a letter in the mail telling me that I
was fired. Mr. Peus signed the letter. All four of us who
drafted the petition were fired. The ironic thing is that I
had just received a certificate and money from Mr. Peus
five days before the meeting rewarding me for the good
job I was doing at the school. They thought that they
could scare the public by firing us and the result of this
would be that nobody would be against the [alternative
education] plan. But it didn't turn out the way that they
had planned because a wave of protest swept through
158. Interview with Mr. Laszlo Ollos, Professor at the Nitra Pedagogical College and
Hungarian Civic Party member, in Samorin, Slovakia (July 23, 1996).
159. See generally SME, May 20, 1995.
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[southern Slovakia] and people in communities organized
against the proposal.
In retrospect, I'm sad that I lost my job, but I still think
my sacrifice was necessary because it caused problems for
the government. I know that the threats to Hungarian
language schools are not finished, but national attention
was drawn to the situation after I was fired.'6
If the government is using its power to appoint and dismiss school officials
in a manner that suggests discrimination against ethnic Hungarian
principals, the government is acting contrary to international law. The
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 7 states that
"all are . . . entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the
law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in
violation of this Declaration .... "161 CCPR Article 19 asserts that
"everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 'l 62
CCPR Article 18 and ECHR Article 9 guarantee the right of freedom of
thought and conscience. These provisions encompass the right to oppose a
government policy.
Another major problem facing Hungarian language education is the
lack of Hungarian speaking teachers. This problem is due to decrease in
university training of teachers in the Hungarian language. In addition,
insufficient numbers of recent university graduates are qualified to replace
retiring teachers .161 The age structure of active teachers is unfavorable
because between 1970 and 1989, termed the Husak Period after then
President Husak, government policy was to phase out the education of
teachers at the Hungarian Department of the Nitra Pedagogical College.
Today there are approximately 700 Hungarian students at the Pedagogical
College. During the Husak Period, this number was decreased to
approximately 100 Hungarian students. Mr. Laszlo Ollos of the
Department of Philosophy at the Nitra Pedagogical College explained:
[wie will need 1,500 Hungarian teachers to replace the
first generation of Hungarian teachers who will soon retire.
160. Interview with Mr. Laszlo Kovacs, former principle of the Hungarian High School in
Samorin, Slovakia, in Samorin, Slovakia (July 10, 1996).
161. See generally International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, May 28, 1993
[hereinafter CCPR].
162. Id.
163. For extensive statistics on Hungarian language education, such as number of
pupils/students, availability of schools and teachers, see Education in the regions with mixed
nationalities (1993); See also Gabzdilova, Schools in the Slovak Republic with instruction in the
Hungarian language - present status, in MINORITIES IN POLITICS.
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We currently do not have enough Hungarian teachers to
replace them all. Yet there is constantly a threat to
decrease the number of Hungarian students admitted to the
College, as well as threats to decrease the number of
Hungarian faculty here. Further decreases will continue to
threaten the future of Hungarian education in Slovakia.
There can be no Hungarian language education without
teachers who can teach in the Hungarian language. '6
The total number of Hungarian students accepted at Nitra was reduced
from 1009 in 1994-95 to 700 in 1995-96.6, The Hungarian Department of
Nitra Pedagogical College is the only higher educational facility in
Slovakia where it is possible to take classes conducted in the Hungarian
language. At Comenius University in Bratislava, it is possible to study
Hungarian as a foreign language, however, the language of instruction is
Slovak and knowledge of the Slovak language is required of all students."
In September 1996, the Slovak Parliament passed an ominous
measure that will further centralize government control over university
education. 17 The law increases the Education Ministry's competence to
allot subsidies and gives the Education Ministry the right to veto the
appointment of professors and assistant professors.'- Although it is
premature to predict the effect of the law on the Hungarian minority, this
new law may be employed to nullify the appointment of ethnic Hungarian
professors. This suspicion is reasonable given the current political climate
in Slovakia and the articulated hostility of the Ministry of Education to
Hungarian language education.
Ethnic Hungarian students are under-represented in Slovak
universities.'6 This is a sociological problem that affects members of the
164. Interview with Mr. Laszlo Ollos, Professor at the Nitra Pedagogical College and
Hungarian Civic Party member, in Samorin, Slovakia (July 23, 1996).
165. See generally NARODNA OBRODA, Feb. 21, 1995.
166. If the minority is considered too small and the effort of founding and maintaining
higher level education in the Hungarian language too costly, organized scholarship systems for
student exchanges with Hungary can be considered. This would be completely in the spirit of
international exchange and cooperation recommended by numerous international agreements.
See supra FCNM supra note 71, art. 12 (3).
167. This measure was vetoed by President Kovacs and later re-approved by Parliament on
October 23, 1996. See Sharon Fisher, Slovak Parliament Re-Approves Controversial Laws, 207
OMRI DAILY DIG. II, (Oct. 24, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997) <http://www.omri.CZ/
publications/DD/index.Dhtml >.
168. See Jiri Pehe, Slovak Parliament Rules on Universities, 188 OMRI DAILY DIG. II,
(Sept. 27, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997) <http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index
.Dhtml >.
169. This point is elaborated in Gabzdilova, see MINORITIES IN POLITICS supra note 163.
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Hungarian minority and the state because they do not benefit from the total
intellectual resources of its citizenry.7 0 Reasons given for this under-
representation include the lower social and economic standing of ethnic
Hungarians, the lack of incentives for Hungarian students to study at
Slovak universities, insufficient knowledge of education possibilities, and
insufficient proficiency in the Slovak language. '1'
Nationalist interests resulted in the cancellation of a school
textbook entitled Slovakia in the New Century that was to be published in
1997. Although five of the six members of the oversight committee at the
Ministry of Education supported its publication, the history textbook was
canceled due to its sections pertaining to the de facto Slovak state in
existence between 1939 and 1945 and the Czechoslovak state from 1918
and 1945.172 Matica Slovenska, a cultural organization aimed at promoting
the Slovak nation, successfully opposed publication of the textbook for its
inclusion of criticism of the Slovak government's compliance with Hitler's
regime during World War II and for its failure to include information
concerning the abuse and humiliation inflicted on Slovaks by the Czechs
during pre-war Czechoslovakia. Mr. Jan Benko, vice-chairman of the
history section at Matica Slovenska, explained the organization's
opposition to the textbook: "Slovak history is a fight for national
sovereignty and Slovak statehood. National history . . . must have its
pride. This 'textbook' lacks the sense and pride of national history. It
therefore cannot be used to educate our children to become patriots. They
cannot, they must not, learn from this textbook.""'
The Slovak Constitution specifically guarantees the right to be
educated in a minority language.11 This guarantee, however, is weakened
by a fixed by law clause that could limit or restrict this constitutional right.
Furthermore, exercise of the rights granted in Article 34 of the constitution
may not "threaten the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic or discriminate
against other citizens."", The provision granting the right to be educated
in one's minority language should not be categorized as a threat to Slovak
sovereignty. As long as education in the Slovak language continues to be
170. Only 2.1% of ethnic Hungarians have university degrees, as compared with 6.5%of
Slovaks and 8% of the Ukrainian minority (due to positive discrimination during the communist
era).
171. See MINORITIES IN POLITICS, supra note 163, at 170-71.
172. See Jana Dorotkova, Matica Slovenska Cancels History Textbook, THE SLOVAK
SPECTATOR, July 31-Aug. 13, 1996, at 3.
173. Id.
174. SLOVK. CONST. art. 34(2)(a). In addition to the right to learn the official language,
the citizens of national minorities or ethnic groups shall, under provision fixed by law, also be
guaranteed: (b) the right to be educated in a minority language.
175. Id. art. 34(3).
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supported by the Slovak government, the maintenance of Hungarian
language school will not lead to discrimination against other citizens.
Under the constitution, therefore, the Slovak government should continue
to support and finance Hungarian language education at its present level.
Numerous provisions of international documents concern the
education of national minorities. Under the League of Nations system,
several treaties contain paragraphs specifically providing for the use of
minority language instruction. The Polish Minorities Treaty of 1919, as
well as similar treaties in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania,
provide that minorities "shall have an equal right to establish, manage, and
control at their own expense, charitable, religious and social institutions,
schools and other educational establishments with the right to use their own
language and exercise their religion freely therein."11 6  This paragraph
obliged states to establish minority language schools in areas inhabited by
minorities and to finance these institutions on a proportional basis. 7 In
Treatment of Polish Nationals in Danzig, the Permanent Court of
International Justice examined Article 9 of the Polish Minorities Treaty."8
This article ensured that adequate primary instruction facilities would be
provided to non-Polish speaking nationals. The court held that such a
provision represented the right of "minorities, the members of which are
citizens of the state, to enjoy . . . amongst other rights, the equality of
rights . . . in matters relating to primary education."' 79  The Permanent
Court again reinforced the provision of minority language education in the
Advisory Opinion on Minority Schools in Albania.' The Court held:
[p]rovisions will be made in the public educational system
in towns and districts in which [there] are resident a
considerable proportion of Albanian nationals whose
mother-tongue is not the official language, for adequate
facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools
instruction shall be given to the children of such nationals,
through the medium of their own language, it being
understood that this provision does not prevent teaching of
176. See supra note 121.
177. Id. at 96.
178. Treatment of Polish Nationals in Danzig (1932), P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 44, 1.
179. Id. at 9.
180. Advisory Opinion on Minority Schools in Albania, 1935, P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 64,
3, at 21. This opinion examined the validity of an Albanian law aimed at abolishing all private
schools operating within the state.
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the official language being made obligatory in the said
schools. "
In the Belgian Linguistic Case,12 the European Court of Human
Rights held that ECHR, Protocol 1, Article 2 did not impose an affirmative
duty on states to ensure, at their own expense, or subsidize education of a
particular type. Article 2 only implies the right to "avail themselves of the
means of instruction existing at a given time."" 3  Article 2, therefore,
concerns the freedom of education, not a social or cultural right to
education. Furthermore, the Court concluded that it is not per se
discrimination on the basis of ethnicity under Article 14 to limit the
number of languages in which instruction is given in state sponsored
schools.
The holding of the court in the Belgian Linguistics Case is
pragmatic. It has been asserted that it would be unrealistic to mandate that
a state provide full funding for every linguistic minority, regardless of their
numbers, schooling in their respective minority language. A pure minority
language educational system could be an unruly drain on state resources
and may result in decreasing the cumulative quality of education on a
national level. However, these adverse consequences may not hold true in
Slovakia, where the Hungarian minority is heavily concentrated in one
region. This demographic situation eases the hardships relating to the
provision of minority language schooling. Since 1968, when the Belgian
Linguistics Case was decided, the right to minority language education has
been codified in numerous international human rights documents. It is
possible that the Belgian Linguistics Case would be decided differently in
light of the increasing emphasis placed upon the protection of linguistic and
cultural rights within the international legal framework.
The most relevant statement on minority language education is
Recommendation 1201 both because of its explicit discussion of minority
language education and its binding nature upon the Slovak government.
Recommendation 1201 was contained in the SHBT. The Slovak
government is thus obliged to respect the provisions contained in this
document. Recommendation 1201 Article 8(1) states:
[e]very person belonging to a national minority shall have
the right to learn his/her mother tongue and to receive an
education in his/her mother tongue at an appropriate
number of schools and of state educational and training
181. Id.
182. See supra note 134.
183. Id. at 31.
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establishments, located in accordance with the
geographical distribution of the minority.'"
The Slovak government did not issue any reservations limiting the effect of
this provision. Although the legal obligations under Recommendation
1201 have been debated,",s the Slovak government explicitly negotiated the
terms of the SHBT and should be held to the obligations created therein.
Under Recommendation 1201's terms, educational opportunities in the
Hungarian language should not be curtailed, particularly in the southern
region of Slovakia where the Hungarian minority is concentrated.
In addition to Recommendation 1201, the FCNM includes state
mandates to provide minority language education. FCNM Article 12(1)
articulates that state parties "shall, where appropriate, take measures in the
field of education and research to foster knowledge of the culture, history,
language and religion of their national minorities and of the majority."
The language of this provision reflects the importance attributed to the
education of national minorities about their respective cultures and
identities. FCNM Article 12(2) asserts that state parties "shall inter alia
provide adequate opportunities for teacher training and access to textbooks,
and facilitate contacts among students and teachers of different
communities." FCNM Article 12(3) obliges that states "undertake to
promote equal opportunities for access to education at all levels for persons
belonging to national minorities." Education is a means through which
individuals advance socially, intellectually, and economically. Given
evidence of the disproportionate representation of ethnic Hungarians in
higher education, the Slovak government, to comply with the dictates of
Article 12, should take active steps toward closing this gap in educational
achievement.
FCNM Article 14 specifically addresses the importance of an
individual belonging to a national minority group to learn his or her
minority language. Paragraph 1 states that parties to the signatory states
"undertake to recognize that every person belonging to a national minority
has the right to learn his or her minority language." Paragraph 2 sets forth
the conditions under which education is to be provided in minority
languages. The clause asserts that:
[i]n areas inhabited by persons belonging to national
minorities traditionally or in substantial numbers, if there
184. See supra note 61, Recommendation 1201 art. 8(1).
185. See generally (Opinion on the Interpretation of Article 11 of the Draft Protocol to the
European Convention on Human Rights Appended to Recommendation 1201 of the
Parliamentary Assembly, Venice Commission), CDL-INF (96) 4, Mar. 22, 1996. This opinion
is discussed in greater detail in the section on Slovakia's territorial division legislation, infra.
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is sufficient demand, the Parties shall endeavor to ensure,
as far as possible and within the framework of their
education systems, that persons belonging to those
minorities have adequate opportunities for being taught the
minority language or for receiving instruction in this
language. "6
Similar to FCNM Article 10(2), Article 14(2) includes the condition that
sufficient demand from persons belonging to a national minority be
expressed before instruction in minority languages is provided. This
phrase, however, is left undefined. Beyond purely demographic
consideration of whether sufficient demand for Hungarian language
schooling exists, political tensions in the region and the historic presence
of Hungarian speakers in southern Slovakia are also relevant factors to be
considered in this determination. 7 The words as far as possible indicate
that the allocation of state expenditure to minority language institutions is
contingent upon the state's financial resources. The FCNM provisions
dealing with minority language education and instruction are worded
flexibly to allow individual states to determine the appropriate level of
funding in light of its particular circumstances. Mr. Heinrich Klebes of
the Council of Europe commented that:
[t]he alternative referred to in [Paragraph 2] "opportunities
for being taught the minority language or for receiving
instruction in this language" - are not mutually exclusive.
Even though Article 14 paragraph 2 imposes no duty upon
states to do both, its wording does not prevent the state
Parties from implementing the teaching of the minority
language as well as the instruction in the minority
language. Bilingual instruction may be one of the means
of achieving the objective of this provision. The obligation
arising from this paragraph could be extended to pre-
school education.,u
Article 14(3) recognizes that knowledge of the official language is
a factor of social cohesion and integration. 9 Overall, the wording is
tentative and evidences unease at the prospect of recognizing the right to
minority language education. This hesitancy is largely derived from the
186. See FCNM supra note 71, art. 14, para. 2.
187. See DE VARENNES, supra note 128, at 205.
188. See DE VARENNES, supra note 128.
189. "Paragraph 2 of this article shall be implemented without prejudice to the learning of
the official language or the teaching in this language." See FCNM supra note 71, art. 14(3).
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need to balance the desire to integrate minority groups into the society of
the state concerned and the need to preserve minority culture and
language.190
Beyond the obligations contained in Recommendation 1201 and the
FCNM, numerous international instruments embody the growing trend in
human rights law to provide, to a varying degree, the right to education in
one's mother tongue. The Convention Against Discrimination in
Education Article 519, states that:
[t]he state parties to this Convention agree that...
(c) it is essential to recogni[z]e the right of members of
national minorities to carry on their own educational
activities, including the maintenance of schools and,
depending on the educational policy of each state, the use
or the teaching of their own language ....
Furthermore, the Convention on the Rights of the Child Article 29
provides that:
1. State parties agree that the education of the child shall
be directed to...
(c) the development of respect for the child's parents, his
or her own cultural identity, language and values, for the
national values of the country in which the child is living,
the country from which he or she may originate, and for
civilizations different from his or her own .... 192
The Council of Europe's European Charter for Regional of
Minority Languages also provides for minority language education in
Article 8.1"3 Article 8 offers several options for the allocation of education
in the relevant regional or minority language at the pre-school, primary
school, secondary level, technical and vocational education, university and
adult educational level. Section (g) and (h) of this article provide for the
training of teachers in minority languages and for the teaching of minority
190. Notably, the ECHR is silent on this issue.
191. Convention Against Discrimination in Education, adopted Dec. 14, 1960, 429
U.N.T.S. 93.
192. Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N.G.A. Res. 25 (XLIV), 44 U.N. GAOR
(Nov. 20, 1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1457 (1989).
193. See generally European Charter for Regional of Minority Languages, Council of
Europe, Strasbourg, Nov. 5, 1992.
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history and culture. Provision for minority language instruction is again
contained in the EU's Resolution on the Languages and Cultures of
Regional and Ethnic Minorities.," This Resolution recommends, in
paragraph 5, that:
[M]ember states . . carry out educational measures
including: arranging for pre-school to university education
and continuing education to be officially conducted in the
regional and minority languages in the language areas
concerned on an equal footing with instruction in the
national languages, . . . giving particular attention to the
training of teaching staff in the regional or minority
languages and making available the educational resources
required to accomplish these measures, promoting
information and resources on educational opportunities in
the regional and minority languages .... 9
Education in one's mother tongue, particularly during primary
schooling, is one of the most effective ways of teaching young children. If
a child speaks Hungarian at home and enters a Slovak-only language
school upon the age of six, foreign language education could produce
negative affects on the child. In areas of Slovakia where ethnic
Hungarians comprise the vast numerical majority, a child is continually
exposed to the Hungarian language in the home, on the streets, and in local
shops. Entering into an educational institution that teaches in the state
language may logically produce feelings of anxiety, inferiority, and
discomfort. UNESCO studied the impact of foreign language education
and concluded that "[t]o expect [a child] to deal with new information or
ideas presented to him [sic] in a familiar language is to impose on him a
double burden, and he will make slower progress."'1' This view was
reinforced in the South West Africa Case (Second Phase), where Judge
Tanaka of the International Court of Justice commented that "if we
consider education . . . we cannot deny the value of vernacular as the
medium of instruction[.]" 1'9
194. Resolution on the Languages and Cultures of Regional and Ethnic Minorities
(European Union) European Parliament, Strasbourg, Oct. 30, 1987. Reprinted in DE VARNNES,
supra note 128, at 299.
195. Id. para. 5.
196. UNESCO, THE USE OF VERNACULAR LANGUAGES IN EDUCATION 691 (1953).
197. 284 South West Africa Case, 1966 I.C.J. 6. (July 1966) Several studies have been
conducted which support the conclusion that non-mother tongue education correlates with poor
educational results, psychological inferiority, and may even provide a basis for ethnic tension.
See generally Steven Rosnbaum, Educating Children of Immigrant Workers: Policies in France
and the USA, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 429, 455 (1981); Karl A. Deustach, THE POSTAL
19971
82 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
Alternative education should be considered an additional
educational opportunity for ethnic Hungarians. As higher education in the
Slovak Republic is available almost exclusively in the Slovak language,
ethnic Hungarians must develop knowledge of the state language in order
to pursue advanced careers. By widening the selection of educational
options available for ethnic Hungarians, the alternative education plan
could provide benefits to the minority community. The projected benefits
of alternative education can only be reaped if the element of choice is
extant in the system. Otherwise the alternative education plan, together
with positive discrimination in favor of ethnic Slovak teachers and pressure
on pupils to incline towards more Slovak options, constitutes a blatant
attempt to assimilate children of the ethnic Hungarian community into the
Slovak nation. '
It is a difficult task for the Slovak government to create an
educational system that will satisfy the needs of both Hungarians and
Slovaks in ethnically commingled areas. While Hungarians must be
offered an education in their own language, they should also be given the
possibility to learn sufficient Slovak to prepare them for university studies
and for coexistence in a multilingual state. Although the importance of
learning Slovak should not be underestimated, Hungarian language schools
on all levels must be made available to all who wish a unilingual,
Hungarian education.' The desirable level of Slovak mastery is a question
to be answered by each individual (or parent) for his or herself.2 The role
of minority language education in Slovakia should not be underestimated.
Multilingual abilities must be viewed as an asset in Slovakia. The policy
of the Slovak government should be one of generosity towards the
Hungarian minority. This is particularly true given Slovakia's
commitments under international law. As language is the primary
distinctive feature of ethnic Hungarians, education in the Hungarian
language is vital to the preservation of Hungarian cultural identity.
SIGNIFICANCE OF LINGUISTIC CONFILICTS (Savard & Vigneault, eds., Les Etats multilingues 14
(1975); STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION, U.N. PUBLICATION 90, cited with approval
in DE VARENNES, supra note 128, at 194.
198. FCNM art. 5(2) states: "Without prejudice to measures taken in pursuance of their
general integration policy, the Parties shall refrain from policies or practices aimed at
assimilation of persons belonging to national minorities against their will and shall protect these
persons from any action aimed at such assimilation." See FCNM supra note 71, art. 5(2)
199. See, e.g., the possibilities for the Swedish minority in Finland to study law or
medicine in the Swedish language.
200. See Justification supra note 122. "The state ... is required to establish the conditions
for, and must strive to insure that, every citizen be able to master the language in which he can
make himself understood in the entire territory of the state[.]"
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3. Territorial Divisions
In July 1996, despite wide criticism and a presidential veto, the
Slovak parliament passed a controversial territorial division measure that
geographically and administratively reconfigured the country's political
map. The law expands the number of districts from thirty-four to seventy-
nine and increases the number of regions from four to eight. In addition,
parliament approved a measure that reorganizes state administration at the
regional and district level, mandating that a state administrator be
appointed in each region. This administrator then appoints an
administrator for each district. Each district state administrator can then
appoint all of the members of the district state administrative board.°'
The territory division law stretches the regions of Slovakia from
north to south, thus weakening the voting power of the Hungarian minority
by splitting Slovakia's southern region, where most ethnic Hungarians
reside, into several new and smaller districts. The territorial division plan
leaves an ethnic Hungarian majority in only two of the seventy-nine newly
approved districts.- Successful passage of the territorial arrangement plan
resulted in the center of gravity of each of the regions being placed in
central Slovakia, longitudinally. Ethnic Hungarians must now travel to
distant locations to conduct administrative business. In addition, there is a
greater likelihood that ethnic Hungarians will encounter officials who do
not speak Hungarian. This is in contrast to the bilingual abilities of most
officials in southern Slovakia.
While government officials assert that the reorganization measures
are a means of giving more administrative power to local authorities,
opposition politicians criticize the plan as reminiscent of communist-style
central rule where party members regulate local affairs. Rather than direct
election of local officials by the local population, this regime allows
regional and district heads to be appointed by the state government.
Refuting the government's claims of local empowerment, Democratic Left
Vice-Chairman Peter Weiss remarked that "[d]ecentralization is when the
state transfers a part of its powers to elected municipal governments and
makes sure those are adequately financed from taxes collected in the
region." 203 Ethnic Hungarians believe that the territorial reorganization is a
201. See Jana Dorotkova, Law Carves Slovakia Into More Regions, THE SLOVAK
SPECTATOR, July 17 - 30, 1996, at 3.
202. Statement of the Hungarian Civic Party, Mar. 27, 1996.
203. Id. Opposition parties speculate that the territorial arrangement may serve to secure a
HZDS victory in the upcoming elections in 1998. At the HZDS Congress held in March 1996,
Meciar articulated the benefits of changing the Slovak electoral system from a proportionate
system to that of a majority system, thereby creating two leading political rivals in an effort to
stabilize the Slovak political scene.
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gerrymandering device aiming to create new districts to ensure HZDS and
SNS victories in future elections.
This legislative measure may be a response to increasing calls for
ethnic Hungarian cultural, educational, and territorial autonomy.
Following the first government proposal for altering the territorial
arrangement in January 1994, ethnic Hungarians held a controversial
meeting in the southern city of Komarno. This meeting resulted in
demands for a territorial division plan based on ethnic composition. The
Hungarian proposal aimed at decentralizing the state by delegating more
power to regional and local authorities in predominantly Hungarian as well
as Slovak regions.2 The Slovak government assessed the proposal as a
step in the direction of a secession of majority Hungarian territories.
Territorial self-rule would grant "autonomy for a region that would very
quickly join the Hungarian mother state. The creation of a greater
Hungary is the dream of ethnic Hungarian politicians . . . ." asserted
Zdenka Anettova of the Slovak cultural organization, Matica Slovenska.- 5
Government resistance to full autonomy stems from the fact that in all
areas where Hungarians constitute an ethnic majority, ethnic Slovaks are a
minority. To hand over all decision making power to local authorities,
therefore, is not politically feasible. The current Slovak government is
likely to resist requests for any form of autonomy because it would
decentralize HZDS's centralized political control. The prospect of local
self-government in southern Slovakia prompted the Slovak government to
counter the influence of elected representatives by replacing government
officials with SNS party members throughout the region. Such activity has
reversed the results of democratic elections.
The Hungarian political parties all, to varying degrees, support
greater decision making power for minorities; be it in the shape of
decentralization or a form of minority autonomy. Coexistence, which has
taken the most radical stand on the issue, supports the creation of self-
governing territorial units. MKDH strives to ensure "autonomy in the
minority culture and education."- ° In 1994, however, MKDH rejected the
concept of territorial autonomy in favor of cultural autonomy. Mr. Gyula
Bardos, a MKDH parliament member stated:
[iun the current confrontational atmosphere, many political
representatives see autonomy as something evil, negative,
204. See Statement of Convention of Local Government Representatives, Mayors and
Members of Parliament from Southern Slovakia, issued in KoMARNO, Jan. 8, 1994.
205. Zdenka Anettova, Should Ethnic Hungarians Receive Autonomy?, THE SLOVAK
SPECTATOR, July 31-Aug. 13, 1996, at 11.
206. Information provided by MKDH.
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or even dangerous, jeopardizing the territorial integrity of
the Slovak Republic . . . Some people claim that
autonomy, or self-administration, is a tool to join the
territory of southern Slovakia to Hungary. This is a lie.
We are not questioning the borders, we do not want to join
anyone. We only want decisions about us not to be made
without us. In theory, according to the Constitution, we
have the right to participate when matters concerning
national minorities and ethnic groups are being decided.
But in practice, there are no laws and regulations that
would guarantee us effective participation in the decision
making and control process.w
The Hungarian Civic Party has taken a far less radical stance on the issue
of autonomy than the other parties. The Hungarian Civic Party
recommends decentralization efforts and plebiscites to decide the names of
towns, a very contentious issue that is discussed in greater detail below.
Ethnic Hungarian parties, by promoting this issue, have become suspect
even in the eyes of the more moderate political parties and are therefore
finding it difficult to have any kind of cooperation with the other parties on
a national level.- The cause of the Hungarian minority, ironically, has
been harmed by the more radical positions held by members of the
Hungarian coalition. The most commonly suggested form of self-
government is the simple decentralization of power in Slovakia, both in
Slovak and Hungarian regions. Functional self-government in matters of
culture and education is another suggested form of autonomy. Functional
self-government would allow Hungarian schools to be operated by
Hungarian boards, while Slovak schools would stay under Slovak control.
Ratification of the SHBT re-agitated the debate on self-government
for ethnic Hungarians. The SHBT contained a binding provision regarding
local or autonomous authorities. SHBT 15(4)(b) states: "[The State
Parties] shall apply . . . as legal obligations . . . Recommendation of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe No. 1201 (1993),
respecting individual human and civil rights, including the rights of
persons belonging to national minorities." Recommendation 1201 Article
11 stipulates that:
[I]n the regions where they are in a majority, the persons
belonging to a national minority shall have the right to
207. Gyula Bardos, Should Ethnic Hungarians Receive Autonomy?, THE SLOVAK
SPECTATOR, July 31-Aug. 13, 1996, at 11.
208. See generally Sharon Fisher, Ethnic Hungarians Back Themselves Into a Corner,
TRANSITION, Dec. 29, 1995.
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have at their disposal appropriate local or autonomous
authorities or to have a special status, matching the specific
historical and territorial situation and in accordance with
the domestic legislation of the state.
The treaty was passed by the Slovak parliament only because the ratified
version included a restricting clause limiting the effect of Recommendation
1201 Article 11. The restricting clause stated that:
[tihe Government of the Slovak Republic emphasizes that it
has never accepted and has not enshrined in the treaty any
formulation that would be based on the recognition of the
principle of collective rights for the minorities and that
would admit the creation of autonomous structures on
ethnic principle. It insists that it has agreed to mention the
Recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe No. 1201 (1993) exclusively with the
inclusion of the restricting clause: 'respecting individual
human and civil rights, including the rights of persons
belonging to national minorities.
Memorandum and addendum issued unilaterally by a government
pertaining to the interpretation of a bilateral treaty does not have any effect
under international law. Nevertheless, the interpretation clause has a
significant effect on political culture in Slovakia. The pronouncement
serves to reinforce the absolute opposition of the government to any
accommodation for the self-governance of the Hungarian minority.
Recommendation 1201 Article 11 was the subject of study in
March 1996 by the Venice Commission, a group of experts appointed by
the Council of Europe. The Commission concluded that Article 11 should
be interpreted very cautiously and that the right of national minorities to
local or autonomous authorities "is possible only in the presence of a
binding instrument of international law." 210 Article 11 does not support a
collective right to local self-government, but rather asserts the right of
individual members of a national minority group to exercise the rights
provided in association with others. Article 11 neither defines the three
209. Statement of the Slovak Government, Mar. 18, 1996 quoted in Heinrich Klebes, The
Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 16 HUM.
RTs. L.J. 92, 96 n.21. Interestingly, prior to its admittance into the Council of Europe, the
Slovak Parliament passed a resolution stating that the Slovakia's policy on the protection of its
national minorities was based on the principles contained in Recommendation 1201. See
generally Slovak National Council, Resolution 295, June 23, 1993.
210. Opinion on the Interpretation of Article 11 of the Draft Protocol to the European
Convention on Human Rights Appended to Recommendation 1201 of the Parliamentary Assembly,
Venice Commission, CDL-INF (96) 4, Mar. 22, 1996, at 5.
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means of autonomy enumerated, "local or autonomous authorities or to
have a special status," nor proscribes a model for fulfilling obligations
created therein. Although Recommendation 1201 may not entitle the
Hungarian minority to autonomous authorities, the direction of the
Recommendation is clear. Recommendation 1201 seeks to encourage state
parties to allocate sufficient power to local authorities in regions heavily
populated by members of national minority groups. This allocation would
result in the interests of national minorities being reflected in government.
By implementing legislation that takes elective control of local
representatives out of the hands of the local population, the Slovak
government has acted in violation of the spirit of Recommendation 1201.
While the right to local autonomy is not settled under international
law, the right to effective participation in a civil society is widely accepted.
Ethnic Hungarian calls for autonomy have been in response to the
perceived deterioration of minority voting power and representation in
government. This situation could be remedied through other means, such
as by passage of a law that truly decentralizes state administration. The
FCNM, while not providing a legal right to local autonomy, does
guarantee the right to effective participation of members of national
minority groups in public affairs. 2" FCNM Article 15 states: "The Parties
shall create the conditions necessary for the effective participation of
persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic
life and in public affairs, in particular those affecting them." 212 Although
no reference is made to local authorities, the territorial arrangement now in
effect in the Slovak Republic denies ethnic Hungarians of this right.
FCNM Article 16 also concerns the minority participation in government.
This article states that, "The parties shall refrain from measures which
alter the proportions of the populations in areas inhabited by persons
belonging to national minorities and are aimed at restricting the rights and
freedoms flowing from the principles enshrined in the present framework
convention."2 '3 The Explanatory Report accompanying the FCNM lists as
examples of such measures not just "expropriations, evictions, and
expulsions," but also "redrawing administrative borders with a view to
restricting the enjoyment of such rights and freedoms." 2 4 Redrawing the
regions and districts of Slovakia has infringed on the right to effective
participation in public affairs. The effectiveness of Hungarian participation
in public affairs is diminished if administrative contacts are conducted in a
211. See FCNM supra note 71, art. 15.
212. Id.
213. Id. art. 16.
214. FCNM, Explanatory Report. See generally FCNM supra note 71.
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language other than one's mother tongue and far from their homes. None
of the measures recommended to state parties by the FCNM Explanatory
Report to enhance minority participation have been taken in Slovakia. 5
The principle of effective participation of members of national
minority groups is further referenced in IPNM Article 21. This article
provides that: "in accordance with the policies of the states concerned,
states will respect the right of persons belonging to national minorities to
effective participation in public affairs, in particular in decisions affecting
the areas where they live or in the matters affecting them." The
effectiveness of Hungarian participation at all levels of government is
diminished by the territorial division law's prohibition against the election
of regional state administrators, local district administrators, and the
district state administration board members. By forcing members of the
Hungarian minority to travel farther distances to reach the administrative
center of their respective regions, Hungarian's interests are less likely to
be represented or acknowledged because of the increased distance from
predominantly Hungarian territories. These results are in contrast to
Recommendation 1201, the FCNMs provisions, and the IPNM.
The role of local and regional authorities is particularly important
in a state emerging as a democracy after decades of centralized, communist
rule. The principles encompassed in the European Charter of Self-
Government, while not binding on the Slovak Republic, should be
instructive.116  This Charter outlines a framework to be followed in
establishing forms of local self-government. The preamble stresses that:
[local authorities are one of the main foundations of any
democratic regime; [c]onsidering that the right of citizens
to participate in the conduct of public affairs is one of the
democratic principles that are shared by all member states
215. Parties could promote ... inter alia the following measures:
-consultation with these persons, by means of appropriate procedures and, in
particular, through their representative institutions, when Parties are contemplating
legislation or administrative measures likely to effect them directly;
-involving these persons in the preparation, implementation and assessment of national
and regional development plans and programmes likely to effect them directly;
-undertaking studies, in conjunction with these persons, to assess the possible impact
on them of projected development activities;
-effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in the decision
making processes and elected bodies both at national and local levels;
- decentralised or local forms of government.
See Klebes, supra note 1, at 101.
216. See generally European Charter of Local Self-Government, 1985 Europ. T.S. No.122
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of the Council of Europe; [c]onvinced that it is at the local
level that this right can be most directly exercised;
[c]onvinced that the existence of local authorities with real
responsibilities can provide an administration which is both
effective and close to the citizen; [a]ware that the
safeguarding and reinforcement of local self-government in
the different European countries is an important
contribution to the construction of a Europe based on the
principles of democracy and decentralization of power;
[a]sserting that this entails the existence of local authorities
endowed with democratically constituted decision making
bodies and possessing a wide degree of autonomy with
regard to their responsibilities, the ways and means by
which those responsibilities are exercised and the resources
required for their fulfillment .... 21
Article 3(1) defines the concept of local self-government as follows:
"Local self-government denotes the right and the ability of local
authorities, within the limits of the law, to regulate and manage a
substantial share of public affairs under their own responsibility and in the
interests of the local population. "218 The options outlined in the Charter are
particularly appropriate for the states of Central and Eastern Europe.
Implementing measures aimed at increasing local democracy, by
redistributing the historic powers held by the central government to
regional or local authorities, would enhance the right of minorities to
participate in local government. Slovak sovereignty would continue to be
respected under this scheme. This Charter provides a framework within
which states can arrange local authorities to maximize the participation of
members of national minority groups while preserving the young state's
territorial integrity. 29  Enhancing the role of local authorities in the
southern territory of Slovakia would grant ethnic Hungarians a greater
ability to express and promote their group identity.
The Council of Europe's Congress of Local and Regional
Authorities of Europe (CLRAE) adopted Resolution 250 (1993): "on the
adoption of local and regional self-government in Central and Eastern
European countries. " 2 In order to facilitate the development of local and
regional democratic institutions, CLRAE made several recommendations.
217. Id., preamble.
218. Id. art. 3(1).
219. Id. art. 5.
220. COUNCIL OF EUROPE'S CONGRESS OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL AUTHORITIES OF
EUROPE RES. 250 (1993) [hereinafter CLRAE].
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Some of the actions CLRAE encouraged include: 1) respecting the
autonomy of local and regional authorities, 2) supporting cooperation
among local and regional authorities, 3) promoting the election of regional
authorities, and 4) financing these institutions at such a level as to facilitate
their effectiveness.Y' The Slovak government has not implemented any of
these suggestions. In fact, measures directly contrary to these suggestions
are currently operating to resist decentralization.
The EU's Resolution on the Languages and Cultures of Regional
and Ethnic Minorities recommends that:
[m]ember states . . . carry out administrative and legal
measures including: providing a direct legal basis for the
use of regional and minority languages, in the first instance
in the local authorities of areas where a minority group
does exist, . . . requiring decentralized central government
services also to use national, regional, and minority
languages in areas concerned ....
The Council of Europe's Recommendation 1134 also includes the
right of national minorities to "participate fully in decision making about
matters which affect the preservation and development of their identity and
in the implementation of those decisions .. . ." Furthermore, the Report
of Experts on National Minorities23 by the OSCE states in paragraph II
that: "[The participating states] reconfirm that persons belonging to
national minorities have the right freely to express, preserve and develop
their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity and to maintain and
develop their culture in all aspects, free of any attempts at assimilation
against their will." The Experts noted, inter alia, the positive results
obtained through the use of 1) local and autonomous administration
including territorial autonomy, 2) decentralization, and 3) advisory and
decision making bodies in which minorities are represented.-2
The impact of the territorial division legislation has yet to be
assessed, but because the territorial delineation makes Hungarians the
minority in the overwhelming majority of districts, negative consequences
are soon to become apparent. The territorial division plan clearly
221. Id., see also PATRICK THORNBERRY ET AL., COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND MINORITIES
61, n.275 (1994).
222. European Parliament Resolution on the Languages and Cultures of Regional and
Ethnic Minorities, Strasbourg, para. 6, (Oct. 30, 1987), reprinted in DE VARENNE, supra note
128, at 299.
223. Report of Experts on National Minorities, Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (now the OSCE), Geneva, July 19, 1991.
224. Id.
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diminishes the presence of Hungarian voters in all districts, but in addition,
the plan also reduces the strength of the minority's ability to request
changes in other administrative services, such as the provision of bilingual
information. Wherever a minority constitutes a substantial percentage of
the population, its members shall have the right to use their own language,
dictates the FCNM. This condition is no longer fulfilled in a single district
due to the geographic manipulation of local districts under the territorial
division legisltion. Thus, the question must be asked whether the Slovak
government is deliberately attempting to circumvent its obligations under
the FCNM.
Some form of local self-government in southern Slovakia would
serve to ease ethnic tensions and perhaps restore a degree of faith in the
Slovak government to ethnic Hungarians. By refusing to consider this
alternative, the government has further agitated the minority population
with its hard-line resistance. Genuine democracy is premised upon the
participation of all individuals in the decision making processes of society.
Minorities exercise their basic rights at the local level, therefore, the
importance of adequate representation of national minorities cannot be
dismissed by the government. Articulation of the special concerns of the
ethnic Hungarian population, therefore, is vital to maintaining a democratic
state that respects all members of its society.
4. The Law on Names
According to Slovak grammar, female surnames add the suffix "-
ovd" in the nominative case. Hungarian grammar does not contain a
similar directive, therefore, any measure that imposes the "-ova" ending is
a highly sensitive issue among Hungarian women. Such a mandate is
viewed as a means of Slovakizing Hungarian names. On July 7, 1993, a
Law on Names and Surnames was passed by the Slovak Parliament.
Adding the "-ova" ending to one's last name was made compulsory for
Slovak citizens under the 1993 law, regardless of ethnicity. In addition,
the law prohibited the registration with authorities of non-ethnic Slovak
Christian names. Traditional Slovak names such as the first name "Jan"
could be registered as an official birth name, but the Hungarian
counterpart, "Janos," could not. This version of the law was in force until
1994, when the interim Moravcik government, under pressure from the
Council of Europe, drafted changes in the law making the female gender
suffix optional and including a provision accepting Hungarian Christian
225. For example, Mr. Kovacs versus Mrs. Kovacsova.
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names. The proposal was voted and approved by Parliament on May 27,
1994.226 This law remains in force in the Slovak Republic.2 17
Protection of ethnic names is pronounced in Recommendation 1201
Article 7(2), which articulates that: "[elvery person belonging to a
national minority shall have the right to use his/her surname and first name
in his/her mother tongue and to official recognition of his/her surname and
first names." The provisions contained in Recommendation 1201 are
directly binding on the Slovak government as they are incorporated into the
SHBT. As a result, the use of ethnic first and last names must be ensured
and protected by the Slovak government. In addition, state obligations
under the FCNM are clear with regard to the recognition of ethnic names
and surnames. FCNM Article 11(1) states that "[t]he Parties undertake to
recognize that every person belonging to a national minority has the right
to use his or her surname (patronym) and first names in the minority
language and the right to official recognition of them, according to
modalities provided for in their legal system." The right to use traditional
first names from the minorities' cultural sphere is likewise ensured by this
article. The IPNM also confirms official recognition of ethnic names.
Article 11 asserts that: "[a]ny person belonging to a national minority
shall have the right to use his/her surname and first names in his/her
language and the right to official acceptance and registration of such
surname and names." Furthermore, the EU's Resolution on the Languages
and Cultures of Regional and Ethnic Minorities recommends that member
states "officially recogni[ze] surnames . . . expressed in a regional or
minority language. "228
The CCPR contains, in Article 17, protection against arbitrary or
unlawful interference in one's private life. The United Nations Human
Rights Committee has held that this article protects the right to choose
one's own name.29 The Committee supported its conclusion by analyzing
the importance of one's name to the preservation of his or her identity. In
line with this ruling, ethnic Hungarian traditional names should be
respected and allowed.
226. On the occasion of the vote, the representatives of HZDS and SNS left the assembly
hall in protest.
227. The Language Law also contains a provision concerning the use of Slovak names.
Section 3(6) states that "[e]very citizen of the Slovak Republic has a right to alter, free of
charge, his first name and his family name into a Slovak orthographic form." Language Law of
Slovak Republic § 3(6). (The reverse administrative procedure is not free of charge).
228. See supra note 221.
229. Communication No. 453/1991, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. (Oct: 31, 1994), in which
two Dutch citizens sought to change their given surnames to Hindu names. The Dutch
authorities refused to process their request, and the parties filed a complaint under Article 17 and
18 of the CCPR.
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The provisions protecting the right to use traditional names are not
written in discretionary language; they do not contain restricting clauses.
Thus, under international human rights law, gender suffixes cannot be
imposed on citizens of a state. Linguistic minorities cannot be forced to
obey grammatical rules of the majority language. Respect for Hungarian
Christian names is not dependent on the state's resources, but rather on the
state's willingness to recognize the cultural diversity within its society.
The Hungarian language largely uses the same characters as the Slovak
alphabet and minor adjustments can easily be made to accommodate for
any differences. This accommodation involves little or no expense to the
government, but would be a symbolic gesture of deference to the minority.
The state has an unequivocal obligation under international law to provide
legislation (or administrative procedures) to grant the usage and state
recognition of minority language first names and surnames, including the
optionality of gender suffixes.
5. Bilingual Road Signs
Cities, towns and villages throughout southern Slovakia have
different names in Hungarian than in Slovak as a remnant of when
Hungary controlled the region. According to ethnic Hungarians inhabiting
this territory, location names should be posted in both the Slovak and
Hungarian languages. Currently, bilingual language road signs are posted
across southern Slovakia.
With the birth of the Slovak Republic in January 1993, measures
were taken to eliminate Hungarian or bilingual road signs. The Ministry
of Transportation issued a decree entitled, "Elimination of the Deficiencies
in the Vertical Road Signs," under which all bilingual road signs in
Slovakia were to be replaced by Slovak language postings by July 31,
1993. Protests ensued in the form of memoranda, demonstrations, and
obstruction of traffic in Hungarian-dominated villages. The Ministry
claimed that the decree promoted the normal supervision of road signs and
was in full accordance with Council of Europe recommendations. 20 The
measure was also allegedly intended to ensure the standardization of road
signs throughout Slovakia to comply with EU standards.
In 1993, the Council of Europe recommended that a law be
adopted to guarantee the posting of bilingual road signs. On January 28,
1994, a law concerning bilingual road signs in communities with large
percentages of minorities was defeated in Parliament by just three votes.
The law was redrafted to include a provision that communities with over
twenty percent of the population belonging to a minority should post
230. The motive was also forwarded that the Hungarian language road signs constituted a
hazardous distraction.
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bilingual signs. A law on bilingual road signs drafted by the interim Prime
Minister Moravcik was eventually passed by the Slovak Parliament.23' This
law is referenced in the Language Law's Article 3(3)(d):
[i]n the state language ... official names of municipalities
and their districts, denomination of the streets and other
public places, other geographical names, as well as the
data in the layout of the state map works, including the
land-registry maps, are conducted; denomination of
municipalities in other languages are regulated by a
separate law .... 232
By this language, the existing law on the use of bilingual road signs and
place names should not be overruled by the Language Law's provisions.
Recommendation 1201, as included in the SHBT, contains a
provision on this issue. Article 7(4) asserts that "[i]n the regions in which
substantial numbers of a national minority are settled, the persons
belonging to that minority shall have the right to display in their language
local names, signs, inscriptions and other similar information visible to the
public." This articulation of when and under what circumstances
Hungarian traditional names and signs can be displayed must be adhered to
in light of the binding nature of this document upon the Slovak
government. Members of the Hungarian minority are heavily concentrated
along the southern border of the state. Therefore, the substantial numbers
requirement is clearly met throughout this region.
The right of linguistic minorities to bilingual road signs is also
enshrined in the FCNM Article 11(3). This article asserts:
[i]n areas traditionally inhabited by substantial numbers of
persons belonging to a national minority, the Parties shall
endeavor, in the framework of their legal system,
including, where appropriate, agreements with other
States, and taking into account their specific conditions, to
display traditional local names, street names and other
topographical indications intended for the public also in the
minority language when there is a sufficient demand for
such indications.
The substantial numbers mentioned in this article are not specified.
However, in certain areas of Slovakia where the Hungarian population
surpasses twenty to eighty percent, the condition is clearly fulfilled.
231. Language Law of Slovak Republic, Law No. 191/1994.
232. Id. art. 3(3)d.
233. See generally FCNM supra note 71, art. 11(3).
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Sufficient demand is another unclear provision. Surveys indicate that this
condition is fulfilled. In one survey, ninety-six percent of ethnic
Hungarians stated that they wanted bilingual road signs.
In addition to the SHBT's Recommendation 1201 and the FCNM,
the IPNM recognizes the right of members of national minority groups to
the posting of bilingual local names. Article 14 provides that: "[iun
conformity with their national legislation states may allow, where
necessary through bilateral agreements with other interested states, the
displaying of bilingual ... local names . . in areas where the number of
persons belonging to a national minority reaches . . . a significant level."
Again, the significant level of persons belonging to a national minority
requirement is clearly met in the southern region of Slovakia. The posting
of bilingual signs is mandated by the bilateral friendship treaty ratified by
Slovakia and Hungary.
The EU's Resolution on the Languages and Cultures of Regional
and Ethnic Minorities recommends that member states "officially
recogni[ze] . place names expressed in a regional or minority
language." 235 Furthermore, in paragraph 9, the Resolution provides for the
"use of regional languages for road and other public signs in street
names."236 As Slovakia is seeking entry into the EU, adherence to these
principles is necessary to being granted member status. It is, therefore,
recommended that Slovakia continue to abide by the Resolution's
recommendations.
The issue of road signs is thus one of the few contentious issues
where the situation of the Hungarian minority has been settled in
accordance with international agreements, albeit through the arduous
negotiations of a previous government. In light of the binding nature of
Recommendation 1201, and its express provision relating to this issue, the
Slovak government should continue to respect the posting of bilingual
public signs. In addition, such action is supported by the FCNM, the
IPNM, and the EU's Recommendation on the Languages and Cultures of
Regional and Ethnic Minorities.
6. Mass Media
Perhaps the most alarming aspect of Slovak public life is
continuing government control of the mass media. . Since the 1994
parliamentary elections, the Slovak government has urged all media outlets
to report in an objective and neutral manner, namely, to limit government
234. See PETER HUNCIK ET AL., COUNTERPROOF 106 (1994).
235. See supra note 220
236. Id. para. 9.
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criticism.2" Two media oversight organizations, which many journalists
charge monitor and suppress anti-government media, have been
established: the Mass-Media Council and the Slovak Information Agency.
This policy has resulted in an antagonistic relationship, between the
government and the press.
Prime Minister Meciar has utilized the courts to stifle expression
and has replaced the heads of the state television, radio, and news agency
with his own political allies. In November of 1996, a Slovak court ordered
the leading Slovak opposition newspaper Sine, to apologize to and pay
cabinet ministers approximately $242,000 for publishing an article
criticizing the eighteen cabinet members . 2 8 The Slovak government has
been diligent in replacing individuals within media organizations who are
not explicitly friendly to HZDS with its own sympathizers. For example,
the appointed director of the Slovak Television (STV), the state-operated
television network, immediately canceled three popular programs with
political satires. He stated that television "cannot continue to be used to
offend the nation . . . [or] national institutions." 39  Slovak Radio and
TASR (a news agency) have been subjected to the same kind of
censorship.240
A graphic example of political interference with the development
of a free and independent press occurred in November 1996. Ms. Tatiana
Repkova was removed as editor-in-chief and publisher of Narodna
Obroda, an independent daily newspaper. Her termination occurred after
the newspaper published a Russian report stating that Prime Minister
Meciar was ill with a brain tumor. Narodna Obroda's owner, the VSZ
steel mill, meddled with the newspaper's editorial content and published an
apology to the Prime Minister without Ms. Repkova's knowledge or
consent. VSZ's directors and major shareholders of VSZ have close ties to
the Prime Minister, and the Slovak Minister for Transportation is one of
VSZ's owners. When Ms. Repkova sought assurance for VSZ that there
would be no further interference with the newspaper, she was dismissed as
editor and publisher. She was not given any reason for her termination.24'
237. See generally Sharon Fisher, Slovak Media Under Pressure, TRANSITION, Sept. 8,
1995.
238. See Sharon Fisher, Slovak Opposition Daily Loses Slander Case, 216 OMRI DAILY
DIG. II (Nov. 7, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997)<http://www.omri.CZ/publications
/DD/index.Dhtml >.
239. Id.
240. See generally REUTERS, Feb. 25, 1995.
241. See Jane Perlez, Dismissal of Slovak Editor Called Setback for Press Freedom, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 29, 1996, at A 15.
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Ms. Repkova's replacement was recently employed by the pro-government
regional daily, Luc.242
Slovakia's long-awaited media bill passed through the
government's legislative council in March 1996. If passed by Parliament
in its current form, the media bill would severely limit press freedom and
cause great financial hardship on the independent press. Monetary
penalties for violation of the law's provisions would be a maximum of one
million Slovak Crowns (approximately $33,220).24, The bill also requires
journalists to reveal their sources, a practice that is contrary to western
norms. In addition, the bill prohibits the publication of material that "in a
hidden or open way offends Slovak statehood, state symbols, [or] . . .
nationality.
The Slovak government has utilized a variety of means to maintain
substantial control over the media. Television, for example, has remained
largely within government control.2' 5 STV has been criticized for canceling
several popular political satire programs and for serving as a government
mouthpiece.
Radio licenses and newspapers are slowly passing into the hands of
government supporters. While privatization efforts continue, the
government has been criticized for favoring government sympathizers in its
privatization scheme.2" For example, the Board of Radio and Television
Broadcasting recently granted Radio Koliba a broadcast license. The co-
owner, Mr. Fedor Flasik, is reputed as having close ties with HZDS and
was one of the main organizers of the 1994 HZDS election campaign.74
More recently, this agency was granted a television license to replace the
frequencies freed by STV's second channel.' 8
The operation of Radio Free Europe was also threatened by the
Slovak government. On January 10, 1996, Slovakia's Board for Radio and
TV Broadcasting Chairman announced that Radio Free Europe would lose
242. See Sharon Fisher, Slovak Roundup, 226 OMRI DAILY DIG. II (Nov. 16, 1996) (last
visited Oct. 28, 1997) <http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index.html>.
243. Id.
244. Anne Nivat, Slovak Media Under Government Fire, 2 TRANSITION, No. 9, May 3,
1996, at 60.
245. There is a private cable channel, VTV. Four out of the five owners of this channel are
loyal to the HZDS. Markisa is another private channel.
246. Vincent Boland, Political Feuding in Slovakia Obscures Economic Progress, THE FIN.
POST, Dec. 28, 1995, at 1.
247. Sharon Fisher, New Radio License Granted, 129 OMRI DAILY DIG II (July 3, 1996)
(last visited Oct. 28, 1997) < http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index.Dhtml >.
248. Jiri Pehe, Another Private Nationwide TV Station Planned in Slovakia, 188 OMRI
DAILY DIGEST II (Sept. 27, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997)<http://www.omri.CZ
/publications/DD/index.Dhtml >.
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its license, if it did not improve its news reporting within thirty days. The
openly admitted reason for threatening to cancel Radio Free Europe's
license is because the station is not perceived as reporting favorably to the
government. Director-General Dusan Kleiman of the SLOVAKIA Press
Agency alleged:
[t]he news reporting presented by this radio station is
unbalanced and non-objective. It is almost entirely
dominated by critical and negative material. This way of
informing the public diverges from the nature of a mass
media institution, which Radio Free Europe makes itself
out to be, as it is obviously performing the propaganda
purposes of certain political circles not leaning favorably
towards the current government and Slovakia.49
Journalists have also reported that they are being followed by the secret
police.-" Other journalists have been prosecuted for their reports25' or have
lost their positions shortly after expressing independent views. 2 2
In February 1995, Prime Minister Meciar announced that there
were too many newspapers in Slovakia, and that their number should be
diminished by a tax increase.22  The ensuing proposal would have
increased taxes for newspapers with foreign ownership. This provision
would have produced dire effects on opposition newspapers, which are
commonly owned by foreign agents. In response to this proposal, two-
thirds of Slovak daily newspapers- simultaneously published a blank front
page bearing the title, Anxiety. Perhaps as a result of this protest, the
measure failed to be approved by the Slovak Parliament.
249. See generally DAILY NEWS MONITOR/TASR, Jan. 11, 1996. Despite these attacks,
Radio Free Europe's license was extended for 18 months on November 19, 1996. See Slovakia
Extends RFE/RL License, 225 OMRI DAILY DIG. II (Nov. 20, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28,
1997) <http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index.Dhtml>.
250. See generally THE PRAGUE POST, Dec. 27, 1995.
251. See Human Rights News Briefs from Slovakia, INT'L HELSINKI FED'N, Jan. 8, 1996.
252. See generally Sharon Fisher, Slovak Media Under Pressure, TRANSITION, Sept. 8,
1995.
253. In spite of the alleged shortage of funds for media matters and the stated superfluity of
newspapers, the government has provided funding for an entirely new daily, the Nova Zinena
Mladych. This newspaper, received somewhere between fifteen and fifty million Slovak Crowns
from the government. The newspaper's Editor-in-Chief was a former editor of Zinena, a weekly
widely criticized for anti-Semitic articles, and as his deputy was a former spokeswoman of the
SNS. The paper quickly established itself as staunchly nationalist, "anti-European" and faithful
to the government. This newspaper has since gone out of print. See generally THE PRAGUE
POST, Jan. 12, 1996.
254. See generally DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Mar. 6, 1995.
255. See NEWSWEEK, July 17, 1995.
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As of May 1995, Slovenska Republika, a daily newspaper partly
owned by HZDS and highly loyal to the same receives funds designated for
the minority press to publish supplements directed at minorities in minority
languages. This supplement often does not represent the interests of the
minority population. The allocation of public funds to a reputed nationalist
newspaper for coverage of issues affecting national minorities is
surprising, as it is unlikely that minority members read this paper.2 ' The
government ministries frequently support the Slovenska Republika by
regularly publishing advertisements in the daily.
Slovaks and ethnic Hungarians alike believe Slovak government
policies in this field are inappropriate. After only three months in office,
Prime Minister Meciar's government received a petition signed by over
100,000 Slovaks, which accused the government of violating freedom of
speech. 7 In a recent survey, 51.4% of the respondents expressed distrust
for Slovak Television. 8  The question as to whether the government
should control the activities of mass media was answered in the negative by
71.4% of the respondents. 9
The mass media issue is of concern to the Hungarian minority in
two ways: generally, a free press serves democracy and civil rights of
Hungarians and Slovaks alike; and specifically, the entities taking over the
media are manifestly nationalist and anti-Hungarian. Actions directed
against free mass media are making it increasingly difficult for Hungarian
spokespersons to express their views officially and to receive fair
coverage. Anti-Hungarian declarations receive full coverage and serve to
aggravate the ethmic relations. For example, on the eve of the December
parliamentary session that could have ratified the SHBT, STV repeatedly
broadcasted a documentary, titled Bloody Christmas, on Hungary's
occupation of southern Slovakia during World War II, cutting several times
to an interview with Mr. Miklos Duray, Chairman of the Coexistence
party. MKDH Chairman Bela Bugar noted:
[t]he coalition government has successfully created an anti-
Hungarian atmosphere among the people of Northern
Slovakia who don't have any contact with members of the
Hungarian minority ... In Liptovsky Mikulas [a northern
256. See Sharon Fisher, Slovak Media Under Pressure, TRANSITION, Sept. 8, 1995.
257. See DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR Mar. 9, 1995.
258. Quoted in SME, Jan. 13, 1996.
259. Id.
260. There are, of course, Hungarian language or bilingual newspapers. Out of 871
Journals, dailies, weeklies and monthlies, 25 belong to this category. See Adresar Periodik a
Vidavatel'ov Slovenskej Republiky 1995, Novinarski Studijny Ustav, Bratislava 1995.
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Slovak town], it was clear that sixty-five of the seventy
people in attendance at my speech left the room with the
feeling that "My God. So that is what the Hungarians
want. Now we don't have to be afraid of the Hungarians
anymore." [Slovak citizens living in Northern Slovakia]
don't know us. They are manipulated by Slovak television
and radio. It is through radio and television that northern
Slovak citizens hear about ethnic Hungarian. All they
receive is a biased image of us. 2'"
The confusion among the Slovak citizenry reflected in Mr. Bugar's
statement derives largely from the fact that disputes involving the
Hungarian minority are routinely featured in Slovak newspapers and on
television and radio. For example, when the Hungarian minority living in
Velky Kapusany wanted to build a memorial to commemorate the arrival
of Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin 1,100 years ago, the event was
characterized as an act of separatism and turned into a media spectacle.
This issue was also debated in a session of Parliament.m In response to the
erection of a Hungarian monument on Slovak soil, the Slovak Parliament
approved a bill in July 1996 regulating state symbols. The measure
prohibits the public display of the Hungarian flag in Southern Slovakia
except during official visits by Hungarian officials. 6 3 Turning relatively
benign events into national political issues only serves to perpetuate fears
and stereotypes of the Hungarian minority. "Every week there is a
different issue: towns erecting Hungarian monuments, President Kovac
visiting Hungary, and the document from the conference in Budapest in
July of 1996. This strategy is employed to get the Slovak public to regard
us as troublemakers, an internal enemy," concluded Mr. Gyozo Bauer of
CSEMADOK. 264
The Language Law also regulates members of the Hungarian
minority's ability to broadcast Hungarian language programming. Section
5 of the Language Law seemingly precludes all broadcasting of programs
in languages other than Slovak. Section 5(1) states that "[r]adio and
television broadcasting is, on the whole territory of the Slovak Republic,
conducted in the State language." This general preclusion exempts
261. Interview with Mr. Bela Bugar, MKDH Chairman, in Bratislava, Slovakia (Aug. 1,
1996).
262. See generally No Agreement in Kapusany, PRAVDA, June 18, 1996, at 2.
263. See Sharon Fisher, Slovak Government Approves Bill on State Symbols, 144 OMRI
DAILY DIG. II, Part II (July 26, 1996)(last visited Oct. 28, 1997)
<http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index.Dhtml>.
264. Interview with Mr. Gyozo Bauer, President of CSEMADOK, in Samorin, Slovakia
(July 16, 1996)
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broadcasting in the languages of national minorities by specific legislation.
The ambiguity of the Language Law, however, may provide a pretext for
interpretations detrimental to minority rights, as the current leadership of
STV is manifestly nationalist and anti-Hungarian. By specific legislation,
the broadcasting of minority language programs is permissible. The
Slovak Television Act of 1993 asserts that "Slovak Television provides
also for implementation of the interests of nationalities and ethnic
minorities living in the Slovak Republic through [sic] the television
broadcasting in their mother tongues."26 The Radio and Television
Broadcasting Operation Act of 1993 commits the operators of media outlets
to "produce or let produce a significant part of the programs broadcast so
that the cultural identity of the nation, nationalities and ethnic groups of the
Slovak Republic could be preserved and developed .... "266 The content,
perspective, and quality of minority language programs are not ensured by
this legislation.
The Language Law regulates media aimed at young audiences in
Section 5(2). This section outlaws the production and broadcasting of
children's television programs in any language other than Slovak.
Language Law Section 5(2) reads: "[a]udio-visual works of art intended
for children up to twelve years of age must be dubbed into the state
language." This provision, although primarily aimed at Czech television
programs, negatively affects Hungarian children as television is an
important means of instruction in the pre-school years and thereafter.
Currently, there are no Hungarian language children's programs besides
those accessed via Hungarian national television channels.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child Article 17 states that
"[sitate Parties shall ... . encourage the mass media to have particular
regard to the linguistic needs of the child who belongs to a minority group.
." This encouragement is clearly not present in Slovakia. In fact, such
activity is precluded by Language Law Section 5(2). Children of
Hungarian nationality are forced to learn Slovak in order to understand
television programs. While this is a legitimate governmental objective, the
Slovak government should provide options for Hungarian children and
their parents. Under the Language Law, not even a local channel would be
able to broadcast children's programs in the Hungarian language. The
Language Law provision precludes Hungarian children from hearing their
language spoken on Slovak television. The Slovak Republic cannot, given
the Language Law, fulfill its obligation of encouraging the mass media to
265. The Slovak Television Act, Law No. 271/1993, § 3(3), SL of the Slovak National
Council.
266. The Radio and Television Broadcasting Operation Act, Law No. 268/1993, (2), SL of
the Slovak National Council.
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provide for the needs of ethnic Hungarian children as mandated in the
Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Television is an important means for the development of children's
culture and cultural education. FCNM Article 5(1) states that the "Parties
undertake to promote the conditions necessary for persons belonging to
national minorities to maintain and develop their culture .... " This
provision includes consideration for minority children. The prevailing
policy in Slovakia is an effective means of assimilation of Hungarian
minority children into the Slovak nation. Article 5(2) provides that:
[w]ithout prejudice to measures taken in pursuance of their general
integration policy, the Parties shall refrain from policies or practices aimed
at assimilation of persons belonging to national minorities against their will
and shall protect these persons from any action aimed at such
assimilation. '" 6 7  Furthermore, FCNM Article 9 ensures that national
minorities not be discriminated against in their access to the media. This
article prohibits governmental hindrance of the creation or use of the
printed media, radio or television by persons belonging to national
minorities. Due to the restrictiveness of the Language Law, all of these
referenced obligations are in question.
A free media in a democratic society operates independent of
government directives and pressures. It serves to objectively inform the
public of current events and proposed government policies. These
objectives are severely hampered by a government that strictly scrutinizes
and punishes media outlets that are deemed unfriendly. Through use of the
courts, questionable privatization methods, and political appointments to
important media positions, the Slovak government has effectively stifled
the media's ability to objectively educate the Slovak public about domestic
events. This control negatively affects the Hungarian minority.
Government interests reflected in the media often contain anti-Hungarian
biases. As a result, Hungarians are perceived as dangerous by Slovak
citizens. The restrictiveness of the Language Law also operates to
preclude the broadcasting of minority language programs, a service that is
vital to the preservation of Hungarian culture in Slovakia. The Slovak
government must respect the operation of a free press within its state, even
if the media reports are unfavorable to government policy. In addition,
minority language programs and media services should be honored as a
means to respect the cultural diversity present within Slovakia.
267. See FCNM supra note 71, art. 5(2).
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7. Minority Culture
A striking aspect of Slovak government policy toward the state's
national minorities is its failure to support minority culture, particularly
Hungarian. This area is one of the most crucial to the survival of
Hungarian cultural identity within Slovak borders. Over the past three
years, funding for Hungarian culture has plummeted from 140.5 million
Slovak crowns to zero. This situation resulted from changes in the state
funding mechanism for cultural activities. In 1995, the Slovak government
decided to grant decision making power over minority culture to the Pro
Slovakia fund."a  Pro Slovakia, on a case-by-case basis, reviews
applications for funding from the various cultural organizations in Slovakia
and determines funding allotments based on specific proposals. As a
result, the budget for Hungarian cultural organizations has been drastically
reduced and the vast majority of proposals have been denied by Pro
Slovakia.2 9
The board of trustees of Pro Slovakia is appointed by the Ministry
of Culture and the identities of the trustees are kept secret. The
government justifies the members secrecy by asserting that this set-up
prevents undue pressure from being exerted upon trustees. Pro Slovakia
has been criticized for favoring cultural organizations that promote the
Slovak culture at the expense of national minority culture. Pro Slovakia
granted 20.7 million Slovak crowns to the dailies Slovenska Republika and
Hlas ludu, a regional newspaper, for supplements aimed at ethnic
minorities. Members of minorities are less likely to be interested in these
newspapers, which have reputations for being staunchly Slovak nationalist
and government-faithful newspapers. A further 6.8 million Slovak crowns
were allocated to a project intended to make Slovak culture popular among
minorities. 270  Funds to minority culture, therefore, are being used to a
great extent to promote Slovak culture among minorities.
The centralized Hungarian cultural organization is CSEMADOK.
This organization has traditionally distributed its lump sum budget from the
government to finance smaller Hungarian cultural societies throughout
Slovakia. 27 ,' Last year, the Ministry of Culture refused to allocate any
money for CSEMADOK, accusing the organization of failing to report
268. A measure labeled unlawful by the Hungarian Coalition Parties, according to Slovak
laws on the distribution of powers.
269. Interview with Mr. Gyozo Bauer, President of CSEMADOK, in Samorin, Slovakia
(July 16, 1996).
270. See Some Facts on the Worsening Situation of the Hungarian Minority Living in
Slovakia, Evaluation by the Hungarian Coalition (Sept. 1995).
271. Interview with Mr. Gyozo Bauer, President of CSEMADOK, Bratislava, Slovakia
(July 16, 1996).
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how its finances were spent during the past budgetary year.272 Mr. Gyozo
Bauer, the President of CSEMADOK, explained:
[tihis accusation is only a front for the government's
refusal to support our organization. We submitted all of
our reports to the Ministry of Culture and to the OSCE
High Commissioner for National Minorities to prove the
government's accusation is false. If it was true, why
haven't I been arrested and tried in a court of law for
theft? No government official has asked us for any
paperwork or money. They only bring up this issue when
asked why they do not fund Hungarian culture. The
government is extremely afraid of CSEMADOK. We have
a fifty year history here. We survived the time when it
was illegal to even speak Hungarian . . . . It is the
government's policy to first destroy the centralized
organization because then there would be no one to support
the 500 community projects in the villages.273
The lack of government support for Hungarian culture has forced
organizations like CSEMADOK to rely on private support. Some finances
are obtained from Hungarian non-governmental organizations in Hungary
and other states. This support has prompted the Slovak government to
accuse Hungary of interfering with Slovakia's internal affairs. This
situation places ethnic Hungarian cultural societies in a precarious position.
The minority cannot rely on Slovak financial support for their cultural
activities, nor can they solicit funds from abroad without accusations of
threatening Slovak sovereignty. Mr. Arpad Ollos, former mayor of
Dunajska Streda, stated:
[w]hen Hungarians from Slovakia make contacts with
individuals or groups in Hungary, it is not a fight against
the Slovak state . . . Each time we make contact [with
Hungary], we are accused of nationalism. We are not part
of Hungary. The border will stay the same. These facts
are not questioned. We only want to be able to make and
maintain contacts with Hungary and not be accused of
being traitors .274
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Interview with Mr. Arpad Ollos, former major of Dunajska Streda, in Dunajska
Streda, Slovakia (July 11, 1996).
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The Slovak government's failure to support Hungarian culture in
Slovakia is contrary to guarantees contained in the Slovak Constitution, as
well as provisions enumerated in numerous international standards. Slovak
Constitution Article 34(1) asserts that "citizens of national minorities or
ethnic groups in the Slovak Republic shall be guaranteed their full
development, particularly the rights to promote their cultural heritage, ...
and create and maintain . . . cultural institutions. "25 If the Slovak
government supports cultural programs that promote Slovak cultural
identity, it has an obligation to also promote the cultural heritages of the
various minority groups within Slovak borders. To act otherwise would be
counter to the letter and spirit of the Slovak Constitution.
The FCNM's preamble states that a component of a truly
democratic society is respect for the cultural identity of each citizen. State
parties should "create appropriate conditions enabling individuals
belonging to a national minority to express, preserve, and develop this
identity[.] '" 21 FCNM Section II, Article 4(2) articulates the duty of a state
party to promote "full and effective equality" in cultural life between
ethnic minorities and the ethnic majority. Article 5(1) further obliges the
state party to "promote conditions necessary for persons belonging to
national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve
the essential elements of their identity, namely their . . . traditions and
cultural heritage." The EU's Resolution on the Languages and Cultures of
Regional and Ethnic Minorities recommends in paragraph 8 that member
states "ensur[e] that representatives of groups that use regional or minority
languages are able to participate directly in cultural facilities and activities
.... "277 The Council of Europe's Vienna Declaration on Human Rights,
Appendix II, states: "We, Heads of State and Government of the member
states of the Council of Europe, have agreed as follows, concerning the
protection of national minorities: ...States should create the conditions
necessary for persons belonging to national minorities to develop their
culture, while preserving their religion, traditions and customs." 2 7 8
A system that fails to support the vast majority of Hungarian
cultural activities, including folk dance troupes, literature, theater and
choruses, cannot be said to fulfill this undertaking. Encouraging these
cultural activities certainly do not threaten the Slovak nation. Such
activities can be pursued and still be compatible with the government's
general integration policy. By recognizing the importance of maintaining
275. See SLOVAK. CONST. art. 34(1).
276. See FCNM supra note 7 1, preamble, para. 7.
277. See supra note 221.
278. Id. at 303.
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Hungarian cultural heritage, Slovakia will fulfill its commitment to
promote a spirit of tolerance and cooperation among ethnic groups.
8. The Law on Foundations
The role of foundations and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) is a vital component to the maintenance of a civil and democratic
society. The importance of such organizations cannot be underestimated,
as they serve to direct public policy, review and comment on legislation,
and create a dialogue between the government and the public. The
existence of NGOs allows individuals to play an important role in all
spheres of public life by participating in the task of building a civil society.
In this arena, as with the private media, the Slovak government has
been reluctant to develop this independent sector. The emergence of
NGOs is perceived as a thorn in the side of the government's agenda. The
position of NGOs in Slovak society has been stunted by the recently
enacted Law on Foundations.27'9 After being once vetoed by President
Kovac and widely criticized by EU, United States, and United Nations
officials, this legislation was again passed by the Slovak Parliament in July
of 1996. This measure imposes strong governmental control over NGOs
and includes substantial monetary thresholds for qualification as a
recognized NGO. The basic start-up capital requirement is 10,000 Slovak
crowns (approximately $320). This amount must be increased to 100,000
Slovak crowns within six months in order for an organization to remain a
recognized foundation. The equivalent of $3200 in capital, this
requirement is an difficult threshold in a country with a per-capita income
of $2600. This requirement is applicable regardless of the size, purpose,
or needs of the organization. In addition, the Law on Foundations requires
that all foundations register with, and receive approval from, the Slovak
Ministry of Interior. The law also includes a prohibition against a
foundation's use of its resources to finance any political party activities or
financial support for a political movement.
While this law does not exclusively touch upon Hungarian
organizations, foundations play a large role in the solution of minority
problems given the absence of governmental activity in this area.U° For
example, the work of the Sandor Marai Foundation, a Hungarian
foundation, would be hindered by both the financial burdens of the law and
the provisions that indirectly limit permissible criticism of the government.
279. It was estimated that 500 foundations and associations existed prior to passage of the
Law on Foundations. Gallop and Kemp, Review and Recommendations: Proposed Slovak Law
on Foundations (prepared for the European Commission), May 10, 1996.
280. The organs and policies in place for solutions of minority issues in the CSFR have
been removed in the Slovak Republic.
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The Sandor Marai Foundation has developed training centers on ethnic
conflict resolution for ethnic Hungarian, Roma and Slovak communities.
As Mr. Peter Huncik, President of the Sandor Marai Foundation, asserted:
[t]he Law on Foundations has very serious implications for
our foundation. The [Sandor Maria Foundation] not only
works on trying to dissipate ethnic tensions, but also
supports Hungarian educational and cultural activities. We
publish an annual 'Global Report on Slovakia' which
analyzes the country's progress in twenty-two different
fields including minority relations, privatization,
education, and the environment. None of these activities
are supported by the government and, if the government is
able to increase their control over foundations, these
activities could be limited. But even more serious a
problem is the fate of smaller foundations doing vital
community work that are located outside of the cities.
They will not be able to survive the financial requirements
of the new law. The only purpose [of the law] is to control
foundations because we were getting too strong and
playing too large a role in society. So, the government
had to step in and try to keep us dependent. It is the
typical Bolshevik, paternalistic behavior that we have
endured for so long.
The fact that the power to define what constitutes a political cause
rests with a governmental body may produce dire effects on several
developing cultural and social advocacy organizations. For example, a
conference organized by an environmental foundation concerning clean air,
an awards ceremony developed by a Ruthenian organization, or a
symposium on domestic violence by a women's organization may be found
to be a political, and therefore prohibited act. This could inhibit the
democratic rights of individuals participating in NGOs by limiting the
ability of the public to express its views on social and political issues. In
addition, the approval requirement by the Slovak Ministry of Interior may
lead to the elimination of foundations that the government perceives, for
one reason or another, as undesirable. Given the antagonistic climate
between the Slovak government and ethnic Hungarian organizations, this
power may be wielded in a discriminatory manner.
FCNM Article 17(2) prohibits state parties from interfering with
the right of individuals to participate in local, regional, national and
international non-governmental organizations. This negative limitation on
the government's activity is not to be dismissed. Although the Law on
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Foundations does not prohibit the establishment of NGOs outright, it
certainly has the potential effect of limiting their presence and activities.
9. Draft Legislation
a) The Law on the Protection of the Republic
The Law on the Protection of the Republic was first passed by the
Slovak Parliament in March of 1996 and provoked immediate international
criticism. 28' This measure, which would amend the Criminal Code,
imposes stiff penalties for organizers of public rallies if the event is
deemed to be aimed at subverting the constitutional system, territorial
integrity or defense capability of the country.382 Under the law, Slovak
citizens could face up to two years in prison if found guilty of
"disseminating false information abroad damaging the interests of the
republic."23  For example, the offense of participation in public
demonstrations with the intent to overthrow the state carries a twelve year
prison sentence.2"
These amendments were broadly drafted and fail to articulate with
sufficient specificity what constitutes a violation. For example, under
Article 91 it is unclear who defines what constitutes "undermining the
country . . . ." Although the measure was passed by the Slovak
Parliament, it was vetoed by President Kovac in April 1996 and returned
to Parliament. In May 1996, Prime Minister Meciar said that debate on
the amendments would be delayed indefinitely because a "wider
democratic discussion" was needed to ensure the law's compliance with
international human rights conventions. m This assessment is certainly
true, as the potential for arbitrary interpretation and abuses appear to be
substantial and could result in criminal prosecution based on political
beliefs. HZDS placed the amendments on the parliamentary agenda this
fall. Parliamentary Chairman Ivan Gasparovic told the press on the eve of
the new parliamentary session that although he had abstained from voting
for the measure in March, if he had "known what would happen later
during the [July] Budapest conference [where ethnic Hungarian autonomy
281. Officials from the EU and the United States Department of State expressed concern
that the law could restrict freedom of speech, assembly and expression. The day after the
amendments were passed, an EU delegation met with Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk to
lodge a formal expression of concern about the measure. See Joe Cook, Slovak Law Threatens
Human Rights, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 12, 1996, at 013.
282. The Law on the Protection of the Republic, art. 92.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. See generally PRAVDA, May 9, 1996.
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was proposed] . . ., [he] would have probably pushed the 'yes' button." 286
Despite Mr. Gasparovic's support, the amendments were again removed
from the legislative agenda.2 7 After a milder version of the penal code
amendments was passed in December of 1996, President Michal Kovac
again vetoed the measure in light of continued opposition and the bill has
since failed to gather sufficient support in Parliament to override the
presidential veto.-
The freedoms of speech, assembly, and expression are deeply
embedded principles of democracy and are codified in numerous
international human rights instruments. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights proclaims that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion, . . . the right to freedom of opinion and
expression, . . . the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and
association. "9 These rights are also recognized in the ECHR (Articles 9
through 11), and the CCPR (Articles 18, 19, 21, and 22). These
established rights are also referenced with particular regard to national
minorities. FCNM Article 9 specifically discusses the right of freedom of
expression held by persons belonging to a national minority. This right is
to be exercised "without interference by public authorities and regardless
of frontiers." 290 If passed without substantial alterations, the Law on the
Protection of the Republic will inhibit many forms of democratic political
demonstrations and manifestations.
While the protection of freedom of speech, assembly, and
expression is a concern for all members of Slovak society, it is particularly
crucial for ethnic minorities, especially Hungarians who are perceived as a
political threat. It is unclear under these provisions whether actions such
as a public manifestation or the call for the resignation of the Prime
Minister by a Hungarian political party could be construed as an "effort to
subvert the constitutional system." While this analysis is somewhat
premature given the uncertain future of this legislation,2 9' examination is
286. Sharon Fisher, Slovak Parliamentary Chairman Defends Controversial Legislation,
205 OMRI DAILY DIG. II (Oct. 22, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997)<http://www.omri.CZ/
publications/DD /index.Dhtml>.
287. Sharon Fisher, Slovak Parliament Withdraws Penal Code Amendment, II, 208 OMRI
DAILY DIG (Oct. 25, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997)<http://www.omri.CZ/publications
/DD/index.Dhtml >.
288. Sharon Fisher, Slovak Parliament Rejects Penal Code Amendment, 30 OMRI DAILY
DIG (Feb. 12, 1997) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997)<http://www.omri.CZ/publications
/DD/index.Dhtml>.
289. See supra note 132.
290. See FCNM supra note 71, art. 9(1).
291. On December 17, 1996, the penal code amendment was again passed by the Slovak
Parliament. Although this measure omitted the penalty for "spread[ing] false information
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prospective in the event that a majority of the Slovak Parliament believes
that such legislation is necessary. 29
D. Slovakia 's Prospects for EU and NATO Accession
The Slovak government has been actively pursuing admission into
the EU and NATO since the state's inception in 1993. Slovakia became a
member of the Visegrad Club, four states considered to be next in line for
EU membership, and had the outspoken ambition to become a member of
NATO. Following secession from Czechoslovakia, the Slovak government
set out to establish good relations with its neighboring states in an effort to
gain Western favor. Within the framework of the European Stability Pact,
Slovakia negotiated treaties on friendly relations and cooperation with four
of its neighbors, the Czech Republic, the Ukraine, Hungary, and Poland.
Despite these advancements, the coalition government has not proven its
commitment to basic democratic principles.
The reluctance of the Slovak Republic to form a dependable
alliance with its southern neighbor, together with disrespect of its
Hungarian minority, centralization efforts, slow and questionable
privatization methods, 29 and an unproven economy count among the
possible reasons why Slovakia should slip on the list of countries next in
line for entry into the EU, NATO, and other western-oriented
abroad," opposition and trade representatives protested the law, claiming the measure continued
to infringe upon basic freedoms. Mr. Jan Slota, Chairman of the SNS, stated that he was "very
happy" with the measure's passage and asserted that the "integrity of the young Slovakia is
jeopardized by some representatives of the Hungarian coalition and opposition." Slovak
President Michal Kovac vetoed the controversial law on the protection of the republic on Dec.
31, 1996. Since this time, the amendments have not gained sufficient support to pass through the
Slovak Parliament. See Sharon Fisher, Opposition Protests Slovak Penal Code Amendment, 243
OMRI DAILY DIG II, (Dec. 18, 1996); See also Sharon Fisher, Slovak President Vetoes Penal
Code Amendment, 1 OMRI DAILY DIG. II (Jan. 2, 1997) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997)
•http://www.omri.CZ/publications /DD/index.Dhtml; Sharon Fisher, Slovak Parliament Rejects
Penal Code Amendment, 30 OMRI DAILY DIG. II, (Feb. 12, 1997) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997)
<http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index.Dhtml>.
292. On July 20, 1996, the Central Board of the SNS held a meeting in Zilina where it
promised to use all legislative possibilities to re-debate the anti-subversion law. See generally
SNS Wants to Re-debate Amended Penal Code in Parliament, DAILY NEWS MONITOR/TASR, July
20, 1996, at 2.
293. On November 21, the Slovak Constitutional Court held that legislation transferring
control over privatization from the government to the National Property Fund was illegal. The
National Property Fund had been criticized for selling state property through direct sales,
frequently at prices well below market value. Sales were largely kept secret. Under the 1994
legislation, the government, the Supreme Supervisory Office and the courts had no control over
the National Property Fund. All of the board members of the National Property Fund were
representatives of the ruling government coalition. See Sharon Fisher, Slovak Constitutional
Court Rules on Privatization, 227 OMRI DAILY DIG. II (Nov. 22, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28,
1997) <http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index.Dhtml>.
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organizations. Political stability in Slovakia was seriously jeopardized in
the summer of 1996 when HZDS coalition partners threatened to leave the
partnership over disputes for control of the country's largest state
insurance company, Slovenska Poistovna. The SNS and the Association of
Slovak Workers threatened to derail the country's privatization process
after their supporters were purged from Slovenska Poistovna's board of
directors. The crisis was resolved when HZDS made concessions granting
one opposition parliament member a position on the parliamentary
commission that supervises the Slovak Intelligence Service. Demands have
also been made to put opposition members on the parliamentary
committees governing television and radio, something EU officials have
stressed for some time.2 14 "A strong government in a strong democracy
needs a strong opposition," asserted Mr. Werner Hoyer, plenipotentiary
for EU matters, on his visit to Slovakia in June of 1996.29 The
government's unwillingness to tolerate political dissent continues to be a
frequently voiced concern of many Western diplomats.
Slovakia currently possesses the status of an associate member of
the EU29 and has completed the EU's questionnaire, both of which are
prerequisites for the upcoming EU expansion scheduled to begin in 1998.19,
Slovakia's future membership in the EU, however, is in jeopardy.
Criticism of the coalition government's policies and practices have come
from numerous sources. EU Foreign Affairs Commissioner Hans van der
Broek called on Slovakia to "further develop and strengthen democratic
institutions and to respect ethnic minority rights and freedom of speech."i9,
Since Prime Minister Meciar won elections in 1994, the EU has delivered
two diplomatic notes warning of the need for observance of human and
political rights. 2" The United States has also issued a demarche urging the
294. See Jan Stojaspal, Slovak Coalition Moves Past Crisis, THE PRAGUE POST, July 3 - 9,
1996, at 1.
295. Jana Dorotkova, Kohl's Remarks Sour Slovakia's Supposedly Sweet Day, THE SLOVAK
SPECTATOR, July 31- Aug. 13, 1996, at 2.
296. See PAVOL BURAK, ET AL., SLOVAKIA IN THE WORLD, THE WORLD IN SLOVAKIA
(1994).
297. See generally Individual Talks With Candidates for EU Amalgamation in 1998, DAILY
NEWS MONITOR/TASR, July 19, 1996, at 2.
298. 42 OMRI DAILY DIG. II, (Feb. 28, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997)
http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index.Dhtml. (quoted in DAILY NEWS MONIToR/TASR
FEB. 27, 1996). Van der Broek also expressed that he hoped Slovakia would soon pass
legislation on minority languages, cancel its 10% import surcharge, show more openness to
foreign investment, close unsafe nuclear reactors, and harmonize its legislation with that of the
EU.
299. European Parliament, European Parliament, Resolution on the need to respect human
and democratic rights in the Slovak Republic, Nov. 16, 1995; See also EU/Slovakia: Van Den
Broek Visits Bratislava But Not Meciar, MONTHLY REP. ON EUR., No. 137, Mar. 1, 1996.
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government to put a greater emphasis on the toleration of diverse opinions.
United States Ambassador Ralph Johnson recently stated that if Slovakia
sought admission into the EU and NATO, the state must be democratic
"not only in its electoral process, but also in its laws, their implementation,
and its preservation of individuals rights, including the right to disagree
without being considered an enemy of the state. '"0 German Chancellor
Helmut Kohl also questioned Slovakia's chances of early admission into
the EU stating that he "deeply regret[s] that Slovakia's internal
development is very harmful with regard to [early EU admission]. 3 °I
Chancellor Kohl also added that Slovakia's chances "have not gotten
better, they've gotten worse." 2
Despite Western criticism, support for EU integration continues to
rise among the Slovak public. A December 1995 poll revealed that 59.4%
of Slovak citizens supported EU integration, up from 58.8% in June
1995.303 Slovakia's efforts to be among the first former communist nations
to join the EU have been impeded by tensions between ethnic Hungarians
and Slovaks, Bratislava and Budapest. These tensions have not been
placated by ratification of the SHBT as EU officials had hoped.
NATO accession has also been imperiled by actions of the
coalition government. The United States recently delivered a severe blow
to Slovakia's chances of admission into NATO by refusing to include the
country on a list of new democracies to be given $60,000,000 in financial
aid to facilitate NATO enlargement.- Prime Minister Meciar explained on
Slovak Radio on July 26, 1996 that Slovakia's omission could partly be
attributed to the "many untruths [being] said about us abroad."0" Prime
Minister Meciar dismissed the United States' position, asserting that the
absence of Slovakia's inclusion on the congressional resolution was not on
account of Slovakia's internal political situation, but rather because the
nation's housing accommodations and shopping facilities do not meet the
standards of the generals' wives 306 NATO membership is contingent upon
improvements in Slovakia's respect for democratic values, respect for
300. Sharon Fisher, United States, EU Call for More Democracy in Slovakia, 206 OMRI
DAILY DIG. II, (Oct. 23, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997)<http://www.omri.CZ/publications
/DD/index.Dhtml>.
301. See generally SNS on Kohl's Remarks on ORF, DAILY NEWS MONITOR/TASR, July
18, 1996, at 4.
302. Jana Dorotkova, Kohl's Remarks Sour Slovakia's Supposedly Sweet Day, THE SLOVAK
SPECTATOR, July 31-Aug. 13, 1996, at 2.
303. See generally DAILY NEWS MONITOR/TASR, Jan. 10, 1996.
304. Ben Barber, Slovakia Ignored as NATO Grows, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1996, at A14.
305. Tom Hundley, Slovakia's Shifty Leader Irritates the West, CHI. TRIB., July 28, 1996,
at 4.
306. Id.
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human rights, and the protection of minorities. One survey found support
for Slovakia's entry into NATO among Slovaks to be 42.5%, up from
38.5% in June of 1996. However, opposition to integration was also
significant and surveyed at 21.9%. " A United States congressional aid
asserted that Slovakia is subject to heightened scrutiny as one of the first
post-communist states being considered for NATO membership.M
Entering the alliance is contingent upon the state's ability to settle
neighborly disputes and domestic conflicts.309
Despite the steady increase in public support, opposition members
of Parliament have questioned whether the government truly desires
Western integration. Slovakia occupies a strategically significant segment
of Europe being located between the expanding West and the newly
democratic Soviet states and Russia. If Hungary, the Czech Republic and
Poland join NATO as expected, Slovakia will abut the western alliance's
eastern frontier, sandwiched between the amalgamated additions. One
possible reason for Slovak resistance to Western integration is that it may
threaten Slovakia's relations with Russia. Slovakia and Russia are
substantial trading partners, with Russia ranking second in terms of
imports to Slovakia and seventh in.terms of Slovakia's exports. 10 Failure
to construct a comprehensive program to fulfill EU and NATO accession
requirements, coupled with the government unwillingness to accept the
terms of integration, have provoked scepticism. MKDH Chairman Bela
Bugar assessed that "[w]hen it comes to foreign policy or foreign
integration, all the parliamentary groups should represent the same
interests. There is no consensus but they have not even tried to make
consensus in this field.""' Prime Minister Meciar, in the Russian daily
Trud, stated that the aim of Slovak foreign policy was to balance its
relations with the East and the West. He asserted that western integration
would not force the Slovak government to "unconditionally agree with the
West on everything." 1 2  Despite speculation, Prime Minister Meciar
307. See generally SME, Jan. 12, 1996.
308. James Morrison, Selling Slovakia, WASH. TIMEs, Feb. 26, 1996, at A17.
309. Id.
310. Sharon Fisher, Slovak Prime Minister on Relations with Russia, 196 OMRI DAILY DIG
II (Oct. 9, 1996)<http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index.Dhtml>. A free trade
agreement with Russia is currently being prepared and should be signed by late June 1997. See
Sharon Fisher, Slovakia, Russia Strengthen Ties, 229 OMRI DAILY DIG II (Nov. 26, 1996) (last
visited Oct. 28, 1997) < http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index.Dhtml >.
311. Interview with Mr. Bela Bugar, Chairman of MKDH, in Bratislava, Slovakia (Aug. 1,
1996).
312. Sharon Fisher, Slovak Prime Minister on Relations with Russia, 196 OMRI DAILY DIG.
II, (Oct. 9, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997) <http://www.omri.CZ/publications
/DD/index.Dhtml>.
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continues to profess the ultimate goal of NATO expansion. He blamed his
opposition for the current questioning by the international community
about the prospects of Slovakia entering NATO among the first wave of
new post-Cold War democracies. The Prime Minister also accused
"certain individuals, who are driven by their personal traumas" of sending
negative information about the state abroad and thereby threatening
Slovakia's chances for early integration."' HZDS supports a public
referendum on NATO and EU membership. Such a measure is prompted
by the frequent questioning of the benefits of Western integration posed by
HZDS junior coalition partners, the SNS and the Association of Slovak
Workers .14
In the event that Slovakia is denied admission to both the EU and
NATO while its neighbors accede to Western integration, minority rights
in Slovakia could be further threatened. The ethnic Hungarian minority
may become increasingly vulnerable because of the following reasons: 1)
the government coalition will no longer have Western pressure to adhere to
international human rights standards; 2) the country will be somewhat
alienated by the West and may further solidify its eastern allegiances; and'
3) politicians may attempt to use the Hungarian minority as a scapegoat in
the event of the state's denial of EU and NATO admission. Many
Hungarian political leaders have already made these predictions. Mr.
Bugar stated:
[iut is possible that if Slovakia is not integrated into the
West, and the internal economic situation continues to
worsen, members of the SNS or HZDS will try to escalate
tensions between ethnic Hungarians and Slovaks in an
attempt to distract attention away from the real issues, such
as a failed economic policy. It is in our [ethnic Hungarian]
interests to be integrated into the EU and NATO. . . . If
we are integrated, this means that we have fulfilled the five
basic requirements of NATO, one of which is solving the
minority issue .... This is what we want.'"
This sentiment prompted over 500 ethnic Hungarians to converge on the
town of Komarno in southern Slovakia to announce an open letter to EU
313. See Jiri Pehe, Slovak Prime Minister on NATO, EU, 200 OMRI DAILY DIG. II, (Oct.
15, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997) <http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index.DhtmI>.
314. See Sharon Fisher, Slovakia Plans Referendum on EU, NATO, 208 OMRI DAILY DIG.
II, (Oct. 25, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997)<http://www.omri.CZ/publirations/DD/index
.Dhtml >.
315. Interview with Mr. Bela Bugar, MKDH Chairman, in Bratislava, Slovakia (Aug. 1,
1996).
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and NATO countries entitled, Democracy is Endangered which highlighted
questionable measures of the Slovak government. 1'6 Statements like this
prompted the government to accuse Hungarians of spreading
disinformation abroad, thereby jeopardizing Slovakia's chances of
integration.
It is clear that Slovakia has not attained the democratic threshold
necessary to permit the state's accession into the EU and NATO. This
conclusion is supported by the government's relentless control over media
institutions, its questionable privatization methods, its disrespect for
national minorities, and its failure to stabilize relations with Hungary. If
Slovakia is hastily integrated into NATO, a revision of the Turkish-Greek
conflict is possible. While the SHBT is a significant step towards placating
tensions between the Hungarian and Slovak governments, it should only be
considered one step down the rocky path toward building a friendly and
trusting alliance. The Slovak government must adhere to its present
obligations under international human rights law to protect its minority
groups. Until the Slovak government sets the tone for tolerance, rather
than division, towards the Hungarian minority, it is unlikely that a positive
relationship between Slovakia and Hungary will be secured.
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The historical context underlying present relations between the
Hungarian minority and the Slovak majority has resulted in an exaggerated
awareness of the need to safeguard Slovak ethnicity in the young republic.
Protection of the Slovak nation is a sensitive and important government
prerogative. The Slovak government's authority to take measures to
defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity is not questioned. These
interests, however, must be balanced by protections for all Slovak citizens
regardless of nationality. The legislative measures analyzed in this report
have furthered the interests of ethnic Slovaks while leaving persons
belonging to a national minority vulnerable. Such initiatives are contrary
to the letter and spirit of international agreements ratified by the Slovak
government. As a multi-ethnic state, the Slovak government must resist
urges to place the Slovak nation before the interests of national minority
groups residing within its borders. All Slovak citizens must be treated in a
fair and equitable manner.
Ethnic problems arise when individuals are discriminated against,
denied their freedom of expression, or prohibited from exercising their
cultural and linguistic practices. The Slovak government, while ratifying
316. Sharon Fisher, Slovak Hungarians Complain to EU, NATO, 194 OMRI DAILY DIG. II
(Oct. 7, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997)<http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index
.Dhtml >.
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international instruments aimed at securing the rights of minorities on the
one hand, is simultaneously taking steps that increase ethnic tensions with
the other. The government's willingness, on occasion, to manipulate
ethnic tensions for political gain has cast doubt on its commitment to
protect minority rights. Legislation restricting the use of the Hungarian
language, decreasing support for Hungarian language education and
cultural activities, and disrupting local representation in political life has
resulted in resentment and discord among the Hungarian minority.
It must not be forgotten that as the Slovak government struggles to
build a national identity from heterogeneous elements, the selection of a
state language may be an important symbol and a practical necessity.
From the point of view of the Hungarian minority, however, the selection
of the Slovak language as the state language places members of the
minority at a distinct disadvantage. It seems incumbent upon the state to
ensure that this disadvantage is eliminated as far as possible. Language is
the primary feature that unites the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. While
uniting members of the Hungarian minority, language may also prove to be
extremely divisive as it pits Slovak speakers against those whose mother
tongue is Hungarian. Disrespect for minority languages has fanned the
centuries-old flames of discontent, and language, unfortunately, has
become the rallying cry for ethnic tension.
Many of the problems analyzed in this report may be attributed to
weak drafting skills or lack of precedents that in due course will fill out the
lacunae. Legal and institutional protection for the rights of minorities in
Slovakia remain weak, specifically, the fragility of democratic institutions
and the constitutionally-based rule of law generally. The Slovak
government has promised that other laws are forthcoming, albeit at a
modest pace, that may modify the contents of the legislation in question.
In light of nationalistic tendencies prevalent in Slovakia, recently
promulgated legislation presents a disquieting picture of Slovak. life.
Rather than implementing the philosophies of decentralization and
transfrontier cooperation, antediluvian notions such as continued
centralization of state power and disrespect for the value of national
minorities continue to dominate Slovak political life. If the ruling coalition
truly strives to integrate into both the EU and NATO, extensive effort
needs to be made to resolve domestic disputes. Efforts need to be made
not only in the arena of minority relations, but also in all areas of society
where conflicting opinions arise.
The Slovak government must abide by its obligations under
international and national law to protect the human rights of members of
the Hungarian minority, specifically, to:
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1) Respect the Hungarian minority's constitutionally guaranteed
rights, contained in Article 34, to "promote their cultural heritage,"
"receive and disseminate information in their mother tongues, form
associations, and create and maintain educational and cultural institutions,"
"be educated in a minority language," "use a minority language in official
contacts," and "participate in decision making in matters affecting" them.
These constitutional rights should not be limited, restricted or eradicated
by domestic legislation, as the free exercise of these rights does not
threaten Slovak sovereignty or territorial integrity;
2) Promulgate legislation, as promised, defining the permissible use
of minority languages in the Slovak Republic. This measure should be in
accordance with the state's obligations under the SHBT, Recommendation
1201, the FCNM and the ECHR. In light of the geographical
concentration of the Hungarian minority in southern Slovakia, special
consideration should be given to the use of the Hungarian language in
administrative contacts throughout this region. This accommodation will
protect members of the Hungarian minority from possible discriminatory
effects caused by the Language Law's prohibition on the use of minority
languages in this context;
3) Establish a commission, comprised of minority representatives, to
monitor the implementation of the Language Law to guarantee that its
provisions are not fulfilled in a discriminatory manner;
4) Modify its alternative education plan to ensure that acceptance of
bilingual education is truly voluntary;
5) Support, facilitate and provide for education in the Hungarian
language, an adequate number of classes for Hungarian students at all
levels, ensure that teachers are properly-trained to teach in the Hungarian
language; and enable a sufficient number of Hungarian students to attend
the Nitra Pedagogical College to receive teacher training;
6) Develop a program aimed at increasing minority enrollment in
universities;
7) Amend legislation authorizing the government appointment of
district administrators and the district's state administration board to allow
for the election of these local representatives;
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8) Amend the territorial division legislation to more adequately
decentralize government control of local affairs and increase the
participation of the Hungarian minority in government. These amendments
should reflect suggestions contained in the Explanatory Report to the
FCNM, the European Charter of Self-Government and the CRLAE
Recommendation 250;
9) Respect the use of traditional Hungarian Christian names;
10) Respect the posting of bilingual public signs, especially signs
indicating historic place names;
11) Allocate spending on minority culture in a proportional and non-
discriminatory manner;
12) Reduce the statutory mandates on financial thresholds created by
the Law on Foundations to better facilitate growth in this sector;
13) Make substantial changes to the Law on the Protection of the
Republic to ensure that the freedoms of speech, association and expression
are protected in accordance with international human rights principles;
14) Adopt an affirmative plan. to recruit more members of the
Hungarian minority into government positions to ensure the adequate and
fair representation of all Slovak citizens. This recommendation is
particularly important in the ministries of Education and Culture;
15) Allow members of the Hungarian Coalition access to parliamentary
committees, particularly the committee on radio and television, state
security, and culture;
16) Strengthen legal mechanisms for protecting the legal rights of the
Hungarian minority, including making revisions, where necessary, to
facilitate the ability of citizens to challenge government decisions,
including those of local authorities;
17) Implement an educational program for judges aimed at
incorporating international human rights standards into court decisions;
18) Take additional measures to guarantee the independence of the
judiciary;
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19) Take affirmative actions to reduce tensions between minorities and
the Slovak majority. Efforts should be made to introduce educational
programs on minority rights, minority history and culture, and human
rights standards. Human rights training programs should be provided for
the police, government officials, local authorities, and teachers;
20) Establish a commission, comprised of government, opposition and
minority representatives, to investigate anonymous threats, and physical
and verbal harassment to journalists and opposition political leaders;
21) Abandon its attempts to deprive democratically elected officials of
their positions;
22) Refrain from misusing its authority to replace political opponents
with government sympathizers; and
23) Distance itself from extremist views, whether they be nationalist,
xenophobic, or anti-Hungarian.
It is incumbent upon the Slovak government to set the tone of
respect for members of national minorities. Rather than provoke ethnic
division and unrest, the Slovak government should serve as a model for a
tolerant and civil atmosphere. Claims of Hungarian irredentism should not
be used to vilify the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. Territorial claims
have repeatedly been refuted by the Hungarian government. In addition,
representatives of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia have repeatedly
stated that they do not want to reunify with Hungary. What ethnic
Hungarians do want is the right to live free from discrimination in
Slovakia. In closing, Mr. Bugar's words are appropriate:
We only want the right to remain Hungarian. This is the
ethnicity and language of our parents, grandparents and
great-grandparents. Hungarians in this region have a very
good habit which has worked for centuries. The more they
beat us, the more we protect ourselves and organize to
resist their attacks. [Many people] fear this situation now.
There is an old Hungarian idiom: You can't catch a
sparrow with a gun. This holds true for us now. 17
317. Interview with Mr. Bela Bugar, Chairman of MKDH, in Bratislava, Slovakia (Aug. 1,
1996).
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article discusses the interpretation of Article 25' of the United
Nations Charter that was offered by the International Court of Justice in its
advisory opinion of June 21, 1971 (Namibia Opinion).2 It is a topic that is
unfortunately overlooked by the current arguments concerning the power
of the revived Security Council. The end of the Cold War has liberated
the United Nations from the confrontation between the West and the East,
and has freed the Security Council from the functional paralysis that the
veto power of its permanent members had forced upon it. The activities
* Research Associate, University of Tokyo; Ph.D. Candidate in Law, University of
Tokyo, Graudate School of Law and Politics; LL.M., 1996, Georgetown University Law Center;
LL.M., 1994, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Law and Politics; LL.B., 1992,
University of Tokyo, Faculty of Law; Netherlands Certificate in Public International Law, 1994
and 1996, Hague Academy of International Law.
1. Article 25 of the United Nations Charter provides, "[T]he members of the United
Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with
the present Charter." U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
2. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16
(Advisory Opinion of June 21) [hereinafter Namibia Opinion].
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of the revitalized Security Council, which have been activated not only
quantitatively but also qualitatively,' have pushed the question of the
limitations on the Council's power under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter into "the forefront of attention"4 of international lawyers.
While numerous articles have discussed this question from various points
of view,5 little attention has been given to the interpretation of Article 25
of the Charter.
II. NAMIBIA OPINION, ARTICLE 25, AND THE POWER OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL
In the Namibia Opinion6 the International Court of Justice stated
that in addition to the powers specifically granted to the Security Council
in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII, which are enumerated in Article 24,
paragraph 2, of the United Nations Charter, the Council has general
implied powers in paragraph 17 of the same Article, stemming from its
3. BOUTROS BOuTROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE 7-12 (ed. 1995).
4. T.D. Gill, Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Power of the UN Security
Council to Exercise its Enforcement Powers Under Chapter VII of the Charter, 26 NETH. Y.B.
INT'L L. 34 (1995).
5. E.g., LE DtVELOPPEMENT DU R6LE DU CONSEIL DE StCURITIt (Ren~e-Jean Dupuy
ed., 1993); Giorgio Gaja, Reflexions sur le r6le du Conseil de Sgcuritg dans le nouvel ordre
mondial, 97 REv. GlN. D. INT'L PUB. 297-320 (1993); Thomas M. Franck, The Powers of
Appreciation: Who is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality? 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 519-23 (1992);
Vera Gowiland-Debbas, Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of State Responsibility,
43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 55-98 (1994); Martti Koskeniemmi, The Police in the Temple, 6 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 325-48 (1995); R. Lavalle, The Law of the United Nations and the Use of Force,
Under the Relevant Security Council Resolutions of 1990 and 1991, To Resolve the Persian Gulf
Crisis, 23 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 3-65 (1992); Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf
Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 452-73 (1991); Gill, supra note 4, at 33-138.
6. Namibia Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16. The confrontation between the United Nations and
South Africa concerning the Mandates of Namibia (South West Africa) has occurred since the
establishment of the United Nations. The International Court of Justice gave some decisions and
advisory opinions regarding the conflict. See Ernst Klein, South West Africa/Namibia (Advisory
Opinions and Judgments), in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 260-70 (R.
Bernhardt ed., 1981). The Security Council, on January 30, 1970, adopted resolution 276 and
declared that "the continued presence of the South African authorities in Namibia is illegal, and
that consequently all acts taken by the Government of South Africa, on behalf of or concerning
Namibia after the termination of the Mandate, are illegal and invalid." The Situation in Nambia,
S/RES/276 (1970) S.C. Res. 276 (1970). Moreover, the Council called upon all States "to
refrain from any dealings with the Government of South Africa." Id. Since South Africa,
nevertheless, did not withdraw from Namibia and did not alter her policy concerning it, the
Security Council requested the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on
Legal Consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970). The Situation in Nambia,
S/RES/284 (1970) S.C. Res. 284 (1970).
7. Article 24, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the United Nations Charter provides,
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responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.' In support
of this position the Court cited the Secretary General's statement of
January 10, 1947, which was submitted to the Security Council. That
statement pronounced that
[t]he powers of the Council, under Article 24, are not
restricted to the specific grants of authority contained in
Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XI. 9 The Members of the
United Nations have conferred upon the Security Council
powers commensurate with its responsibility for the
maintenance of peace and security. The only limitations
are the fundamental principles and purposes found in
Chapter I of the Charter."
Furthermore, the Court stated that Article 25, which provides
decisions of the Security Council with legal binding effect upon Member
States," applied not only to decisions taken under Chapter VII but also to
those taken under the general implied powers.' 2 In other words, the Court
admitted that the Security Council had general mandatory powers, which
are implied from its responsibility to maintain international peace and
1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its
Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying
out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their
behalf.
2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with
the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers
granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid
down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.
U.N. CHARTER art. 24., paras. 2-3.
8. This is theoretically justified by implied powers doctrine, according to which
international organizations can deduce powers necessary for discharging their objects from their
duties when such powers are not explicitly provided in the constituent documents. See, e.g.,
Manfred Zuleeg, International Organizations, Implied Powers, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 312 (1984); Manuel Rama-Montaldo, International Legal Personality and
Implied Powers of International Organizations, 44 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 111-55 (1970). The
International Court of Justice has admitted this doctrine. For example, in the Reparation Case, it
stated, "[T]he rights and duties of an entity such as the [United Nations] Organization must
depend upon its purpose and functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents and
developed in practice." Reparation for Injuries, 1949 I.C.J. 180 (Advisory Opinion of Apr. 11)
(emphasis added).
9. Namibia Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 52.
10. Id.
11. U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
12. Namibia Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. at 52-54.
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security.' 3  Those general implied powers give the Security Council the
authority to impose any obligation upon Member States, so long as the
Council acted for such purposes.
Little attention has been paid to the Namibia Opinion in this
context. Instead, current arguments only focus on what the Security
Council can decide under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The
Security Council increased mandatory sanctions after the end of the Cold
War.' 4 These mandatory sanctions have been justified "under Chapter VII
of the United Nations Charter.' This justification precludes an argument
proposing that Article 25 applies to the Council's decisions. Thus, it has
been found unnecessary to discuss what decisions can be made outside
Chapter VII with legal binding effect.
However, if the interpretation of Articles 24 and 25 offered by the
International Court of Justice is accepted, current arguments concerning
the limitations on the Security Council's exercise of authority under
Chapter VII would become futile. An action taken pursuant to the
Council's direction could be vindicated by its general mandatory powers
even if one could contend that the Council's action could not be justified
by its power under Chapter VII.
Arguments concerning the Lockerbie Incident provide a good
example of this point. Three years after the explosion of Pan American
Flight 103, on December 21, 1988, the Security Council adopted
resolution 748 (1992), which determined that "the failure by the Libyan
Government . . . to respond fully and effectively to the requests in
resolution 731 (1992) constitute[d] a threat to international peace and
security" 6 and decided that, "[a]cting under Chapter VII, . . .the Libyan
Government must now comply without any further delay with .
resolution 731 (1992) regarding the requests" for extradition of the alleged
suspects of Libyan nationality."' Although this incident has raised
animated arguments coricerning the limitations of the Council's power
under Chapter VII and the justiciability of the Council's activities, 8 very
13. UN SCOR, 3d Sess., 91 mtg. at 45. (1947).
14. There were seven sanction regimes imposed by the Council as of December 16, 1994,
although there was only one as of January 31, 1988. See BOUTROS-GHALI, npr"note 3, at 8.
15. E.g., S.C. Res. 661 (1990), S.C. Res. 670 (1990), Humanitarian Assistance S.C. Res.
687 (1991); S.C. Res. 778 (1992) (against Iraq); Yugoslavia Situation S.C. Res. 713 (1991);
S.C. Res. 820 (1993) (against Former Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. 733 (1992) (against Somalia); Air
and Arms Embargo S.C. Res. 748 (1992) (against Libya); S.C. Res. 788 (1992) (against
Liberia); S.C. Res. 841 (1993) (against Haiti).
16. S.C. Res. 748 (1992) S/RES/748 (1992).
17. Id.
18. Bernard Graefrath, Leave to the Court What Belongs to the Court, the Libyan Case, 4
EUR. J. INT'L L. 184-205 (1993); Mark Weller, The Lockerbie Case: A Premature End to the
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few of these arguments pay attention to the issue of general mandatory
powers of the Security Council. 9 Most fail to recognize that the general
mandatory powers would justify the Council's sanction on Libya, even if
any limitations of the power under Chapter VII exist.
Among the few scholars who have discussed the relationship
between the Council's general mandatory powers and its power under
Chapter VII, three standpoints emerge. Professor Bothe contests the
interpretation of Article 24 offered by the International Court of Justice.
He contends that the predominance of the great powers in the system of
international peace and security is legitimated by the fact that the power of
the Council is defined very strictly, that is, the Council has only specific
powers as defined by Article 24, paragraph 2.20 Since Bothe denies the
existence of the general implied powers of the Security Council, naturally
he would also deny the Council's general mandatory powers, which are
premised upon the existence of the general implied powers. Professor Gill
basically accepts the interpretation of the International Court of Justice but
contends that, where the Council's authority is defined by specific
provisions in the Charter, the Council's general powers "should not be
construed in such a way as to violate or exceed the allocation and
limitation of authority contained in specific provisions of the Charter."
21
Professor White definitely supports the position of the Court22 and
contends that the current Security Council resolutions imposing mandatory
sanctions should be adopted under "the Council's general mandatory
powers, as identified by the World Court in the Namibia [sic] case rather
than under Chapter VII. "23
None of these views are satisfactory. First, Professor Bothe's
perspective neglects the fact that the general implied powers of the
Security Council are widely accepted by the international community.24
Second, Professor Gill's view is inconsistent because the Security
Council's powers cannot be limited to those things specifically listed in the
New World Order?, 4 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 302-24 (1992); Manfred Mohr, Der Lockerbie-
Fall vor UN-Sicherheitrat und Jnternationalem Gerichtshof, 20 DEMOKRATIE UND RECHT 305-14
(1992); C. Tomuschat, The Lockerbie Case before the International Court of Justice, 48 THE
REVIEW 38-48 (1992); Gerald McGinley, The ICJ's Decision in the Lockerbie Cases, 22 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 577-607 (1992); Franck, supra note 5, at 519-23.
19. See Bothe, Les limites des pouvoirs du Conseil de Sgcuritg, in LE DtVELOPPEMENT DU
ROLE DU CONSEIL DE StCURITI, supra note 5, at 70-71.
20. Id.
21. Gill, supra note 4, at 70.
22. N.D. WHITE, KEEPING THE PEACE 61-66 (1993) (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 66.
24. LELAND M. GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, COMMENTARY
AND DOCUMENTS 204-07 (3d & revised ed. 1969).
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chapters granting its powers and at the same time be expanded to include
implied powers.
Moreover, both Professors Gill and White do not examine the
validity of the Court's interpretation. Both of them premise the Court's
interpretation without questioning it. The advisory opinion of the
International Court of Justice is not binding, and even the decision of the
Court has no precedential value in a strict sense. 25 This means that the
Court's opinion can be relied upon only when it is in accordance with
existing international law. 26  Thus, study on the Court's interpretation is
essential in discussing the relationship between the Council's general
mandatory powers and its power under Chapter VII.
In discussing whether the majority of the International Court of
Justice validly interpreted Article 25 of the Charter, this article examines
whether the Court's own reasoning is sustainable (Section II); whether the
Court's opinion can be supported by certain other doctrines (Section III);
and finally, whether the Court's interpretation has been accepted by the
Member States of the United Nations (Section IV).
III. MAJORITY OPINION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
The majority opinion of the International Court of Justice in the
Namibia Opinion explores two premises in determining whether Security
Council resolution 276 (1970) is mandatory. 7 First, the Court examines
the legal basis of the resolution and, second, the binding effect of the
decision.28 That is to say, the Court distinguishes the legal basis for
adopting such a resolution from the legal effect that the resolution may
have. This distinction should be noted. As for the legal basis of the
resolution, the Court relies upon the general implied powers of the
Council. This is necessary for discharging the responsibility of maintaining
international peace and security, which is vested in the Council under
Article 24, paragraph 1, of the Charter.29 As to the legal effect of the
resolution, or in other words, what makes the implied powers mandatory,
the Court contends that Article 25 not only applies to enforcement
measures adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter but also to the
25. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 59. However, it is usual for the
International Court of Justice to follow its preceding judgments and opinions.
26. Judicial decisions shall be applied by the International Court of Justice "as subsidiary
means for the determination of rule of law." Statute of the International Court of Justice, art.
38, para. I(d) (emphasis added).
27. Strictly, the Court admits the mandatory nature of paragraphs 2 and 5 of the Security
Council resolution. Namibia Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 52.
28. See id. at 51-54.
29. See id. at 52.
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decisions of the Security Council adopted in accordance with the general
implied powers.30
It is true, as mentioned above, that the Security Council's general
implied powers regarding Article 24, paragraph 1, of the Charter have
been generally accepted. However, this does not necessarily mean that the
Security Council can take any type of action, even though this means that
it can act upon any appropriate occasion.3 ' That is, even though the
general implied powers empower the Security Council to act in any
appropriate occasion, this does not necessarily mean that, on such
occasion, it can issue binding decisions directly based upon such general
powers. This is the reason why the majority opinion explores two
premises in reasoning that the Security Council has general mandatory
powers. Since the majority's first premise is generally accepted, the
second premise is the focus of this paper. That is, the focus of this paper
is to discuss whether Article 25 applies to those decisions of the Security
Council which are adopted in accordance with the general implied powers
under Article 24, paragraph 1.
The reasoning of the majority on this point is rather simple. The
Court shows a strong presumption that the declarations made under Article
24 would bind all the Member States, rejects two refutations of the
presumption, and, consequently concludes the legal binding effect of
resolution 276.32
First of all, a strong assumption is granted to the legal binding
effect of resolution 276 which is adopted in accordance with the general
implied powers without showing any grounds but by stating that
[ilt would be an untenable interpretation to maintain that,
once such a declaration had been made by the Security
Council under Article 24 of the Charter, on behalf of all
member States, those Members would be free to act in
disregard of such illegality or even to recognize violations
of law resulting from it. When confronted with such an
internationally unlawful situation, Members of the United
Nations would be expected to act in consequence of the
declaration made on their behalf.33
Second, the Court rejects the contention "that Article 25 of the
Charter applies only to enforcement measures adopted under Chapter VII
30. See id. at 52-53.
31. See id. at 293 (dissenting opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice).
32. Namibia Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. at 52.
33. Id. at 52.
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of the Charter"34 for the following reasons: (a) no words define "the
decisions of the Security Council" in Article 25, as those merely in regard
to enforcement action under Chapter VII, and the only words confining
such decisions are "in accordance with the Charter;"3" (b) Article 25 is
placed not in Chapter VII but in Chapter V, which deals with the functions
and powers of the Security Council in general; 36 and, finally, (c) Article
25 would be unnecessary if it only related to decisions regarding
enforcement actions under Chapter VII, since Articles 48 and 49 provide
binding effect for such decisions.37
Furthermore, the Court refutes the contention that resolution 276
does not purport to impose any legal duty upon the Member States as it is
couched in exhortatory language, on the grounds that i) "the terms of the
resolution to be interpreted," ii) "the discussions leading to it," iii) "the
Charter provisions invoked," and iv) "in general, all circumstances that
might assist in determining the legal consequences of the resolution" have
to be taken into account to determine the binding effect of the Security
Council resolution. 3' That is, the decisive factor is not the language used
in the resolution, but the Council's intention, which can be inferred from
"all circumstances. 39
Two issues should be separated in examining the Court's
reasoning. The first issue is whether this reasoning is sufficient to refute
the contention that Article 25 applies only to enforcement measures
adopted under Chapter VII. The second issue is whether the reasoning is
adequate enough to prove that Article 25 applies to any decisions adopted
in accordance with the general implied powers of the Security Council.
The Court's reasoning as to the first issue is convincing. Article 25 would
be unnecessary if it only relates to decisions regarding enforcement actions
under Chapter VII. However, this does not lead to the conclusion that
Article 25 applies to any decisions based upon the Council's general
implied powers. In other words, negating the view that Article 25 applies
only to enforcement measures adopted under Chapter VII does not
necessarily refute the contention that Article 25 applies only to decisions
adopted in accordance with specific provisions in the Charter, including
Articles other than Chapter VII, such as Article 34 and Article 94,
paragraph 2.
34. Id. at 52-53.
35. Id. at 53.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 54.
38. Namibia Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. at 54.
39 Namibia Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 52.
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In light of the possibility that under Article 25 the powers of the
Security Council are limited by the specific Charter provisions, the basis
of the majority opinion of the Court becomes unstable. First, "[ilf . ..
Article [25] were automatically to make all [sic] decisions of the Security
Council binding, then the words 'in accordance with the present Charter'
would be quite superfluous."' Second, the fact that Article 25 is placed in
Chapter V of the Charter does not mean that it applies to all decisions
adopted in accordance with general implied powers. Article 25 is placed
in Chapter V as a general provision, which provides a binding effect with
decisions adopted in accordance with specific provisions including those
other than Chapter VII. Third, Articles 48 and 49 complement Article 25,
and the latter is still significant as a general provision.4'
On the other hand, the rejection of the second refutation is not
meant to prove the legal binding effect of the resolution itself. According
to the Court's reasoning, the Security Council's intention is a decisive
factor in determining what declaration made in accordance with the
general implied powers would have legal binding effect. However, it is
only when the Council has the general mandatory powers that the
Council's intention would matter. Here, the Court presumes the Security
Council's general mandatory powers again.
. In conclusion, although the Court effectively refutes the contention
that Article 25 applies only to enforcement actions under Chapter VII, its
reasoning is not enough to prove that the Article applies to any decisions
adopted in accordance with the general implied powers of the Security
Council. It is the strong presumption that "[i]t would be an untenable
interpretation to maintain that, once such a declaration had been made by
the Security Council under Article 24 of the Charter, . . ., those Members
would be free to act in disregard of such illegality or even to recognize
violations of law resulting from it"42 that nevertheless leads the Court to
the latter conclusion.
However, such a presumption by the Court is not shared by all.
Indeed, this view emphasizing institutional effectiveness43 of the Security
40. Id. at. 293-94 (dissenting opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice).
41. AC Cilliers, United Nations Competence in respect of South West Africa, 2 SOUTH
AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 136-37 (1976); Von Wilhelm A. Kewenig, Die Problematik der
Bindungswirkung von Entscheidungen des Sicherheitsrates, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR U. SCHEUNER
ZUM 70 GEBURTSTAG 273-74 (H. Ehmske et al. eds., 1973); M. KROKEL, DIE
BINDUNGSWIRKUNG VON RESOLUTIONEN DES SICHERHEITSRATES DER VEREINTEN NATIONEN
GEGENUBER MITGLIEDSTAATEN 49 (1977); Jean Paul Jacqu6, L'Avis de la cour internationale de
justice du 21 Juin 1971, 76 REV. GtN. DROIT INT'L PUB. 1088-89 (1972).
42. See Namibia Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. at 52.
43. Institutional effectiveness has been relied upon by the International Court of Justice to
provide an international organization with "those powers which, though not expressly provided
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Council is strongly criticized as making the Council's power essentially
unlimited, thus enabling the Council to impose any obligation upon
Member States against their will. 44 According to the majority opinion, the
Security Council could impose any obligation upon Member States by
asserting that it is discharging its responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security, since it is easy to represent any
controversial international situation as involving a latent threat to peace
and security. 45 As Judge Gros contends, the majority opinion is "to turn
the Security Council into a world government," ' a result that is most
likely unacceptable to many of the Member States, which are part of an
international community whose main actors are still independent sovereign
states.
4 7
In other words, the Council's emphasis on the institutional
effectiveness of the Security Council comes into conflict with state
sovereignty, which is an issue emphasized by some dissenting opinions.48
Institutional effectiveness and state sovereignty are equally crucial since
both of them relate to fundamentals of the international society. Basic
units of the international community are sovereign states, and yet, on the
other hand, the function of the Council is to maintain peace and security of
the international community. It is true that state sovereignty is somehow
limited by the establishment of the United Nations, but this does not lead
to the conclusion that institutional effectiveness always supersedes state
sovereignty. Thus, any attempt to deduce a conclusion from a certain
value is bound to be futile, for it leads to the sterile confrontation between
in the [constituent documents], are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential
to the performance of its duties." Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. 182 (Apr. 9) (emphasis added).
See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 690 (4th ed. 1990).
44. W. Riphagen, The Legal Consequence of Illegal Acts under Public International Law,
20 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 27, 31 (1973); Lawrence L. Herman, The Legal Status of Namibia and
of the United Nations Council for Namibia, 13 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 306, 319 (1975). Contra,
RENATA SONNENFELD RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 127-28
(1988); ROSGEN, supra note 41, at 159; Rosalyn Higgins, The Advisory Opinion on Namibia:
Which UN Resolutions Are Binding Under Article 25 of the Charter? 21 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
270, 286 (1972).
45. See Namibia Opinion, 1971 I.C.J at 294 (dissenting opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice).
46. Id. at 340 (dissenting opinion of Judge Gros).
47. See Anthony J.M. Zuijdwijk, The International Court and South West Africa: Latest
Phase, 3 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 332, 338-40 (1973). See also Riphagen, supra note 44, at
34; P.H. Koojimans, The Advisory Opinion on Namibia of the International Court of Justice, 20
NETH. INT'L L. REV. 17, 24 (1973); Herman, supra note 44, at 319; Arthur W. Rovine, The
World Court Opinion on Namibia, 11 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 203, 230 (1972); Cillers,
supra note 41, at 136; Oliver J. Lissitzyn, International Law and the Advisory Opinion on
Namibia, 11 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 50, 73 (1972).
48. See Namibia Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. at 294-95 dissenting opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice);
Id. at 341 (dissenting opinion of Judge Gros); Id. at 147 (separate opinion of Judge Onyeama).
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two absolute values. Therefore, apart from such axiology, a more fruitful
discussion can be had by examining how states regard the scope of binding
decisions of the Security Council .
IV. GENERAL MANDATORY POWERS DOCTRINE
This section examines whether the interpretation offered by the
majority opinion can be sustained from another perspective. Having
analyzed the reasoning of the majority opinion, this section examines the
alleged basis of the general mandatory powers doctrine, which contends
that the Security Council has general and almost unlimited powers to issue
binding decisions if it acts in maintaining international peace and security.
The alleged basis of this doctrine, other than those discussed above, are
travaux pr~paratoires (preparatory documents) of the United Nations
Charter and practices of the Security Council.
A. Travaux Prdparatoires (Preparatory Documents)
Some scholarss' base their contention on the fact that, at the San
Francisco Conference, an amendment proposed by Belgium was voted
down." That amendment would have required that any obligation of the
Member States, under Article 25 to carry out the Security Council's
decisions, be restricted to those decisions adopted under Chapter V1115 2 of
the Dumbarton ProposalV3 be expressly stated. Indeed, the Secretary
General's statement reads, "[t]he rejection of this [Belgian] amendment is
clear evidence that the obligation of the Members to carry out the
decisions of the Security Council applies equally to decisions made [under
the general implied powers] under Article 24 and to the decisions made
49. See A. C. Arend, Chapter III: A Methodology for Determining an International Legal
Rule, in LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
50. Koojimans, supra note 47, at 22-23; Jost Delbruck, Artikle 25, in CHARTA DER
VEREINTEN NATIONEN KOMMENTAR 376 (B. Simma ed. 1991; RAHMATULLAH KHAN, IMPLIED
POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 7 (1970). See also Higgins, supra note 44, at 278-79;
SONNENFELD, supra note 44, at 126-27.
51. The Belgian proposal was to add the words "taken under Chapter VIII" after the words
"Security Council" in paragraph 4, section B, chapter VI, which provided as follows: "All
members of the Organization should obligate themselves to accept the decisions of the Security
Council and to carry them out in accordance with the provisions of the Charter." The United
Nations Dumbarton Proposals for a General International Organization, Doc.1, G/l, 3
U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 9 (1945).
52. Chapter VIII of the Dumbarton Proposal corresponds to Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of
the current United Nations Charter. Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for a General International
Organization, Doc.l, G/I. 3 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 12-19 (1945).
53. Id.
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under the grant of specific powers."5 4 However, this understanding is too
simplistic and it is untenable to conclude so from this fact.
First, the Belgian proposal received a favorable vote of a majority
of the delegates that attended and voted at the meeting, despite it being
voted down due to the lack of the necessary two-thirds majority."
Moreover, the Belgian amendment was not intended to modify the text
substantially, but to make explicit that the decisions of the Security
Council, which Member States have an obligation to accept, referred
solely to its powers under Chapter VIII of the Dumbarton Proposal. 6 In
addition, one of the sponsoring countries, the United Kingdom, suggested
that the amendment was not necessary, since the decisions of the Security
Council were specified by the phrase, "in accordance with the provisions
of the Charter.
57
Furthermore, some governmental official reports on the San
Francisco Conference support the view that the binding decisions of the
Security Council must be based upon the specific Charter provisions. For
example, the United States report on the result of the San Francisco
Conference clearly states that it is to be noted that the members of the
Organization agree to carry out the decisions of the Security Council in
accordance with the present Charter. Thus, the precise extent of the
members' obligation under Article 25 can be determined only by reference
to other provisions of the Charter, particularly Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and
XII 8  Moreover, the Canadian official commentary on the Charter
emphasizes that the view that Member States assume obligations under
54. U.N. SCOR, 2d Sess., 91st mtg. at 45, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 91 (1947) [hereinafter U.N.
SCOR]. See also Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971
I.C.J. Pleadings, 100, n. 160 (1970) (statements of the Secretary General of the United Nations).
55. The proposal received a favorable vote of 14 to 13. Summary Report of Fourteenth
Meeting of Committee, Doc. 597, III/1/30, 11 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 395 (1945).
56. See id. at 394.
57. Id. Indeed, the British delegation suggested the Security Council can issue binding
decisions only under Chapters VIII and XII (Chapter XVII of the current Charter) of the
Dumbarton Proposal. Id. Other than these two countries, the Soviet Union argued against the
Belgian amendment because the proposal would restrict the Council's power undesirably but
Canada contended that paragraph 4 should be interpreted as relating exclusively to chapter VIII
of the Dumbarton Proposal. Id. at 394-95.
58. See The Charter of the United Nations for the Maintenance of International Peace and
Security, Submitted by the President of the United States on July 2, 1945: Hearings on Senate,
Before the Comm'n on Foreign Relations, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1945) (report to the
President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference by the Chairman of the United States
delegation, the Secretary of State, June 26, 1945) (emphasis added).
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Article 25 only when other specific provisions provide so was accepted at
the Conference. 9
This analysis on travaux pr~paratoires (preparatory documents)
shows that inferring from these travaux preparatoires (preparatory
documents) that the Security Council has general mandatory powers is
invalid.' The record strongly suggests that the prevailing view was that
the binding decisions of the Security Council must be based upon the
specific provisions of the United Nations Charter.6
B. Practices of the Security Council
Other scholars62 claim that the Security Council has general
mandatory powers, based on the analysis of several practices. However,
these practices, such as the question of the Statute of the Free Territory of
Trieste, the Palestine question, the Congo question, the Indonesian
question, the Cashmere question, the Greek frontier incidents question, the
Iranian question, and the South African question, are not relevant to the
present issue 63 and no conclusion regarding the general mandatory powers
can be drawn from these practices.'
1. The Question of the Free Territory of Trieste65
The Permanent Statute for the Free Territory of Trieste, one of the
instruments relating to the establishment of Free Territory of Trieste,
which was decided under the proposed peace treaty with Italy, provided
that the integrity and independence of the Free Territory should be assured
59. See DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, 2 REPORT ON THE UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 33 (Conference Series 1945).
60. Kewenig, supra note 41, at 274; Higgins, supra note 44, at 278; Jacqu6, supra note
41, at 1089.
61. See RUTH B. RUSSELL & JEANNETTE E. MUTHER, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS CHARTER 665 (1958); GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 24, at 208; Kewenig, supra note
41, at 275-77.
62. PHILIPPE MANIN, L'ORAGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES ET LE MAINTIEN DE LA
PAIX 50, 57-69 (1971); JORGE CASTAIFEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS
RESOLUTIONS 72-75 (1969).
63. Jacqud, supra note 41, at 1089-92.
64. See, e.g., GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 24, at 208; Kewenig, supra note 41, at 265;
SONNENFELD, supra note 44, at 122; A. J.P. Tammes, Decisions of International Organs as a
Source of International Law, 94 R.C.A.D.I. 299 (1958-I).
65. See 2 REPERTORY OF PRACTICE OF UNITED NATIONS ORGANS 41-42 (1955).
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by the Security Council.6 6 The Statute raised a discussion regarding the
authority of the Council to assume the responsibilities relating to the Free
Territory and regarding the obligations of Members of the United Nations
in consequence of. the decision by the Council to assume those
responsibilities. This case is viewed as a decisive precedent since, in this
discussion, the Secretary General of the United Nations submitted a
statement expressing the view that "the obligation of the Members to carry
out the decisions of the Security Council applies equally to decisions
[based upon the general implied powers] ...under Article 24 and to the
decisions made under the grant of specific powers."6 7
However, this case only relates to the Security Council's general
implied powers under Article 24, not to its mandatory powers under
Article 25.68 It was not made clear as to "what countries would be bound
by the obligations to ensure the integrity and independence of the Free
Territory. , 69 Furthermore, it should be emphasized that the territory was
not under any sovereignty and that the responsibility of the Security
Council was consented to by all the signatories to the proposed Peace
Treaty. In other words, this decision "is not one where the principle of
the sovereignty of States ... is at stake." 70
2. Palestine Question
This case related to the implementation of the Plan Partition with
the Economic Union for Palestine.7' In the Plan, the General Assembly
requested the Security Council to assume responsibility for the Plan's
execution. Consequently, the question was raised whether the Council had
the power to accept such responsibility. This case is definitely irrelevant
since the Security Council rejected the Assembly's request. However,
Professor Jorge Castafieda regards this as one of the precedent-setting
cases of general mandatory powers of the Security Council.72
66. See Permanent Statute of the Free Territory of Trieste, art. 2, 49 U.N.T.S. 187
(1950).
67. U.N. SCOR, supra note 54, at 45.
68. See Jacqu6, supra note 41, at 1090-91.
69. U.N. SCOR, supra note 54, at 57 (statement of Australian delegation).
70. Id. at 58 (statement of French delegation).
71. See 2 REPERTORY, supra note 65, at 22-24.
72. CASTA&IEDA, supra note 62, at 73.
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3. Congo Question, Indonesian Question, and Cashmere Question
These cases are also irrelevant to this issue. All of these related to
the resolutions, which requested a cease-fire. Thus, Article 403 of the
Charter is regarded as their authority, and, indeed, in the latter two cases a
cease-fire came into effect only after the parties concerned accepted
them.74 Therefore, these questions did not involve the issue of general
mandatory powers of the Security Council.
4. Greek Frontier Question
The issue raised in this case was whether Article 25 applied to the
decisions of the Security Council to conduct an investigation under Article
34.75 That is, the decision was not based upon the general mandatory
powers of the Security. Council but was based upon a specific provision of
the Charter, Article 34 in Chapter VI.
6. Iranian Question and South African Question
In these cases, the Security Council did not issue any binding
decisions upon Member States. As for the Iranian question, the
controversial issue was whether the Security Council could remain seized
of the dispute even after the complaint was withdrawn by the submitting
state, Iran.76 Although the Council decided to continue the discussion on
the dispute, this decision did not impose any obligation upon Iran or any
other Member States. As to the South African question, Security Council
resolution 134 (1960), requesting South Africa to "abandon its policy of
apartheid and racial discrimination," which Professor Castafieda 77 contends
is a binding decision, was not regarded as such by the Security Council.
73. Article 40 of the Charter provides, "[in order to prevent an aggravation of the
situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the
measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such
provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable." U.N. CHARTER art. 40.
74. As for the Indonesian question, the Council indicated the Commission on Indonesia
should assist the parties in reaching agreements for cease-fire. (U.N. SCOR, 4th Sess., 421st
mtg. at 5 (1949). As to the Congo question and the Cashmere question, see Jacqud, supra note
41, at 1092.
75. See 2 REPERTORY, supra note 65, at 45. Article 34 of the Charter provides, "[t]he
Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international
friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or
situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." U.N.
CHARTER art. 34.
76. See 2 REPERTORY, supra note 65, at 19-20.
77. CASTAfEDA, supra note 62, at 75.
Mori
ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
In conclusion, none of these alleged practices of the Security
Council support the contention that Article 25 of the Charter applies to any
decisions adopted under the Council's general implied powers. In some of
these cases, no binding decision was taken and, in others, the legal basis
of the binding decision can be found in a specific Charter provisions.
V. RESPONSE TO THE COURT'S OPINION
As indicated by the foregoing analysis, the reasoning behind the
majority opinion in the Namibia Opinion and the general mandatory
powers doctrine is untenable. Next, the responses of states to the Court's
opinion is examined to discover whether the opinion has been accepted by
the Member States of the United Nations.
Although South Africa was offended by the Court's opinion,78 the
Security Council, in resolution 301 (1971), agreed with the Court's
conclusion. However, in the resolution, the Council did not refer to the
Court's reasoning. Indeed, some Council members severely contested its
reasoning concerning Article 25 of the Charter in the discussion on the
Namibia Opinion.
The United Kingdom and France79 strongly criticized and even
denied the Court's interpretation of Article 25 of the Charter. 80 According
to both states, Article 25 only applies to the decisions under Chapter VII
of the United Nations Charter. The delegate of the United Kingdom
stated,
[T]his part of the majority opinion [which asserts that
certain resolutions adopted by the Security Council were
legally binding] seems . . . to be open to the most serious
legal objection . . . . And, as a matter of law, my
Government considers that the Security Council can take
decisions generally binding on Member States only when
the Security Council has made a determination under
Article 39 that a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or
78. See JOHN DUGARD, THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA DISPUTE 490-92 (1973).
79. Delegate of France stated, "[T]he Security Council is empowered to take decisions
binding on all States. But such decisions are limited to cases of a threat to the peace, breaches of
the peace or aggression." U.N. SCOR, 26th Sess., 1588th mtg. at 2-3. See also U.N. SCOR,
26th Sess., 1598th mtg. at 2.
80. These two permanent members of the Security Council abstained from voting on
Resolution 301 (1971).
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act of aggression exists. Only in these circumstances are
the decisions binding under Article 25.81
Moreover, some other countries, such as Japan, 2 Italy,
Belgium, 3 and the United States,' also put up a question on the
interpretation. As the delegate of Italy clearly stated, "[T]he Court
offered a far-reaching interpretation of Articles 24 and 25 of the Charter
- an interpretation which is highly controversial and, I must say, not
shared by my Government. ,
85
Italy's criticism of the Court's reasoning was not necessarily in
contradiction with their agreement with the conclusion of the opinion. The
states could rely upon the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia
to accept the Court's conclusion. As in previous resolutions regarding this
issue,86 the Security Council, in the resolution 301 (1971), emphasized the
illegality of the South Africa's presence in Namibia, not referring to the
reasoning advanced by the majority opinion. Indeed, in resolution 301
(1971), the Security Council stated,
The Security Council,
4. Declares that South Africa's continued illegal
presence in Namibia constitutes an internationally wrongful
act and a breach of international obligations and that South
Africa remains accountable to the international obligations
or the rights of the people of the Territory of Namibia;
81. U.N. SCOR, 26th Sess., 1589th mtg. at 5-6. See also U.N. SCOR, 26th Sess.,
1598th mtg. at 3.
82. Delegate of Japan stated, "[W]e do not fully agree with all of the reasoning,
particularly with regard to some interpretations of the Charter, underlying the Court's opinion.
U.N. SCOR, 26th Sess., 1589th mtg. at 9.
83. Delegate of Belgium stated, "[W]e feel that the Security Council can adopt decisions
mandatory for all Member States of the United Nations only when, in conformity with chapter
VII of the Charter, it has found that there is a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act
of aggression." U.N. SCOR. 26th Sess., 1594th mtg. at 5-6.
84. Delegate of the United States stated, "Our acceptance, of course, does not necessarily
imply approval of all the Court's reasoning. We note in this connection concern about the
Charter interpretation which has been expressed by several members of this Council." U.N.
SCOR. 26th Sess., 1598th mtg. at 3.
85. U.N. SCOR, 26th Sess., 1589th mtg. at 11. Cf. U.N. SCOR 26th Sess., 1594th mtg.
at 4 (1971) (statement of the Liberian delegate).
86. See S.C. Res. 269 (1969), para. 4; The Situation in Nambia, S.C. Res. 276 (1970),
para.2.
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5. Takes note with appreciation of the advisory
opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June
1971;
6. Agrees with the Court's opinion, as expressed in
paragraph 133 of its advisory opinion:87
VI. CONCLUSION
The end of the Cold War has revitalized the activities of the
Security Council and consequently activated the discussions on the issue of
the limitations on the Security Council's power under Chapter VII of the
United Nations. However, the Namibia Opinion has the potential for
ruining such arguments due to the majority opinion's contention that the
Security Council has general mandatory powers. If, as the International
Court of Justice stated, Article 24, paragraph 1, of the United Nations
Charter grants the Security Council the general implied powers and Article
25 provides a legally binding effect with decisions based upon such
general powers, the Security Council does not have to rely on Chapter VII
when it imposes sanctions. The general mandatory powers would
empower the Council to take any action so long as it asserts that it is
acting pursuant to its responsibility to maintain international peace and
security.
Among the few scholars who have referred to the relationship
between the Security Council's general mandatory powers and its powers
under Chapter VII, even fewer have examined the validity of the Court's
interpretation in the Namibia Opinion. However, since the advisory
opinions of the International Court of Justice have no precedential value in
a strict sense, the authority of the opinion depends upon the soundness of
its reasoning. Thus, the Namibia Opinion should be fully examined from
this viewpoint.
The Court's interpretation of Article 25 of the Charter is not
sustainable. Its own reasoning is untenable. First, the Court's reasoning
does not by itself prove that Article 25 applies to any decisions based upon
the general implied powers. However, its reasoning in refuting the
contention that Article 25 only applies to enforcement measures adopted
under Chapter VII of the Charter is sound. Second, the Court's
presumption that the Security Council has general mandatory powers leads
to the sterile confrontation between two absolute values, the institutional
effectiveness and the state sovereignty. Moreover, the reasoning behind
some other doctrines are also untenable. First, travaux pr~paratoires
87. S.C. Res. 301 (1971).
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(preparatory documents) of the Charter do not support the conclusion that
the Security Council has general mandatory powers to the extent claimed.
Second, practices of the Security Council are irrelevant to the issue
discussed here. Furthermore, the Court's interpretation of Article 25 has
not been accepted by Member States of the United Nations, especially the
members of the Security Council.
In conclusion, the proposition that the Security Council has
general mandatory powers, as admitted by the International Court of
Justice in the Namibia Opinion, is not sustainable and, indeed, is not
accepted by states. In other words, the existence of general mandatory
powers cannot be based upon the Namibia Opinion. Since the general
mandatory powers is found untenable, limitations, on the Security
Council's power under Chapter VII, are not superseded by the general
mandatory powers, which are essentially unlimited.
Hopefully, this analysis fills the gap in the current arguments on
the power of the Security Council. The common understanding that the
Security Council's mandatory powers could not be deduced from its
general implied powers should be the starting point of a fruitful discussion
on the limitation on the Security Council's power, thereby surmounting the
sterile debate between legalists, insisting upon state sovereignty, and hard-
headed realists, insisting upon the institutional effectiveness of the United
Nations Security Council.88
88. See Jose E. Alvarez, Judging the Security Council, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 1-38 (1996);
Koskenniemi, supra note 5, at 325-48.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In February 1995, the Pushkin museum in Moscow exhibited sixty-
three paintings, including paintings from German private and museum
collections prior to World War II.1 One month later, the Hermitage in St.
Petersburg exhibited seventy-four paintings, of which almost all were
owned by the German government or its citizens before the war.2 These
exhibits have created friction between Germany and Russia because these
works of art can be considered cultural property. Under the 1954 Hague
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, a country's cultural property includes works of art. Since the
German paintings in the Hermitage and Pushkin museums were forcibly
wrested from Germany during and after World War II, there is the
question of whether these cultural objects can be returned to Germany.
* B.A., Political Science, 1994, Loyola University of Chicago; Juris Doctor, 1997,
Chicago-Kent College of Law. Steven Costello is currently an associate with the Chicago law
firm of Sweeney and Riman, Ltd., practicing insurance defense litigation in the field of workers'
compensation.
1. Jamey Gambrell, Displaced Art; Art Seized From Nazi Germany by the Soviet Union
After World War II, ART IN AM., Sept. 1995, at 88.
2. Id.
3. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,
May 14, 1954, art. 1, 249 U.N.T.S. 215 [hereinafter 1954 Convention].
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To understand the present problem, one must return to the point
where the controversy began. Near the end of World War II, as the Red
Army plowed through the German Reich, trophy brigades were created for
the sole purpose of taking as many objects of value from Germany as they
could.4  As a result of looting, it is estimated that some 2.5 million
artworks, ten million books, including Gutenberg Bibles, and gold from
the unearthing of Troy was taken back to Russia. Also, much of the
German art fell into the private hands of Soviet soldiers and generals.
Soviet soldiers were allowed to take a certain amount of baggage from
Germany, while Soviet generals were allowed to take train carloads of
spoils home with them.6 For many years Stalin kept the stolen German art
hidden, but this widescale looting by the Russians in Germany was never a
well kept secret. 7 There was even a certain degree of acknowledgement on
the part of the Soviets, when in 1955, some 1.5 million items were
returned to East German museums.8 Although there is relief that these
artworks survived the war, the art's return to the international spotlight has
created the problem of whether under international law the artworks should
be returned to their rightful owners in Germany.
The fact that the Russian museums and government are in
possession of paintings which were taken from Germany during and after
World War II poses questions that this article will attempt to answer.
First, what treaties between Russia and Germany address the question of
the possible return of the art to Germany? Next, what international
agreements or conventions could the Germans use to initiate the return of
German artistic or cultural property? Also, can one hold Russia to the.
treaties created by its former entity, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics? Finally, there is the problem of what to do if German cultural
property is bought by United States nationals or galleries from the Russian
black market.
II. BILATERAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE
FORMER SOVIET UNION
In 1990, the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Partnership and
Cooperation was signed in Bonn. The Treaty addressed the issue of the
4. Who Owns This Art?, PROVIDENCE J. BULL., May 9, 1995, at 12A.
5. Robert Hughes, The Spoils of War; Russia's New Displays of Art Looted From
Germany Reignite a Debate Over Who Rightfully Owns Such Plunder, TIME, Apr. 3, 1995, at
64.
6. Catherine Foster, Stolen Art As War Booty: Hostages Or Harbingers of Peace?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 8, 1995, at 1.
7. Yardley Rosemar, Who Owns the Art Loot?, NEws & REC., Mar. 31, 1995, at All.
8. Hughes, supra note 5, at 64.
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return of cultural property taken during the war with both parties agreeing
that "lost or unlawfully transferred art treasures which are located in their
[German or Russian] territory will be returned to their owners or their
successors." 9 In 1992, after the fall of the U.S.S.R., a cultural agreement
was signed which also stipulated that German cultural property in Russia
should be returned to Germany.'0  Therefore, it has been recently
acknowledged by the Russian government that German cultural property
taken during and after the war should be returned.
With the present internal instability of the Russian government,
however, the immediate return of the stolen artworks to Germany does not
appear likely. In March 1995, the Russian Parliament reviewed a draft
law declaring that the art taken from Germany during and immediately
after World War II, would be the "sole property of the Russian
Federation."" In April 1995, the Russian parliament took a step further by
adopting a resolution imposing a moratorium for the return of cultural
items which were transferred during the years of the Great Patriotic War. 2
These acts of the Russian Parliament are not widely opposed by the
Russian populace since the legislature's acts are not inconsistent .with the
feelings of many Russians, especially those Russians who fought the
Germans or lived under the Nazi occupation of Russia. As a result of
World War II, Russia had over forty million people killed or wounded, had
3000 of its cities destroyed, hundreds of its museums looted, over 1000 of
its Orthodox churches razed, millions of its books stolen, and hundreds of
thousands of its works of art taken. 3  Many Russians feel that the
possession of these German cultural objects is part of compensation for the
horrors the country experienced in its war against the Third Reich.
The present German government views any stall in the restitution
of their cultural objects as unacceptable. The Germans feel that theirs is a
different government now, and point to the fact that over fifty billion
Deutschmarks in aid have already been given to Russia. 4  As to the
restitution of Russian objects stolen by the Nazis, some 500,000 objects
were returned to the Soviets by the British and Americans after finding
9. Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, Partnership and Cooperation, Nov. 9, 1990, F.R.G.-
U.S.S.R. art. 16, 30 I.L.M. 504, 512.
10. Tape of Conference on Russian Museum Exhibits Art Taken From Nazi Germany,
held by National Public Radio Broadcast (Apr. 1, 1995)(transcript #1117-9).
11. Jean MacKenzie, Controversy Greets New Exhibit of 'Trophy Art,' Moscow TIMES,
Mar. 29, 1995, No. 680.
12- Russian Parliament Bans Return of Stolen Art Works, DEUTSCH PRESSE-AGENTUR,
Apr. 21, 1995.
13. See Tape of Conference on Russian Museum Exhibits Art Taken From Nazi Germany,
supra note 10.
14. Christopher Knight, Displaying the Spoils of War, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1995, at Al.
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stolen objects in their sectors of occupied Germany. This shows Russia
has received some restitution of cultural objects taken by the Nazis."
The 1990 and 1992 agreements between Germany and Russia
stipulated that Russia should return the German art objects. In certain
situations there has been some restitution with respect to German cultural
objects still in Russia. One example of this restitution was the recent
return of 13,500 books from Moscow's library to the Berlin library.' 6
Considering the Russian Parliament's present actions, the feelings of the
Russian people, and the past historical experiences of World War II,
enforcement of these agreements is unlikely. Therefore, the German
government should next look to multilateral treaties to see if international
law proscribes a return of Germany's cultural objects.
III. MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS AND TREATIES WITH REGARD TO
CULTURAL PROPERTY
As far back as 1899, there have been agreements which address
the importance of safeguarding a nation's cultural property. The following
multilateral treaties encompass stipulations on the illicit trade of cultural
objects and the responsibility warring nations have to one another's
cultural property.
The 1899 Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, signed by both the German and Russian Empires, applies to
the issue of the Russian possession of German artwork. Under Section III,
regarding military authority over hostile territory, "pillage is formally
prohibited."' 7  Also, "private property cannot be confiscated."' The
Convention went on to categorize that property of "religious, charitable,
and education institutions, and those of arts and science, even when State
property, shall be treated as private property."' 9 This 1899 Convention
helped to create a guide to subsequent treaties with respect to cultural
property.
The 1907 Convention on Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land replaced the 1899 Convention, but kept the Section III articles
regarding an occupying nation's authority over an occupied state.'
Unfortunately, World War II proved that the tenets of the 1899 and 1907
15. Gambrell, supra note 1.
16. Foster, supra note 6.
17. Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899,
art. 47, 32 Stat. 1803, 1822, T.S. No. 539.
18. Id. art. 46.
19. Id. art. 56.
20. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403.
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Hague Conventions' articles prohibiting the pillaging and confiscation of
private property were not followed.
After World War II, the 1954 Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict was enacted,
supplementing the 1907 Convention. Both the U.S.S.R. and F.R.G. are
signatories to the Convention. The Hague Convention notes that "damage
to cultural property means damage to the cultural heritage of all
mankind." 21 The 1954 Convention also stipulates that "jurisdiction to try
offenses against cultural property is not limited to the government of the
offender." 2 The problem with the 1954 Convention regarding the present
issue of Germany trying to regain its artwork is that the Convention does
not discuss the question of restitution.2 3
The 1970 Convention for Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property was
promulgated by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization, and is referred to as the UNESCO Convention.2 4 The
UNESCO Convention prohibits member countries from importing cultural
property stolen from a museum and states that a member country should
take steps to return property taken from another state, provided that the
bona fide purchaser receives just compensation.25 Russia continues to be a
signatory to the Convention, however, the Federal Republic of Germany is
not a signatory.
In 1972, the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural
and Natural Heritage adopted the UNESCO rules and created a system for
the collection and organization of important cultural and natural heritage
properties .2  This Convention, however, limits objects of cultural heritage
to monuments, groups of buildings, and natural heritage.27 The 1972
Convention does not appear applicable to the return of German artwork
since it seems to be a request that nations inventory their cultural heritage
21. Claudia Fox, Comment, The UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported
Cultural Objects: An Answer to the World Problem of Illicit Trade in Cultural Property, 9 AM.
U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 225, 247 (1993).
22. John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 AM. J.
INT'L L. 831, 842 (1986).
23. Fox, supra note 21, at 248.
24. Fox, supra note 21, at 248.
25. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, art. VII, 823 U.N.T.S. 231.
26. Paige L. Margules, International Art Theft and the Illegal Import and Export of
Cultural Property: A Study of Relevant Values, Legislation, and Solutions, 15 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 609, 612 (1992).
27. Convention Concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov.
23, 1972, arts. I & II, T.I.A.S. No. 8226.
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and submit the information to the United Nations in hopes of safeguarding
a nation's cultural property in the future.
Most recently, in June 1995, a final draft of the UNIDROIT
Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Items was produced.39
The purpose behind this Convention is to promote international claims
regarding the restitution of stolen cultural objects.29  This Convention
would allow both government and private claimants to bring causes of
action to the courts of a country where the contested artwork is located.39
Unfortunately, the Convention applies only to those cultural objects which
are stolen after the Convention enters into force.,' In the drafting of the
UNIDROIT Convention, one of the main concerns was the issue of
retroactivity. After much discussion, the drafters followed the rule of
treaty interpretation and concluded that UNIDROIT would remain
nonretroactive. 2  However, the Convention acknowledged that prior
takings of cultural property were not absolved by the nonretroactivity of
the Convention. Article 10(3) states that illegal takings before this
Convention are not now legitimized and that States or people should
continue to make claims other ways for the return of prior stolen cultural
objects.3  The UNIDROIT Convention would appear a favorable
instrument for the Germans to use since it affords States and their nationals
ways to regain stolen cultural items. The Convention, however, does not
provide the legal impetus to demand restitution of the German cultural
objects taken during World War II.
In 1993, the United Nations General Assembly directly addressed
the question of the restitution of cultural property to its country of origin.3
The General Assembly declared that such restitution contributes to the
strengthening of international cooperation. 3 5 The General Assembly went
on to state that member states should concede bilateral agreements to
return cultural properties to their countries of origin.3
6
28. UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 7-24,
1995, 34 I.L.M. 1322 [hereinafter UNIDROIT Convention].
29. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 28, art. I.
30. Nina R. Lenzer, Comment, The Illicit International Trade in Cultural Property: Does
the UNIDROIT Convention Provide an Effective Remedy for the Shortcomings of the UNESCO
Convention?, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 469, 493-94 (1994).
31. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 28, art. X.
32. See id.
33. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 28, art. X(3).
34. G.A. Res. 15, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. AIRESI48/15 (1993).
35. Id.
36. Id.
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In conclusion, there appears in the preceding treaties a common
theme that one country may not rob another country of its cultural
property. Since the 1899 Hague Convention, subsequent conventions have
included articles prohibiting the looting of a country's cultural property.
By robbing a nation of its cultural property in times of war, aggressor
countries are not only stealing, they are depriving and even destroying a
country's roots, its history. The German artwork which Russia has stored
in the many vaults of the Hermitage is a reflection of what Germany has
given artistically to the community of nations.
IV. TREATY OBLIGATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AS
SUCCESSOR TO THE U.S.S.R.
With the dissolution of the U.S.S.R on December 25, 1991, the
immediate question was whether the Russian Federation could be held to
treaties prior to that date which involved the U.S.S.R. as a party.' Russia
attempted to answer this question in its note to the United States
government on January 13, 1992, that Russia continues to perform the
rights and fulfill the obligations following from the international
agreements signed by the U.S.S.R." The General Consul of Russia has
also stated that Russia is the continuation of the U.S.S.R.3 9
The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of
Treaties, which was opened in 1978 but is not yet in force, declares that if
a predecessor state continues to exist, it is "generally bound by the treaty
rights and obligations in force prior to the break-up of the state."40 Under
the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, the predecessor state continues
to be bound by the treaty rights and obligations in force prior to the break-
up of the state." Russia seems to fall into the category of a predecessor
state, as it has taken the position that it is the continuation of the former
Soviet Union and will fulfill the treaty obligations of the former Soviet
Union.4 2
Since Russia has proclaimed itself the continuation of the Soviet
Union, under a continuity theory, any treaty that was in force for the entire
territory of the predecessor state is presumed to continue in force for each
37. See generally Agreement on Trade Resolutions Between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., June
1, 1990, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 1992 WL 466079.
38. Id.
39. Paul R. Williams, The Treaty Obligations of the Successor States of the Former Soviet
Union, Yugo., and Czech.: Do they Continue in Force?, 23 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 18
(1994).
40. Id.
41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON FOREIGN RELATIONS § 210 (1987).
42. Williams, supra note 39, at 36.
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separating state.4 3  Prior historical examples of the continuity theory
involve the 1903 secession of Panama from Colombia and the 1830
secession of Belgium from the Netherlands." In both cases, Colombia and
the Netherlands were held to their bilateral treaties, while the seceding
states of Panama and Belgium were allowed a clean slate. Under a clean
slate theory, new states "wipe their individual slates clean and choose
whether or not to join treaties brought by their predecessor states."4 5 Thus
it would appear that the states that broke away from the U.S.S.R.: the
Baltic states, the Ukraine, Belarus, and the Caucasus states, would not be
bound by the treaties of the former U.S.S.R. Russia, however, as the
continuation of the U.S.S.R., would appear bound by the treaties of the
former Soviet Union. In accordance with this interpretation, Switzerland,
considering Russia to be the continuity of the former U.S.S.R., has merely
"replaced the designation of U.S.S.R. with Russia on all multilateral
treaties for which it was a depository."4 6
The United States State Department's view of the break-up of
states found that with the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., "the stability of legal
rights and obligations are, on balance, better served by adopting a
presumption that treaty relations remain in force," and acknowledged the
prior treaties of the U.S.S.R. as binding on Russia.4 ' The Department of
State then took into account the fact that Russia retains much of the
territory of the former U.S.S.R., contains the majority of the former
U.S.S.R.'s population, resources, and armed forces, and occupies the
same seat of government (Moscow) as the former U.S.S.R. The
conclusion was that the State Department found that Russia has inherited
the legal identity of the former Soviet Union, and could retain the
memberships the U.S.S.R. had in international organizations .48
Therefore, as the continuation of the Soviet Union, Russia appears
to be bound to the bilateral and multilateral agreements the Soviet Union
made prior to its 1991 break-up.
V. WHAT TO DO IF GERMAN ARTWORK APPEARS ON UNITED
STATES TERRITORY?
Immediately after World War II, the Russians were not the only
occupying power that acquired German artworks. Some 202 paintings
43. Id. at 2.
44. Id. at 11.
45. Id. at 2.
46. Id. at 18.
47. Id. at 21.
48. Williams, supra note 39, at 21.
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were shipped from Germany to the United States after the war.4 9 What
followed was a twelve city United States tour of the paintings, which
finally ended in 1949 after American art historians and museums
condemned the tour as being no better than the Nazi's actions of looting
Europe's museums .? Today, in the event that German artwork stolen by
the Russians appears on United States soil, there is case and statutory law
that could favor restitution of the paintings to Germany.
The cases of Kunstammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon and
Deweerth v. Baldinger both dealt with Germans trying to recover paintings
taken by American soldiers during the occupation of Germany.' In
Kunstammlungen, two paintings were stolen from a German castle by
American soldiers.-2 Eventually, the paintings ended up in the hands of an
art collector who years later discovered the German origins of the
paintings." When a German museum discovered that the paintings were in
the hands of the American art dealer, they sued for the paintings' return.
At trial, the art dealer argued that the statute of limitations had run. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, applied the "demand and
refusal" rule, whereby the statute of limitations would start to run after the
museum had requested the art dealer return the paintings, and ruled that
the paintings must be returned to Germany.?
The Deweerth case involved the stealing of a Monet painting from
a home in Bavaria where American soldiers were being housed.,, The
court in Deweerth, however, held for the bona fide American purchaser,
due to the fact that Ms. Deweerth did not use reasonable diligence in
attempting to locate her missing painting.? The reason behind the
requirement of reasonable diligence on the part of the victim is to protect
future good-faith purchasers and to encourage the original owners to
actively seek out their stolen property."
Besides case law, the National Stolen Property Act "criminalizes
the knowing transportation, sale, or receipt in interstate or foreign
commerce stolen artwork." 8 Under this statute, Germany would have to
49. Gambrell, supra note 1, at 88.
50. Id.
51. Deweerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987); Kunstammlungen zu Weimar v.
Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982).
52. Kunstammlungen, 678 F.2d at 1152.
53. Id. at 1153.
54. Id. at 1161.
55. Deweerth, 836 F.2d at 105.
56. Id.
57. Margules, supra note 26, at 618.
58. National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-15 (1988).
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"acknowledge the ownership rights to the cultural property and have
existing domestic legislation prohibiting the export, transfer, removal, or
excavation of the cultural property at issue." 9 Therefore, in the event that
an American art dealer obtains a German painting from a Russian national,
and knows that the property had been stolen, Germany would have
recourse to try to obtain the cultural property.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the stagnation of the
present Russian economy, it would not be surprising if Russian citizens
and museums try to turn the German artwork they have into hard currency.
It would thus be advantageous for the Germans to keep watch over the
American art market, since many of the German cultural objects in Russia
may cross from the Russian black market into American galleries,
museums, and private collections. By remaining diligent in tracing the
movement of artwork into the American marketplace, American law could
be used to expedite the return of German artwork rather than waiting for
Russia to fulfill its bilateral and multilateral agreements.
VI. CONCLUSION
Legally, the Federal Republic of Germany should be allowed to
receive the artwork taken by the Russians during and after World War II.
The 1990 bilateral treaty between the U.S.S.R. and Germany stipulates
that each country should return the cultural objects that rightfully belong to
the other nation. Multilateral treaties that both countries are signatories to,
such as the 1899, 1907, and 1954 Hague Conventions also include
provisions that the taking of a country's cultural property by an occupying
power is illegal. Treaties such as the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the
1995 UNIDROIT Convention continue the spirit of the Hague Conventions
by requiring that countries aggressively combat the trade of stolen cultural
property, and return the stolen property to the country of its origin.
Finally, even the United Nations has promulgated a resolution declaring
that countries should return stolen cultural objects to their country of
origin.
Whatever rights the Germans may have legally under international
law, the emotions regarding the paintings remain an issue. One cannot
over emphasize the vast destruction caused by World War II, which is why
it is so hard for many Russians to acknowledge that they may have to
return the paintings to Germany. By returning the paintings to Germany,
Russia would be seen as admitting that the taking of the German artwork
was wrong. But how can Russia acknowledge its own guilt under the fact
that tens of millions of its citizens died and thousands of its own treasures
59. Margules, supra note 26, at 621.
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were destroyed as a result of the Nazi invasion of Russia? Perhaps the
future will hold some compromise culminating in the return of the
paintings to Germany. For as the generation of those Russians who
experienced the "Great Patriotic War" die out, the remaining generations
of Russians may learn to see that returning Germany's artwork will not be
an acknowledgement of guilt, but will help to close a painful chapter in the
history of World War II.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There has been an increasing interest on the effects of the United
Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (Hamburg Rules) on
the double insurance problem which arises whenever a proposal to modify
a carrier's liability regime is under discussion.' The Hamburg Rules can
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1. The Hague Rules were so controversial in the United States that it took Congress 12
years to enact them. The Visby Amendments have given us a quarter century of controversy,
with no end in sight. The Hamburg Rules have been controversial practically since the United
Nations first began to work on them. The most prominent of the arguments that have reappeared
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potentially alter not only the price of insurance relevant to international
trade but also the insurance-purchasing behavior among parties involved in
international trade. Sets of propositions have been introduced explicating
whether and how the Hamburg Rules would affect insurance practices
among cargo owners, that is, mostly international traders and cargo
carriers.
Supporters of the Hamburg Rules have argued that adopting them
will decrease double insurance and overall insurance costs.2 Opponents
assert that these costs are lower under the Hague or the Hague-Visby Rules
than under the Hamburg Rules.3 However, neither side rests on empirical
virtually every time might be about "the insurance argument." Michael F. Sturley, Changing
Liability Rules and Marine Insurance: Conflicting Empirical Arguments about Hague, Visby,
and Hamburg in a Vacuum of Empirical Evidence, 24 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1, 120 (1993).
2. Examples of supporting arguments for the Hamburg Rules are as follows. First, for an
argument that the adoption of the rules would decrease total costs due to a higher standard of
care on the part of the carrier, see, for example, United Nations Conference on the Carriage of
Goods by Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.89/14 (1981) [hereinafter UN COGSA] (comments of the
Australian representative); Erling Selvig, The Hamburg Rules, the Hague Rules and Marine
Insurance Practice, 12 J. MAR. L. & COM., 299, 311 (1981). Second, for an example of
arguments that the clarity and better predictability of the Hamburg Rules will reduce litigation
and the expense of claims settlements, see Rolf Herber, The UN Convention on the Carriage of
Goods by Sea, 1978: Hamburg Rules, Its Future and the Demands of Developing Countries,
Y.B. MAR. L., 81, 91-92 (1984); But see John 0. Honnold, The United Nation Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL): The 1976 Draft Convention on the Carriage of Goods by
Sea, 4 ANN. PROC. FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 365, 370 (1978). Third, for an example of
arguments that shifting a greater proportion of the risk to the carrier and then to the P&I clubs in
the Hamburg Rules would reduce overall costs since P&I insurance is operated more cost-
effectively than cargo insurance see, Stephen Zamora, Carrier Liability For Damage or Loss to
Cargo in International Transport, 23 AM. J. COMP. L. 391, 394 n.12 (1975); Selvig, supra note
2 at 316; UNCTAD, Economic and Commercial Implications of the Entry into Force of the
Hamburg Rules and the Multimodal Transport Convention, U.N. Doc. TDIBIC.41315 (Part I),
16 (1987). See Sturley, supra note 1, at 121, n.14.
3. Examples of opponents' arguments against the Hamburg Rules are as follows. First,
for an argument that there is no reason to believe that cargo damage would be any less common
under the Hamburg regime, see John A. Maher & Joan D. Maher, Marine Transport, Cargo
Risks, and the Hamburg Rules: Rationalization or Imagery?, 84 DICK. L. REV. 183, 202 (1980).
Second, for an argument that the adoption of the Hamburg Rules would lead to unnecessary and
expensive litigation due to more confusing and less clear provisions, see George F. Chandler, A
Comparison of COGSA, the Hague/Visby Rules, and the Hamburg Rules, 15 J. MAR. L. & COM.
233, 237 (1984); Birch F. Reynardson, The Implications on Liability Insurance of the Hamburg
Rules, in THE HAMBURG RULES 1-2 (Lloyd's of London Seminar Sept. 28, 1978); J.P. Honour,
The P. & I. Clubs and the New United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea
1978, in THE HAMBURG RULES ON THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA, 239-40 (Samir
Mankabady ed. 1978). Some Hamburg Rules opponents even seek to generalize these assertions
to contend that any change in well-established laws will lead to uncertainty and higher expenses.
See Herber, supra note 2, at 81, 91-92. Third, for an argument that the Hamburg Rules would
increase overall costs by exacerbating a needless double insurance expense, especially due to
higher costs in liability insurance than marine insurance, see, e.g., Thomas Chenal, Uniform
Rules for a Combined Transport Document in Light of the Proposed Revision of the Hague Rules,
20 ARIZ. L. REV. 975 n.144 (1978); UN COGSA, supra note 2, at 235 (comments of the
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evidence to support its arguments.4  Hence we cannot draw any
conclusions about their ostensible superiority or inferiority unless we
analyze the problem systematically with reliable information. First, the
Hamburg Rules have not yet been generally adopted as a common rule,
and the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules are applied in different ways in
different countries. Second, cargo insurance premiums are not based on
risk statistics because reliable statistics often are not available. Instead, the
premium is set according to the account (whether it is a large or small
policy, whether the insured is a new client, etc.) and according to the
underwriter's own intuition.5 Even if insurance costs increase, competitive
carriers will be able to absorb the increased costs internally rather than
shifting them to the shipper. This is because insurance cost is not a major
factor in rating total freight, which can be absorbed through more
reasonable management than before.6 With this reality in mind, it is hard
Japanese representative). Fourth, there is also concern that carriers may use the Hamburg Rules
as an excuse to increase rates even if their P&I calls do not increase. For such a concern, see,
e.g., Zamora, supra note 2, at 394, 395; Robert Hellawell, Less-Developed Countries and
Developed Country Law: Problems for the Law of Admiralty, 7 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 203,
212, 216 (1968). See Sturley, supra note 1, at 147.
4. There are authors who have stated that there is little reliable information for empirical
study on this problem. See, e.g., Sturley, supra note 1, at 148; UNCTAD, The Economic and
Commercial Implications of the Entry into Force of the Hamburg Rules and the Multimodal
Transport Convention, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.4/315 (Part I) 4, 16 (1987); Selvig, supra note 2, at
314; William Tetley, The Hamburg Rules: A Commentary, LLOYD'S MAR. J. COM. L.Q. 4
(1979); Janet M. Donovan, The Hamburg Rules: Why a New Convention on Carriage of Goods
by Sea, 4 MAR. L. 1, 9 (1979); Honour, supra note 3, at 244; John D. Kimball, Shipowner's
Liability and the Proposed Revision of the Hague Rules, 7 J. MAR. L. & COM. 250 (1975).
5. There are four main types of individual rate plans used in business insurance contracts:
1) the experience rating plan;
2) the retrospective rating plan;
3) the schedule rating plan; and
4) the judgment rating plan.
Of these, usually it is the judgment-rating plan that is adopted in marine cargo insurance, which
involves rating mainly according to the judgment of underwriter and not so much according to
any statistical rationales. The judgment rating plan is justifiably the most unscientific of the four
main plans commonly used.
6. Basically, the cost of liability insurance does not seem to consume any substantial
portion of total freight. According to a report by the United States Department of
Transportation, United States shipping companies' net cost of liability insurance amounts to about
0.15% of total freight receipts, and total cost of liability insurance (including claim amounts and
premium) amounts to about 2.05% of total freight receipts. Another report relates that the total
operating cost of liners is estimated from 8% to 25%, or 3-5% of average liner freight.
Therefore, the effect of a 6-8% increase in the cost of liability insurance on liner freight rate
comes to only about 0.2% (.03 x .06) or 0.4% (.05 x .08). If the insurance cost portion of total
liner freight is assumed to be 10% and this cost is increased by 15%, its effect on total liner
freight comes to 1.5%. Reynardson, supra note 3, at 16. It has also been asserted that the
question of whether carriers raise their freight rates to cover their increased P&I insurance costs
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to generalize the effects that these three rules have on overall insurance
costs. Double insurance will be burdensome to the cargo owner in the
end, and this will dampen the vitality of international trade and the efficient
allocation of international resources. Therefore, the liability between the
carrier and the shipper should be distributed in a way to minimize double
insurance - keeping in mind in any case that it will be hard to avoid the
double insurance problem because both the liability insurer and the cargo
insurer must pay administrative costs or current expenses. We should
evaluate the distribution of liability between the carrier and the shipper
from this point of view.
With these difficulties in mind, this paper will examine the
theoretical effects of the application of the Hamburg Rules on both liability
insurance and cargo insurance and then explore potential implications by
means of face-to-face interviews with concerned parties. This article will
not attempt to provide definitive answers to these questions, for that would
require greater statistical groundwork than what is currently available.
II. CARGO INSURANCE UNDER THE HAMBURG RULES
Sea carriage depends on two types of insurance, namely cargo
insurance and carrier's liability insurance. These are similar in that they
both cover risks on loss or damage during sea carriage. They are different
with respect to the contracting parties and the risks to the insured. Liability
insurance covers carrier liability for loss or damage during carriage, while
cargo insurance covers economic losses resulting from loss or damage to
the goods.' However, they constitute an overlapping system of insurance
in the sense that they cover the same goods. Costs related to claims
investigation, administration, and litigation likewise overlap in these two
different types of policy. Though not widely recognized, the overlapping
insurance problem existed before the Hamburg Rules were concluded.
Almost all cargo loss or damage is ultimately paid either by the
cargo insurer or the carrier's liability insurer (to be precise, either type is
paid by four parties, including the cargo interests and the carrier). The
uncertainty about compensation for loss or damage to shipped cargoes
during the voyage may be eliminated by having the carrier assume absolute
liability. Another alternative is having the shipper assume all liability for
will depend on the particular competitive situation of the carrier. That is, although one cannot
generalize, it may be that there are many cases where carriers will not raise their rates to
recapture the entire increase in P&I costs. Under such conditions, on the whole, the shift in
burden from cargo insurers to P&I insurer should, in itself, have little effect on world shipping.
See Robert Hellawell, Allocation of Risk Between Cargo Owner and Carrier, 27 AM. J. COMP.
L., 357, 366-67 (1979); Hellawell, supra note 3, at 211-16.
7. There is one case in which cargo insurance covers third-party liability. This is
provided by the Collision Clause of the Institute Cargo Clauses of 1982.
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loss or damage. However, it is unlikely that such a method would be
accepted as practical.'
To complicate matters further, even though shifting the risk to
each of the two contracting parties would eliminate dual insurance, it does
not always result in savings against total costs, whether from the point of
view of the cargo owner or from that of the total society. If the cargo
owner bears responsibility for all cargo damage, cargo insurance becomes
more important than liability insurance, and hence liability insurance could
be eliminated. This could result in savings in the P&I costs of
administration, claims investigation, and subrogation recoveries, as well as
P&I calls. However, it is uncertain whether the cargo owner is benefited
by such cost saving, since it depends on changes in the freight rate and
cargo insurance premium. One important issue relevant to this question
may be whether carriers will be able to pass on the costs of P&I insurance
to shippers through higher freight rates. Predictions are divided regarding
this. Opponents of the Hamburg Rules generally assert that carriers must
pass on any cost increase if they are to stay in business.9 Supporters, on
the other hand, consider the issue more complicated and argue that carriers
may not pass on higher costs.'o "Comparing the relative expense of cargo
insurance and P&I insurance undoubtedly requires empirical evidence, for
there are plausible reasons why either could be found less expensive.""
On the other hand, if the carrier bears responsibility for all cargodamage and possible decrease in costs' 2 turn out to be more than the
8. The insured bill of lading attempted by OCL (Overseas Container, Ltd.) and ACT
(Associated Container Transportation, Ltd.) was not successfiul because the large cargo owners
rejected it. That was due to the fact that the savings in premiums resulting from insuring large
goods through cargo insurance was greater than that resulting from the insured bill of lading.
See G. Tantin, Les Documents de Transport Combing, 15 EUR. TRANS. L. 377-78 (1980). That
is, insured bill of lading would provide all shippers with standard coverage at an average cost,
and large shippers do not like this. They prefer to arrange insurance coverage consistent with the
needs of the particular business activity involved and thus to obtain advantages regarding claim
settlements, premiums and other benefits that insurers offer important customers or that a
customer with a good claims record may want. It has been suggested that a more practical way
to approach this problem would be to develop understandings between cargo insurers and
shipowner-liability insurers whereby formulae are agreed upon in advance for the allocation of
loss in specified categories of claims, with non recourse agreements backing up those formulae
so that the cargo insurer will not attempt to recover from the liability insurer amounts in excess
of what would be provided therein. It has also been indicated that costs would be incurred in
investigating the claims and in assessing quanta. At least the costs of litigation would be
reduced, however, and in this way one of the main potential disadvantages of the adoption and
application of the Hamburg Rules would be avoided or mitigated.
9. See supra note 3.
10. See supra note 2.
11. Sturley, supra note 1, at 147.
12. It is asserted that as cargo insurance is a highly competitive business, premiums would
go down as payments from P&I clubs increase simply because the cargo insurance companies'net
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increase in costs in P&I calls and freights, it is theoretically plausible that
cargo owners will have some benefits under that regime. However, even
if cargo owners have such benefits, there is no practical way for them to
select the range of coverage to take advantage of favorable premiums.
Additionally, a number of problems can arise because cargo owners have
to make claims directly to liability insurers for loss or damage. In short,
there is no reason to expect that the covered risks of the cargo insurer will
be reduced substantially.
Consequently, some degree of double insurance is unavoidable
under the Hamburg Rules. This fact is apparent upon examination of the
provisions of the Rules that follow, although there may be no practical
problem for the shipper to be compensated for loss or damage from the
carrier according to the provisions of the Hamburg Rules.
A. Basis of Liability
Carrier liability under Article 5(1) of the Hamburg Rules 13 is based
on the principle of presumed fault or neglect. This provision is heavily
influenced by the language used in conventions concerning the international
transport of cargo by air,' 4 rail,' 5 and road 6 carriage. According to this
payments will go down. Selvig, supra note 2, at 316; Hellawell, supra note 6, at 366-67.
Regarding the cost of recourse actions which should be taken into account in rating premiums,
the simplification of the liability regime in the Hamburg Rules is said to be likely to facilitate
recourse to such an extent that one may even expect an actual reduction in recourse cost. It has
also been indicated that cargo companies are hardly expected to seek recourse in cases where the
cost will be unreasonably high. Selvig, supra note 2, at 316. In addition, it has been asserted
that if the ratio of claims administration to recoveries is increased (mainly due to the increase in
recourse actions between two insurers), it would be temporary, reflecting only the inevitable
period of uncertainty, which occurs whenever any new measure is introduced, whether it be a
statute, a convention or a technological advance. C. C. Nicoll, Do the Hamburg Rules Suit a
Shipper Dominated Economy?, 24 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1, 170-77 (1993).
13. Article 5(1) provides that:
[tihe carrier is liable for loss resulting from loss or damage to the goods, as well as
from delay in delivery, if the occurrence which caused the loss, damage or delay took
place while the goods were in his charge as defined in Article 4, unless the carrier
proves that he, his servants or agents took all measures that could reasonably be
required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences.
UN COGSA, supra note 2.
The former part of Article 5(1) gives strict liability to the carrier, while the latter part permits the
carrier an exclusion by requiring him to take all measures that could reasonably be required to
assure safe delivery. In the clause above, the exact level of care required of the carrier is open to
future determination, since the language "took all measures that could reasonably be required" is
novel in the area of carriage of goods by sea. Hellawell, supra note 6, at 358.
14. Articles 18-(1) and 20-(1) of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air October 12, 1929 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter The
Warsaw Convention]. The Warsaw Convention applies only to international carriage, which is
defined as that taking place between two contracting states, or occurring within a single
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clause, the carrier is not liable for loss resulting from loss or damage to the
goods unless the occurrence which caused the loss or damage took place
while the goods were in his charge. Compensation from the carrier is
uncertain if it is impossible to explain the cause of such loss or damage
because there is no provision for determining who is responsible for
liability in such a case. Moreover, there is a certain amount of ambiguity
in Article 5(1) as to whether the shipper is responsible for proving that the
cause of the loss took place while the goods were under the carrier's
custody, or whether the carrier is responsible for proving that the cause of
the loss had arisen before the goods were in his custody when the clean bill
of lading was issued.
The carrier is not liable for any loss if there is no fault or
negligence on his part or on the part of his servants or agents according to
the principle of fault or neglect. However, some level of cargo damage is
nearly inevitable in sea carriage, even where the carrier has taken all
measures that could reasonably be taken to avoid it. Some level of cargo
damage might be considered almost an inevitable price of international
commerce, even though the level of damage is still subject to some degree
contracting state if there is an agreed-upon stopping place outside it. Id. art. 1(1), (2). With
respect to the basis of liability, the carrier under the Warsaw Convention is presumed liable upon
simple proof of damage or loss to the cargo, in line with the general rule. Id. art. 18(1). The
major exceptions to liability, and the air carrier's major defense, are contained in Article 20(1).
15. Articles 27-(l) and 27-(2) of the International Convention Concerning the Carriage of
Goods by Rail (May 9, 1980) <http://www.unicc.org/unece/trade/cotif/cotif09.htm>
[hereinafter CIM]. The scope of the CIM may be summarized in terms of three criteria: (1) the
convention applies only to international carriage between at least two contracting states; (2) the
shipment must be covered by a single transport document, in the approved form, which covers
the entire carriage; and (3) the shipment must be carried only on lines registered on official lists.
Id. art. I(1). The convention applies from the time the goods are accepted for delivery until the
time of delivery. Id. art. 27(1). The liability system under the convention has been assessed to
be based on absolute liability, strict liability (droit strict) or liability ex recepts (system of liability
without fault). Zamora, supra note 2, at 424, which is provided in Article 27(1). Under the
CIM there are two classes of exceptions to liability. Under one class of exceptions, termed non-
privileged exceptions, the burden of proof is on the carrier to establish that one of these
exceptions caused the damage or loss. CIM, supra note 15, arts. 27(2), 28(1). Under the other
class of exceptions, termed privileged exceptions, the carrier's burden of proof is applied
favorably. Id. art. 27(3). That is, the carrier needs only show that the loss or damage could
have been caused by one of these risks, in which case it shall be presumed that the damage or
loss was so caused.
16. Articles 17-(1) and 17-(2) of the Convention on the Contract for International Carriage
of Goods by Road (Geneva, May 19, 1956) <http://www.anase.irv. uit.notrade/law/doc/UN.
CMR. Road.Carriage.Convention.1956.html10/21/97> [hereinafter CMR]. The CMR applies
to every contract for the carriage of goods by road in vehicles for reward, when transport takes
place between two countries, at least one of which is a contracting country, which can be applied
by contractual agreement when it would not be applied by default. Id. art 1(1). The basic
feature of the regime is a presumption of liability against the carrier once the cargo owner has
established the fact of the loss or damage. Id. art. 17(1). The carrier's liability depends on the
exceptions available to the carrier to rebut the presumption against it. Id. art. 17(2).
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of control. If carriers were willing to take all necessary precautions, we
could have international commerce with little to negligible cargo damage.
But possibilities of loss or damage still remain due to other causes, such as
by inherent vice or nature, 7 latent defect, unavoidable fire, third parties'
cargo, war, strikes, etc. Precautions may far exceed the value of almost
any cargo carried by sea. Thus, contracting parties make a conscious
decision to tolerate some level of cargo damage in order to save in the
overall costs of the enterprise operation.
We recognize that there are vague provisions about the placement
of liability in the Hamburg Rules. Some losses are inevitable. Substantial
losses during sea carriage are commercially predictable. Therefore, cargo
owners might bear some of the risk under the Hamburg Rules as they do
under the Hague-Visby Rules, and they will need to purchase cargo
insurance just the same.' 8
B. Period of Liability
The carrier's period of liability under the Hamburg Rules (Article
4) is based on the port-to-port criteria, which impose a duty of care on the
carrier while he is in charge of the goods, from receipt to delivery. It
replaces the old tackle-to-tackle limitation of carrier liability. However,
cargo should be delivered to the departing port or inland depot and stored
at a place of storage before it is under the custody of the carrier. If the
cargo insurance covers all risks from warehouse to warehouse, 9 the cargo
insurer compensates the cargo owner for loss or damage regardless of the
17. Inherent vice or nature of the goods is covered under a cargo insurance policy by the
special or expressed clauses - including, for example, the rust clause, the standard coal clause,
the livestock clause, or the clause involving risks of rats and/or vermin - which require the
insurer's due diligence or reasonable measures to avoid such risks for the indemnification from
the insurer.
18. Even under cargo insurance there are exclusionary risks such as willful misconduct of
the assured, delay (delay is excluded even if the delay is caused by a peril insured against),
ordinary wear and tear, ordinary leakage and breakage, inherent vice or nature of the subject
matter insured, and rats/vermin, under the United Kingdom's Marine Insurance Act of 1906 and
under the Institute Cargo Clauses (A) of 1982. See Section 55(2) of the Marine Insurance Act of
1906; Clause 4 of the Institute Cargo Clauses (A). In current practice there is also the category
of cargo loss or damage for which neither the carrier nor the cargo insurer is liable, such as loss
or damage caused by the purely inherent vice or nature of the cargo or willful misconduct of the
assured.
19. In cargo insurance, which is developed in accordance with the various demands of the
insured, the duration of risk regulated in the United Kingdom's Marine Insurance Act of 1906
from loading at the departure port to discharging at the destination port - is expanded by the
transit clause or the warehouse-to-warehouse clause. For example, in the Institute Cargo Clauses
of 1982 (Clause 8), the duration of risk is from the time the goods leave the warehouse or place
of storage at the place named in the policy for the commencement of the transit to the time the
goods are to be delivered to the consignees' warehouse or other final warehouse or place of
storage at the destination named therein.
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carriage section in which the loss or damage occurs, or even if the cause of
loss or damage cannot be proved. Without cargo insurance, the cargo
owner may encounter difficulty in attempting to show that the cause of loss
or damage occurred while the cargo was in the carrier's custody.
Therefore, under the Hamburg Rules, cargo insurance is still necessary,
although the carrier's period of liability is extended.20
C. Package Limitation
Much discussion has taken place about the increase in the monetary
limit of liability under the Hamburg Rules. The Hamburg Rules provide
for a nominal increase of about twenty-five percent in the monetary limit
by comparison with the Hague-Visby Rules.21 However, it is unimportant
to the cargo owner or carrier whether the carrier's limits of liability in
international conventions are high enough or are excessively low because
the limitation exists merely to create some certainty in commercial
relations.22 Moreover, the shipper can be provided compensation that is
.considered sufficient, over and above the limitation of the carrier's
liability, in accordance with the specific provisions of the agreement with
20. The carrier's liability under the Hamburg Rules may be said to be strengthened when
one considers the fact that the probability of occurrence of loss or damage from the stage of
receipt of the cargo for transportation to the stage of shipment is high compared to other stages of
transportation. But in some countries (e.g., the United States or France) the carrier's extended
period of liability has been realized to incorporation into the bill of lading. Such an extension of
the carrier's period of liability is helped less by the Hamburg Rules than the Hague or Hague-
Visby Rules.
21. The Hague Rules have a limit of £100 per package or unit, which has led to wide
variation in calculating the limitation figure. The Hague-Visby Rules, as amended by the 1979
Protocol, provide for a limit of 666.67 SDR per package or 2 SDR per kilo, whichever is
greater. Under the Hamburg Rules the limits are 835 units of account per package or other
shipping unit or 2.5 units of account per kilogram of gross weight of the goods, whichever is
greater. This nominal increase of about 25%, which could hardly be interpreted as generous to
cargo owners, is assessed to represent a substantial reduction in the limits of a carrier's liability
in real terms when inflation is taken into account. This is said to be contrasted with the much
more generous levels fixed by the other conventions, for example, the CMR, whose Article 23
provides for a limit of 8.33 SDRs per kilogram (together with all the costs of carriage). A. J.
Waldron, The Hamburg Rules:A Boondoggle for Lawyers?, J. BUS. L. 313-14, n.41 (1991).
22. See C. W. H. Goldie, Effect of the Hamburg Rules on Shipowners' Liability Insurance,
24 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 113 (1993). The package limitation was asserted not to be substantially
meaningful due to one of the following reasons. First, the limit of liability in terms of real
values has nearly always varied greatly among Hague Rules countries. Extremes are exemplified
by Spain with a low of $62 and Switzerland with a high of $1455 per package. These differences
are due themselves to the fact that legislation in most Hague Rules countries has fixed the amount
in national currency and monetary developments during the past 40 to 50 years have resulted in
quite different outcomes for the currencies of the various countries. Second, the concepts of
package and unit, one element of the limit of liability, has also been understood in different
ways. This has greatly affected the actual limit to be applied in particular cases. Selvig, supra
note 2, at 321.
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the carrier. 23  The shipper simply has to choose between the security of
having full recovery guaranteed from the carrier who agrees to cover such
costs with higher freight or the purchase of excess cargo insurance, and the
greater risk entailed by keeping within standard liability ,limits.
Considering that compensation from the carrier is commonly delayed and
compensation procedures are somewhat complicated, the shipper would do
well to insure the goods by purchasing cargo insurance for prompt and full
compensation. In light of this, the necessity to insure goods by means of
cargo insurance will continue to exist regardless of the expansion of the
carrier's liability limitation.
D. Other Clauses
Where fault or neglect on the part of the carrier, his servants, or
agents only causes lart of the loss, damage or delay in delivery, the carrier
is liable only to the extent that it is attributable to such fault or neglect.2'
In such a case it will tend to take considerable time to investigate the loss
23. Cases are common in which claims clearly exceed the limitation figure, which was
defined as a mere reflection of relative economic power between the two interests, the carriers
and the shippers, more than of commercial need. It seems inevitable that the courts will find a
way to break the limitation in order to provide the claimant with what is considered to be
adequate compensation. See Goldie, supra note 22, at 114. One method whereby United States
courts circumvent the limitation has been to insist that the shipper be given a fair opportunity to
declare the true value of the goods when it is higher than the package limitation. Blank square
clauses in bills of lading, published tariffs giving the shipper a choice of valuations, and
incorporation by reference to the short-form bill of lading of the terms of the long-form bill of
lading (which refers to COGSA) have been accepted by American courts as fair opportunities.
The principle of a fair opportunity to declare has arisen in Canada also. Another method has been
to define the package as a smaller and smaller unit by ruling that each package in the container,
rather than the container itself, is a package. This legislative approach, which has been called the
judicial response to an anachronistic law, is described in GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW
FOR THE AGES (1982) and by many other authors cited in WILLIAM, TETLEY, MARINE CARGO
CLAIMS 866-67 (3d ed. 1988). Also, when the carrier commits a deviation, most United States
courts do not apply package limitations according to the doctrines of deviation and fundamental
breach. See, e.g., Constructors T~cnicos, S. de R. L. v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 945 F.2d 841,
844-45, 1992 AMC 1284, 1289 (5th Cir. 1991); Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. M/V Bodena,
829 F.2d 293-301, 1988 AMC 223, 234 (2nd Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042 (1988);
English Electric Co. v. S.S. Nancy Lykes, 706 F.2d 84-89, 1987 AMC 1351, 1358 (2nd Cir.
1987); General Electric Co. v. S.S. Nancy Lykes, 706 F.2d 80, 86-88, 1983 AMC 1947, 1957-
59 (2nd Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983); Nemeth v. General Steamship Corp., 694
F.2d 609, 612-13, 1983 AMC 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1982); Calmapuip Engineering West
Hemisphere Corp. v. S/S Yafo, 590 F.2d 633, 638, 1984 AMC 839, 846 (5th Cir. 1979). But
see Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. Poseidon Schiffahrt Gmb.H., 313 F.2d 872, 874-75, 1963
AMC 665, 668-69 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 819 (1963). In continental countries,
in contrast with common law countries, the limitation clause has not been applied to damage
caused by the intent or gross negligence of the carrier, but rather the question of whether the
carrier may limit liability for damage caused by such fault of his servant or agent has been solved
in different ways. Selvig, supra note 2, at 321.
24. Articles 5-7 of the Hamburg Rules. U.N. COGSA, supra note 2.
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or damage to ascertain the carrier's portion of liability, even though the
carrier is proved liable for a substantial part of the total loss incurred.
Therefore, even though the carrier indemnifies cargo interests, it will not
necessarily be an advantage to the shipper who is interested in rapid
reimbursement. For a prompt return, it would be more efficient for the
shipper to receive indemnification from the cargo insurer and then to
transfer the claims against the carrier to the cargo insurer. 25
The universality of the new standard of carrier's liability and
burden of proof is undercut by special rules about losses to fire.26 In the
case in which it is interpreted as shifting the burden of proof back to the
shipper, the above clause makes it practically impossible for the cargo
owner to establish the source of the fire during the voyage because the
carrier may be the only party knowledgeable of any accidents that have
occurred during the voyage.
In view of this, the cargo owner still needs to insure goods by
means of cargo insurance against loss or damage arising from fire in order
to guarantee compensation. Thus, the necessity to insure goods through
marine cargo insurance would not be mitigated under the Hamburg Rules
during the period of enforcement, even though it would be reduced more
or less in the long run under the condition that prompt and full
compensation from the carrier is secured, such as from the cargo insurer.
III. LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDER THE HAMBURG RULES
To date, the matter of double insurance has mainly been discussed
under the assumption that the Hamburg Rules would strengthen the liability
25. In practice,
a loan receipt could be applied, which is an arrangement between the shipper and his
insurer whereby the latter lends the shipper the amount of the loss caused by the
carrier's negligence, in consideration of the shipper's agreement (a) to take suit against
the carrier at the expense and direction of the insurer, and (b) to pay over any eventual
recovery to the insurer. This loan receipt, rather than subrogation receipt, is often
used by American underwriters so that the claim is technically and theoretically
unsettled and yet the underwriter, under the terms of the loan receipt and the insurance
policy, may sue in the name of the insured.
William Tetley, Who May Claim or Sue for Cargo Loss or Damage?, 17 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 2,
171-72 (1986).
26. Article 5.4(a) of the Hamburg Rules provides that the carrier is only liable for the loss
of, or damage caused to, goods, or delay in their delivery, caused by fire if the claimant proves
that the fire arose from the fault or neglect of the carrier or his servants or agents. The failure to
employ the formula "all measures that could reasonably be taken," as in the case of other loss or
damage and specifying instead fault or neglect as the criterion for liability gives rise to the
question of whether the effect of Article 5.4(a) is purely to reverse the burden of proof or has a
more substantive effect upon the standard of the carrier's care.
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of the carrier.2' Now this article will examine the effects that
strengthening a carrier's liability has on liability insurance and costs.
There has also been a great deal of discussion on the increase in monetary
limits of carrier liability, as well as on the potential increase in the amount
of litigation that is likely to arise due to ambiguity in the provisions and the
removal of the lists of exceptions under the Hamburg Rules. The latter
will affect shipowner's liability insurance demand and cost.
Irrespective of whether the increased package limitations discussed
above should be of any concern,28 it is unlikely that any such increase will
have a dramatic effect on shipowner's liability insurance under the
Hamburg Rules. There have been many disputes in the courts related to
this, but interpretations of the relevant clauses in the Hague Rules have
been continuously invoked to settle them for seventy years.29 it seems
likely, therefore, that the volume of litigation involving the interpretation
of the clauses will increase insofar as the principle of interpretation
changes according to changing circumstances.
But it is not enough to show that there will be an increase in
litigation because of the adoption of the Hamburg Rules. Under the
Hamburg Rules, the carriers are primarily anxious about restrictions on the
27. Of course, there are some authors who see the Hamburg Rules as reducing the
carrier's liability. Tetley, supra note 4, at 17.
28. Examples of this trend may be found in the Conventions on Limitation of Liability for
Maritime Claims, such as the Convention on Limitation of Carrier's Liability, effected in
December 1986, and the Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their
Luggage by Sea, effected in April 1987. The former increased the liability limitation by 140%
or more, while the latter increased the liability limitation by 25% for cargo in the hold, 67% for
automobiles, including luggage, and 12.5% for other cargoes, compared to the Convention of
1957. Moreover, shipowners like Matson Navigation in the United States voluntarily increased
the limitation to U.S.$1000 per package. John Betz, Anchors Aweigh for the Hamburg Rules?,
DISTRIBUTION, Feb. 1992, at 54.
29. Opponents of the Hague Rules have proffered arguments that ambiguity in the Rules
will lead to expensive and unproductive litigation. This is similar to opponents' arguments
against the Hamburg Rules regarding interpretation. See, e.g., Relating to the Carriage of
Goods by Sea: Hearings before the House Committee on Merchant Marine & Fisheries, 68th
Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1925) (statement of Norman Drapper), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT AND THE TRAVAUX PRIPARATOIRES OF THE HAGUE
RULES 716, 239-40 (1990); Relating to the Carriage of Goods by Sea: Hearings before the House
Committee on the Merchant Marine & Fisheries, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 91 (1923) (statement of
C. B. Heinemann). Until somewhat recent years there have been two opposite points of view
about ambiguity in the Hague Rules. Some commentators have asserted that the Hague Rules
have worked well in practice and have provided a considerable degree of certainty, especially in
dealing with cargo claims, which is the most important part of the provisions of the Rules. See
John C. Moore, The Hamburg Rules, 10 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 2 (1978-1979); Honour, supra
note 3, at 239. Other opponents have asserted that some provisions are uncertain and differ in
the interpretation of the Rules. See Kurt GrCnfors, The Hamburg Rules: Failure or Success?, J.
BUS. L. 334 (1978); SAMIR MANKABADY, THE HAMBURG RULES ON THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS
BY SEA 30, 114 (1978), cited in Selvig, The Hamburg Rules, supra note 2, at 302.
164 [Vol. 4:153
1997] Sup Lee 165
defenses which are available to them by removal of the catalogues of
exception of the Hague-Visby Rules. Shipowners have little opportunity to
prevent or manage risk during the voyage in most countries, and
companies, and the extent to which shipowners do indeed have control
over short deliveries or damage to shipped cargoes during a given voyage
varies from country to country and among carriers' companies. 3°
In spite of the fact that the defenses available to the carrier through
the exception catalogues have tended in practice to be interpreted
restrictively under the Hague or Hague-Visby Rules, 3' the removal of those
defenses under the Hamburg Rules might weaken the shipowner's position
because the court will not consider the exceptions. 32 Hence, an increase in
carrier liability through the removal of exceptions would result in an
increase in demand for carrier liability insurance. Nevertheless, it is not
likely that an increase in carrier liability due to a removal of exceptions
under the Hague-Visby Rules will result in an equivalent increase in the
liability insurance premium. Carrier liability insurance covers many kinds
of risks, and one cannot predict with any confidence that an increase in
some cost factors will be fully reflected in the total cost of liability
insurance.
From the point of view of pure economics, the P&I club could be
assessed to be more efficient and prone to undertake cost-saving measures
30. For example, some companies whose risk management operations are run by a skilled,
well-educated staff and crew will more easily be able to prevent short delivery or damage to
goods during a voyage, while companies that fail to manage risk efficiently will have much more
difficulty doing so. So if we want to assess the effect of the application of the Hamburg Rules,
we should do it country by country and company by company. See Goldie, supra note 22, at
112.
31. According to the Hague Rules:
this means that in many countries it is increasingly difficult for the carrier to prove the
exercise of due diligence in making the ship seaworthy, and it is even more difficult
for him to rely on some of the exceptions listed in Article 4 Rule 2, and it is also more
difficult for him to rely on (b) Fire, (c) Perils of the Sea, (i) Act or omission of the
shipper, etc., (in) Inherent vice, (p) Latent defects, or (q) Any other cause arising
without the actual fault or privity of the carrier, his servants or agents.
Id.
32. Id. at 113-14.
33. Cargo liabilities are reported to amount to between 1/3 and 2/5 of all claims made.
Selvig, supra note 2, at 317. The Hamburg Rules' effect on liability insurance has been assessed
to be too limited because the portion of actual accidents out of the risks insured by the P&I clubs
was reported to be not so large (that is, 30%) and because the provisions of the Hamburg Rules
are related to cargo liabilities among many kinds of liabilities. Reynardson, supra note 3, at 1.
Thus, if the claim amount is increased by 10% to 20%, the total claim amount paid to carriers
will be increased by 3% to 6%.
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than the profit-pursuing cargo insurance companies.34 Hence, it is possible
that carriers may be insured more inexpensively through a P&I club than if
insured through a cargo insurance company, especially in a world of
perfect information and zero transaction costs.35 Granted, it is very
difficult to predict the effect of the Hamburg Rules on the total cost of
insurance without some empirical support, but it is highly doubtful that
activation of the Rules will bring about any increase in total insurance costs
as opponents have asserted, if the shift from marine cargo insurance to
carrier liability insurance is a smooth one.
To summarize, this article has examined the effect of the Hamburg
Rules on liability insurance in this section. While the effect on increased
demand seems somewhat substantial, the liability insurance premium does
not seem quite so dramatic. Nevertheless, we cannot draw any definitive
conclusions about this without better information.36
34. Some investigations made in 1979 showed that the portion of total claims that
constitutes the operating cost of the P&I club is estimated to be 3.5%, Reynardson, supra note 3,
at 4, and 85% to 90% of the total premium is estimated as constituting actual claims. Selvig,
supra note 2, at 316. According to one United States report about 50% of cargo insurance
companies' premium receipts was estimated as constituting claim amounts, while about 33%
went to general operating costs. The rest constituted company profits. Cargo Liability Study,
FINAL REPORT, PREPARED BY OFFICE OF FACILITATION, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY, AND CONSUMER AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 65 (June 1975). In the case of the European cargo
insurance companies, 75% of total premium receipts was estimated as constituting claim
amounts, 20% as general operating costs, and 5% as profits. N. Kihlbom, The Hague Rules and
the UNC1TRL Draft, SCANDINAVIAN INS. Q. 32, 34 (1977).
35. See Sturley, supra note 1, at 125. There are some contrary assertions that P&I
insurance is generally more expensive than cargo insurance. See, e.g., Chenal, supra note 3, at
915, n.144; M. J. Shah, The Revision of the Hague Rules on Bills of Lading Within the UN
System: Key Issues in the Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, at 11, n.5 (1978);
Hellawell, supra note 3, at 367. See also comments by Germany, VII Yearbook 218-19;
comments by Sweden, id. at 230-31; International Maritime Committee, id, at 249; International
Union of Marine Insurance, id, at 257; comments by Japan, id, at 221-22. One reason is that
cargo insurance spreads the risk of a major catastrophe broadly, among all the cargo insurance
companies or underwriters involved on the navigation, while P&I insurance concentrates that risk
on a single policy. See, e.g., N.R. McGilchrist, The New Hague Rules, LLOYD'S MAR. & COM.
L. Q. 260 (1974). Another is that first-party property insurance is more economical than third-
party liability insurance. See, e.g., U.N. COGSA, supra note 2, at 235 (comments of the
Japanese representative). From the point of view of risk combination and diversion, insurance
companies' underwriting methods and premium imposition are more efficient and scientific than
those of the P&I club, considering the relatively large volume of underwriting and long-
established experience of the underwriters. But it is not reasonable to conclude that liability
insurance is costlier than cargo insurance if we consider this point alone and do not consider the
total operating costs of the two industries.
36. There are two examples of empirical studies on the effect of the Hamburg Rules on
liability insurance. One was done by the forwarder associations of the United Kingdom and the
other by C. W. H. Goldie. The major freight forwarder associations of the United Kingdom
made the new standard clauses about the carrier's liability. Instead of the actual principle of non
liability, according to which the shipper is responsible for proving the carrier's negligence, these
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IV. EXPLORATION OF THE EFFECT OF THE HAMBURG RULES: FIELD
PRACTITIONERS' EXPECTATIONS
The purpose of this exploration is to introduce an understanding of
the effects of Hamburg Rules from the perspective of business practitioners
involved in international trade, that is, international traders as cargo
interests and carriers. A more complete understanding of the effects of
Hamburg Rules is likely to be obtained by scrutinizing both theoretical
explication and field practitioner opinion. Because the main purpose of the
Hamburg Rules is to regulate the business practices of carriers involved in
international trade, opinions from the field should be regarded at least as
important as what academicians theorize.
Firsthand information from industry practitioners was collected by
means of a series of face-to-face interviews with personnel working for
either trading companies or shipping companies located in Korea.37
Interviewees included company presidents, directors, and other authorities
in charge of their firms' decisions concerning insurance and carriage
contracts regulating the importation and exportation of goods. In order to
obtain both broad and in-depth information, a set of unstructured, open-
ended questions was presented in each of the 231 one-on-one interviews
clauses adopt the new limitation of liability, which has substantially been strengthened. This
means that the carrier's liability has been more strengthened than it would have been under the
Hamburg Rules. However, it has been observed by the business world that freight rates have not
gone up and the major freight forwarders have not been required to pay higher premiums for
liability insurance than under the previous system. M. D. Booker, European Shippers View on
the Hamburg/Visby Controversy, Paper Presented to the Shippers National Freight Claims
Council at its 13th National Conference at New Orleans (Mar. 4, 1987), cited by United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 33, at 34. On the other hand, C. W. H.
Goldie examined the possible impact of the Hamburg Rules on liability insurance in 1993. His
study showed that the effect of the Hamburg Rules on shipowner's liability insurance would not
be notably dramatic. Goldie, supra note 22, at 115-16.
37. As an example from this empirical study, Korea was assumed to lie between the
shipping developed countries like the United States and the shipping developing countries like
those that have yet to ratify the Hamburg Rules. That would place Korea at around the tenth
largest country in volume of foreign trade and the twelfth largest in volume of shipping space in
the world. Consequently, Korea's adoption or rejection of the Rules may or may not be
indicative of the decisions of other countries. But the effect of the Rules on marine cargo
insurance and shipowner's liability insurance in Korea would be even less indicative of broader
trends created by the Rules than the question of their adoption. Perusing the results of the
interviews, we should consider the general state of the circumstances surrounding Korea's
insurance and shipping industries with those of other advanced countries. For example, in
Korea, marine cargo insurers usually use the premiums made in other insurance-advanced
countries as benchmarks in setting their rates rather than using completely independent criteria.
Almost all Korean shipping companies have very weak competitive positions compared to
shipping-advanced countries, and it may be somewhat restrictive for them to estimate freight
according to the market mechanism. These factors may obstruct our ability to generalize
concerning the general effect of the Hamburg Rules on marine cargo insurance and the
shipowner's liability insurance.
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with trading company authorities and fifty with shipping company
authorities. These questions included:
1) whether the Hamburg Rules are likely to change the informant's
firm's insurance purchasing behavior;
2) whether the Hamburg Rules are likely to affect the premiums of
the insurance the informant's firm purchases; and
3) how the informant's firm would respond or is responding to the
changes brought about by the Hamburg Rules.
Interviews were conducted during the period from August 1993 to August
1996.
Informants were evaluated based on the adequacy of their
knowledge of and willingness to provide the information. All informants
were familiar with the Hamburg Rules and the potential effects of the
Rules on their businesses. In Korea, carrier liability has been strengthened
substantially by the modification of the International Sea Carriage Law in
1992, which incorporated ideas from the Hague-Visby Rules and, to a
lesser extent, from the Hamburg Rules. Informants were aware of on the
implications of those modifications, which had significantly increased
carrier's liability marine cargo. In addition, all informants were willing to
provide information. During the interview period, the author was in
charge of Advanced Management Programs at Pusan National University,
where the authorities of the affronted trading and shipping companies had
been educated. A one-on-one interview, lasting an average of about forty-
five minutes, was conducted in either a seminar room or in the author's
office at the University.
The procurement of information from two major parties involved
in international trade helped clarify the field practitioners' perceptions of
the Hamburg Rules and the expected influences by the Rules on their
insurance-related businesses. Considering the diversity of propositions that
are provided in the literature on the issue, the opinions of these business
practitioners were surprisingly similar. Findings are summarized based
upon the interviews with the traders and then with the carriers. Finally,
the information from both categories of informant is integrated to discuss
the overall effects of the Hamburg Rules on marine cargo insurance and
shipowner's liability insurance.
A. Traders' Responses
The Hamburg Rules will not change cargo insurance practices.
More than ninety percent of informants representing trading companies
expressed a need to insure the goods they export and import regardless of
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increased carrier liability on those shipped goods. Trading companies in
general seem to trust insurance companies rather than either shipping
companies or P&I clubs to provide prompt and full compensation for lost
or damaged goods. Surprisingly, most trading companies are reluctant to
contact shipping companies to make claims for the loss or damage of their
goods incurred during voyage. Shipping companies in most cases were
reported to be substantially unresponsive in compensating the shipper for
lost or damaged goods, even when causes are clearly attributable to the
carrier. Trading companies seem to be motivated to resort to insurance
companies rather than to shipping companies.38 The working relationship
with an insurance company resulting from accumulated transactions
provides international traders with not only trustworthy relief but also
fringe benefits such as discounted insurance premiums. Thus, because
international trading companies perceive cargo insurance as a better
alternative than the compensation plan available at shipping companies, an
increase in carriers' liability imposed by the Hamburg Rules would not
significantly alter the practice of marine cargo insurance among
international traders. 3
As far as the possible change in cargo insurance premium is
concerned, trading companies do not expect such a change in the
foreseeable future. Quite contrary to what many academicians have
proposed, business practitioners believe that cargo insurance premiums
would be minimally, if at all, affected by the increase in carriers' liability
on shipped cargo. Informants representing trading companies expected,
judging from their business experiences, that because cargo insurance
premium levels are determined by a multiplicity of factors, changes in a
38. Basically, they seemed to be very reluctant to expose themselves to possible confusion
over complicated procedures in making claims with shipping companies as well as to settle such
matters in court. In addition, the proportion of attorneys to total population is much lower in
Korea than in the United States. Therefore, very few trading companies have their own legal
advisors or counselors.
39. It may also be inferred from the cargo interests' conservative attitudes about their
business in relation to marine cargo insurance that the requirement to insure traded goods with
marine cargo insurance, irrespective of strengthening the carrier's liability, will continue for a
substantial period of time. For example, in Korea, the New Lloyd's Policy of 1982 for marine
cargo insurance with the Institute Cargo Clauses of 1982 (made by the Corporation of Lloyd's of
London and the Institute of London Underwriters) was introduced and used from 1983. See EUN
SUP LEE, MARINE INSURANCE 134-37 (1996). Its contents were reported to be very
understandable and convenient for Korean traders compared to the Lloyd's S.G. Policy of 1779
with the Institute Cargo Clauses of 1963. See id. However, until June 1996, the Lloyd's S.G.
Policy had been used. The author surmises from the above interviews with trading companies
that the Lloyd's S.G. Policy had, in fact, covered 50-60% of all insurance contracts made by
them in Korea for 13 years after the introduction of the New Lloyd's Policy. It seems to have
made little difference that it is far more difficult for Korean traders to understand the terms of the
Lloyd's S. G. Policy than those of the New Lloyd's Policy of 1982.
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single factor (that is, increased carriers' liability) would not be strong
enough to have an immediate effect on the premium level. A number of
informants added that it will take substantial time (at least ten years) before
the increase in carrier liability decreases the premiums on marine cargo
insurance.
B. Carriers' Response: Cost-Saving, not Freight Increase
Informants representing carrier companies also provided
information regarding the potential impact of the Hamburg Rules on their
businesses. According to them, the Hamburg Rules would have a strong
influence on their businesses in terms of how they impact on shipowner's
liability insurance. The increased carrier responsibility imposed by the
Rules would raise their costs because they will have to purchase more
liability insurance, and these additional costs, in turn, would alter their
business practices.
Many carrier company respondents indicated that they have
attempted to absorb the increased costs through cost-saving strategies
rather than by raising freight. These informants further explained that, due
to intensive competition among carriers, most Korean carriers are
discouraged from attempting to raise freight to make up for the increased
costs incurred by increased liability coverage. They would rather save in
other areas by resorting to reengineering, mark-up reduction, and service
reduction. Contrary to opponents' objections to the Rules that one finds in
the literature, therefore, the Hamburg Rules may not directly affect freight
levels, at least in the near future. In summary, the increase in carrier
liability by the Hamburg Rules is likely to result in market expansion for
the liability insurance industry and an increase in P&I calls. However,
freight levels are not likely to increase in the foreseeable future.
C. Overall Effects of the Hamburg Rules on the Insurance Industry
The effects of the Hamburg Rules on marine cargo insurance and
shipowner's liability insurance, inferring from the interview data, needs to
be evaluated from both long-term and short-term perspectives. In the long
term, the Hamburg Rules have the potential to induce a restructuring of
insurance practices among parties involved in international trade.
International traders are likely eventually to take advantage of the reduced
burden under the condition that they come to trust shipping companies to
render prompt and full compensation for lost or damaged goods. They
will not have to insure cargo as much as they do now. We can
consequently predict some shrinkage in the cargo insurance market in the
long run. On the other hand, increased carrier liability will result in the
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expansion of the liability insurance market, increasing the carriers' costs.
Eventually, freight levels will have to go up.
On the other hand, the Hamburg Rules are not likely to affect the
insurance industry in general in the foreseeable future. Current business
practices are not providing a viable ground for the Rules. International
traders, in particular, expressed resistance to the idea of pacing up their
business practices with the changes imposed by the Rules. Their insurance
purchasing behavior seems to be more influenced by existing business
customs than the new liability regime imposed by the Hamburg Rules.
Regardless of the increased liability on carriers, international traders are
likely to insure the goods they import and export. The Rules are not
expected to affect the Cargo insurance either. The area in which the
Hamburg Rules have an immediate influence seems to be the liability
insurance market. Facing increased liability, carriers will have to purchase
more liability insurance. A majority of carriers, however, will not be able
to charge additional freight because of intensive competition in the
industry. Freight levels will consequently not be directly affected by the
Hamburg Rules in the short term.
Overall, the Hamburg Rules may have a detrimental effect on
world trade in the short run due to the increased possibility of double
insurance. As long as international traders hesitate to rely on carrier
compensation plans, a cargo of shipped good has a greater chance of being
insured by both traders and carriers. The Hamburg Rules thus need to be
understood at best as not affecting and at worst as even exacerbating the
current practice of double insurance in the short term.4°
V. CONCLUSION
Resolving the problem of insurance costs depends on a number of
empirical conclusions. Consider, for example, the argument that cargo
40. Besides the effect of the Hamburg Rules on marine cargo insurance and shipowner's
liability insurance, the general economic benefits of the Hamburg Rules from the view point of
the shippers were recognized by the parties concerned in the interviews, viz., maximum amounts
of compensation from the carrier would increase. Recovery would be permissible when the
shipowner's negligence is the (proximate) cause of the loss, or for delay. Greater care of cargo
by the carriers or their agents could be expected. This observation is very similar to cargo
interests' contentions of other advanced countries like the United States, except with regard to the
matter of the cargo insurance premium. For example, William J. Augello, the Executive
Director, for the Transportation Claims & Protection Council, pointed out that the Hamburg
Rules would reduce the cost of international trade by lowering the cost of cargo insurance, in
addition to the above benefits. Augello also charged the marine insurance industry with
opposition to Hamburg because they feared a reduction in cargo premium revenue, contrary to
their own apocalyptic objection that the Hamburg Rules would constitute a "brand new regime of
international law governing ocean liability, requiring years. of litigation to clarify issues." Betz,
supra note 28, at 52-54.
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insurance costs will drop if the carrier is more liable for losses. In theory,
this should occur because the cargo insurer will recover a greater share of
its payments from the carrier through subrogation. The cargo insurer,
knowing that its net payments will be lower, could charge lower
premiums, while the liability insurer could charge higher premiums.
However, there are still two questions to be answered. First, how much
decrease and increase will there be? Second, how quickly will the reduced
and increased premiums take effect? Not only is it unclear whether the
Hamburg Rules significantly shift the risk of loss from cargo interests to
the carrier, but most shippers would still prefer to purchase cargo
insurance even if the carrier were fully liable for all cargo damage.
In light of the foregoing theoretical review and qualitative
exploration, it is unlikely that the Hamburg Rules will have the dramatic
effect on the double insurance problem by efficiently and economically
shifting the shipper's risk from the cargo insurer to the shipowner's
liability insurer in the near future. Instead, if the Hamburg Rules impose
such heavy liability on the carrier, this will increase what are perceived as
wasteful double insurance expenses from the standpoint of the total
economic system, but it will not affect freight directly for a substantial
time. Moreover, it will take considerable time for the Hamburg Rules to
realize its potential to affect the double insurance problem even though
they strengthen carrier liability in the end, and it is for this reason that
cargo owners have to trust shipping companies to render prompt and full
compensation. In short, the gap between the ideal of the Hamburg Rules
and actual business practices will continue for some time to come.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent escalation of human rights abuses around the world has
led many to question the effectiveness of the current methods used to
enforce and/or monitor human rights around the globe.' As a result, many
states, as well as non-government organizations, are slowly realizing that
the use of economic aid as a weapon against human rights abuses may be
1. As Patricia Striling accurately states:
In the past ten years, human rights tragedies have abounded. To
comprehend the seriousness of the situation and the urgent need for some
type of effective enforcement of core human rights, one need only consider
such tragedies as the tribal slaughters in Rwanda, the atrocities in the former
Yugoslavia and the thousands of demonstrators gunned down by government
forces in Burma. The alarming frequency of horrific violations of
fundamental human rights illustrates the overall ineffectiveness of current
methods of protection. An effective alternative is obviously needed, one
that is capable of garnering universal support and which has quick and
effective mechanisms for enforcement,
Patricia Stirling, The Use of Trade Sanctions As An Enforcement Mechanism for Basic Human
Rights: A Proposal for Addition to the World Trade Organization, 11 AM. U.J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 1, 45 (1996).
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the most effective enforcement mechanism to date. 2  And what financial
institution would be better suited to carry out that mission than the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank or
IBRD)., The suitability of the World Bank stems from various factors.
2. See, e.g., United States International Financial Institutions Act, 22 U.S.C. § 262d(f)
(1988) (instructing United States Executive Directors of the World Bank "to oppose any loan,
any extension of financial assistance, or any technical assistance to any country," whose
government is engaged in a pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights
unless the assistance "is directed specifically to programs which serve the basic human needs of
the citizens of such country"). The Act further provides, in part:
Section 701(a) [T]he United States Government, in connection with its voice and vote
in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International
Development Association, the International Finance Corporation, the Inter-American
Development Bank, the African Development Fund, and the Asian Development Bank,
shall advance the cause of human rights, including by seeking to channel assistance
toward countries other than those whose governments engage in . . . 1) a) consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, such as torture
or cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention
without charges, or other flagrant denial to life, liberty, and the security of person. b)
Further, the Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct each Executive Director of the
above institutions to consider in carrying out his duties: 1) specific actions by either
the executive branch or the Congress as a whole on individual bilateral assistance
programs because of human rights considerations: 2) the extent to which the
economic assistance provided by the above institutions directly benefits the people in
the recipient country. . . (c) The Secretaries of State and Treasury shall report
annually to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate
on the progress toward achieving the goals of this title, including the listing required in
subsection (d). (d) The United States Government, in connection with its voice and
vote in the institutions listed in subsection (a), shall seek to channel assistance to
projects which address basic human needs of the people of the recipient country. The
annual report required under subsection (c) shall include a listing of categories of such
assistance granted, with particular attention to categories that address basic human
needs. (e) In determining whether a country is in gross violation of internationally
recognized human rights standards, as defined by the provisions of subsection (a), the
United States Government shall give consideration to the extent of cooperation of such
country in permitting an unimpeded investigation of alleged violations of
internationally recognized human rights by appropriate international organizations
including, but not limited to, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Amnesty
International, the International Commission of Jurists, and groups or persons acting
under the authority of the United Nations or the Organization of American States.
Id. § 701 (a).
In addition, see Staff Writer, India - Human Rights: Group Urges Action On Child Labor,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 16, 1996, at 1 (the Human Rights Watch Urges the Suspension of
Economic Aid to India Due to Abused Children in the Indian Labor Market); see also Peter R.
Baehr, Concern for Development Aid and Fundamental Human Rights: The Dilemma as Faced
by the Netherlands, 4 HuM. RTs. Q. 39, 42 (1982) (outlining the Dutch government's use of
civil and political rights as a precondition for development aid).
3. See Ibrahim F. L. Shihata, The World Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis of Legal
Issues and the Record of Achievements, 17 DEN. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 39, 40 (1988)
(highlighting the World Bank's suitability to play an active role in the area of human rights).
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First, the World Bank is owned by the governments of 177 countries,4 and
any decision by the World Bank in the area of human rights will be seen as
a multi-lateral decision, and as such, will carry greater weight than a
unilateral decision by one specific nation state.' Second, unlike the
International Monetary Fund, 6 the World Bank does have the authority to
provide direct loans and financial assistance to nation states for the purpose
of development and that, in turn, means that the World Bank can exercise
greater power in the area of human rights than can the International
Monetary Fund.' Finally, in recent years, due to the widening gap
between poor and rich countries, in addition to the World Bank's ever-
increasing financial strength,8 the bank loans to developing countries are
now considered "the primary source" of foreign capital,9 making the
World Bank a potential champion of human rights.
4. WORLD BANK, 1996 ANN. REP. 3. The World Bank's assets, funds and properties are
owned by member countries in the form of shares and stocks. Countries who contribute more
money to the Bank will have more ownership rights in the World Bank. Id.
5. Some commentators argue that a multi-lateral decision to suspend aid to a country that
violates human rights is far more effective than a unilateral decision, and that there is an inherent
weakness in unilateral decisions to suspend aid since
an aid donor's formal statement that an aid recipient violated human rights, followed
by the subsequent withdrawal or suspension of aid, can insult the criticized government
publicly, and thereby damage bilateral relations. As a result, aid donors are unlikely
to raise human rights issues in such a manner, particularly with countries of political,
economic, or strategic importance.
Kaoru Okuizumi, Implementing the ODA Charter: Prospects for Linking Japanese Economic
Assistance and Human Rights, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 367, 395 (1995).
6. The International Monetary Fund's primary purpose was "to maintain an orderly
system of receipts and payments between nations" by maintaining a stable exchange rate of
currency. The International Monetary Fund does not provide loans for the purpose of
development, as the World Bank does. See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Crossing the Rubicon:
Synthesizing the Soft International Law of the I.M.F. and Human Rights, 11 B.U. INT'L L. J. 81,
87 (1993). For the difference between the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, see
Joseph Gold, The Relationship Between the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 15
CREIGHTON L. REV. 499, 501-03 (1981).
7. This is based on the theory that a country who needs a loan, or economic aid, is likely
to seek the help of the World Bank first, since the World Bank offers direct loans. The
International Monetary Fund, on the other hand, will only assist that country by helping them to
repay their debt to creditors on a timely basis. See BARTRAM S. BROWN, THE UNITED STATES
AND THE POLMCIZATION OF THE WORLD BANK 3 (Kegan Paul International ed. 1992).
8. In 1996, the World Bank distributed loans to developing countries in excess of
$13,000,000,000,000. See WORLD BANK, 1996 ANN. REP. § 6.
9. Victoria E. Marmorstein, World Bank Power to Consider Human Rights Factors in
Loan Decisions, 13 J. INT'L L. & Eco. 113, 118 (1978). The reasons for the increasing reliance
of developing countries on the World Bank, for loans, is due to the fact that the World Bank
loans are not only given at a very low interest rate (which averages 5%), but there is also a
nominal service charge of only 0.75%, and there is a generous grace period before which any
payment is expected . . . typically 10 years. That makes developing countries more apt to
borrow from the World Bank than from an open market, which imposes more stringent terms for
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But despite the apparent suitability of the World Bank as a monitor
and/or enforcer of human rights across the globe, a growing number of
nation states and international scholars now strongly oppose the notion of
using the World Bank to monitor and/or enforce human rights.'0 These
opponents argue that using the World Bank for human rights purposes not
only contradicts the World Bank's own mandate and violates certain
principles of international law, but it is also highly impractical and
potentially detrimental to the World Bank and its members. This is due to
the fact that the World Bank would subsequently lose its prestigious
financial status, thereby becoming a mere political tool used to achieve
non-economic objectives."
The following note will explore the various arguments made as to
the legality or illegality of using the World Bank to defend human rights,
and it will also examine the World Bank's historical practices within the
context of human rights. The main purpose of this note, however, is not to
assess the strengths and/or weaknesses of the various arguments made.
Rather, it is to highlight those arguments in an effort to aid the reader in
forming his or her own view on the issue. As for my personal view on the
issue, it will be expressed at the end of this note. I have divided this note
into four general sections. First, an overview of the World Bank and its
operating mechanism. In the second section, I will explore the various
arguments asserted against using the World Bank to monitor and/or
enforce human rights around the world. Section three deals with the
various arguments asserted in favor of the World Bank playing such a role.
And in the fourth and final section, I will examine the World Bank's actual
practices in the area of human rights from the time of its inception.
borrowing. See CHERYL PAYER, THE WORLD BANK: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 23-26 (1982);
BROWN, supra note 7, at 5.
10. See Jonathan Cahn, Challenging The New Imperial Authority: The World Bank and the
Democratization of Development, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 156 (1993); Robert E. Lutz,
Environment, Economic Development and Human Rights: A Triangular Relationship?, 82 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 40, 61-2 (1988); David A. Writh, The United States and World Bank:
Constructive Reformer or Fly in the Functional Ointment?, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 687 (1994);
James B. Wolf, Africa, Human Rights and the Global System: The Political Economy of Human
Rights in a Changing World, 24 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 241-43 (1995); Jerome Levinson,
Conference on Human Rights, Public Finance, and Development Process. Multilateral
Financing Institutions: What Forms of Accountability?, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 47
(1992).
11. See BROWN, supra note 7, at 53-86; Lutz, supra note 10, at 60-63.
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II. THE WORLD BANK: AN OVERVIEW
The World Bank was established in 1944 by the United Nations
Monetary and Financial Conference. 2 The original purpose of the World
Bank was to reconstruct war-tom Europe. But with the introduction of the
Marshall Plan in 1947, the World Bank was now free to shift its resources
to developing countries.'3 The World Bank is comprised of four different
agencies known as The World Bank Group.•4 The World Bank Articles of
Agreement states that one of the World Bank's official purposes is
12. See Brian B. A. McAllister, The United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development: An Opportunity to Forge a New. Unity in the Work of the World Bank Among
Human Rights, the Environment, and Sustainable Development, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 689, 701 (1993).
13. BROWN, supra note 7, at 4.
14. The World Bank Group is comprised of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development [hereinafter IBRD], the International Development Association [hereinafter IDA],
the International Finance Corporation [hereinafter IFC], and the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency [hereinafter MIGA]; see Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, opened for signature Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, T.I.A.S.
No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 134; Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association,
done Jan. 26, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 2284, T.I.A.S. No. 4607, 439 U.N.T.S. 249; Articles of
Agreement on the International Finance Corporation, done May 25, 1955, 7 U.S.T. 2197,
T.I.A.S. No. 3620, 264 U.N.T.S. 117. Each one of those agencies plays a role in carrying out
the World Bank's objective of encouraging development in the third world, and each of those
agencies was established on, or subsequent to 1945, when the World Bank's Articles of
Agreements were opened for signature. The first agency established was the IBRD, which is the
main branch of the World Bank. It was established in 1945, and its purpose was to provide
direct loans to countries in need.
The International Development Association (IDA) was created in 1960 due to the
perceived inability of the IBRD to respond to a growing group of underdeveloped countries in
need of a more liberal type of development fund. The IDA was designed to provide assistance
for the same purposes as the IBRD, but primarily to the poorer developing countries and on
terms that would bear less heavily on their balance of payments than would IBRD loans. IDA
assistance is, therefore, concentrated on the very poorest countries---those with an annual per
capita gross national product of $610 or less (in 1990 dollars). More than forty countries (mostly
in Africa) are eligible under this criterion. By contrast, IBRD loans are directed toward
developing countries at more advanced stages of economic and social growth. Whereas money
distributed by the IBRD is deemed a loan, funds paid out by the IDA are called credits.
• The other two institutions in the World Bank Group are the International Finance
Corporation and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. The IFC was established in
1956 to assist the economic development of less-developed countries by promoting growth in the
private sector of their economies and helping to mobilize domestic and foreign capital for this
purpose. Membership in the IBRD is a prerequisite for membership in the IFC, which totals 146
countries. Legally and financially, the IFC and the IBRD are separate entities. The IFC has its
own operating and legal staff, but draws upon the World Bank for administrative and other
services.
The MIGA was established in 1988 with the following mandate: to encourage equity
investment and other direct investment flows to developing countries through the mitigation of
non-commercial investment barriers. To carry out this mandate, MIGA offers investors
guarantees against non-commercial risks; advises developing member governments on the design
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to assist in the reconstruction and development of
territories of members by facilitating the investment of
capital for productive purposes, including the restoration of
economies destroyed or disrupted by war, the reconversion
of productive facilities to peacetime needs and the
encouragement of the development of productive facilities
and resources in less developed countries. '3
The vice president and general counsel of the World Bank
explained that the official purpose of the World Bank
encompasses such varied subjects as the alleviation of
poverty, the fulfillment of basic human needs for nutrition,
safe drinking water, education, health and housing, the
concern for the settlement of people affected by large
development projects (including the tribal people), the role
of women in development, and preserving the
environment.' 6
The World Bank's capital is raised by selling shares of the World
Bank to nation states that are members of the Bank. 7 The World Bank's
decision to provide, or to not provide loans to a particular developing
country is the responsibility of the World Bank's Board of Executive
Directors. ' The Board of Executive Directors consists of twenty-two
directors, and five of those twenty-two directors are appointed by the five
member states having the largest number of shares of capital stock.,9 The
Board of Executive Directors uses a weighted majority voting system in
rendering its decision, where the weight of each executive's vote will be
determined by the number of shares owned by the particular nation state
and implementation of policies, programs and procedures related to foreign investments; and
sponsors a dialogue between the international business community and host governments on
investment issues. By June 30, 1992, the convention establishing MIGA had been signed by 115
countries, of which 85 had also become members. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, THE WORLD BANK: GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 7 (1993).
15. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
opened for signature, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, as
amended Dec. 16, 1965, 16 U.S.T. 1942, T.I.A.S. No. 5929.
16. Shihata, supra note 3, at 40.
17. IBRD Articles of Agreement, art. VI, 3, 11 U.S.T. at 2296-97, 439 U.N.T.S. at 270.
Currently, there are 177 member states in the World Bank. See generally WORLD BANK, 1996
ANN. REP.
18. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 17, art. V, § 3.
19. Id. Currently, the five member states having the largest number of shares in the Bank
are the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. WORLD BANK, 1996
ANN. REP.
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which he or she represents.20 Currently, the United States exercises more
than eighteen percent of the total voting power of the Board of Executive
Directors, "nearly three times the amount exercised by the next largest
share holder, Japan." 2'
The World Bank became a specialized agency of the United
Nations in 1947, this by virtue of an agreement between the World Bank
and the United Nations.Y Under this agreement, the World Bank is
required to take note of the obligations assumed by members of the United
Nations and to have "due regard for decisions of the Security Council
under Articles 41 and 42 of the United Nations Charter.",3
20. See supra note 17.
21. See Wirth, supra note 10, at 695. "This weighted voting formula has never been very
popular with the developing countries since, in effect, it institutionalizes within the World Bank
the inequality between the economically strong countries and the economically weak ones."
BROWN, supra note 7, at 6. It is worth noting that the United States of America had an
inconsistent track record with regard to its position on the issue of linking economic aid with
human rights violations. For example, in 1965 the United States opposed the granting of any aid
to the Republic of South Africa and the government of Portugal for their human rights abuses.
However, the United States has consistently voted in favor of granting economic aid to China,
despite China's well documented human rights abuses. See UNITED STATES NATIONAL
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL POLICIES:
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, ANNUAL REPORTS TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS FOR FISCAL
YEARS WORLD BANK, 1980-1987; 1965, 1994, 1995, 1996 ANN. REP.
22. The Bank -is a specialized agency established by agreement among its member
governments and having wide international responsibilities, as defined in its Articles of
Agreement, in economic and related fields within the meaning of Article 57 of the Charter of the
United Nations. By reason of the nature of its international responsibilities and the terms of its
Articles of Agreement, the Bank is, and is required to function as, an independent organization,"
The Agreement Between the United Nations and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, Nov. 15, 1947, art. 1(2), 16 U.N.T.S. 346 (hereinafter Agreement); see also
Agreement Between the United Nations and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development on Relationship Between the United Nations and the International Finance
Corporation, 265 U.N.T.S. 314 and Agreement between the United Nations and the International
Development Association, 394 U.N.T.S. 222 for similar agreements related to IFC and IDA
respectively.
23. Agreement, supra note 22, art. VI (1). This Agreement further highlights the
reciprocal obligations between the World Bank and the United Nations. For example, article IV
of the agreement provides that:
1. The United Nations and the Bank shall consult together and exchange views on
matters of mutual interest. 2. Neither organization, nor any of their subsidiary
bodies, will present any formal recommendations to the other without reasonable
prior consultation with regard thereto. Any formal recommendations made by
either organization after such consultation will be considered as soon as possible
by the appropriate organ of the other. 3. The United Nations recognizes that the
action to be taken by the Bank on any loan is a matter to be determined by the
independent exercise of the Bank's own judgment in accordance with the Bank's
Articles of Agreement. The United Nations recognizes, therefore, that it would
be sound policy to refrain from making recommendations to conditions of
financing by the Bank with respect to particular loans or with respect to terms or
conditions of financing by the Bank. The Bank recognizes that the United
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In 1979, in response to an "acute balance of payments crisis in the
late 1970s among borrowing member countries," the World Bank officially
implemented what is known as "structural adjustment loans."' 4 These
structural adjustment loans are loans that are attached with policy-based
conditions aimed at forcing the borrowing countries to conform to certain
Bank policies and practices in their internal and/or external affairs. 2
Despite the question of the legality of the structural adjustment loans2 6 by
1992 the Bank's structural adjustment loans constituted twenty-seven
percent of the Bank's total loans. 27
Today, the impact of the World Bank extends far beyond financial
aid to developing countries. Not only has the World Bank "assumed the
role as true leader in policy making for smaller and newer international
and regional development banks(such as the African Development Bank,
the Asian Development Bank, and the Inter-American Development
Bank"), but also the Bank is "recognized as the intellectual leader and
influences policy changes ... .
Nations and its organs may appropriately make recommendations with respect to
the technical aspects of the reconstruction or development plans, programs or
projects.
Id.
24. Diana E. Moller, Intervention, Coercion, or Justifiable Need? Legal Analysis of
Structural Adjustment Lending in Costa Rica, 2 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 483, 501 (1995).
However, some scholars have argued that the World Bank, since its inception, has always put
conditions on its loans, and that the structural adjustment loans have always been a part of the
Bank's policy. See PAUL A. MOSELY, AID AND POWER: THE WORLD BANK AND POLICY-
BASED LENDING 25-27 (1991).
25. STANLEY PLEASE, THE WORLD BANK: LENDING FOR STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, IN
ADJUSTMENT CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD 83, 87 (Richard E. Feinberg & Valeriana Kallab,
eds., 1984). For a complete history of the World Bank's structural adjustment loans and their
impact, see GIOVANNI ANDREA CORNIA, ADJUSTMENT WITH A HUMAN FACE (Claredon Press
Oxford eds., 1987); AART VAN DE LAAR, THE WORLD BANK AND THE POOR (Martinus Nijhoff
eds., 1980).
26. See Levinson, supra note 10, at 49-50. A full discussion of the legality of the
structural adjustment loans of the World Bank will be handled infra section II and section III. If
the World Bank is to become an active player in the area of human rights, it would most likely
do so by using structural adjustment loans to enforce and/or monitor human rights, and thus, the
question of the legality of structural adjustment loans is, in essence, the same question as to the
legality of the World Bank's involvement in the area of human rights.
27. WORLD BANK, 1992 ANN. REP. at 19.
28. McAllister supra note 12, at 702. Most of the regional development banks have
articles of agreement similar in scope to the World Bank, and most of those regional banks
implement similar policy-based loans as does the World Bank. These regional development
banks face that same question as to the legality of the structural adjustment loans which they
extend to developing countries. See John Linarelli, The European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and Post-Cold War Era, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 373 (1995) (highlighting the
legal challenges faced by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, including
structural adjustment loans).
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III. THE CASE AGAINST USING THE WORLD BANK TO ENFORCE
AND/OR MONITOR HUMAN RIGHTS
According to those who voice discomfort and discontent over the
idea of tying World Bank loans to human rights, such action is not only
illegal (as it violates international law), but it is also both impractical and
potentially detrimental. Each of these arguments will be explored
separately.
A. Using the World Bank to Enforce and/or Monitor Human Rights
is an Illegal Act that Violates International Law
In the eyes of those opposed to the World Bank acting as enforcer
and/or monitor of human rights, such a role is illegal under international
law on various grounds. These grounds include the violation of the Bank's
own Articles of Agreement; the violation of international law prohibiting
coercion in any form including economic coercion, the violation of the
principles of sovereign integrity and sovereign equality; and finally, the
violation of the recipient states' right to development. Each of these
arguments will be examined separately.
1. Using the World Bank to Enforce and/or Monitor Human Rights
Violates the Bank's Articles of Agreement
When making loans to developing countries, the World Bank
actually violates its own Articles of Agreement in considering human rights
factors, according to the opposition. Under the Bank's Articles of
Agreement, the Bank's main purpose is "to promote the long-range
balanced growth of international trade and the maintenance of equilibrium
in balances of payments by encouraging international investment for the
development of the productive resources of members, thereby assisting in
raising productivity, the standard of living and conditions of labor in their
territories." 29 Further, Article IV of the Bank's Articles of Agreement
expressly prohibits the Bank from taking on such a role. It states that:
the Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political
affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their
decisions by the political character of the member or
members concerned. Only economic considerations shall
be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations
29. The World Bank Articles of Agreement, art. I (iii).
182 [Vol. 4:173
Moris
shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the
purpose stated in Article 1.30
Article III of the Bank's Articles of Agreement states that: the Bank shall
make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are used only
for the purposes for which the loan was-granted, with due attention to
considerations of economy and efficiency and without regard to political or
other non-economic influences or considerations .3
Because of these provisions in the Bank's Articles of Agreement,
opponents argue that, "the World Bank is clearly and unequivocally
prohibited from making or denying loans based upon a country's
performance in terms of its human rights record, no matter how atrocious
that record may be. "32 That is because the human rights issues are not only
beyond the Bank's stated purpose, but also because they are viewed as
political issues that the Bank is prohibited from considering in its loans
decisions .3
2. Using the World Bank to Enforce and/or Monitor Human Rights
is a Form of Coercion Prohibited by United Nations' Charter
Using economic aid to force recipient countries to comply with
and/or respect human rights is a form of coercion prohibited by
international law. Many developing nation states argue that the Bank's use
of economic aid in order to force compliance with human rights norms
clearly violates the United Nations Charter, as well as international law,
due to its coercive nature.34 These nation states cite Article II, paragraph 4
of the United Nations Charter, which states that "all members shall refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."' Here, they argue,
the Bank's use of economic aid over developing nations who are in
desperate need of such aid, amounts to an economic use of force and
30. Id. art. IV, § 10. Despite this express language that prohibits the Bank from
considering non-economic factors in its loan decisions, in the early 1980's the Bank
implemented what are known as Structured Adjustment Policies. These are ideology based loans
aimed at forcing developing countries to comply with certain ideologies. For a history of the
Structured Adjustment Policies, see Henry S. Bienen & Mark Gersovitz, Economic Stabilization,
Conditionality, and Political Stability, 39 INT'L ORG. 729 (1985).
31. Id. art. III, § 5b.
32. Levinson, supra note 10, at 56.
33. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 17, art. III, § 5b
34. BROWN, supra note 7, at 53-59.
35. U.N. CHARTER, art. II, para 4.
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coercion that is prohibited by the United Nations Charter. 36 These nation
states further argue that a prohibition against coercion by means other than
armed attacks, such as economic force, was implicitly affirmed by the
International Court of Justice in its opinion in Nicaragua v. United States."
In that case, the court recognized that an illegal use of coercive force need
not take the extreme form of an armed attack, but could take "other less
grave forms."3  And that economic coercion, in the form of withholding
aid from developing countries who do not comply with the Bank's human
rights policy, falls within the scope of the less grave forms standard set by
the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. United States. Thus, the
Bank's use of economic force (in the form of withholding aid to developing
countries) does indeed constitute an illegal use of coercive force prohibited
by international law.
3. Using the World Bank to Enforce and/or Monitor Human Rights
Violates the Principle of Sovereignty
Imposing the World Bank's human rights ideology on recipient
nations constitutes an illegal violation of the principle of state sovereignty,
in addition to violating the United Nations' Charter. Many of the aid
recipient countries argue that the act of linking economic aid to the human
rights policies of the recipient countries infringes on the sovereignty of
those countries, while also constituting unlawful interference with their
domestic affairs.19 And that form of interference is forbidden by the
United Nations' Charter, which expressly prohibits any interference in the
domestic affairs of member states, while mandating respect for the
sovereign integrity of those states.'0 They further argue that a state's
economic policy is clearly within the state's sovereign power, and that
international law ( for the most part) acknowledges that each state has a
right to decide what economic policy it will follow in its domestic setting
and in its dealings with other states." Therefore, tying economic aid to a
human rights policy will only serve to hinder and infringe on the states'
ability to pursue a particular economic policy, both domestically and
internationally. In addition, within the context of various United Nations'
36. Stephen C. Neff, The Law of Economic Coercion: Lessons From the Past and
Indications of the Future, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 3 (1981); BROWN, supra note 7, at 54.
37. Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4 (June 27).
38. Id. at 101; BROWN, supra note 7, at 58.
39. See Susumu Awanohara et al., Vienna Showdown, FAR E. ECON. REV. (1993)
Michael Vatikiotis & Robert Delfs, Cultural Divide, FAR E. ECON. REV. 20 (1993), 16.
40. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, § 2; art. 2, § 1; art. 2, § 4; and art. 2, § 7.
41. BROWN, supra note 7, at 66.
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resolutions and declarations, developing countries have stressed the
importance of their sovereign integrity, as well as their condemnation of
any attempt to interfere with such sovereignty vis-a-vis economic means . 2
Thus, any attempt by the World Bank to impose its human rights agenda
on recipient countries through the use of economic aid not only violates the
sovereign integrity of those countries, but is also an act which is prohibited
by international law.
4. Using the World Bank to Enforce and/or Monitor Human Rights
Violates the International Principles of Equality
Using the World Bank to enforce and/or monitor human rights in
developing countries violates the legal principle of sovereign equality. The
United Nations' Charter explicitly states that one of the fundamental
principles of international law and United Nations membership is "the
principle of sovereign equality of all members."4 3  But since only
developing countries are in need of economic aid from the World Bank,
this will mean that only developing countries will be subject to human
42. See United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the
World Conference on Human Rights, Final Declaration of the Region Meeting .for Asia of the
World Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/59 para. 4 (1993),
[hereinafter Bangkok Declaration] ("The Ministers and representatives of Asian States, meeting
at Bangkok from 29 March to 2 April 1993. .. discourage any attempt to use human rights as a
conditionality for extending development assistance."). In contrast, it should be noted that the
Vienna Declaration and Program of Action of the World Conference on Human Rights contained
no provisions concerning development aid conditioned on human rights. United Nations,
General Assembly, Vienna Declaration and Program of Action of the World Conference on
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (1993); A.W. Clausen, former World Bank
President, acknowledged the sovereignty of developing nations when he stated that the World
Bank worked "in close partnership with its developing members -- which number well over a
hundred separate, sovereign, culturally diverse societies . . . ." WARREN C. BAUM & STOKES
M. TOLBERT, INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS OF WORLD BANK EXPERIENCE v (1985).
Finally, the 1966 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of
States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty states that:
I. No state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of another state. Consequently, armed
intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the
personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural element are
condemned.
2. No state may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of
measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the
exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind.
6. All states shall respect the right of self-determination and independence of
peoples and nations, to be freely exercised without any foreign pressure ...
UNGA Resolution 2131 (XX) of 21 December 1965, U.N. GAOR, Vol. 20, Supp. 14 at, 11, U.N.
Doc. A/6014 (1966).
43. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2 (1).
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rights scrutiny of the World Bank," and that, in turn, violates the principle
of sovereign equality and equal treatment among nation states.
5. Using the World Bank to Enforce and/or Monitor Human Rights
Violates the Developing Countries' Right to Development
Finally, the World Bank's withholding of economic aid, due to
human rights abuses, is illegal since it violates the recipient nation's right
to economic development. Recipient states argue that they are entitled to
the right of development, which has "progressed from its status as an
international norm, recognized by repeated non-binding United Nations'
resolutions, to the status of an evolving general principle of international
law. 1 45  The recipient states further argue that the World Bank and the
44. Developing countries point out that human rights abuses are just as prevalent in
developed countries as in developing countries, and that using the World Bank to enforce human
rights will only mean that developing countries will be subject to the scrutiny of the Bank, while
developed countries will be free to abuse human rights as they wish, unmonitored. Some of the
examples given illustrating human rights abuses in developed countries are: In Australia,
Aborigines comprise about 1.8% of the total Australian population, approximately 300,000
individuals, who are not only under-represented in the political process, but also ill-treated. See
Theresa Simpson, Claims of Indigenous People to Cultural Property in Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand, 18 HASTINGS INT'L COMP. L. REV. 195, 204-205 (1994); Australian PM Pledges
Better Aborigine Treatment, Reuter Libr. Rep., Dec. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, World File. For historical view of the Australian's treatment of Aborigines, see
RICHARD BROOME, ABORIGINAL AUSTRALIANS: BLACK RESPONSE TO WHITE DOMINANCE,
(1788), (George Allen & Unwin 1982).
In Japan, it has been said, "Japan is more or less a democracy for ethnic Japanese, but
is not so great for ethnic Koreans or other minorities." See Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P.
Miller, The End of History and the New World Order: The Triumph of Capitalism and
Competition Between Liberalism and Democracy, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 277, 282 (1992).
There are an estimated 677,000 Koreans in Japan who are not only deprived of participating in
Japanese democracy, but are also discriminated against by native-born Japanese. See William H.
Lash III, Unwelcomed Imports: Racism, Sexism, and Foreign Investments, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L,
8 (1991). For a history of Japanese treatment of Koreans in Japan, see Changsoo Lee, Koreans
in Japan: Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation, Univ. of Calif., Berkeley Press (1981).
In the United States, despite their alleged autonomy, Native Americans are not only
discriminated against, but for the most part, severely under-represented in the American
democratic process and deprived of basic human rights. For a history and evaluation of the
status of Native Americans, see STUART LEVINE AND NANCY OESTREICH LURIE, THE
AMERICAN INDIAN TODAY, (Everett Edwards, Inc. Florida, 1968); DALE VAN EVERY,
DISINHERITED: THE LOST BIRTHRIGHT OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN (1966).
45. Moller, supra note 24, at 493. The World Bank senior counsel acknowledged that the
right to development is a "third generation" human right. See Aly Abu-Akeel, World Bank
Perspectives, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 552-3 (1985). However, some scholars argue that third
generation human rights are considered soft rights and differ from the "traditional" human rights
included in the International Declaration of Human Rights because they include such rights as the
rights to development, environment, peace, and participation. See Rajagopal, supra note 6, at 84
n. 11, 96. The recipient countries cite a number of international instruments in support of their
assertion that they are entitled to the right of development. Among these instruments is Article I,
paragraph 3 of the U.N. Charter that states that the purpose of the United Nations is "to achieve
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donor nations not only have an obligation to extend economic aid for the
economic exploitation that took place during the colonization period,'4 but
also that any withholding of aid that is justified on grounds of human rights
is a violation of the recipient countries' right to develop."' Finally, the
recipient nations argue that tying economic aid with human rights is a
international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or
humanitarian character . . . ." U.N. CHARTER, art. I, para 3; The International Covenant of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which articulates the right of development in various
articles such as the right to work and to work in "just and favorable" conditions, id. art. 7; the
right to social security, id. art. 9; the right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of physical
and mental health, id. art. 12; the right to an education, id. art. 13; and everyone's right to
enjoy cultural life and the benefits and applications of scientific progress id. art. 15. In
particular, article 11 recognizes the right "of everyone to an adequate standard of living for
himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and the continuous
improvement of living conditions and the fundamental right to be free from hunger." U.N.
CHARTER art. 11.
Under Article 4, State Parties "may subject such (economic, social, and cultural) rights only
to such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the
nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare of these
rights." See ICESCR, Dec. 16, 1986, art. 4, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. (1966); Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217 A (Ill), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71, arts. 17, 22-
26 (1948), (recognizing such rights as the right to own property, to work and receive just pay, to
receive social security, and to receive free education). Article 25 specifically states that
"everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself
and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social
services . Id.
In addition, the United Nations' Declaration on the Right to Development states in part that:
1) The human person is the central subject of development and should be the active
participant and beneficiary of the right to development.
2) All human beings have a responsibility for development, individually and
collectively, taking into account the need for full respect of their human rights and
fundamental freedoms as well as their duties to the community, which alone can ensure
the free and complete fulfillment of the human being, and they should therefore
promote and protect an appropriate political, social and economic order for
development.
3) States have the right and duty to formulate appropriate development policies that
aim at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all
individuals, on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in
development and in the fair distribution of the benefits resulting therefrom.
See The United Nations' Declaration on the Right to Development, UNGA Res. 41/128, art. 2.
(1986).
46. For a full analysis of this argument, see Seymour J. Rubin, Most Favored Nation
Treatment and the Multilateral Trade Negotiations: A Quiet Revolution, 6 INT'L TRADE L.J.
221, 225 (1980-81) (presenting the developing nations' argument that special treatment is needed
for their weakened economies due to long periods of dependency and the effects of colonialism);
"Consessional aid from the rich, often demanded as a matter of right, is regarded by developing
nations as an inadequate recompense for past injuries." Rubin, infra note 54, at 87.
47. Id.
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conspiracy by the World Bank and the developed countries, aimed at
depriving recipient nations of the right to genuine development.4 8
B. Using the World Bank to Enforce and/or Monitor Human Rights
is Detrimental to the Parties and the Process
Recipients of the World Bank aid argue that tying the Bank's
economic aid to human rights is detrimental to all parties involved, namely
the recipient nations,49 the donor nations,-° and the World Bank itself.
As for the recipient countries, the argument is made that the World
Bank's withholding of economic aid, due to human rights abuses, is likely
to hurt the people rather than the governments," and that due to the
dependency those countries have on the World Bank loans, withholding of
those loans (for human rights reasons) will likely cause economic
stagnation in those countries. That, in turn, will cause an increase in
human rights abuses since there is a positive correlation between poverty
and human rights abuses. 2 That is the greater the level of poverty in a
particular country, the greater the possibility that human rights abuses will
be found in that country. In addition, recipient countries argue that
48. See THE BRANDT COMM'N (INDEPENDENT COMM'N ON INT'L DEVELOPMENT
ISSUES), NORTH-SOUTH: A PROGRAM FOR SURVIVAL (1980) (assessing the thesis that the ills of
the developing nations stem from their exploitation by developed nations). Under this view, if
the terms of a structural adjustment loan cause significant economic suffering, deprive an
individual of adequate food, clothing, housing, employment, or subject the individual to
inadequate living conditions, the terms of the loan are in violation of the individual's right to
development. Moller, supra note 24, at 497. The developing nations seek to end their
dependency on the developed world through fundamental structural changes in international
institutions and political power structures. See Mark Ewill Ellis, The New Industrial Economic
Order and General Assembly Resolutions: The Debate over the Legal Effects of General
Assembly Resolutions Revisited, 15 CAL. W. INT'L J. 647, 648 (1985) (discussing the South's
attempts to structurally change international organizations); R. Rothstein, Global Bargaining:
Unctad and the Quest for a New INT'L ECON. ORDER, 15, 240-80 (1979) (defining this dispute
in the context of the positions of the developing countries and the developed countries).
49. By recipient nations we mean those nations that receive loans and economic assistance
from the World Bank.
50. By donor nations we mean those nations that donate money to the World Bank in
exchange for shares.
51. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REP. XVI, XVIII (1994). Perhaps the most
vivid example of this is the economic blockade against Iraq which was proven to be detrimental
to the Iraqi people. It has been estimated that about one million Iraqi children have died since
1990 when an economic blockade was put on Iraq after the Gulf war. See Carol Hartman,
Sanctions Don't Hurt Saddam in Iraq: Nearly One Million Children Have Died Because of
Sanctions since 1990, Says a UW-Madison Professor, WISC. ST. J., 1997, at IC; Dilip Hiro,
Iraq: Oil income, Too Little, Too Late?, INTER PRESS SERVICE (1997), at 1.
52. See THE BRANDT COMM'N (INDEPENDENT COMM'N ON INT'L DEVELOPMENT
ISSUES), COMMON CRISIS: NORTH-SOUTH COOPERATION FOR WORLD RECOVERY 260-83
(1983) (highlighting the positive correlation between poverty and human rights abuses).
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economic development is necessary before human rights can be fully
developed and protected,53 and that "civil and political rights are robbed of
significance unless there preexist social and economic human rights ....
[A] necessitous man is not a free man."4 Thus, the recipient nations
argue, withholding development aid will only hurt people and slow down
the journey of economic recovery which is destined to lead to full
enjoyment of human rights.
As for the donor countries, the argument is made that withholding
economic aid from developing countries, due to violations of human rights,
will be detrimental to donor countries as well. The argument goes as
follows: Economic aid to developing countries (who are known for having
large, untapped markets and an abundance of natural resources) serves to
stimulate the economies of those developing countries, and that, in turn,
enables developed countries (who are donor countries), to infiltrate the
markets in developing countries. Withholding any aid will have the
opposite effect, and the donor countries will lose potentially large markets,
and that, in turn, will affect the economy of the donor countries and cause
its stagnation." Furthermore, due to the fact that there is a limited number
of large donor countries with significant voting power in the World Bank,
developing countries will likely view any decision to suspend aid as a
decision articulated by those countries, and thus, they will likely refuse to
deliver natural resources to donor countries, which in turn, could hurt the
economies of the donor countries."
Advocates of this argument point to a recent example to support
their stand. They state that despite the atrocious human rights' abuses in
China and the well-publicized massacre in*Tianenmen Square, the World
Bank and the United States have nevertheless positioned China as the
highest aid recipient country, due to the potential economic benefits to be
had once the large Chinese market is infiltrated.57 As for the World Bank
itself, arguments have been made that there will be disastrous effects on
the World Bank if it tries to tie human rights with development loans. Put
simply, allowing the World Bank to examine other non-economic factors
(like human rights) in its loan decisions will transform the Bank from a
53. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REP. XVI, XIII (1994) (examining and responding
to the argument that economic development is a prerequisite to a full human rights protection).
54. Seymour J. Rubin, Economic and Social Human Rights and the New International
Economic Order, 1 AM U.J. INT'L L & POL'Y 67, 82 (1986).
55. For an overview of this argument, see Okuizumi, supra note 5, at 391-95.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 393. Despite the obvious human rights abuses in China, it still enjoys the status
of the most favorite trade partner with the United States See Mike Jendrzejczyk, Human Rights
and Most Favorite Nation for China, 1996 WL 10165077; China also is the 1996 highest
recipient of World Bank aid. See WORLD BANK, 1996 ANN. REP., § V.
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respected international financial institution to a political institution that is
likely to be used as a political weapon for purposes of political gains.m
"We cannot ignore the fact that the World Bank is a development financing
institution, and it should not become a tool for political games among its
members; that would be to the detriment of all its members." 9 And there
is a limit to institutional elasticity, i.e. the extent to which institutions are
created and still used for other purposes in order to get them to perform
human rights functions, especially when these functions are accomplished
at the expense of their manifest functions. Institutions simply cannot do
everything we think they are capable of, if this requires them to move too
far from their manifest mandate. ,0
C. Using the World Bank to Enforce and/or Monitor Human Rights
is Impractical
Opponents of the idea of the World Bank's involvement in human
rights argue that such an idea is impractical on several grounds. First,
they point to the irony of having an institution like the World Bank, which
itself is being accused of violating human rights, suddenly become a human
rights enforcer and/or monitor. And, in that the World Bank has a
"history" of funding projects that involve human rights abuses, "the
likelihood is high that human rights abuses will continue to occur in at least
some World Bank projects. "61 An example of this is the World Bank's
financing of the Kedung Ombo Dam project in Indonesia, which led to
extreme human rights abuses in the form of forced resettlement by the
Indonesian government, 2 and the financing of family planning programs in
58. Lutz, supra note 10, at 61-63.
59. Id. The argument further continues that there cannot be a stretch of World Bank
objectives to include non-economic factors such as human rights, since that will undermine the
Bank's effectiveness as an international economic institution, and that there is a limit as to the
"institutional elasticity" of the Bank, and that limit operates to maintain the Bank's credibility in
the world's financial affairs. Id.
60. Thomas Hutchins, Using the International Court of Justice to Check Human Rights
Abuses in the World Bank Projects, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 487, 496 (1992).
61. Id. at 489-97.
62. Michael Reisman, Through or Despite Governments: Differentiated Responsibilities in
Human Rights Programs, 72 IOWA L. REV. 391, 395 (1987). In 1985 the World Bank approved
a loan for $156 million to the Republic of Indonesia for the construction of the Kedung Ombo
multipurpose dam. The total project cost $283 million. The Kedung Ombo dam, officially
completed on January 14, 1989, produces 22.5 megawatts of electricity a year, stores sufficient
water to irrigate between 57,000 and 62,000 hectors during the dry season, and prevents floods
during the rainy season. The dam project required the resettlement of 5,390 families in 37
villages, or about 25,000 people. The dam inundated 4,363 hectors of privately-owned land,
1,500 hectors of national forest and 304 hectors of land the Indonesian government owned, for a
total of 6,167 hectors. On January 14, 1989 the Indonesian government declared the Kedung
Ombo dam officially completed and closed its gates, yet a large number of people remained in
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developing countries, which led to human rights abuses in the form of
coercing young families not to have children.63
the area to be submerged by rising waters in the months to come. Estimates of the people
remaining ranged from almost 9,000 to more than 12,000. The people who refused to evacuate
did so chiefly because they felt that the Indonesian government had failed to compensate them
properly for their land. They felt that the government either had set too low a price, had not
negotiated properly, or had refused to allocate land to them which was comparable in size and
quality and close in proximity to the land they lost.
The Indonesian government engaged in a program of intimidation to force those who
remained in the area to leave. Some intimidation took the form of physical abuse of those who
refused to accept the government's compensation. One reputed victim of such abuse reported his
story to the Indonesian weekly magazine Tempo as follows:
[The old man, a grandfather] received an order to report to the local military
headquarters. He was filled with fear. And with good reason: the five soldiers who
interrogated him roughed him up. "My head was jerked back," the father of seven
children said. Next, a soldier slapped him in the face. This little drama.. .he said,
took place in front of and was witnessed by the government district head .... After
he was slapped . . . [his] courage failed. He immediately put his thumb print on a
release form and signed over his house and surrounding lot of 2,700 square meters for
monetary compensation of 1.5 million rupees . . . Some intimidation took the form of
death threats and threats of extended prison sentences: Local government officials
frightened villagers who refused to accept compensation by telling them they would be
killed under a government program for eliminating hardened criminals, or put in jail
for 13 years. Coupled with the death threats, units of the Indonesian security agency
BAKORI would go in the middle of the night to the homes of those who refused to
sign over their land, awaken them by pounding on their doors, order them outside to
answer questions, and then force them to sign compensation agreements. For a full
account of what happened in the Kedung Ombo Dam project.
Id.
Between the years of 1980 to 1986, the World Bank has financed an estimated 144 projects
around the globe that caused various forms of forced settlement of the locals. See CHARLES
ESCUDERO, INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD BANK ASSISTED PROJECT 18-21
(1988).
The World Bank has admitted that it made mistakes in regards to its resettlement policies
and the human rights abuses associated with it. See Shahid Husain, Vice President of Operations
Policy for the World Bank, Operations Policy Note 10.08, Operations Policy Issues in the
Treatment of Involuntary Resettlement in Bank-Financed Projects (Oct. 10, 1986) [hereinafter
Policy Note 10.08]. "The Bank has sometimes not applied the policy and its related operational
procedures with adequate rigor, and issues have remained regarding the resettlement policies,
laws and practices of borrowers." Id. para. 3. "Supervision by the Bank of the implementation
of resettlement operations must be made more effective." Id. para. 6. Policy Note 10.08
stresses that the Bank has the duty not to make those mistakes: "it is essential that the Bank's
own approach set an example of how these (resettlement) issues should be addressed and that
Bank policies be applied to Bank-financed operations faithfully and effectively." Id. para. 3. "It
is not acceptable to leave unexplored or unimplemented reasonable measures to prevent those
dislocated from becoming temporarily or permanently impoverished." Id. para. 5. "It is
essential that the Bank's supervision of resettlement work be both diligent and effective." Id.
para. 9.
63. In Indonesia, for example, the World Bank "has supported five consecutive population
projects, totaling 211.8 million U.S. dollars," and these projects were characterized as including
.coercive practices" for population control. For a full account of those projects and their impact
on human rights, see In the Name of Development, supra note 62, at 105-34.
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Second, it is impractical to use the World Bank to enforce and/or
monitor human rights since neither the Bank nor its staff have the
necessary experience to perform such a complex role." The World Bank is
staffed mainly by economists. "They are there to play with numbers; they
are not there to make policy . . . . [I]t is a forlorn hope to expect that
economists will become sensitive to human rights issues."65 The World
Bank is not well-equipped, nor does it possess the expertise to play the role
of human rights advocate."6
Finally, it is impractical to use the World Bank to enforce and/or
monitor human rights abuses since the Bank lacks an effective monitoring
and enforcement mechanism.'" Once the Bank has given a loan to a
developing country, there is an "absence of a meaningful monitoring
system." 1 The World Bank's own 1992 report concluded that "little is
done to monitor the ultimate impact of Bank projects on recipient
countries."6 9 For all of the above-mentioned reasons, opponents of the
World Bank's involvement in human rights argue that the World Bank
should disentangle itself from human rights issues.
IV. THE CASE FOR THE WORLD BANK'S MONITORING AND/OR
ENFORCING HUMAN RIGHTS ACROSS THE GLOBE
Proponents of the idea that the World Bank should play an active
role in human rights point out that such a role is legal, beneficial and
practical.
A. Using the World Bank to Enforce and/or Monitor Human Rights
is Legal
Proponents argue that using the World Bank to enforce and/or
monitor human rights is legal for various reasons. To begin with, although
Article IV of the World Bank's Articles of Agreement prohibits the Bank
from considering political factors in its loan decisions,", "an analysis of the
Bank's articles reveals that it is empowered to incorporate human rights
64. Lutz, supra note 10, at 52.
65. Id.
66. Escor-r REID, STRENGTHENING THE WORLD BANK, 169 (Adlai Stevenson Institute,
Chicago 1973).
67. Cahn, supra note 10, at 183.
68. Id.
69. Id. (citing World Bank, Portfolio Management Task Force, Effective Implementation:
Key to Development Impact (July 24, 1992) (Discussion Draft)). This report clearly highlights
the Bank's failure to implement effective monitoring mechanisms once the loans were given. See
id. at IV.
70. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 17, art. IV, § 10.
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factors into lending policies[.] Indeed, human rights fall beyond the
purview of article IV's political activity provision."" That is because
human rights not only political activities,7 but also some human rights have
been recognized as jus cogens by various international players, including
the International Court of Justice,' 3 international scholars'7 4 and the United
Nations .7  That, in turn, means that the World Bank "cannot hide behind
Article IV of its Articles of Agreement, and avoid human rights issues in
its loan decisions. In addition, as a specialized agency of the United
Nations and the Bank, the World Bank is obligated to cooperate with the
United Nations in the area of human rights .76 The relationship agreement
between the World Bank and the United Nations sets forth certain
mechanisms to achieve cooperation between the Bank and the United
Nations to implement the United Nations' objectives, including respect for
71. Marmorstein, supra note 9, at 124.
72. "When we are talking about a much more constructive approach to human rights, we
have to come back and argue quite clearly that human rights are not political, that they are
matters of international law." Lutz, supra note 10, at 54.
73. In Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd., the I.C.J. referred to the
fundamental nature of human rights by stating that,
[i]n view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal
interest in their protection: they are obligations erga omnes. Such obligations derive,
for example, in CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, from the outlawing of acts of
aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic
rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial
discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered into the
body of general international law . . . others are conferred by international instruments
of a universal or quasi-universal character.
Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Company, Ltd, 1970 I.C.J. 4, 33. (Feb. 5)
74. See Bilder, The Status of International Human Rights Law: An Overview, INT'L HUM.
RTS. L. & PRAC. 1, 3 (1978).
75. The preamble of the U.N. Charter states that "we the peoples of the United Nations
(are) determined . . .to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights . . . ." U.N. CHARTER
preamble. Article 55 of the Charter also states that "the United Nations shall promote: ...
universal respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." Id. In addition, the United Nations has
drafted a large number of declarations and resolutions that stressed the fundamental nature of
human rights, among these the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1952
Convention on the Political Rights of Women, the 1959 Declaration on the Rights of the Child,
the 1963 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 1966
International Covenants on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political
Rights, the 1971 Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, the 1975 Declaration
on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms
of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. UNIFO, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS: 1948-1982 (1983). See MARK W.
JANIS, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 248-49 (1993).
76. Marmorstein, supra note 9, at 130-33.
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human rights. 7 The World Bank's refusal to consider human rights factors
in its loan decisions will mean that the Bank not only breached its
agreement with the United Nations, but also violated international law.
Also, the United Nations' Charter explicitly states that "in the event of a
conflict between the obligation of the members of the United Nations under
the present charter, and its obligation under any other international
agreement, its obligation under the present charter shall prevail." 7  That,
in turn, means that the World Bank's donor states are obligated by the
United Nations' Charter to disregard any obligation under the Bank's
Articles of Agreement, which conflict with the objectives and goals of the
United Nations, and since one of the most important goals of the United
Nations is to promote the respect for human rights and to stop human
rights abuses around the globe, the donor states of the World Bank are
obligated to consider human rights factors in any loans made by the Bank
to developing countries.79 This is due, in part, to the fact that World
Bank's donor states, as well as all other state members of the World Bank,
act as states, not as representatives, of the World Bank.80
In addition, proponents argue, the World Bank's considerations of
human rights factors in its loan decisions does not amount to interference
with the sovereign integrity of the borrowing states. That is because the
77. Id. at 132. The U.N. IBRD Relationship Agreement, provides the mechanism for
cooperation on the human rights front. For example, Article II of the Agreement provides:
1) Representatives of the United Nations shall be entitled to attend, and to
participate without vote in, meetings of the Board of Governors of the Bank.
Representatives of the United Nations shall be invited to participate without
vote in meetings especially called by the Bank for the particular purpose of
considering the United Nations point of view in matters of concern to the
United Nations.
2) Representatives of the Bank shall be entitled to attend meetings of the
General Assembly of the United Nations for purposes of consultation.
3) Representatives of the Bank shall be entitled to attend, and to
participate without vote in, meetings of the committees of the General
Assembly, meetings of the Economic and Social Council, of the
Trusteeship Council and of their respective subsidiary bodies, dealing
with matters in which the Bank has an interest.
IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 17, art. II.
Article V states: [t]he United Nations and the Bank will, to the fullest extent practicable
and subject to paragraph 3 of article 1, arrange for the current exchange of information and
publications of mutual interest, and the furnishing of special reports and studies upon request. Id.
78. U.N. CHARTER art. 48 (2).
79. Escott, supra note 66, at 166.
80. See IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 17, art. I.
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principle of obligations erga omnes allows even states which are not
directly affected by human rights abuses to respond to those abuses. The
principle of erga omnes provides that a state which violates peremptory
human rights norms is accountable to all other states, and thus cannot
claim that its human rights policies are within its exclusive domestic
jurisdiction.' This is because human rights abuses directly injure not only
individual victims of the abuse, but also all of the states in the international
community, and those states have the right and the obligation to stop such
abuse.82
Also, the World Bank's utilization of human rights factors in its
loan decisions does not amount to economic coercion, as recipient states
may argue. A coercive act is defined as an illegal use of force, but here,
"the suspension or withdrawal of aid is not an illegal act."83 It is an act
that aims to pressure human rights violators to comply with international
law that mandates compliance with respect to human rights.' The
International Court of Justice explicitly affirmed that the suspension of
economic aid is not an illegal act that breaches international law."5
Furthermore, some scholars warn that interpreting the use of economic aid
as coercion, or as an illegal use of force will have detrimental
ramifications, since those who are subject to the suspension, or
withholding of that aid might then claim the right to initiate the use of
force in self-defense. 6 This would only serve to lower the threshold of
violence in international relations.
Furthermore, the World Bank's consideration of human rights
factors in loan decisions does not violate the recipient countries' rights to
development, as those states may argue. The right to development, like
the right to self-determination, is a right given to human beings, not to
states. 87 And while recipient states could argue that state development will,
81. Okuizumi, supra note 5, at 375.
82. Id. The same idea was articulated by the International Court of Justice in its opinion
in the Barcelona Traction case, where the court held that human rights abuses concern all states,
and once the international community acts to stop such abuse, the abusing state cannot object to
such an act under any legal grounds embodied in international law. See Barcelona Traction,
Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Beig. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 33 (Feb. 5).
83. Okuizumi, supra note 5, at 375.
84. Id.
85. The Court was "unable to regard such action on the economic plane as is here
complained of (cessation of economic aid) as a breach of the customary law." Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 126 (June 27).
86. BROWN, supra note 7, at 58.9. Article 51 of the United Nations' Charter recognizes
the right to use force in self-defense. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
87. The right to development has been interpreted as being a right of people, not of states,
and such right embodies the following beliefs: 1) The realization of the potentialities of the
human person in harmony with the community should be seen as the central purpose of
1997]
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in turn, result in the satisfaction of the individual's right to development
(since economic prosperity will trickle down to individuals), such an
argument will not stand since "countries have, in fact, achieved reasonably
satisfactory growth rates without simultaneously attaining reasonably
satisfactory standards of living for the majority of the population."" Even
if the notion of a state's right to development was accepted, still, "human
rights should never be sacrificed to development. Rather, development
should serve to promote and protect rights - economic, social, cultural,
civil, and political. Respect for human rights will facilitate development
by bringing about a society in which individuals can freely develop their
own abilities. "" A real and sustained economic development is not
possible without respect to human rights.1°
Finally, proponents argue that the World Bank, by virtue of its
own nature, has the legal power to consider human rights factors in its
lending decisions. Not only does the World Bank's own Articles of
Agreement allow the Bank to consider non-economic factors in its lending
decisions, such as human rights factors, when "special circumstances"
arise, such as, arguably, gross violations of human rights, 9 but also the
World Bank, like any domestic bank, must consider various non-economic
factors in determining the credit-worthiness of a country, factors such as
"country risk" and "country stability," thereby, "a poor human rights
situation which threatens the internal stability could be a significant factor
in country risk analysis."9 The greater a country's instability because of
development; 2) The human person should be regarded as the subject and not the object of the
development process; 3) Development requires the satisfaction of both material and non-material
basic needs; 4) Respect for human rights is fundamental to the development process; 5) The
human person must be able to participate fully in shaping his own reality; 6) Respect for the
principles of equality and non-discrimination is essential; and 7) The achievement of a degree of
individual and collective self-reliance must be an integral part of the process. Report of the
Secretary General on the Right to Development, U.N. Comm. on Hum. Rts., 35th Sess., at 7-13,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.411334 (1979).
88. Seymour J. Rubin, Economic and Social Human Rights and the New International
Economic Order, AM. U.J. INT'L. & POL'Y 67, 92 (1986). United Nations study warned of the
danger of focusing on economic growth in development: Human rights may be submerged and
human beings seen only as instruments of production rather than as free entities for whose
welfare and cultural advance the increased production is intended. See U.N. Doc.
E/3347/Rev.1, para. 90 (1960). Perhaps one of the classic examples of this theory is the case of
Thailand. Despite the substantial increase in economic growth in Thailand, still Thailand
continues to have massive poverty and the distribution of wealth is highly unequal. See Goodno
B. James, Thailand's Malaise: Poverty, THE CANADIAN DIMENSION May-June 1994, at 40.
89. Okuizumi, supra note 5, at 384-85.
90. Stirling, supra note 1, at 12.
91. Levinson, supra note 10, at 49-50. The World Bank's own Articles of Agreement
provide that the Bank could consider non-economic factors in its loan decisions when there are
special circumstances warranting such action. See World Bank Articles of Agreement, art. 5.
92. Marmorstein, supra note 9, at 127-28.
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human rights abuses, the greater the risk the Bank will have to take in
deciding to extend loans to that country. Thus, the World Bank has the
implied power to consider human rights factors in its lending decisions, as
does any domestic bank when it considers the risk factors of a particular
borrower.
B. Using the World Bank to Enforce and/or Monitor Human Rights
is Both Practical and Beneficial
Proponents argue that considerations of human rights factors by the
World Bank, in its lending decisions, is beneficial since such
considerations will "enable the Bank to ensure that its resources do not
assist governments to circumvent human rights-motivated economic
sanctions, or contribute themselves to human rights deprivations." 9 In
addition, such considerations will have the profound, tangible benefits of
"alleviating present suffering, and paving the way for future improvement"
in the area of human rights.2 Furthermore, proponents argue that such
considerations will be beneficial for the World Bank itself in that they will
change the static nature of the Bank and inspire the Bank to consider and
participate in the relevant issues of the time, such as human rights.1 "The
Bank will need to make adjustments and accommodations to changed
circumstances in order to remain relevant to the problems and needs of its
members. "9
In addition, proponents argue that it is practical to use the World
Bank to monitor and/or enforce human rights. This is due not only to the
fact that the World Bank has tremendous influence on developing countries
(as a result of its lending ability), but also because "there is a growing
realization that the solutions to global-economic problems are inextricably
linked with the remedies to many human rights violations, "7 and that the
multilateral, and the universal nature of the World Bank will go a long way
toward complying with various United Nations resolutions which mandate
that human rights issues "be examined globally." 9
93. Id. at 135.
94. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Human Rights, Development and International Financial
Institutions, 8 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 27, 37 (1992).
95. BROWN, supra note 7, at 246.
96. Id.
97. Rajagopal, supra note 6, at 83.
98. See Alternative Approaches and Ways and Means Within the United Nations System
for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, G.A. Res.
130, 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 45 at 150-518 U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977); Commission on
Human Rights, Res. 7/36, 65 U.N. ESCOR Supp. No. 3 at 164-66, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1408
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V. THE WORLD BANK'S ACTUAL PRACTICES IN THE AREA OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
Examining the history of the World Bank's actions in the area of
human rights reveals an inconsistent pattern of practice. In mid 1960, the
United Nations General Assembly issued two resolutions requesting that
the World Bank deny economic loans to the government of South Africa,
in light of its apartheid policy, and to the government of Portugal, due to
the human rights abuses which were occurring in the Portuguese colonies."
However, the World Bank refused to comply with the two resolutions,
claiming that it was "precluded from considering human rights factors in
loan decisions." 10 In 1972, the World Bank cut off loans to the Allende
government in Chili, citing among other reasons, violations of human
rights by the Allende government.10' Despite the objection/abstention of
the United States 6f America, the World Bank continues to approve loans
(1980) (stressing the importance of viewing human rights abuses as a global problem that
mandates a global solution).
99. In December 1965, the General Assembly adopted a resolution entitled "The Policies
of Apartheid Government of the Republic of South Africa." In this resolution the U.N.
requested "the specialized agencies of the U.N. take necessary steps to deny technical and
economic assistance to the Government of South Africa." The Policies of Apartheid of the
Government of the Republic of South Africa, G.A. Res. 2054 A (XX), 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
No. 14 at 16, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966).
The General Assembly adopted a second resolution entitled, "Implementation of the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries Peoples." Similarly, this
resolution requested the specialized agencies of the U.N. to withhold assistance to Portugal as a
result of its colonization policy. See The Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the
Republic of South Africa, G.A. Res. 2105 (XX), 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) at 16, U.N.
Doc. A/6014 (1966). For an in-depth discussion, see text accompanying notes 40-48, supra.
100. Marmorstein, supra note 9, at 114. The Bank justified its refusal on the grounds that,
[T]he Bank's Articles provide that the Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the
political affairs of any member and that they shall not be influenced in their decisions
by the political character of the member or members concerned. Only economic
considerations are to be relevant to their decisions. Therefore, I propose to continue to
treat requests for loans from these countries in the same manner as applications from
other members...I am aware that the situation in Africa could affect the economic
development, foreign trade and finances of Portugal and South Africa. It will
therefore be necessary in reviewing the economic condition and prospects of these
countries to take account of the situation as it develops.
Statement of IBRD President Woods to Executive Directors on March 29, 1966, in statement of
IBRD General Counsel to U.N. Fourth Committee, 21 U.N. GAOR, C.4 1645th mtg. 317-18
(1966), reprinted in 13 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 728 (1968).
101. See Reports of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the
International Development Association, and the International Finance Corporation, 1972
U.N.Y.B. 315-317.
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to countries which are well-known to have committed gross violations of
human rights. 1w
Yet the World Bank is also funding world-wide projects that have a
direct impact on human rights across the globe.103 These projects range
from giving Pakistan and Somalia loans in order to create work
opportunities for refugees' °0 to providing loans in order to promote the
equal treatment of women in third-world countries. 05
VI. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
With the increasing realization of the importance of economic
factors in international relations, human rights advocates are now focusing
on the notion that economics may be the most effective enforcement
mechanism for human rights to date. In the eyes of many, using the World
Bank is, potentially, the ultimate weapon against the persistent violations of
human rights around the globe. But the probability of the World Bank
becoming an effective enforcer of human rights is plagued by various legal
and non-legal obstacles, as noted above. An effective utilization of the
World Bank's power to monitor and/or enforce human rights will depend,
for the most part, on the Bank's ability to overcome these obstacles. Yet,
there are concrete steps which the Bank could take in an effort to overcome
these obstacles while becoming an active player in the arena of global
human rights.
First, the Bank could amend its Articles of Agreement to clearly
provide for the legal authority which the Bank needs in order to consider
human rights factors in its lending decisions. Second, the Bank could
create a sub-agency with sufficient human rights experience. This sub-
agency would be given the task of evaluating human rights conditions in
borrowing countries. In addition, this task force could be given the
responsibility of examining the potential impact that withholding and/or
withdrawing loans (for human rights violations) would have on the people
residing in those borrowing countries. Third, the Bank should adopt a
consistent policy of lending that would allow withholding and/or
withdrawing loans for human rights violations, regardless of who the
borrowing country is and what economic impact that withholding and/or
withdrawing would have on the international economic order or
international market. Finally, the Bank should abstain from funding
102. See generally United States National Advisory Council on International Monetary and
Financial Policies: International Finance, Annual Reports to the President and Congress for
Fiscal Years 1980-1987; WORLD BANK, 1996 ANN. REP.
103. For a list of these projects, see Shihata, supra note 3, at 48-66.
104. Id. at 60.
105. id. at 57-59.
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projects that have the potential for human rights violations in any form,
including forced resettlement or coerced family planning.
By considering some or all of the above-mentioned suggestions,
the World Bank could become a visible player in the area of human rights,
a role which the Bank is not only well-qualified to play, but more
significantly, a role which the Bank has an obligation to play. At present,
the World Bank is considered a failure when it comes to effectively
advocating for human rights. In addition, more and more people are
becoming enlightened as to the Bank's persistent practice of providing
loans and economic assistance to countries notorious for gross and
systematic human rights violations. With this in mind, it would not be
unusual for citizens to interpret the Bank's actions as an implied blessing
and an outright encouragement of human rights violations in those
countries, a perception which the Bank, itself, would undoubtedly argue.
Becoming a well-established human rights advocate would not only
eliminate the possibility of such interpretation, but also has the potential of
saving many lives and stopping many forms of human misery around the
globe.
Finally, by becoming a human rights advocate, the World Bank
will be able to refine and soften its rigid image in the eyes of the
international community, an image that was expressed by the former Bank
director, A. W. Clausen, when he said that "[tihe World Bank is not the
Robin Hood of the international financial sector, nor the United Way of the
development community. The World Bank is a hardheaded, unsentimental
institution that takes a very pragmatic and nonpolitical view of what it is
trying to do."°0
The World Bank has the promise of becoming the most dynamic
human rights enforcer ever, a role that will undoubtedly benefit the Bank
itself. Yet whether the Bank can effectively utilize such potential is a
question only the World Bank can answer, and so far the World Bank has
not responded.
106. Hutchins, supra note 60, at 514 (quoting ALDEN W. CLAUSEN, BANKING ON THE
POOR 236 (1983)).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Yves Beigbeder, an international scholar, once asked, "If self-
determination is an internationally recognized principle, why does it not
apply to the people of West Iran, East Timor, Tibet, Kashmir and other
territories, as it has been applied to other colonial territories?"' Today,
there are an estimated 140 minority groups around the globe, asserting
their right to self-determination.2 Yet despite powerful rhetoric on behalf
* Halim Moris is a 1997 cum laude graduate of Suffolk University Law School, Boston
Massachusetts. He received his B.S. from the College of Communication at Boston University
where he graduated summa cum laude. Mr. Moris has been an active member of various human
rights organizations and international law societies. Currently, Mr. Moris is employed as a staff
attorney with the Immigration Unit at Greater Boston Legal Services where he represents asylum
seekers and immigrants. Mr. Moris wishes to thank both Professor Marguerite Dorn and
Professor Valerie Epps for all their help and outstanding support and encouragement.
1. YvEs BEIGBEDER, INTERNATIONAL MONITORING OF PLEBISCITES, REFERENDA AND
NATIONAL ELECTIONS: SELF-DETERMINATION AND TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 145 (1994).
2. The most noticeable of these groups are the Koreans, Vietnamese, Ibos, South
Sudanese, Taiwanese, Somalis, Kurds, Armenians, Germans of Romania, Scots, Catalans,
Basque, Bangalis, Northern Irish, French Canadians of Quebec, Welsh, Lebanese, Tibetans,
Bretons, Lapps, Sicilians, Corsicans, Frisians, Walloons, German-speaking inhabitants of
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of nation states, as well as the United Nations, in support of the right to
self-determination, "no state has recognized a right to self-determination
for a group within its own territory." 3  This "paradox of self-
determination" has lead internationalists to question the true meaning of
self-determination in the post cold war era.4 The question often asserted is
whether the principle of self-determination actually grants an affirmative
right to minorities and indigenous people to determine their own destiny,?
or is it merely a case of "a noble word being abused?"6
This paper will attempt to answer this question, placing special
emphasis on current state practices in this area. The paper will be divided
into two parts: 1) an overview that will focus on the development of the
principle of self-determination in the area of international law, and 2) an
analysis that will attempt to address the question posed, with particular
focus on current state practices.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF SELF-DETERMINATION
Although the idea of self-determination is by no means new,
scholars have yet to agree upon the actual source of its origin.7 President
Alsace-Lorraine, Croatians, and numerous Indian people throughout the Western hemisphere.
See James Falkowski, Secessionary Sef-Determination: A Jefferson Perspective, 9 B.U. INT'L
L. J. 209, 242 (1991); Deborah Z. Cass, Re-Thinking Self-Determination: A Critical Analysis of
Current International Law Theories, 18 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 21, 23 (1992).
3. Malvin Halberstam, Nationalism and The Right to Self-Determination: The Arab-
Israeli Conflict, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. & POL. 573, 575 (1994).
4. Nathaniel Berman, Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-Determination and International
Law, 7 WiS. INT'L L.J. 51, 52 (1988).
5. For those indigenous people, the right of self-determination is said to include the right
of internal sovereignty, as well as "the right and power of indigenous peoples to negotiate with
States on an equal basis the standards and mechanisms that will govern relationships between
them." U.N ESCOR, 45th Sess., Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/22,
at 10 (1989). On the other hand, minorities are defined as:
[a] group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a non-
dominant position, whose members being nationals of the State possess ethnic,
religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population
and show, of only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their
culture, traditions, religion, or language.
Francesco Capotorti, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging To Ethnic, Religious and
Linguistic Minorities, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1, UN Sales No. E.78.XIV.1 (1979).
Regarding those minorities, the right of self-determination is said to encompass the right to a
representative government, or even the right to secede, if such group of minorities possesses
certain criteria. See infra, Part II (B) (2). For the purpose of this paper, the words indigenous
and minorities will be used interchangeably.
6. Clyde Eagleton, Excesses of Self-Determination, 31 FOREIGN AFF. 592, 593 (1953).
7. Some scholars attribute the origin to the American and French revolutions. See, e.g.,
Claudia Saladin, Self-Determination, Minority Rights and Constitutional Accommodation: The
Example of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 172, 173 (1991).
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Woodrow Wilson was responsible for elevating the principle of self-
determination to an international level when, in 1916, he included it in his
fourteen points.8 Thereafter, while the League of Nations did not explicitly
mention the principle of self-determination in its covenant, 9 scholars agree
that self-determination was "implicitly embodied in spirit in the mandate
system of the League of Nations as a sacred trust of civilization .... "10 In
1945, self-determination gained strong support from various nation states
who were under colonial rule, and it was eventually incorporated into the
United Nations Charter." By the 1960s, the citing of the principle of self-
determination had become common-place, appearing everywhere from the
International Court of Justice advisory opinions, 2 to the charters of
Others argue that it originated at the time of Greek city states. See Falkowski, supra note 2, at
212. Others argue that self-determination originated in the writings of John-Jacques Rosseau, the
18th century writer. See Angela M. Lloyd, The Southern Sudan: A Compelling Case For
Secession, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L..419, 422 (1994).
8. President Woodrow Wilson, address before the League to Enforce Peace (May 27,
1916), reprinted in 53 CONG. REC. 8854 (May 29, 1916). "We believe these fundamental
things: First, that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live
.... " Id.
9. The League of Nations covenant implicitly acknowledges the principle of self-
determination when mandates are "able to stand by themselves under strenuous conditions of the
modem world." LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para. 1.
Also, in the Aaland Island Case, a committee of jurists appointed by the League of Nations
recognized the existence of the principle of self-determination. However, they found that such a
principle does not include the right to secede and separate from the state. Gregory J. Ewald, The
Kurd's Right to Secede Under International Law: Self-Determination Prevails Over Political
Manipulation, 22 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 375, 378 (1994).
10. Ved Nanda, Self-Determination: The Case of Palestine, 82 AM SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC.
334, 335 (1988).
11. The United Nations Charter provides that one of the purposes of the United Nations is
"to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples . . . ." U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2. Article 55 tracks the
language of article 1 in requiring member nations to promote higher standards of living,
international and cultural cooperation, and universal respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms. U.N. CHARTER art. 55. Implicit reference to the principles of equal rights and self-
determination can also be found in article 73 requiring member nations to assume responsibilities
for administering territories whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-
government, and to recognize that the interests of the inhabitants of such territories are
paramount. U.N. CHARTER art. 73. Finally, article 76 (b) embraces the idea of self-
determination in trusteeship systems. "One of the basic objectives of the trusteeship system is to
promote the progressive development of the inhabitants of the trust territories towards self-
government or independence, taking into account the freely expressed wishes of the peoples
concerned." U.N. CHARTER art. 76 (b).
12. Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21); Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16);
Portugal v. Australia, 1995 I.C.J 90 (June 30). The Portugal v. Australia case, also known as
the East Timor Case, marks the first post colonial case that dealt with the issue of self-
determination outside the colonial context. Although the International Court of Justice found that
it had no jurisdiction in this case, the court acknowledged that self-determination is a binding
principle of international law, a principle which the court described as irreproachable.
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regional organizations,' 3 to a significant number of major international
conventions."
Today, the right to self-determination is considered jus cogens, and
a part of customary international law that imposes binding obligations on
all nation states."I It is considered not simply a principle of international
law, but rather an affirmative right of all peoples.'6 It is seen as a
prerequisite to any genuine enjoyment of any of the human rights.17 But
despite notable recognition of the right to self-determination, there is still a
great deal of disagreement among states, and among international scholars,
as to the scope and parameters of the right to self-determination, as well as
who, exactly, is entitled to such a right.
For some, the right to self-determination is limited strictly to those
individuals who are under colonial rule or foreign occupation.' 8 This is
known as external self-determination, and it gives those under the
13. For example, the preamble of the Organization of African Unity States "convinced that
it is the inalienable right of all people to control their destiny . . . ." Charter of the Organization
of African Unity, May 25, 1963, African States 479 U.N.T.S. 39.
14. The right to self-determination has been incorporated into a number of international
treaties and conventions, for example: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, art. 1, para. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, para. 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5; Declaration on the Granting
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, at 66-67, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960); Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance With the
Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 123,
Doc. A/802 (1970) U.N.; Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE): Final
Act, Aug. 1, 1975, Principle VIII, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292, 1295 (1975). The CSCE's
Charter of Paris for a New Europe and Supplementary Document to Give Effect to Certain
Provisions of the Charter, Nov. 21, 1990, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 190, 197 (1991); and The
CSCE's Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension,
reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1305, 1308 (1990).
15. Laurence S. Hanauer, The Irrelevance of Self-Determination Law to Ethno-National
Conflict: A New Look at the Western Sahara Case, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 133, 153 (1995);
Sam Blay, Self-Determination: A Reassessment in Post Communist Era, 22 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 275 (1994).
16. Scholars point out that self-determination first emerged as a right, rather than a
principle of international law, in 1960, when the United Nations General Assembly adopted The
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which first used
the expression "the right to self-determination of all people." See Catherine J. Iorns, Indigenous
Peoples and Self-Determination: Challenging State Sovereignty 24 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
199, 253 (1993); PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF
MINORITIES (1991).
17. In the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, the collected U.N. Member
States declared that they considered "the denial of the right of self-determination as a violation of
human rights .... " Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, June 25, 1993, para. 2, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 157/24 (Part I) (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1661, 1665 (1993).
18. See Blay, supra note 15, at 275; Gregory H. Fox, Self-Determination in the Post Cold
War Era: A New Internal Focus?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 733 (1995).
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aforementioned circumstances the right to conduct their own affairs
without any foreign interference.' 9 Yet for others, the right to self-
determination is not limited to those under colonial rule or foreign
occupation, but rather, it is given to all peoples, including minorities and
indigenous people who live within the boundaries of an existing nation
state. 20 This is known as internal self-determination, which gives
minorities and indigenous people the right to determine their own destiny.
However, there is disagreement as to the scope of the right to internal self-
determination given to minorities and the indigenous. Some argue that the
right to internal self-determination encompasses the right to secede.2'
Others assert that the right to internal self-determination is merely the right
of minorities and indigenous peoples to have a representative democratic
government chosen through a legitimate political process.22 For the
purpose of this paper, we will examine both the right to secede and the
right to internal sovereignty in our analysis of internal self-determination.
HI. ANALYSIS
A. External Self-Determination
External self-determination is the right of the people to be
independent and free from outside interference.23 This right stems from the
United Nations Charter, which forbids nation states from interfering with
the territorial integrity of other nation states3'
19. HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 49 (1990).
20. Edward A. Laing, The Norm of Self-Determination, 1941-1991, 22 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 209, 248 (1992).
21. Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to
Secede, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 257, 275 (1981); Lloyd, supra note 7, at 419.
22. lons, supra note 16, at 273; The idea of interpreting internal self-determination to
mean a representative Democratic government came from the United Nations Declaration on
Friendly Relations, which declares, in part, that
any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity
or political unity of sovereign and independent states conducting themselves in
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples ... and
thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the
territory without distinction to race, creed or colour.
G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121 (1970); reprinted in 9 I.L.M.
1292 (1970).
23. Henry J. Richardson III, Rights of Self-Determination of People in Established States:
Southern Africa and The Middle East, 85 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 541, 545 (1991).
24. U.N. CHARTER art. 2.
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This right was further embellished by the United Nations
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
People, stating that "the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation,
domination, and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human
rights; it is contrary to the United Nations Charter, and is an impediment
to the promotion of world peace and cooperation. "5 The same notion was
affirmed in various other United Nations resolutions.26 The right to
external self-determination is applicable to both the traditional colonial
context and to any foreign domination of one state over another. This
paper will explore both applications.
1. Traditional Colonial Context
While the external right to self-determination was extremely
popular during the 1960s and 1970s (in Asia, Africa, and Latin America),27
today, claims of a right to external self-determination in the colonial
context are virtually nonexistent. This is due not only to the formal
termination of colonization as we know it, but also to the fact that today,
"virtually all territor[ies] on earth [are] within the jurisdiction of some
sovereign state. "28 Another contributing factor to the current decline in the
number of claims of a right to external self-determination in the colonial
context is the notion that most of the former colonies have accepted the
boundaries as their own legitimate boundaries, despite being drawn
arbitrarily by their former colonial masters. This notion was expressed by
the Prime Minister of Ethiopia at the Addis Ababa Summit Conference of
1963, where the Organization of African Unity was established, when he
said, "It is in the interest of all Africans today to respect the frontiers
drawn on the maps, even though they were drawn by the former
coloni[z]ers." 29 Today, claims of a right to external self-determination in
reaction to the effects of the traditional form of colonization are virtually
nonexistent. However, when we take into consideration the factors of
foreign domination, as well as interference by one state over another,
suddenly the number of these claims begins to escalate.
25. G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961).
26. For example, the U.N. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations declares that subjugating peoples to alien domination is an obstacle to international peace
and the principle of self-determination of peoples is a significant contribution to international
law. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970).
27. WILLIAM R. KEYLOR, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY WORLD (1992).
28. Fox, supra note 18, at 752.
29. Hanauer, supra note 15, at 148.
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2. Foreign Domination
Today, unlike claims of external self-determination in a traditional
colonial context, there is a rise in external self-determination claims
originating from foreign domination of one state over another. However,
the def'mition of foreign domination has been expanded to include
nontraditional forms of domination. Today, foreign domination can be
seen militaristically (such as when troops of one country are stationed in
another country), economically (when one country or group of countries
economically dominates another), and culturally (a concept known to social
scientists as cultural imperialism),30 where one country's culture is imposed
on another.
On the militaristic front, claims of a right to external self-
determination were recently made by various countries, including:
Lebanon, which resents the presence of Syrian and Israeli troops on its
soil;3" Panama, which rejected the presence of American troops there;32 and
the inhabitants of the Japanese island of Okinawa, who demanded the
American troops stationed there to leave, following the rape of a twelve-
year-old Japanese girl.3
On the economic front today, various third world countries are
beginning to voice concern over their lack of external self-determination
due to the economic domination by the developed countries. This
sentiment was, perhaps, most eloquently expressed by Gert Rosenthal,
30. See JOHN TOMLINSON, CULTURAL IMPERIALISM: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION
(1991).
31. Both Syria and Israel maintain troops in Lebanon. See Mark Matthew, Lebanon is
Trade-off for Peace; A Country's Freedom Becomes Non-Issue in Israeli-Syrian Talks, BALT.
SUN, Jan. 4, 1996, at 1A.
32. Since the capture of General Manuel Noriega in December 1989, the United States has
maintained troops in Panama. Today, there are an estimated 8000 American troops stationed
there. The United States has maintained those troops there for the stability of Panama and the
protection of the Panama Canal. See Guy Kovner, Guard Reports for Panama Duty: Local Unit
Builds Schools and Roads, PRESS-DEMOCRATIC, Feb. 28, 1996, at P1; Staff Writer, World
Dated Lines: Plan Would Keep U.S. Troops in Panama, S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 7, 1996, at C24.
33. There are an estimated 29,000 to 47,000 American troops stationed on the island of
Okinawa where the United States has been operating a military base since the end of World War
II. See Cameron W. Barr, Battle of Okinawa; '96: Easing U.S. Presence: Major Base Closure
Unlikely, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 8, 1996, at I; Michael A. Lev, 3 GI's Convicted in
Okinawa Rape: Japanese Court Sentences Each To At Least 6 1/2 Years, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 7,
1996, at 8. For many Okinawans, the presence of American troops on their island is a form of
occupation, and the governor of Okinawa, Masahide Ota, stated that the American bases in
Okinawa "hamper its economic development and are one of the main reasons it remains Japan's
poorest region." See Associated Press, Okinawa Governor Balks, But Bases To Stay, Anyway,
HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 27, 1996, at 19; Staff Writer, The Okinawa Rapists Got Off Easy, But
They Raised Hard Questions About U.S. Presence, BUFF. NEWS,. Mar. 8, 1996, at B2.
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General Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin
America, when he stated:
I think that in any relationship between weak and strong,
strong have assets on their side; this occurs at the national
level in distributive matters and it occurs in international
relations among economically strong and economically
weak countries, and it occurs in the world order ...
Latin America and the Caribbean have to take their destiny
in their own hands and resign themselves to the fact that
we live in an inequitable world and that we have to
function in this world ....
This foreign economic domination, various states argue, can take
numerous forms: a very high level of debt,3 ideologically-based conditional
loans by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank,36 or a
monopoly over technological advances by the developed countries. A
current example of economic domination by monopoly over technological
innovation can be witnessed in Japan's domination over its neighbors in
Southeast Asia, via its strategic control of technology infiltrating that
region.37
On the cultural front, periodically there are claims of a lack of
external self-determination because of cultural domination of one country
over another. A right to cultural self-determination can be traced back to
various international treaties, including the International Covenant on
34. SUSANNE JONAS & EDWARD J. MCCAUGHAN, LATIN AMERICA FACES THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY: RECONSTRUCTING A SOCIAL JUSTICE AGENDA 27 (1994).
35. Id. at 20. Today, for example, Latin American countries pay as much as 40% of their
income annually to service their debt owed to developed countries. On the other hand, Africa's
total debt owed to developed countries has increased by 700% between 1979 and 1984. See
Africa's Submission to the Special Assembly of the U.N. General Assembly on Africa's Economic
and Social Crisis, at 66 U.N. Doc. A/AC. 229/2 (1986).
36. Various developing countries have argued that the policies of the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, of attaching restrictive conditions on loans advanced to
those developing countries, a policy known as structured adjustment programs, only serves to
undermine their right to economic self-determination. As one author puts it, "The loss of
national economic control has been accompanied by a growing concentration of power without
accountability in the international institutions, like the IMF and the World Bank for poor
countries, foreign control has been formalized in structural adjustment programs" JEREMY
BRECHER & TIM COSTELLO, GLOBAL VILLAGE OR GLOBAL PILLAGE: ECONOMIC
RECONSTRUCTION FROM THE BOTTOM UP 31 (1994). For evaluation of IMF and World Bank
loan policies, see JOHN DICKEY MONTGOMERY, FOREIGN AID IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS:
AMERICA'S ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS SERIES (1967).
37. Mark Z. Taylor, Dominance Through Technology: Is Japan Creating A Yen Block in
Southeast Asia?, FOREIGN AFF., November/December 1995, at 14.
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Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights38 and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.39 For example, article 27 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that "persons belonging to
... minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice
their own religion, or to use their own language."40 Today, claims of a
right to cultural self-determination are being made by various groups,
including the French-speaking Walloons of Belgium, who assert that their
culture is distinctly different from that of the Dutch Flemings," and the
German-speaking inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine (France), who feel
justified in asserting a cultural self-determination right based on the fact
that language is one of the most significant elements of any culture.42
While these claims of a right to external self-determination because
of foreign domination (whether militarily, economically, or culturally) are
on the rise, they often fall on deaf ears. The international community, in
practice, has not acted beyond the mere reassertion of the right of people
to be free from foreign domination, except on rare occasions.43
B. Internal Self-Determination
Perhaps more than any other aspect of the principle of self-
determination, internal self-determination has aroused the greatest level of
38. G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
39. G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 56, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
40. Id.
41. Gregory M. Balmer, Does the United States Need An Official Language? The
Examples of Belgium and Canada, M.2 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 433, 442 (1992). The
French-speaking Walloons, of Belgium, constitute about 35% of the Dutch population. They
believe that they are distinct, both culturally and linguistically, from the Flemings' majority. For
a history of the conflict between the Walloons and the Flemings, see James Cerruti, Belgium:
One Nation Divisible, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Mar. 1979, at 314.
42. There are an estimated one million German-speaking persons living in Alsace-
Lorraine, France, whose claim of self-determination is based, for the most part, on the fact that
they communicate in a foreign tongue. See Deutsche Presse Agentur, Unification Makes German
Language A Hot Commodity, SEATrLE TIMES, Mar. 28, 1993, at AS; Rone Tempest, For
Alsace-Lorraine, Fear of Germany is a Thing of the Past Europe: The region has been fought
over in three wars. Now, its citizens say they're content to be on the sidelines as the Continent is
reshaped, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1990, at 11.
43. Perhaps one of the most vivid exceptions is the international community's reaction to
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, which could be classified as foreign domination by militaristic means.
See S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/660 (1990). Where the U.N.
Security Council found Iraq guilty of aggression in its occupation of Kuwait. However, an
argument can be made that the situation in Kuwait is different, since the Iraqi presence there was
an outright annexation, rather than a mere attempt to dominate militarily.
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debate among nation states and international scholars. Today, the vast
majority of claims for self-determination are based on internal self-
determination. The viability of that internal right to self-determination has
clearly been enhanced by the transition to majority rule in South Africa,
and by progress toward resolution of the Palestinian question," not to
mention the recent plebiscite in Quebec, 5 or the call for the establishment
of an independent, all-black nation in North America by the head of the
Nation of Islam, Louis Farakhan."
But despite the high number of claims for internal self-
determination, controversy persists over the true definition of internal self-
determination. The two most common responses are that first, the right to
internal self-determination is merely the right to have a representative,
democratic government. 7 Second, internal self-determination encompasses
the right of minorities and indigenous people to secede from an already
existing state, and form their own independent state.41
1. Internal Self-Determination As The Right To Have A
Representative Government
The practice of assuming that where one finds internal self-
determination one will certainly find a representative government stems
from various international treaties. For example, article 25 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that:
[e]very citizen shall have the right and the opportunity,
without any of the distinctions mentioned in Article 2, and
without unreasonable restrictions: a) To take part in the
conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives; b) To vote and to be elected at genuine
periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal
suffrage and shall be by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free
expression of the will of the electors; c) To have access,
44. Fox, supra note 18, at 734.
45. Charles Trueheart, Polarized Quebec Vote No on Separation: Slim Margin for Unity
with Canada May Gird Nationalists for Another Try, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1995, at AO1.
46. Mr. Farakhan believes that the only way to reach justice for blacks in America is by
"complete separation" by blacks to form their own independent state. See Metro Desk, Louis
Farrakhan, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30,1993, at 6.
47. Iorns, supra note 16, at 273; Beigbeder, supra note 1, at 18.
48. Nanda, supra note 21, at 271; Lloyd, supra note 7, at 419.
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on general terms of equality, to public service in his
country ."
But despite the argument among those who assert that the internal right of
self-determination is limited to the right of having a representative
government, there still exist both theoretical and practical limitations to the
notion of limiting internal self-determination to having a representative
government.
On a theoretical level, there is disagreement as to what a
representative government truly means. Various nation states have argued
that a representative government does not necessarily connote a western-
style form of democracy, and thus, these nations argue that their own form
of government is the true, representative government." For example, the
Russians have argued for over seventy years that a true, representative
government is a Communist form. Also, various African nations have
argued that a representative government "need not be a democratic one.",
On the other hand, East Asian countries believe that "western-style
democracy is not applicable to East Asia."52 Furthermore, a large number
of international scholars agree that a western-style form of government
"has not emerged as a binding, international law, but it appears to be
moving in that direction." 3
Second, even if nation states accepted the notion that a western-
style government is the only way to achieve a truly "representative
government, still, the western-style democracy is based on the idea that
decisions are made by a majority vote, which means that "the interests of
the minority too often are overridden by the interests of the majority.",
Therefore, since internal self-determination is often asserted by minorities,
having a democratic form of government does not necessarily guarantee
those minorities a genuine right to internal self-determination. Today, the
world over, minorities who are living under a supposedly democratic
government are still being deprived of the right to have a representative
government, thus denying them the right to internal self-determination.
49. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 39, art. 25,
(1966).
50. lorns, supra note 16, at 274.
51. Id.
52. See Kim Dae Jung, A Response to Lee Kuan Yew: Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of
Asia's Anti-Democratic Values, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 189 (1994). Former Prime Minister of
Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, had argued that a western form of democracy had failed in East Asia.
53. lorns, supra note 16, at 309.
54. Id. at 310.
55. Id.
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Three cases in point can be found among the Aborigines of Australia, 1 the
Koreans in Japan, 7 and the Native Americans in the United States.m
Yet even if we were able to overcome these theoretical limitations
on the right to internal self-determination as entitlement in a representative
government, some practical limitations still exist that would serve to
undermine such a right. First, in order to achieve a truly representative
government that is the basis for internal self-determination, there must be
free and fair elections which would enable the people, especially
minorities, to elect a representative government. While the United
Nations, on numerous occasions, has stressed the importance of free and
fair elections, 9 nation states have managed to develop various techniques to
56. Aborigines comprise about 1.8% of the total Australian population, approximately
300,000 individuals, who are not only under-represented in the political process, but also ill-
treated. See Theresa Simpson, Claims of Indigenous People to Cultural Property in Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand, 18 HASTINGS INT'L COMP. L. REv. 195, 204-05 (1994); Australian
PM Pledges Better Aborigine Treatment, REUTER LIBR. REP., (Dec. 10, 1992) available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, World File. For historical view of the Australian's treatment of
Aborigines, see generally RICHARD BROOME, ABORIGINAL AUSTRALIANS: BLACK RESPONSE
TO WHITE DOMINANCE 1788-1980 (1982).
57. "Japan is more or less a democracy for ethnic Japanese, but is not so great for ethnic
Koreans or other minorities." See Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, The End of
History and the New World Order: The Triumph of Capitalism and Competition Between
Liberalism and Democracy, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 277, 282 (1992). There are an estimated
677,000 Koreans in Japan who are not only deprived of participating in Japanese democracy, but
are also discriminated against by native-born Japanese. See William H. Lash III, Unwelcomed
Imports: Racism, Sexism, and Foreign Investments, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 8 (1991). For a
history of Japanese treatment of Koreans in Japan, see CHANGSOO LEE, KOREANS IN JAPAN:
ETHNIC CONFLICT AND ACCOMMODATION (1981).
58. Despite their alleged autonomy, Native Americans in the United States are not only
discriminated against, but for the most part, severely under-represented in the American
democratic process. For a history and evaluation of the status of Native Americans, see VINE
DELORIA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1985).
59. See S.C. Res. 968, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/968 (1994)
International assistance to resolve the conflict in Tajikistan "must be linked to the process of
national reconciliation, including inter alia free and fair elections."; S.C. Res. 957, U.N. SCOR,
49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/957 (1994) (calling on parties to Mozambique conflict to base
reconciliation "on a system of multi-party democracy and the observance of democratic
principles which will ensure lasting peace and political stability"); S.C. Res. 919, U.N. SCOR,
49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/919 (1994) (welcoming South Africa's "first all-race multiparty
election and the establishment of a united, democratic, non-racial government"); G.A. Res. 149,
U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 48th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/149 (1993) (stating that
reconciliation process in El Salvador requires support for the "democratization process under
way."); G.A. Res. 150, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 48th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/150
(1993) (urging Myanmar to "allow all citizens to participate freely in the political process ...
and to accelerate the process of transition to democracy, in particular through the transfer of
power to the democratically elected representatives"); G.A. Res. 151, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm.,
48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/151 (1993) (condemning events in Haiti "which abruptly and
violently interrupted the democratic process in that country"); G.A. Res. 152, U.N. GAOR 3d
Comm., 48th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/152 (1993) (urging comprehensive political
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ensure that their elections are anything but fair and free, especially to the
minorities who are living within the boundaries of those states.
First, there is the technique of manipulating the voters' eligibility,
so as to exclude those whom the government does not want to vote. For
example, Cambodia designed its election laws in such a way that they
denied its minority Vietnamese settlers the right to vote. This was
accomplished by requiring, among other things, that at least one parent be
born in Cambodia.60 This very same technique was implemented by the
Namibian government to exclude South Africans residing there from
voting. 6'
Second, there is the technique of forced movement of people in
order to manipulate an election. This can take many forms. In Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the complete expulsion of potential voters from the territory,
known as ethnic cleansing, was utilized. 6 Other forms include moving the
potential voters into another territory in the country in order to stack voter
rolls, which occurred in Morocco,63 and murdering potential voters, as has
occurred in Rwanda."
The third technique used by states to prevent minorities from
electing a representative government is by allowing ballot fraud, such as
allowing people to vote more than once, destroying ballot boxes, and
threatening those who attempt to vote. Perhaps the best example of recent
ballot fraud was during the Haitian election in June 1995 .6 Despite the
active role which the United Nations plays in monitoring these elections,
solution to Afghan crisis based, inter alia, "on the free exercise of the right to self-determination
by the people, including free and genuine elections").
60. Fox, supra note 18, at 764.
61. Id. at 762.
62. Id. at 767.
63. Id.
64. An estimated 500,000 people have been killed in Rwanda since 1994, when the
government, dominated by the Huto majority, orchestrated a campaign to wipeout the Tutsi
minority. See John Dahlburg, U.N. Probers Vow to Identify Rwandan Killers, HOUSTON
CHRON., Sept. 4, 1994, at 31; David Lamb, Rwandan Dead Glut the Waters of Lake Victoria,
L.A. TIMES, May 29, 1994, at 1. For further details of the unprecedented violations of human
rights in Rwanda, See also Report of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights on his
Mission to Rwanda, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Human Rights, 3d Special Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/S-3/3 (1994).
65. The Haitian's June municipal election was riddled with ballot fraud on a very grand
scale. Ballot boxes disappeared, people were registered to vote more than once, and the local
police intimidated voters. See The Americas: Carter Center Criticizes Haiti's Election, S.F.
CHRON., July 22, 1995, at A12; Haiti's Elections Were Riddled with Fraud, THE LONDON
INDEP., July 22, 1995, at 11.
66. The United Nations has played an active role in monitoring various recent elections in
countries like Haiti, Mexico, Cambodia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Romania, Zambia, and
Namibia. For a summary and evaluation of recent election monitoring missions by the U.N.,
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there still remains an embarrassingly large number of minorities
throughout the world who are deprived of the opportunity to participate in
genuinely fair and free elections.
Finally, even if these minorities were able to overcome all of the
above mentioned obstacles and were able to freely and fairly participate in
the election of a representative government, there is no guarantee that such
government would act according to their will.
2. Internal Self-Determination as the Right to Secede
In the post cold war era, virtually all claims of a right to self-
determination assert the right to secede, whether those claims were made
by Chechnyans, Southern Sudanese, Quebecois, or Kurds. Nation states
are quick to point out that minorities do not have the right to secede, since
secession would not only violate their territorial integrity guaranteed them
by the United Nations Charter, 67 but would also be violative of the doctrine
of Uti Posseditis Juris. Adopted by the International Court of Justice in
Bukrina Faso v. Republic of Mali,61 Uti Posseditis Juris requires the respect
of the pre-established borders and frontiers. On the contrary, proponents
of the right to secede argue that the territorial integrity of a state, as well
as the pre-established borders and frontiers, have been arbitrarily drawn by
colonial powers without regard to the ethnic minorities living within
them.6 Proponents also insist that a genuine enjoyment of human rights
must include the right to secede, since "it is for people to determine the
destiny of the territory, not [for] the territory [to determine] the destiny of
the people."70
However, those in favor of the right to secede also point out that
not every group of minorities has such a right, and that each group must
possess the following characteristics in order to qualify for the right to
secede:
1. a pattern of systematic discrimination or exploitation
against a sizable, self-defined minority; 2. the existence of
a distinct, self-defined community or society within a state,
compactly inhabiting a region, which overwhelmingly
supports separatism; 3. a realistic prospect of conflict
See Melida N. Hodgson, When to Accept, When to Abstain: A Framework for U.N. Election
Monitoring, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 137 (1992).
67. U.N. CHARTER art.2, para 7.
68. Frontier Dispute (Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 565 (Dec. 22).
69. Cass, supra note 2, at 32.
70. Cass, supra note 2, at 24 (quoting Judge Dillard in his separate opinion in the Western
Sahara Case, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 114 (Oct. 16)).
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resolution and Reace within and between the new [and] old
state as a result of the envisaged self-rule or partition; and
4. the rejection of compromise solutions on the part of the
central government.7 1
These requirements, however, discriminate against the large
number of minority groups not in possession of them. For example,
Coptic Christians living in Egypt will not qualify since they are scattered in
small numbers across Egypt. Thus, they lack the second requirement of
compactly inhabiting a region. 2  Also under these requirements,
Quebecois, and similar groups, will be deprived of the right to secede
since they lack the first requirement of "systematic discrimination or
exploitation." This is due to the fact that their claim to secession is based
solely on common language and culture.
But even if a particular group possesses all of the criteria required
for secession, such a group would still have to overcome one more major
obstacle, namely, international recognition. While it has been accepted
that there are no binding rules in international law that create an obligation
for an existing state to recognize the appearance of a new state. On the
contrary, recognition that may be considered premature may qualify as a
tortious act against the lawful government; it is a breach of international
law. 73
However, there are some internationally accepted standards that
define when an entity becomes entitled to recognition as a state. For
example, the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States cites
four criteria for recognition. First, a defined territory; second, a
permanent population; third, an organized government; and finally, the
capacity to conduct foreign relations. 7 In addition, the I.C.J. has set forth
additional criteria which must be fulfilled in order for a new state to
achieve recognition.75 But meeting all of these criteria does not necessarily
71. Lloyd, supra note 7, at 432.
72. There are an estimated six million Coptic Christians living in Egypt, constituting ten
percent of Egypt's population, who face constant discrimination and exploitation by the Muslim
majority. See EDWARD WAKIN, A LONELY MINORITY: THE MODERN STORY OF EGYPT'S
COPTS (1963); Mae Ghalwash, Minority Large, But Invisible and Maligned, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 29, 1996, at A17.
73. Igor Grazin, The Rights of Ethnic Minorities: The International Recognition for
National Rights: The Baltic States' Case, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1385, 1387 (1991).
74. Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S.
19, art. 1.
75. These additional criteria were established by the court, in its advisory opinion
regarding the interpretation of the U.N. Charter, article 4, paragraph 1. The court stated that for
the newly emerging entity to be recognized by the United Nations, such entity must "1) be a
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guarantee recognition. Rather, the decision to recognize a new state, in
practice, is often a political decision, often made without regard to the new
state's legal qualifications. As one scholar puts it:
The majority of states blend both law and politics into their
decision to recognize a secessionist movement. In fact,
from the empirical evidence that exists, a strong argument
can be made that subjective political considerations far
outweigh objective legal ones when states decide how to
react to a secessionist claim of independence. There is
little evidence that governments shape their response to
civil war adversaries by reference to legal rules and
procedures but rather shape policy mainly on the basis of
calculations of prudence and military necessity. Because
recognition often has a direct impact on whether a
secessionist movement actually becomes a new and lasting
state, it should not be surprising that other states try to use
the tool of recognition to produce a favorable outcome. 6
History provides a great deal of support for the notion that the
recognition of a new state is, for the most part, a political and self-serving
decision. For example, consider "how the Soviet and American positions
on the right of Eritrea to secede flipped after a pro-western government in
Ethiopia was replaced by a Marxist one.""
In more recent context, some argue that had the Quebecois chose
to secede from Canada (during their recent plebiscite in October 1995), the
United States would have had to seriously consider the question of whether
or not it would recognize Quebec as a sovereign state. "The United States'
recognition of a sovereign Quebec will depend more upon the American
national economic interest than on the legal basis for extending
recognition; the United States is apt to seek Quebec's accession on re-
negotiated terms. 78
Against that theoretical background, it is beneficial to explore the
current state practice with regard to recognition of a secessionist
movement. While the number of secessionist movements across the globe
is considerable (which seem to generate tremendous sympathy within the
state, 2) be peace loving, 3) accept the obligations of the charter, 4) be able to carry out those
obligations, and 5) be willing to do so." See Conditions on Admission of a State to Membership
in the United Nations, 1948 I.C.J. 57, 63 (May 28).
76. Lawrence Frankel, International Law of Secession: New Rules for a New Era, 14
HOUS. J. INT'L L. 521, 533 (1992).
77. Id. at 533.
78. Alison Grabell, New Northern Neighbor? An Independent Quebec, The United States
and Nafta, 2 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 265, 269 (1995).
216 [Vol. 4:201
Moris
international community) ,7 international recognition was awarded recently
to a mere two cases: the Baltic States and the States of the former
Yugoslavia.
In 1991, the United States of America formally recognized the
Baltic States as independent states." Other countries soon followed suit.
During that same year, the three Baltic nations were admitted as new
members of the United Nations. 8' However, the recognition of the Baltic
States was not perceived as a trend-setting event, whereby the international
community would suddenly be willing to recognize secessionist
movements. Rather, the recognition of the Baltic States was described by
President George Bush as "a special case. " ' This is due to the fact that
those Baltic States were independent states and members of the League of
Nations before they were annexed by the Soviet Union in the 1920s. 81
Thus, the recognition of the Baltic States is merely "a recognition of a
limited secession right applicable to illegally annexed territories, rather
than a general right of secession. " '  The same analysis will also be
applicable to the international recognition of the former Soviet Republic in
central Asia, since those republics were also independent states prior to the
Soviet annexation that occurred shortly after the Bolshevik revolution.
The second recent act of recognition of a secessionist movement by
the international community is the case of Yugoslavia. The European
Community formally recognized Croatia and Slovenia on January 16,
1992.91 Four months later, the United Nations accepted the Republics of
Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina as official members. 86  For
some, such recognition is particularly significant because, outside the
colonial context, it represents the first time that a wide-spread international
79. The Iraqi Kurds, for example, gained tremendous sympathy from the international
community during and after the Gulf War. However, such sympathy fell far short of formal
recognition as an independent, new state. See S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d
mtg., reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 858 (1991) (condemning Iraq's actions against the Kurds, and
sympathizing with the Kurd's struggle); Staff Writer, U.S. May Seek Autonomous Kurdish
Region, CHI. TRIB., May 5, 1991, at 19.
80. U.S. To Establish Diplomatic Relations with Baltic States, 2 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH,
Sept. 2, 1991, at 647.
81. United Nations Member States, <http://www.un.org/overview/unmember.html.
82. David Hoffman, Baker Vows Aid for Soviets, Lists Five Principles for Dealings,
WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1991, at A34; Cass, supra note 2, at 33.
83. Lawrence S. Eastwood, Jr., Secession: State Practice and the International Law After
the Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 299, 317
(1993).
84. Id. at 321.
85. Stephen Kinzer, Europe, Backing Germans, Accepts Yugoslav Break-up, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 1992, at A10.
86. U.N. Admits Ex-Yugoslaves, THE ARIZ. REPUBLIC, May 23, 1992, at A14.
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state practice has favored secessionist movements still engaged in armed
struggles for independence." For others, however, such recognition is not
necessarily a recognition of secessionist movements per se. On the
contrary, it is international recognition of "state dissolution rather than
secession."" Such a distinction is crucial, since international recognition of
a new state will depend, for the most part, on the question of whether this
new state has emerged as a result of the disintegration of an old state, or
merely as a result of a meritorious secessionist movement attempting to
secede from an already existing state. While the Arbitration Commission
on Yugoslavia seems to acknowledge that Yugoslavia was actually
dissolving, not that the republics were seceding, 89 some scholars insist that
because this dissolution was marked by many unilateral
declarations of independence, and given the fact that the
socialist republic of Yugoslavia was brought to an end by
only Serbia and Montenegro, rather than by a conference
of all republics (as was the case with the Soviet Union),
this process can be better described as a series of
secessions .... 90
Thus, while there is no clear answer as to whether the new, emerging
states in the former Yugoslavia have emerged as a result of a disintegration
of an old state, or simply as a result of genuine secessionist movements
that were successful in gaining independence, the international community
remains divided as to when a particular secessionist movement is entitled
to recognition.
Finally, even if the secessionist movement were able to gain
independence and international recognition, there still remains the very real
possibility that the former parent state will try to exercise control over the
newly independent secessionist movement. "A secessionist movement
cannot be successful in its internal aim if the parent state retains control
over substantial military forces within the secessionist state, and insists on
having effective control over its policies and laws, even if such control is
only exercised sparingly." 9' A case in point is that of the former Soviet
Republics in central Asia. Despite their new-found independence, Russia
is still in control, both militarily and economically. This situation has lead
87. Eastwood, supra note 83, at 322.
88. Id. at 328.
89. Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission's opinions on questions arising
from the dissolution of Yugoslavia (Jan. 11 and July 4, 1992), 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1497.
90. David 0. Lloyd, Succession, Secession, and State Membership in the United Nations,
26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 761 (1994).
91. Frankel, supra note 76, at 528.
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some scholars to question whether secession is truly the ultimate prize in
the fight for self-determination.91
IV. CONCLUSION
The right of self-determination has long been recognized as an
indisputable prerequisite to any genuine appreciation and enjoyment of
human rights. It is a positive, legal obligation established by customary
international law, multinational and bilateral treaties, including the United
Nations Charter, in addition to various advisory opinions articulated by the
International Court of Justice. It has been advocated for by leaders of
great stature, such as Woodrow Wilson, to more obscure minority groups,
such as the South Sudanese. Yet, despite the popularity of the principle of
self-determination, a great deal of ambiguity as to its scope and breadth
continue to undermine its true effectiveness as an affirmative right for
those who are searching for a means by which to determine their own
destiny and future.
For those who assert external self-determination as a means for
achieving freedom from foreign domination, their screams consistently fall
on deaf ears. State practice has barely recognized self-determination in the
context of economic or cultural domination of one state over another. At
the same time, the end of the colonization era has brought with it an end to
all self-determination claims in the colonial context.
For those who assert internal self-determination as the right to
have a representative government, despite some encouragement from the
international players, they continue to be short changed. Nation states
argue their own form of government is the only true example of a
representative government, or create tremendous obstacles intended to
prevent those minorities from electing their own representative
government, such as the forced movement of potential voters, election
fraud, or even mass murders.
However, those who asserted that internal self-determination
entitled them to the right to secede faced the most challenging obstacles of
all. They not only had the obligation to demonstrate that they fit the
definition of a secessionist movement, but they also had to provide enough
political and economic incentives to other international players to achieve
recognition. Even after recognition has been granted, there is no guarantee
that the mother state will not try to control them once again.
Recent state practice indicates that international recognition of
secessionist movements takes the form of sympathy, rather than true
92. Gidon Gottlieb, Nations Without States, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 100 (1994).
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diplomatic recognition. Over the years, a number of secessionist
movements were able to secede, but failed to gain recognition. Examples
include Biafra, in Nigeria, 3  and Katanga, in Congo. 9 But for those
fortunate enough to earn this recognition (namely the Baltic States and
former Yugoslavian Republics), they are classified as special cases. This
distinguishes them from the classical secessionist movements. For
example, the Baltic States were once recognized as independent states
before the Soviet annexation. In addition, the former Yugoslavian
Republics were, perhaps, recognized not as a secessionist movement, but
as new states that emerged as a result of the disintegration of an old state.
Today, thousands of people are killed in their search for the
illusive goal of self-determination. From Chechnya to South Sudan, and
from Yugoslavia to Kurdistan, their search has lead them to a dead-end
road full of obstacles, resentments and a lack of recognition. But these
people continue to put their lives on the line, hoping that those nobel words
of self-determination amount to much more than political rhetoric. So they
continue to die, hoping that maybe, there is a genuine right of self-
determination.
93. On May 30, 1967, Biafra was able to secede from Nigeria and declare itself the
republic of Biafra. While few African states recognized the republic of Biafra, the U.N. and
most of the international community refused to grant recognition to the republic of Biafra. This
lack of recognition, as well as a bloody civil war, caused the Biafran government to surrender to
the Nigerian government and end its secession on January 12, 1970. For a history of the Biafran
movement, see Eastwood, supra note 84, at 307-10.
94. The Katanga region of Congo declared its independence from Congo on August 4,
1960. The leader of the Katangan movement, Tshombe, asked for both international recognition
and U.N. membership. However, such request was denied. No state recognized Katanga as an
independent state. The Security Council issued resolutions calling for the military assistants to
the Congolese government to take back the Katangan region; Eastwood, supra note 84, at 304-
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I. INTRODUCTION
Citizens of industrialized nations regard health-care as a right.
Japan, Canada, and England have developed and funded national health
programs in keeping with this entitlement philosophy. The United States
government, though stopping short of providing every citizen health-care
access as a right,' has entitled various groups through federally funded
programs. But industrialized nations are no longer filled with ranks of
young workers ready to drive the economic engines that fund national
health-care services.
B.S., Boston University; M.A., University of the Pacific; J.D./M.A., University of
Tulsa. The author greatly appreciates the generous assistance and support of Michael Babiak,
Donna Thompson-Schneider, and Marguerite Chapman.
1. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 (1980). See also BARRY R. FURROW ET AL.,
HEALTH LAW § 12-1 at 537 (1995) (noting that some state constitutions, for example, Article I
of New Jersey's Constitution, may raise health-care to the level of a right for state citizens).
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Demographic changes in industrial nations reveal huge increases in
the number of elderly members of society. As current workers prepare for
retirement, young people must assume the ever more burdensome task of
funding national health-care programs. In the face of a shrinking labor
pool and increasing numbers of retirees, the monumental objective of
obtaining sufficient cash flow to maintain the health-care programs is
unrealized.
Industrialized nations have tailored their health-care programs in
response to the changing socioeconomic landscape, but their actions
provide too little too late. Financial cutbacks and organizational
restructuring change access patterns for every consumer. However, as
costs continue to escalate and populations age, policy considerations
targeting the elderly, begin to creep into the service delivery equation. The
health-care considerations implemented by industrialized nations affect
elderly consumers in increasingly important ways as the ranks of adults
over age sixty-five continue to swell.
This paper describes the health-care options provided to elderly
consumers in four industrialized nations: the United States, Japan,
England, and Canada. The options designed to improve elder care provide
only weak supports which will collapse as the dramatic surge in the
number of elderly consumers overwhelms meager and often disorganized
organizational structures and services. Discussion in Part II introduces
various demographic and social phenomena, which necessitate strategic
development of health-care policies targeted to address elder needs. Part
III describes the health-care systems in effect in the United States, Japan,
England, and Canada and addresses the various policy decisions nations
have advanced regarding elder peoples' access to health-care.
Philosophical arguments about the ethics of service-delivery rationing are
explored in Part IV.
II. DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AND SOCIAL PHENOMENA AND THEIR
EFFECTS ON THE Focus OF HEALTH-CARE
Although the emergence of large numbers of adults over the age of
sixty is not limited to industrialized nations, the aging of western society
carries with it profound social and economic ramifications. 2 Worldwide,
the percentage of total population older than sixty-five has increased from
2. Lloyd Bonfield, Was There a Third Age in the Pre-industrial English Past? Some
Evidence from the Law, in AN AGING WORLD DILEMMAS AND CHALLENGES FOR LAW AND
SOCIAL POLICY 37 (John M. Eekelaar & David Pearl eds., 1989). In the United States, the
emergence of lobbying groups helps elder citizens compete for limited economic resources. Id. at
38. A major focus of groups representing older Americans is securing a significant allocation of
state and federal dollars to perpetuate assistance programs such as health and welfare. Id.
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5.1% in 1950 to over 6% in 1990. 3  Marked differences in the
demographics of aging are apparent between developed and developing
countries.' Non-industrialized nations characteristically have a very small
percentage of elderly people and fertility rates far in excess of those of
industrialized nations.' The proportion of the population older than age
sixty-five in non-industrialized nations has increased less than a full
percentage point, from 3.8% in 1950 to 4.5% in 1990. In contrast,
developed countries experienced a rise of almost 5% in the same time
period.6
The aging population of industrialized nations is a recent, sudden
event.' That greater numbers of people live beyond sixty-five reflects the
improved well-being of the entire population., In earlier centuries, infant
mortality was significantly higher and life expectancy shorter than now. 9
Declines in fertility and mortality foretell additional increases in
percentages of elderly in relation to total population.'0  The tendency
towards rapid growth of the elderly cohorts within the total population will
manifest worldwide." However, even into the next century, the proportion
3. Thomas S. Ulen, The Law and Economics of the Elderly, 4 ELDER L.J. 99, 108 (1996)
(reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE (1995)). Judge Posner views the aging
process through the lens of economic theory. Id. at 109. Professor Ulen is a Professor of Law
and Economics at the College of Law and Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Professor Ulen summarizes and critiques Judge Posner's
work.
4. Peter Laslett, The Demographic Scene - An Overview, in AN AGING WORLD
DILEMMAS AND CHALLENGES FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 3, 5 (John M. Eekelaar & David
Pearl eds., 1989) (reporting that the percentage of people over 65 residing in developing
countries is approximately one third the number of elderly residing in developed nations). The
developed countries include Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, France, and
the former Soviet Union. Id. The developing countries include Brazil, India, China, African
nations, and Poland. Id.
5. Id. at 4. Both the actual numbers and the percentage of elderly will rise within the
non-industrialized nations as a function of falling birth rates. Laslett projects that by the
millennium, the proportion of elderly in non industrialized nations, though increasing, will
remain less than half of the share of elderly people residing in developed nations. Id.
6. Ulen, supra note 3, at 108.
7. Laslett, supra note 4, at 7. Laslett cautions that the figures do not take into account
the distinctive social and cultural features of the nations surveyed. Id. Thus, even though aging
itself can be quantified across all cultures, the socio-cultural aspects of each country form unique
contextual milieus. Id. The demographic figures take on different meanings in the various social
settings. Id. at 5.
8. Ulen, supra note 3, at 107 (attributing increases in the number of elderly in the world
population to rising real incomes, better health-care, and a decline in the birth rate).
9. Laslett, supra note 4, at 11.
10. Id. at 4.
11. Id.
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of elderly in the developing nations will remain less than half of the
number of elderly residing in developed countries.'2
Three main trends are directly associated with population aging:
increased life expectancy, altered patterns of fertility, and the feminization
of aging.' 3 These trends can be viewed as interrelated.
4
A. Increased Life Expectancy
Societal viewpoints regarding aging, death, and dying have
changed in light of increases in life expectancy. In the recent past, death
was often an unanticipated visitor. Death at any age was accepted by our
ancestors as one of the unpredictable vagaries of the life cycle." Now,
many people do not encounter the death of a loved one until early
adulthood.' 6  As a result of improved living conditions, individuals in
12. Id. at 5. Projections for third-world populations are expected to rise from 4.0% in the
1980s to 7.8% by 2020. Id. In contrast, the aged populace of developed countries is expected to
rise from 1.3% in the 1980s to 16.7% by 2020. Id. In terms of actual numbers, the world will
have 760 million inhabitants over age 65 by 2020. Id. This figure represents over 9% of the
population. Laslett, supra note 4, at 5.
13. Gunhild 0. Hagestad, The Aging Society as a Context for Family Life, in AGING AND
ETHICS 123, 123-31 (Nancy S. Jecker ed., 1991). The author ties these trends to changes in key
aspects of family life, such as decreased size of the nuclear family, diminished age differences
between siblings, altered patterns of kinship relations, and more predictable death experiences.
Id.
14. Paul Paillat, Recent and Predictable Population Trends in Developed Countries, in AN
AGING WORLD DILEMMAS AND CHALLENGES FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 25 (John M.
Eekelaar & David Pearl eds., 1989). Paillat analogizes the contemporary family to a frail ship
able to withstand the influence of a stormy contemporary environment. Id. Societal notions of
marriage relationships interact with fertility, longevity and migration patterns to impact resource
allocation within particular communities. Id. Paillat regards the dynamic tension between the
factors as contributory to the shift in demographics. For example, the author interprets the rapid
growth of post World War II population as a function of declining morbidity rather than a
manifestation of "genetic frenzy." Id. As successive generations controlled reproduction,
population has become increasingly sensitive to economic and social phenomenon. Id. at 26-28.
In Paillat's view, economic fluctuations alternatively increase or decrease migration. Migration,
in turn, impacts the economic well-being of a particular region. Migratory trends may place
additional demands on the medical, social and cultural infrastructure of a community. Id. at 30,
31.
15. Hagestad, supra note 13, at 124 (characterizing morbidity as "a normal experience in
all phases of family life"). The recent trend is to characterize death which occurs at any point
other than old age as atypical. Id. Death's increasing predictability and its association with
aging removes mortality from everyday experiences. Id. at 125. Death of younger people
becomes traumatic by virtue of its untimeliness. Id. Likewise, for the aged and their families,
death is more likely to mark a lonely transition devoid of the comfortable knowledge that others
have shared this common experience. Id. at 124.
16. Id. at 125. Parents in the early 1900s had a greater than 60% chance of experiencing
the death of a child. Hagestad, supra note 13, at 124. Likewise, children born at the turn of the
last century often experienced the death of either a sibling or a parent. Id. The unexpected loss
of parent or sibling is unusual in current generations. Id. Where in previous times the family's
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industrialized countries are generally able to predict with certainty that they
will attain old age.17
Increases in the number of elderly pose puzzling questions about
the roles of families and institutions. While the bulk of this paper focuses
on broad policy decisions regarding care of the elderly, it is important for
the reader to develop an understanding of the dilemmas individual families
confront regarding elderly access to health-care. Demographic data
indicate that as people live longer, the family unit possesses fewer same
generation members than intergenerational members, who progressively
increase in number.,8  Where three generations of family coexisting
contemporaneously was once the norm, it is now not uncommon to have
four or even five generations existing together.19 These demographic
changes diminish the ability of the family unit to care for elderly relatives,
and it is unclear whether government resources are capable of providing
appropriate support.
B. Fertility Patterns
Changes in fertility patterns influence the size and age structure of
generational demarcations. In contrast to the historical trend for women to
role was to "experience and absorb the shocks of illness and bereavement," the modern family
unit finds the strains of care-giving outside of the common experience of others similarly
situated. Id. Often, adults first experience a family death with the passing of a grandparent. Id.
17. Laslett, supra note 4, at 8 (reporting there is a universally rising expectation of life at
later ages). Laslett informs his readers that the demographic projections derived from survival
curves are representative of global trends. Id. at 11. A survival curve is composed by
examining the longevity of a particular cohort of babies born in the same year. Id. The curve is
plotted on an X axis that reflects the (declining) number of individuals in the cohort and a Y axis
that reflects the age in years of the subjects. Historically, the survival curve dropped markedly
for the first year of life and then descended in a flat, diagonal descent to about the 80 year point.
Id. In the mid-1900s, the initial drop flattened out and the survival curve both lengthened and
crested upward, reflecting a decrease in mortality in the earlier years and increases in survival
rate at the very end of the life span. Id. at 13. This redefinition of the survival curve is known
as rectangularization. Id.
18. Laslett, supra note 4, at 19 (describing the kinship connections of family units in
industrialized nations as "perpetually attenuating"). As an example, the author cites the extreme
case of China. Id. In China, kinship bonding is of primary societal importance. Id.
Traditionally, family support has provided the primary and almost the exclusive means by which
elders receive care. Id. Laslett fears that the drastic declines in fertility China currently
experiences may so attenuate kinship relationships that both societal function and the condition of
the elderly are negatively impacted. Id.
19. Paillat, supra note 14, at 28 (citing data acquired from a longitudinal survey conducted
in France which supports this contention). The study revealed that approximately 20% of 59
year old men in a sample of over 1000 people lived in a four generation family consisting of one
parent (usually maternal), an adult child and a grandchild. Id. at 32-33. Paillat also asserts that
in countries where probable life expectancy is greater than 70 years, two generations of retirees
will belong to the family unit. Id. Specifically, the newly retired 60-year-olds will coexist in
family units with their 80-year-old parents. d. at 33.
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bear many children throughout their adult years, women of industrialized
countries have concentrated their childbearing activities into a more
circumscribed time frame.0 As a result, the proportion of children born to
women over age thirty-five is declining rapidly in industrialized countries.2 1
Declines in the number of offspring change the age structure of
kinship networks by decreasing the number of intergenerational
relationships. As women choose to bear fewer children, horizontal
relationships within each generation diminish. 22 A decrease in the number
of siblings and cousins in a family creates an additional consequence, a
shifting of the numerical balance between the older and younger members
of each generation.23 The diminishing number of young adults carries
tremendous implications for both familial and governmental support
systems. Many governments are restructuring health-care services at the
same time the number of care-givers within each family shrinks. Whether
the family safety net will fold in the face of government cutbacks in health-
care services has yet to be determined.
The redefinition of intergenerational age structure portends a
restructuring of family members' roles. In a reversal of historical trends,
grandmothers are not bearing children concurrently with the onset of their
own children's parenthood.- Instead, grandparenthood signals the
beginning of a life stage which now lacks clearly defined cultural
expectations.25  The ill-defined roles of elders, and their increasing
20. Hagestad, supra note 13, at 123 (reporting that the typical family at the beginning of
the 1900s had four children whereas today's family has two).
21. Paillat, supra note 14, at 25 (contrasting this phenomenon with the frequency of births
in communities where contraception is not practiced). There, fertility is determined by the
frequency of births among females of reproductive age and by the death rate of female children
between birth and reproductive age. Id. at 26. In industrialized nations, where birth control may
be practiced, fertility can be controlled. Id. Several indicators may be used to express fertility
levels. Id. The total fertility rate indicates fertility at one given date but does not predict future
trends related to fertility. Id. at 27. Two additional measures have predictive value. A parity-
progression ration allows investigators to predict how many additional children a woman will
have, given her present number of offspring. The interval between two successive births
measures reproductive behavior. Longer than average intervals demonstrates contraception is
being utilized. Id.
22. There are fewer sisters, brothers, and cousins within each generation. Hagestad,
supra note 13, at 129 (citing the extreme case of family units in China, where the majority of
families have only vertical relationships). Under China's one-child policy, women were
prohibited from having more than one offspring. Id. There are, therefore, virtually no siblings
and no cousins in the present generation of young Chinese. Id.
23. Id. at 129. This is the first time in history that the number of elder members of the
family outnumber the number of children and grandchildren. Id.
24. Id.
25. Hagestad, supra note 13, at 129. Rights and obligations are ill-defined. Today, it is
not uncommon to have grandparents whose ages range anywhere from mid-20s to over 90 years.
Id. at 131. The wide divergence in age fosters role uncertainty. Id.
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numbers, impact the function of the family unit. With decades of life
following parenthood, men and women do not simply raise their children
and then succumb to the frailties of old age. Longevity escalates demands
on the family support system.
Both civic and familial support systems impact the needs of older
adults. Interpersonal relationships link elderly with care-givers and
support systems. Support systems vary along a gender-based dimension.
Many elderly women are divorcees or widows living alone, but the
majority of men over seventy-five years of age live with a spouse. 26 The
gender distinctions are not without important social consequences.
Historically, the family has been an important source of care giving. 27 The
traditional care giving role of the intact nuclear family may change in the
presence of divorce and with the demands of multiple generations of
elderly.28 The costs, both financial and emotional, of caring for two
generations of elders, and potentially for two sets of parents and their
26. Id. at 130 (reporting that 66% of men over 75 years of age reside with a spouse).
Although nearly half of today's marriages will end in divorce, men's patterns of remarriage
increase the likelihood that a second wife will provide support during old age. Id at 137. Of the
population older than 65 years, men remarry with greater frequency than do women. Id. at 138.
As a result of the gender-related variances in patterns of remarriage, the roles of older men and
women differ within the family unit and also in society at large. Hagestad, supra note 13, at
129. The older man more likely than not experiences stepchildren, a second family, and a
marital partnership during the last decades of life. His spouse provides an emotional and
physical support system, and his role as wage earner places him in a situation of relative
economic independence. Id. at 140. In contrast, elderly women face dramatically different
circumstances than their male contemporaries. Females experience more pronounced longevity
than males. Id. at 123. The older woman frequently lives alone; less than 20% of elderly
women are living with a spouse. Id. at 138. Many elderly single women rely upon their
children for support. Id. at 134. Since there is less remarriage among elderly women than
among their male contemporaries, altered fertility patterns impact women's family networks to a
greater extent than they do men's. Id. The choice to circumscribe childbearing reduces the
number of offspring in the nuclear family and sharpens the demarcations between generations.
Hagestad, supra note 13, at 129. Elderly women are often cared for by their daughters. Id. at
134.
27. Id. at 134 (reporting that 80% of elders' constant care is provided by female relatives,
particularly wives and daughters). Men who remarry often lose touch with their children. Id. at
138. Professor Hagestad cites research that reveals that many children lose contact with their
father subsequent to a divorce. Id. at 139. Although there is scant literature on the dissolution
of step-relationships, many remarriages also are terminated. Id. at 140.
28. It is unclear the extent to which family resources, both economic and emotional, will
be exhausted when the.younger generation has to care for two groups of elders. In the 1990s,
wage earning adult children may care for an over 65 year old retired parent as well as a
grandparent of 80 plus years who may be frail as well as elderly. While the older adults may
contribute personal resources towards their care, the young family nevertheless is often
responsible for a large share of the care giving. In light of fertility patterns decreasing the
numbers of siblings and cousins, a trend discussed above, the number of young people available
to assume traditional care-giving functions continues to diminish.
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spouses through remarriage, may tax even an able child with considerable
resources.
In addition to gender distinctions, divorce and subsequent
remarriage redefine familial roles. 29 When men remarry, their contact with
children from the first marriage often declines or disappears." For the
divorced, non-custodial parent, relaxation of family ties, sometimes to the
point of unraveling, alienates the children who form the support system for
an aging parent.', Different problems confront divorced women. Women
frequently experience reduced standards of living following divorce, 2
although, unlike males, they tend to preserve kinship relations.13
C. Feminization of Aging
Simply the fact that women outlive menu4 creates a generation of
elderly women, who look to others for care. 3 Since women tend to outlive
29. Hagestad, supra note 13, at 137. Males age 65 or older remarry at a rate
approximately eight times higher than that of their female contemporaries. Id. at 138. Professor
Hagestad cites a 1980 study conducted by G.B. Spanier and P.C. Glick, which indicates that
women with higher levels of education and greater income are less likely to enter a second
marriage than men with equivalent financial and educational resources. Id. The data suggest a
gender-dependent split in the educational and financial resources available within the population
of single elderly women as compared to the population of single elderly men. Id.
30. Id. at 138 (noting that "divorce and remarriage create more disruption in men's family
networks than in women's. In a study on mid-life divorce, many of the men expressed concern
about the viability of family bonds. About a third felt that relationships with their children had
suffered as a result of the break-up.").
31. Hilde Lindemann Nelson & James Lindemann Nelson, Frail Parents, Robust Duties,
31 UTAH L. REV. 746 (1992). The authors describe the taxing mental and physical fatigue that
results from managing medications, hygiene, nutrition, supervising safety, and emotionally
supporting an aging parent. Id. at 748. For the caregiver, these duties are inescapable. Id. at
749. The care giving routines impact upon other members of the family unit and upon the
relationships the caregivers maintain with their spouse and children. Id. at 748. Employment
and social networks are recast in terms of the filial obligation to care for an aging parent. Id. at
749.
32. Hagestad, supra note 13, at 137. Additionally, the needs of the children do not
diminish in the face of uncertain financial resources. Ulen, supra note 3, at 108, notes that
elderly populations have increased subsequent to a number of factors, one of which is rising real
income. In 1991, 12.4% of the elderly were poor whereas 14.2% of the general population was
characterized as impoverished. Id. Compare these figures to the United States Bureau of the
Census 1992 figures, which classify 12.9% of adults 65 years old or older as poor. Additionally,
a comparison to the figures from the Panel on Poverty and Family Assistance, which was
convened by the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, places the
poverty rate for individuals 65 years old and older at 10.8% in 1992.
33. Hagestad, supra note 13, at 139. "lDlivorce may lead to an intensification of bonds to
grandparents on the custodial side, but to a weakening of ties to the "noncustodial" grandparents.
... [T]he mother often serves as a kin-keeper for her husband's kin." Id.
34. Nelson, supra note 31, at 747 (citing statistical information indicating that women
outlive men by more than seven years, on the average).
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men by almost a decade, the explosive growth in the number of individuals
over sixty-five increasingly recasts health-care in female terms .36 The fact
that caregivers frequently are daughters or daughters-in-law of the patient
adds yet another female dimension to the complex interplay of factors
which influence health-care and the elderly. Although the mother-daughter
relationship has traditionally been a key factor in maintaining elders within
a family network," the changing dynamic of the modem family erodes the
traditional role of the daughter as the caregiver.3 8
In the United States, traditional family-centered care of the elderly
is disintegrating. Societal supports are inadequate to meet the needs of the
burgeoning population of older Americans. Other industrialized nations
have responded to similar demographic trends and social phenomena by
modifying their health-care policies in an attempt to accommodate the
needs of an aging citizenry. As discussed below, the policy supports do
not provide adequately for the escalating numbers of seniors seeking access
to health-care services.
II. HEALTH-CARE SYSTEMS AND ELDERLY CONSUMERS
A. Japan
The Japanese model of health-care provides all consumers with
universal access to comprehensive low-cost medical care. 9 The right to
35. This is not to say that the elderly are absolved of decision making.
36. Nelson, supra note 31, at 747. The number of individuals over 65 has increased eight-
fold since 1900. Id. Health-care policy assumes the tinge of a women's issue because of the
disproportionately large number of females surviving beyond their sixth decade. Id. Creating a
feminine view of the aging question carries with it broader issues regarding the status of elderly
women and the policy decisions made by a power structure not necessarily predisposed to the
needs of the older, female constituency.
37. Hagestad, supra note 13, at 134. Eight out of ten aging mothers reside in the homes
of their children. Id. Over 60% of those children are daughters. Id. When constant care is
provided by a family member, over three-quarters of the caregivers are wives and daughters. Id.
38. Nelson, supra note 31, at 748. The authors discuss the sandwich-generation women
who are squeezed between the demands of their offspring and the needs of their elders. Id. at
749. Cultural expectations that women physically assist elders place working mothers in
incredibly stressful circumstances. Id. The toll of care giving may monopolize the energies of
the care-giver to the point that she "experiences extreme mental and physical fatigue . . . cannot
sleep, loses marital privacy, and often gives up salaried work or switches to part-time work,
despite the repercussions this has on future earnings and pensions." Id.
39. David Wilsford, States Facing Interests: Struggles over Health-care Policy in
Advanced, Industrial Democracies, 20 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 571, 585 (1995). The
Japanese spend less than seven percent of their Gross Domestic Product on health-care as
compared to almost 14% in the United States. Id. But the author cautions that the Gross
Domestic Product may not be the most relevant yardstick by which to measure health-care
expenditures. Id. at 588. Japanese expansion and restructuring of the post World War II
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health-care is rooted in Japan's post World War II constitution.40 Although
access has been a non-issue,4 Japanese incur additional expenses for any
services not offered through the system.42  The system has been
characterized as a complex collection of "loosely connected insurance
schemes."' 3  However, government financial oversight provides an
overarching unity."
The Universal Health Insurance program, Kokuminkai Hoken,
began in 1961 as Japan became a prosperous industrialized country.
Kokuminkai Hoken is composed of three large group plans: Employees'
Health Insurance (Kenko Hoken), National Health Insurance (Kokumin
Hoken), and a special pool, which funds services for the elderly. A
number of small homogeneous units are integrated into each of the three
large group plans." All employed persons and their dependents belong to a
economy has resulted in phenomenal economic growth. Id. Rapid economic growth may mask
fluctuations in certain components of the economy. Id. at 589. See also Aki Yoshikawa et al.,
How Does Japan Do It? Doctors and Hospitals in a Universal Health-Care System, 3 STAN. L.
& POL'Y REv. 111, 113 (1991). Japanese health-care costs are growing by approximately one
trillion yen per year. Id. The escalating costs are considered manageable when compared to
expenditures of other industrialized nations. Id.
40. KENPO, art. 25. See also Wilsford, supra note 39, at 586 (citing W. Steslicke, The
Japanese State of Health, A Political-Economic Perspective, in HEALTH, ILLNESS, AND
MEDICAL CARE IN JAPAN 34, 35 (E. Norbeck & M. Lock eds., 1987). "The right to maintain
the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living. . . (AInd in all spheres of life, the
state shall use its endeavors for the promotion and extension of social welfare and security, and
of public health." Id.
41. Yoshikawa et al., supra note 39, at 134. Only 0.2% of the Japanese who seek medical
care cite access as a problem. Id.
42. Id. at 131. Highly advanced medical treatment examples are use of the artificial
pancreas and Extracorporeal Shock Wave Lithotripsy. Id. Because the rapid diffusion rates of
high technology devices and interventions have escalated costs, the government has limited their
use. Id. at 134. The highly advanced medical treatment system provides reimbursement to
patients for specified high tech equipment only if treatment is obtained in a designated hospital
after authorized institutional approval is obtained. Id. See Dana Derham-Aoyama, U.S. Health-
care Reform: Some Lessons From Japanese Health care Law and Practice, 9 TEMP. INT'L &
CoMP. L.J. 365, 375 (1995). Japanese health-care does not generally cover prenatal care,
childbirth, or preventive-care programs.
43. Yoshikawa et al., supra note 39, at 117.
44. Wilsford, supra note 39, at 586. (describing the broad scope of government
intervention). Legislative action affects the levels and extent of coverage, extends scope of
coverage to uninsured individuals, sets government, employer and employee contribution levels
to finance plans, and establishes nationally uniform drug pricing and service provider rates. Id.
45. Yoshikawa et al., supra note 39, at 112. See also Derham-Aoyama, supra note 42, at
373. Japan, the world's second largest industrialized democracy, was the first Asian nation to
implement universal health insurance.
46. Wilsford, supra note 39, at 587 (presenting an organization of health insurance funds
in Japan). The Employees' Insurance Fund insures general employees at workplaces of small or
medium enterprises who are not enrolled in any other health insurance society. Id. Society-
managed insurance provides benefits to employees' at large enterprises with a health insurance
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small independently administered insurance group.' Each subscriber pays
a premium based upon income and limited by a maximum contribution
cap.u Providers are reimbursed at a prescribed fee-for-service schedule
for any medical services approved by the Central Social Insurance Medical
Council -
The Health and Medical Services System for the Elderly covers
bedridden persons over age sixty-five and seniors over age seventy.
Elderly individuals receive public subsidies and are responsible for only
limited cost-sharing (co-payments). 1  The elderly currently comprise
slightly more than ten percent of Japan's population.52  This group is
society. Id. Day laborers, seamen, teachers, and school employees, railway, and telephone
employees' plans are organized under the Employees' Insurance Fund. d. The Regional
insurance plan insures individuals not covered by employees' insurance such as self-employed,
farmers, physicians and other professionals, artists, and independent small businessmen. Id.
Retirees formerly covered by employees' insurance and their dependents are covered through a
regional insurance provider. Id. For a more detailed explanation of the intricacies of the
Japanese Health Insurance Funds, see also Derham-Aoyama, supra note 42, at 375-77.
47. Yoshikawa et al., supra note 39, at 114. Employee health-care groups evolved prior
to the introduction of Universal Health Insurance. Id. In the 1920s, large corporations were
guided by government to create health-care associations, which financed care for limited numbers
of employees. Id. The Japanese government incrementally expanded coverage, first to blue
collar workers, and then to white collar workers, farmers, fishermen, and other workers. Id.
Efforts were accelerated and extended to virtually all segments of the populace prior to the
Pacific War. Id.
48. Derham-Aoyama, supra note 42, at 376-77 (limiting expenditures to approximately
$3000 per household under the national health insurance plan and setting caps at a fixed
percentage rate of an employee's monthly standard salary in the employees health insurance
plan). See Yoshikawa et al., supra note 39, at 114. The insured must also pay a 10% percent
co-payment for inpatient and outpatient services. The family members of the insured pay a
higher co-payment for the services. Id.
49. Derham-Aoyama, supra note 42, at 377. The Central Social Insurance Medical
Council is a government agency. Id. The Council's decision making impacts national policy
because of its rate setting function. Id. In addition to determining rates, the Council authorizes
services and decides whether to preclude or remove procedures on the current list of
reimbursable services. Id. Chuikyo's determinations have a major impact on both service
providers and consumers. See Yoshikawa et al., supra note 39, at 118, for a discussion of
specific examples where the behavior of the consumer changed when high technology procedures
were listed on the fee schedule.
50. Yoshikawa et al., supra note 39, at 117. The 1982 Health and Medical Services Law
for the Elderly requires the more amply funded Employees Health Insurance societies to
subsidize the elderly. Id. This cross-subsidization lowers the amount of government
contribution and attempts to minimize disparities across insurance plans. Id.
51. Id. at 134. Under the plan, outpatients pay six dollars monthly for services provided
by the plan and an additional three dollars monthly for hospitalization.
52. Laslett, supra note 4, at 5. See also Takatomi Ninomiya, Welfare and Support for the
Elderly in the Community: from a survey in Sumida-ku, Tokyo, Japan, in AN AGING WORLD,
DILEMMAS AND CHALLENGES FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 189 (John Eekelaar & David Pearl
eds., 1989). The Japanese government is reformulating policies that were traditionally directed
at assisting poor elderly citizens. Id. Concepts of autonomy, self-support, and maintaining the
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anticipated to increase over twenty-three percent by the year 2020.-I The
accelerated growth in the numbers of elderly consumers will stress existing
health-care supports.
Like all industrialized nations, Japan's leaders must confront the
future in light of significant demographic changes.m The graying of the
population and shrinking of the numbers of young entry level workers
diminish the tax base which funds the nation's health-care programs.
Despite the massive projected growth in the elderly population, only a
small number of hospital beds currently are allocated for their care."
Since the elderly are a service-intensive sector of the population, the rise in
the elderly census heralds a proportionate increase in medical care costs
through longer stays and deployment of more intensive medical
intervention. Prolonged hospitalizations have been identified as a major
source of inefficiency in the Japanese health-care system.-
Concurrent with the surging population of elderly, notions of the
family as the source of care are eroding. Recent increases in hospital and
nursing facility placements and a rapid decline in the number of elderly
residing with adult children have been noted." The decline of family-based
care is attributed to a number of social factors. Over the past forty years,
Japan has evolved from an agrarian, communal society to an industrialized
nation." Abandonment of a traditional intergenerational communal
lifestyle marks the transition to an industrialized society where resources
family unit underlie government policy. Id. The author rejects the basis of the policy as
"wishful thinking, because the traditional family structure is rapidly declining." Id.
53. Yoshikawa et al., supra note 39, at 128. The rapidity of this change surpasses
anticipated changes in the distribution of elderly individuals as a percentage of the overall
population for all other industrialized nations. Id.
54. Id. Since elderly consumers require more costly medical treatment, the authors predict
that Japan will experience "an unavoidable surge" in health-care costs. Id.
55. Id.
56. Derham-Aoyama, supra note 42, at 379. Patients over seventy stay an average of
three months. Id. The extremely long admissions are attributed to paucity secondary care
facilities coupled with an absence of home care options. Id.
57. Daisaku Maeda, Decline of Family Care and The Development of Public Services - A
Sociological Analysis of the Japanese Experience, in AN AGING WORLD DILEMMAS AND
CHALLENGES FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 297, 304 (John Eekelaar & David Pearl eds.,
1989). Although these trends indicate social changes, more than half of elderly parents reside
with their adult children. Id. at 301. The figure increases to seventy percent in rural areas. Id.
Even if annual decreases in co-living elderly continue at the present rate, statistical extrapolations
of available data indicate that the proportion of elderly residing with adult children will not reach
a national low of 50% for almost another quarter century. Id. at 300-02.
58. Id. at 306 (citing Statistics Bureau, General Executive Office data from 1955 and
1958). Forty-one percent of the population was engaged in agriculture in the mid-1950s. By
1985 the number of people engaged in agriculture had declined to approximately nine percent.
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and occupations are not shared. 9 Small urban family units have supplanted
the natural and expeditious multigenerational living and working
arrangements of farm communities.60
Higher geographic mobility also contributes to disintegration of
large extended families.6 Many women, traditionally the caregivers for
elderly parents, are unable to both care for aged parents and work outside
the home. Children may be unable to give care because of their own poor
health or finances.
Finally, as the number of children decreases, so do available
family caregivers. Though cultural traditions of caring for aging parents
are still pervasive,62 children have no absolute legal responsibility to care
for family elders.63 Because of the profound demographic changes and
their socioeconomic ripple effects, the Japanese universal health-care
system is "experiencing a crisis.""
The Japanese are contemplating changes to address the needs of
their elderly citizens. Any changes must address tensions existing between
the Central Social Insurance Medical Council 6 and the Japanese medical
59. Ninomiya, supra note 52, at 189. Traditional family life involved two or three
generations residing together.
60. Maeda, supra note 57, at 306 (discussing changes brought about by industrialization).
Job changes, driven by economic factors, force workers to move to areas remote from their
agrarian family homesteads. Id. Residential communities in industrialized areas are designed to
accommodate many small family units. Id. In addition, increasing affluence brought about by
industrialization has contributed to a new perception of independence in the younger generation.
Id. at 307. While the younger generation finds wealth and independence in the urban
industrialized areas, aging parents may choose to remain at the original family residence. Id. at
306.
61. Ninomiya, supra note 52, at 188. Only one-quarter of the elderly look to their
children for housing. Id. The author surveyed seniors ages 60 to 74 living independently in the
Sumida-ku district of Tokyo. Id. at 185, 186. Data indicated that of the 75% of the respondents
with children, less than one-fifth of the children visited daily. Id. at 188. Less than half of the
children who maintained frequent contact (either by telephone or in person) lived within 30
minutes of their parents. Id.
62. Maeda, supra note 57, at 300. The author attributes the preservation of traditional
family care to the fact that Japan's industrialization occurred later than industrialization in
Western European or North American nations. Id. at 301.
63. Id. at 299 (reporting that "both financial responsibility and responsibility to care for
aging parents is now defined very narrowly in the actual administration of the Law for the
Welfare of Elderly Persons"). The child is under no obligation to abandon outside employment
to become a caregiver, despite the fact that many middle aged women feel compelled by social
pressures to do so. Id. Without regard to financial status, a family may request the government
provide necessary care, including institutional placement, for elderly parents under the Law for
*Health and Medical Services for Elderly Persons. Id. at 300.
64. Derham-Aoyama, supra note 42, at 385.
65. See Yoshikawa et al., supra note 39.
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establishment, a traditionally autonomous and politically influential group.6
The bureaucrats are driven by economic pressures, including those exerted
by foreign interests to increase domestic consumption,67 while the Japan
Medical Association seeks fewer economic restraints and reductions in
paperwork. 61
Government efforts are being directed at reducing costs through
decreases in the length of hospital stays. Changes have occurred in how
health-care for the elderly is funded. The Health and Medical Services
Law for the Aged of 1983 created a pooling fund financing services for
persons over seventy.69 At the same time, the government implemented a
limited amount of cost shifting by requiring consumers to make small co-
payments on services. 70 The government has also inversely linked the
amount of reimbursement to the length of a hospital stay.7' A new
voluntary prospective reimbursement system transforms payment from fee
for type of service to daily capitation payments. All nursing care,
medications, and examination costs are covered; however, other costs,
comprising approximately fifty percent of the medical care, are not
covered.12
Programmatic supports for the burgeoning elderly population have
been introduced via a policy known as the "Golden Plan. " 71 This Policy
focuses on moving the elderly out of hospitals and into other potentially
66. Wilsford, supra note 39, at 590 (discussing the possibility that the Japan Medical
Association [hereinafter JMA] is losing cohesiveness as younger physicians face a different
economic reality than the senior doctors). Senior level physicians frequently possess an
ownership interest in a clinic or private hospital. Id. Facilities often employ young doctors as
salaried staff. Id. As groups proliferate, competition for the same patient base heats up. In the
face of diminishing resources, the successful facility owner will realize a huge financial gain,
while salaried providers reap little financial benefit and face constant pressure to increase the
volume of patients seen while running an economically efficient service. Id.
67. Id. at 585. The sociopolitical context is one of collaborative problem solving and
negotiation, therefore organized medicine and the state work together to implement reforms. Id.
In contrast, American physicians are often cast as adversaries and intra-interest group conflict is
more often than not the norm in United States health-care policy-making. But see Yoshikawa et
al., supra note 39, at 118 (explaining that the Chuikyo negotiations with the Japanese Medical
Association are agency action and as such sidestep the legislative process). Yoshikawa also notes
that "politics within the council is unavoidable, and many may manipulate the reimbursement
system to serve their own ends." Id.
68. Derham-Aoyama, supra note 42, at 378.
69. Yoshikawa et al., supra note 39, at 128.
70. Willsford, supra note 39, at 591. See Yoshikawa et al., supra note 39, at 134.
Elderly outpatients pay approximately six dollars per month and inpatients pay three dollars per
month for medical care.
71. Yoshikawa et al., supra note 39, at 134.
72. Id. at 130.
73. Id. at 128.
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less restrictive forms of elderly care. To this effect, the government
developed institutional long-term care facilities (Tokurei Kyoka Rojin
Byoin),74 intermediate level facilities (Rojin Hoken Shisetsu) akin to
hospices, and a variety of home help and daycare services. 5 Consumers
may also elect to participate in HMO-type privately funded geriatric long-
term care beds 6 instead of customary hospital based care. 77 Generally,
health management significantly improves life-functioning capabilities for
the elderly;78 however, the bedridden hospital bound patient requires
additional resources so care can be tailored to the needs of the patient
without producing heavy societal costs.
Japan has reevaluated traditional policies, which relegate the care
of the elderly primarily to family members. Concepts of self support and
independence are central contributions of family and community networks;
however, as socioeconomic realities change the lifestyles of the younger
generation, elderly consumers increasingly rely on outside help to address
health-care needs. Some consumers look to the private sector, others to
the restructuring resulting from the Golden Plan. But the substitution of
less costly and lower intensity services for elderly consumers is an
insufficient response in the face of rapid and radical graying of the
Japanese population.79
74. Maeda, supra note 57, at 312. The government-approved beds are subsidized. Id. A
bedridden elderly patient may be admitted for a short-term stay in nursing homes for any reason,
including respite care. Id. This service has existed for over a decade, and there are over forty
thousand such beds in Japan. Id.
75. Id. (describing the increase in home-helpers and the establishment of "rehabilitative
and reactivation services," which will enable elderly to become increasingly functional and
independent in daily living skills).
76. Yoshikawa et al., supra note 39, at 130.
77. Id. at 134.
78. Noriyuki Nakanishi, et al., The Association of Health Management with the Health of
Elderly People, 24 AGE & AGING 334 (1995). A survey study of over 1300 seniors living in
Settsu City, Osaka revealed that participation in social activities, which foster a reason for living,
may bolster and preserve the health of the elderly. "[H]ealthy psycho-social conditions may
motivate the adoption of preventive health practices and the use of health checks." Id. at 339.
79. Ninomiya, supra note 52, at 189. The traditional family structure is deteriorating and
thus can no longer provide the type of care elders need. Id. Additionally, individuals who can
not pay for services rely on a central government that increasingly looks to the public sector to
serve the elderly. Id. Information about public sector services is not freely disseminated to those
seniors most in need of assistance. Id. "It is impossible to expect adequate help for the elderly
given the present situation." Id.
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B. Canada
The Canadian health-care system provides citizens with
government sponsored universal socialized insurance.8w The concept of
socialized insurance was introduced in the province of Saskatchewan in
19448, and expanded to encompass comprehensive medical care insurance
in 1962.82 Socialized insurance, as adopted by the federal government in
1966, makes health-care a right.83 Access to generous program benefits is
premised on a philosophy that the system will serve all citizens, not just
provide for the neediest members of the nation.8
The interaction between provider and payor in the social insurance
system compels accommodation between the desires of the physician and
those of the federal and provincial governments.85 General government
revenues raised through both provincial and federal taxation" are disbursed
at the provincial level to cover expenditures that are medically necessary.87
80. Murray G. Brown, Rationing Health-care in Canada, 2 ANNALS HEALTH L. 101,
(1993). Federally funded publicly administered health-care programs are collectively referred to
as "Medicare." Id. at 103. Medicare members access to medically necessary services is
comprehensive, universal, and portable. Id. at 101-04. For an excellent discussion of the
Medicare program see Evans infra note 87.
81. Carolyn Hughes Tuohy, Principles and Power in the Health-care Arena: Reflections
on the Canadian Experience, 4 HEALTH MATRIX 205, 209 (1994). The social democrats in the
New Democratic Party (hereinafter NDP) introduced the concept of universal and comprehensive
hospital insurance in 1944. Id. See Health Services Act ch.81, 1946 S.S.688 (Sask.) (ensuring
access to hospital services).
82. Tuohy, supra note 81, at 209.
83. The Medical Care Insurance Act, ch. 64, S.C. 1966-67 (Can.); the Canada Health Act
of 1984, ch.6 R.S.C. 1985 (Can.); and section seven of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982 Pt. I, § 7 (Can.) (stating "everyone has the right to life,
liberty, and security of the person .... "), provide statutory guarantees to health-care access.
84. Brown, supra note 80, at 101.
85. Tuohy, supra note 81, at 205. Continuity and development of the health-care system
is dependent on the physician-provider relationship. Id. Physicians' roles vary from one
province to another, however, two main controversies emerge: the extent to which physicians
exercise entrepreneurial versus clinical discretion and the issue of physician autonomy. Id. When
the Canadian government removed financial barriers to treatment by providing tax-based funding
for medical care, the physician's financial autonomy necessarily was curtailed. Id. at 210-14.
Physicians must. work within the economic boundaries set by the provincial legislatures;
however, within those bounds, doctors have the power and autonomy to determine the array of
services that will be provided to health-care consumers. Id. at 222-25.
86. Wilsford, supra note 39, at 593 (describing financing as primarily a provincial
function). Up to one-third of provincial tax revenues are devoted to health-care. Id. Federal
government contributions currently comprise approximately 40% of provincial expenditures. Id.
87. Robert G. Evans, Canada: The Real Issues, 17 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 739,
744 (1992). Medically necessary treatments are subject to frequent redefinition. Id. At present,
almost any service that a physician is willing to provide to a patient is considered medically
necessary treatment. Id. "The increasing interest in the effectiveness, or lack of it, of much
contemporary medical care is likely to infuse more content into the principle of medical
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Administrative costs are quite low, as the government is the single non-
profit payor.u The unified funding source allows consumers the freedom
to select providers of choice.
While the government determines the amount of funding
available, ' the physician defines the treatments that are to be included in
the plan.?° Under Medicare, consumers do not pay the provider directly
for covered services."' Government severance of medical decision making
from funding allocations preserves the physician's clinical autonomy at the
expense of the medical provider's economic self-determination.9
How to equitably balance access with cost containment is a subject
of intense debate. 3 Each province arrives at a satisfactory equilibrium by
necessity." Id. Providers are reimbursed according to a fee schedule, which has been negotiated
with Provincial authorities. Id. at 742. Provincial agencies reimburse hospitals on the basis of
global budgetary projections of operating costs as opposed to fee for service reimbursement. Id.
88. Evans, supra note 87, at 748. Some Canadians opine that the lean and mean
philosophy of single payor system has created administrative anorexia. Id. at 749. Provincial
governments are loath to spend on management while nevertheless continuing to steer the health-
care ship. One might ask, without a crew to look after the engine room, who will tell the captain
that the ship is taking on water?
89. Brown, supra note 80, at 103. Federal cost sharing supports Medicare through
specific federal fiscal allocations and through general federal-provincial agreements that enable
poorer provinces to provide their residents with equitable resources for public services. Id. The
federal-provincial agreements are no string allocations that allow poorer provincial governments
to provide a broader scope of services than would be possible given the provincial budgetary
constraints. Id. at 103, 104.
90. Wilsford, supra note 39, at 596. Discussing tradeoffs under the social insurance
system, the author notes that although Canada provides accessible quality care at reasonable cost,
physicians must negotiate with provincial governments for adequate funding. Id. at 593, 594.
The government imposed financial control creates tension between the provinces and the
physicians. Id. The provincial objective of cost containment is characterized by organized
medicine as underfunding. Id. at 594. Medical professionals argue that restrictive funding
hampers professional freedom, limits patient protections, and lessens quality of care. Id.
91. Brown, supra note 80, at 103. Medically necessary services include a broad but not
unlimited array of treatment options including hospitalizations, diagnostic services and medical
care. Id.
For example, included in the delivery system are not-for-profit hospitals; Red Cross
blood service; other non-governmental organizations . . . ; [and] other health
professionals . . . .Provincial governments directly deliver certain health-care services
such as mental health and long term chronic care ... [and] a broad range of public
health and population health programs that do not deliver direct patient care.
Id.
92. Tuohy, supra note 81, at 224. The accommodation between the provincial
governments and the medical profession is in a state of flux, but will continue to be a focal point
of the development of Canadian health-care. Id. at 222-25. The government underwrites a
service delivery system that has remained essentially unchanged since the advent of national
health-care in the 1960's. Id. at 209.
93. Numerous articles have appeared in the Canadian press. See, e.g., Robert Brown,
Inevitable Surprises: The Graying Population Will Impact the Economy in Good and Bad Ways,
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weighing the efficacy of hospital utilization, high technology treatments,
and clinical services against the economics of service use., There is a
tension inherent in these tradeoffs, as health-care must be rationed to allow
both economic viability and broad access.95 How are the elderly affected
by the provinces' balancing acts?
How and when rationing occurs depends upon the interplay of
numerous factors. Although methodological difficulties exist,96 managerial
decision making within Medicare is, in theory, outcome driven.9
Practically, an implicit ranking process weighs consumer health needs98
against the fiscal well-being of each provincial health-care system.9
But Not Necessarily in the Way You Think It Will, 8 CAN. INV. REV. 34 (1995) (illustrating some
concerns of contemporary Canadians). The author urges governments to consider economic
responses to the rapid upward shift in the proportion of elderly in the general population. Id.
Extending the normal retirement age to 69 and increasing the ratio of working elderly to retirees
is a proposed response to the looming price inflation that accompanies declines in national
productivity. Id. at 36. Other articles voice concerns that elderly Canadians are denied health-
care services for financial reasons. See The Age Factor In Heart Surgery, GLOBE & MAIL
METRO EDITION, June 2, 1995, at A13.
94. Brown, supra note 80, at 102. "Underlying these explicit equity goals regarding
access to health-care and public funding is the imperative to manage scarce public sector
resources efficiently." Id. Since access is equivalent to free medical care, the provinces must
manage fiscal resources in a manner that enables citizens to have reasonable access to the health-
care system. Id. at 103.
95. Wilsford, supra note 39, at 593 (noting the increasing cost of care strains the system).
96. Brown, supra note 80, at 107 (identifying limits to the validity and reliability of data,
if data is available at all). Further difficulties arise when multidimensional comparisons of
effectiveness are attempted; for example cost-effectiveness, clinical-effectiveness, and
programmatic success. Id. The chronic or acute nature of a person's health status presents
another variable, which impacts effectiveness measurements. Id. at 117-18. Limited statistical
data may not account for individual differences, creating uncertainty in resource-allocation
decision making. Id. at 118.
97. Individual patient characteristics that are independent of outcome measures, such as
ethnicity, economic status, or social background, are theoretically external to an outcome-driven
resource allocation process. However, economic status, ethnicity, education and a multitude of
other non outcome-based factors may contribute to personal wellness. Additionally, non
outcome related factors may influence an individual's determinations regarding whether or when
to seek medical care. The number of patients availing themselves of the system and the
acuteness of their ailments necessarily impacts the outcome data.
98. Evans, supra note 87, at 746. Since patient access is based upon physician
determination of need providers become gatekeepers to the health-care system. Id at 758.
However, the physician working in Canada's fee-for-service environment, must treat patients in
sufficient volume to maintain an economically viable medical practice. Id. at 746. The
physician will find it advantageous to determine if patient need exists. Id. The physician also
must respond to government pressure to limit services as utilization escalates and costs increase.
Id. "The political struggle is then over the processes by which need is to be defined. To the
medical profession, need is whatever a physician says it is . . . . Governments, on the other
hand, are increasingly arguing that the test of necessity is effectiveness . . . ." Id.
99. Brown, supra note 80, at 115. At the federal level, cost-sharing incentives attempt to
limit growth to acceptable rates. Id. at 109. Current federal policy links funding to the rate of
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Barriers to access are imposed when the fiscal considerations of provincial
governments are afforded more weight than patient treatment needs. 10
Explicit barriers the province may construct include redefining the
boundaries of the entitlement,10' controlling hospital capacity and the array
of offered services,101 and restricting the number of licensed physicians.'13
The stresses imposed by cost shifting impact all segments of the
population; however, they may appear most formidable to the elderly
consumer. The elderly population simply consumes more and requires
more intensive interventions. °0 The definition of medical need becomes
more flexible when the patient is of more advanced years. 03 Rationing
provincial population growth and gross national product. Id. Federal expenditures in the health-
care sector have progressively declined as the Canadian economy slumps. Id. at 110-11. In
order to preserve the shrinking pool of resources, provincial management of Medicare shifts
costs between the private and the public sectors in a variety of ways. Id. at 111. Future
projections of more robust economic growth will allow the health-care sector some continued
expansion; however, that expansion will not develop at such severe cost to the GNP or public
sector expenditures. Id. at 116.
100. Brown, supra note 80, at 105. Brown believes the realities of resource scarcity make
rationing necessary, however the manner in which rationing is imposed reflects societal value
systems. Id. Canada rations services at the policy level through managerial decision making of
government organizations and transaction specific provider determinations regarding resource
allocations to individual consumers. Id. at 105-06.
101. Tuohy, supra note 81 at 215 (identifying decreased availability of certain high-
technology services). For example, 800% more magnetic resonance imaging scans and radiation
therapy units and 300% more cardiac catheterizations are performed in the United States than in
Canada; six times the number of lithotripsy centers exist per capita in the United States than in
Canada and more coronary artery bypass surgery occurs in Canada than in the United States. Id.
at 216. See Brown, supra note, 80 at 112. The boundaries between necessary and unnecessary
medical care are in a constant state of flux. Recently, provincial governments have deinsured
services deemed to "have low marginal contribution to improved health outcomes." Id. So far,
the federal government has not found provincial deinsurance tactics objectionable. Id.
102. Brown, supra note 80, at 113, 114. Provincial governments manage capacity by
controlling both the structure and the functions of the hospital. Id. The number of beds
allocated to various acute, sub-acute, and chronic care services, the breadth of services: local,
regional or tertiary care, the nature of the care: inpatient/outpatient, the nature of diagnostic
services and budget allocations for staffing and capital equipment expenditures are all decisions
of government managers. Id. The location of the hospital and the role of the fee for service
provider working within the facility also are within the purview of the province. Id.
103. Id. at 114. Restrictions placed on the immigration of foreign-trained doctors almost
two decades ago were tightened in 1993 through implementation of additional reductions in
numbers of physician immigrants and licensure restrictions for foreign educated physicians. Id.
Available spaces in education and training programs within Canada were reduced by 10% in
1993. Brown, supra note 80, at 114.
104. Evans, supra note 87, at 753 (questioning the efficacy of the utilization patterns).
Treatments are "often of unproven effectiveness"). Id.
105. Id. at 757 (commenting that for elderly consumers, "need is indefinitely expansible
within the relevant range"). In addition, as the availability of staff and facilities increase,
utilization also increases. Id. at 758. The relationship of utilization patterns to need is unclear.
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access to technology may disproportionately disadvantage elderly
consumers; however, further information about efficacy of treatment is
needed before definitive comment can be made.0'6 It appears that Canadian
social insurance meets consumers' medical needs by providing broad
access at the expense of service intensity.
Whether an elderly consumer's medical need is addressed by the
health-care system may, in part, be a function of the elderly person's social
support systems. Elders' reliance on social supports creates complex and
variable interactions with medical service providers. I11 Social networks
may be central to threshold determinations of whether people get to the
hospital in the first place. 10 However, social support only weakly relates
to hospital utilization. '0 Yet, home health utilization, which provides high
levels of support, is associated with decreased hospital use."0 Moreover,
individuals who relied upon informal social networks received less
intensive home care services."' Was the amount of home health service
provided a reflection of the elder's reliance on outside help or were
potential elderly consumers denied access to services because informal
networks already existed?"T 2
The elderly may be forced to rely upon additional resources
outside Medicare. Provinces have custom-tailored supplementary
programs for particular segments of the population.'" Supplementary
programs are created by legislative action and financed through provincial
106. Tuohy, supra note 81, at 219.
107. Margaret J. Penning, Health, Social Support, and the Utilization of Health Services
Among Older Adults, 508 J. GERONTOLOGY, SOC. Scl. 330, S337 (1995). The author examined
whether social support systems impacted elders' usage of health services. Id. Interviews were
obtained from a random sample of over 1200 non-institutionalized adults age 60 and over. Id. at
S332. Results reveal significant interactions between the elderly person's social support systems
and health status. Id. at S337. Quantitative and qualitative differences across the spectrum of
care suggest that the importance of social support varies across levels of care. Id. at S337, S338.
108. Id. at S337 (indicating that the presence of support is positively correlated to incidence
of hospitalization).
109. Id.
110. Home Healthcare - The New Direction in Canada's Healthcare System, NEWSWIRE,
July 24, 1996, available in CANNEWS. Community based home health services include
nursing, physical therapy, speech pathology, and home support workers. Home health-care
agencies report that clients experience greater personal autonomy and preserve free choice when
they choose home health services over more institutionalized care settings. Id.
111. Penning, supra note 107, at S337.
112. Id. at S338. Some provinces, as a matter of policy, consider an individual's informal
support networks when making a determination of whether to provide services. Id.
113. Brown, supra note 80, at 116. An example is the Nova Scotia Senior's Pharmacare
Plan. Id.
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revenues .1 Changed circumstances impacting provincial finances may
cause changes in the supplementary health program entitlements. Benefits
may be reduced, co-payments for services may rise,"' and the targeted
population may be redefined to limit access. "1 6
The elderly in Canada participate in an "overwhelmingly
popular""7 system. Yet, several concerns about the impact of Medicare
management on elderly consumers remain unanswered. Canada's response
to recent fiscal stresses was to curtail expansion of services. Rationing
was accomplished at the macro-level by redefining the nature of the
entitlement and the roles of hospital, physicians, and other health service
providers.
Macro-level management strategies eventually exact personal costs
from consumers and providers. The elderly pay a price when they must
supplement Medicare in order to meet medical needs. The sometimes
uneasy accommodation between the provincial government and the health-
care providers creates tensions in the system. As the numbers of elderly
consumers increase, how will funding and rationing decisions interface
with consumer and provider concerns? Will equitable delivery of quality
care be possible?
C. Great Britain
The National Health Service (NHS) was created to remedy Great
Britain's health-care problems. During the 1930s and 1940s, citizens of
Great Britain were subject to inequitable care, inefficient administration,
and costly services. Health-care was only accessible to individuals who
were able to afford it and could travel to the areas where services were
offered."' Those individuals fortunate enough to obtain care entered a
114. Brown, supra note 80, at 114-16. Publicly funded and administered supplementary
health-care programs restrict eligibility to provincial residents. Id. at 116. Private sector entities
contract to provide service delivery. Id. at 114.
115. Id. at 116 (reporting increased co payment fees for both an ambulance transportation
program and the Senior's Pharmacare Plan in Nova Scotia.)
116. See Penning, supra note 107, at S338.
117. Tuohy, supra note 81, at 220. Medicare is a "defining element of the Canadian
identity." Id. Medicare is highly regarded by both the consumer and the physician. Id. at 220,
221. Physician satisfaction surveys reveal over three-quarters of the respondents are satisfied
with practice conditions. Id. at 221.
118. Margaret Whitehead, Who Cares About Equity in the NHS? United Kingdom's
National Health Service, 308 BRIT. MED. J. 1284, 1285 (1994). The prewar insurance system
covered only 43% of the population. Id. at 1284. Workers' spouses and children were often
excluded from coverage. Id. Access was difficult for individuals living in rural and less affluent
areas. Id. Practitioners located in desirable areas and served selected patients. Id. at 1284.
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disjointed system where hospitals, clinics, and physicians fought over
patient dollars, ' 9 not patient care.'20
In the post World War II era, administrators in the ministries of
Health and Finance built a system of socialized medicine2 ' that was free to
consumers,'" centrally administered, 23  and universally inclusive. ' The
system is nationally funded through general tax revenues.'12 The unified
funding source initially contributed to a more equitable staffing distribution
in historically under-served areas by compensating staff according to a
national pay scale',2 and funding ambitious multi-regional hospital
construction efforts.'27
However, access did not guarantee excellence.'" One
commentator summed up outreach within the system: "[tihe consumer's
119. Id. at 1284. The state of services was "highly fragmented and unplanned",
"haphazard," and "inefficient." Whitehead, supra note 118, at 1284. Waste and duplication of
services were common as entities battled for scarce economic resources. Id. The focus of
competing entities was retention of patient dollars, not optimizing patient care through referrals
to other, perhaps more appropriate, treatment settings. Id.
120. Id. (noting that working class people received distinctly different treatment than
wealthier patients).
121. Wilsford, supra note 39, at 597. The British health-care system is "the most
socialized of the seven largest O[rganization for] E[conomic] C[ooperation] D[evelopment]
[hereinafter OECD] countries." Id.
122. Rudolf Klein, Big Bang Health Reform - Does It Work? The Case of Britain's 1991
National Health Service Reforms, 73 MILBANK Q. 299, 303 (1995). Free health service severed
payment considerations from considerations regarding eligibility for treatment. Id. But see
Whitehead, supra note 118, at 1285 (asserting that free treatment at the point of use has been
eroded by current cost shifting back to the consumer in dental, ophthalmologic, and long-term
care settings).
123. Wilsford, supra note 39, at 597 (describing the administrative system as a large and
highly developed one in which strategically placed public officials focus policy).
124. Klein, supra note 122, at 303 (commenting that the goal of providing all consumers in
the system with equitable service has met with only qualified success). Even at the beginning of
this decade, geographic equity in resource distribution and access was lacking. Id. at 304.
Although inequities in funding allocations between regions had diminished, the distribution of
funding allocations within regions varied greatly. Id.
125. Whitehead, supra note 118, at 1285 (characterizing the funding system as "one of the
most progressive," among the OECD nations). Id.
126. Klein, supra note 122, at 312 (identifying strict central control over creation of new
positions). See Whitehead, supra note 118, at 1284. Introduction of a National Resource
Allocation Formula reduced inequities in care. Id. At the outset the NHS used a carrot and stick
approach to redistribution of practitioners: new practices were prohibited in over served areas
and practitioners received financial incentives for establishing offices in underserved locales. Id.
127. Whitehead, supra note 118, at 1284. Construction of hospitals began in 1962, with
many facilities completed prior to evaporation of funding sources in the 1970s. Id.
128. Klein, supra note 122, at 304. Each District Health Authority allocated funds in
widely different ways. Id. Services provided in each district also varied widely. Id. "[Tihe
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only right is to have access to the health-care system:. once that has been
achieved, it is for the professional providers to determine what treatment is
appropriate."129  Even though the distribution of general practitioners has
improved to the point that less than five percent of the population resides in
"undoctored areas,"" 0 access does not guarantee the highest standard of
medical care, but merely universalizes the adequate. 3'
New reforms introduced in 199132 attempted to improve efficiency
throughout the system. The reforms split purchaser functions from
provider functions within the NHS."3 District Health Authorities now
receive per capita funding0 and pay providers for services on a
prospective basis. 35  Per capita payments free administrators to spend
allocated funds on the most cost-effective services, regardless of whether
conclusion is clear: more than 40 years after its birth, the NHS had yet to offer everyone the
same level of service." Id.
129. Klein, supra note 122, at 311. See Alan Maynard, Distributing Health Care:
Rationing and the Role of the Physician in the United Kingdom National Health Service, 4
HEALTH MATRIx 259, 263 (1994) (contending that even after the reforms of 1991, "cost data are
poor, there are large variations in clinical practice, the little effectiveness data that exist tend to
be ignored, often for many years, and the majority of health care services in use have no proven
scientific basis.")
130. Whitehead, supra note 118, at 1287.
131. Klein, supra note 122, at 304. See Howard Davies & Hugh Powell, How to Ration
Health Care -- and be Reelected: The U.K. Experience, 3 STAN. L. & P. REv. 138, 140-41
(allowing physician discretion in treatment decisions leads to inadequate management information
systems). The result is cost analyses based upon inadequate data collection. Id. at 141.
Allocation decisions, heavily weighting high profile specialties while slighting screening
programs and preventive medicine, become arbitrary. Id.
132. N.D. Bateman et al., A Prescribing Incentive Scheme for Non-Fundholding General
Practices: An Observational Study, 313 BRIT. MED. J., August 31, 1996, at 535.
133. Id. See Davies, supra note 131, at 141. The Secretary of State for Health chairs a
political board, which heads the NHS. The management executive reports to the Board. There
are fourteen Regional Health Authorities, which oversee funding, in two separate bodies: the
Fund Holding for General Practitioner Practices (approximately 90 entities) and the National
Health Service Trusts (55 entities). Id. The Regional Health Authorities also oversee the 189
District Health Authorities. Id. Following the 1991 NHS reforms, the District Health
Authorities maintain contractual relationships with approximately 250 direct service providers,
the NHS Trusts, and the Fund Holding for General Practitioner Practices. Id. Direct care
providers also maintain a contractual relationship with the Fund Holding for General Practitioner
Practices. Id.
134. Whitehead, supra note 118, at 1286. In 1976 a national resource allocation formula
(RAWP) severed funding from financial allocations based upon historical patterns of utilization.
Funding determinations were to be based on medical need. Id. RAWP reflected need by
weighting a standardized mortality ratio. Id. Under RAWP, regions with relatively high
mortality rates received more funds than populations in areas where mortality rates were low.
Id. Under RAWP, poor regions experienced improvements in resources while in affluent areas
services were reduced. Id.
135. See Davies, supra note 131, at 142.
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the provider is within or without the NHS.13' There are concerns that the
new capitation formula moves away from equitable geographic distribution
of services" and shortchanges patients requiring more intensive
resources. " ' However, the new reforms are also viewed with cautious
optimism. 39
When the NHS' funding function was severed from care delivery
functions, care provision within Britain fragmented into separate competing
units." 4 The new reforms introduced cost competitiveness into the
system.' 4  As a result, physician-governed medical decision making is
overshadowed by managerial determinations in a market driven system.4 2
Now, hospitals and primary care groups develop purchasing plans that
target specified health outcomes.'4 3  The private payor system which has
136. Id. See Davies, supra note 131, at 142-43. The per capita funding is adjusted for
certain pathologies and for age.
137. Whitehead, supra note 118, at 1284 (asserting serious differentials in quality exist
between deprived and affluent areas of the country). The weighting assigned to standardized
mortality in the 1991 capitation formula has drawn resources away from poor areas and inner
city districts with high morbidity and mortality figures to the wealthier and healthier districts.
Id. A revised national formula is being developed from 1991 census data, however, it is unclear
whether the revised weighting will provide a more equitable distribution of services. Id.
138. Klein, supra note 122, at 313. Because funds follow the patient, providers have
incentives to tailor their services to healthier segments of the population. Id.
139. Id. ("There is no reason to think that the dynamics of the new-model NHS will
necessarily reduce equity . . . ."); see Wilsford, supra note 39, at 603 ("High state autonomy in
the [health] sector gives even the best organized interests few opportunities to exploit."); see
also, Whitehead, supra note 118, at 1284 ("Many working within the NHS are determined to
maintain an equitable service, and the public at large wants this principle retained.")
140. Whitehead, supra note 118, at 1287 (asserting those who can afford to may purchase
fee-for-service elective surgery private health insurance, and private physicians). The private
sector expands continuously. Id. The author expresses concern that the continued growth of
selection on the basis of financial grounds erodes need-based selection. Id. at 1287. "The
situation is not without hope. .. ." Id.
141. Davies, supra note 131, at 142 ("[T]he core principle of the new funding system is
that "money should follow the patient"). Hospitals are contracting for funds prospectively and
pricing services according to acuity levels associated with particular procedures.
142. Stephen L. Heasell, Nursing, Employment, and Resource Allocation in a Reorganized
National Health Service, 4 ANNALs HEALTH L. 173, 176 (1995). The manager becomes the
decision-maker at the organizational level. Id. Where the market drives health-care service
delivery, the manager may regard services as inputs and outputs, and strive for their efficient
use. Id. at 177-78.
143. Klein, supra note 122, at 312. The author identifies several negative aspects
associated with such targeting. Id. The interventions are most easily directed at segments of the
population that can be most easily reached or those persons who will most likely respond to
treatment. Id. "Whereas, in the past, difficult-to-reach patients may have been seen merely as a
burden, now they may suddenly be perceived as a possible source of extra revenue." Id. at 313.
Conversely, plans that identify inequities may seek to bridge any gaps between particular
populations' at risk health status and deficient service provision. Id.
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always existed in Britain recently expanded significantly."11 Reforms in the
NHS have essentially created a health-care market driven by bottom line
financial considerations. 4 At the same time, technology and innovation
have increased the number and types of potential treatments.'" In light of
the NHS reforms and the burgeoning number of therapeutic options,
physicians and administrators are placed in the catch-twenty-two situation
of attempting to maximize both cost containment and care. Can this
approach bring anyone satisfaction even though it involves the
simultaneous pursuance of two seemingly diametrically opposed goals?
Increasing numbers of elderly consumers, and their increasing
need for medical treatment, impose additional demands on the British
health-care system. While the NHS has always implicitly rationed
resources through funding allocations,147 reform has made rationing of
resources more explicit."8 Cost shifting is especially noticeable in non-
acute and community health services, where there is increasing evidence of
hardship. 14 9 In addition, local authorities now conduct tests to determine an
144. Id. at 307. By 1991, over 6.5 million individuals carried some form of private
insurance. Id. at 313. Klein opines that the increase of over 1.5 million private care subscribers
during the first half of the 1990s indicates a failure on the part of the NHS to respond to
consumer demand. Id.
145. Wilsford, supra note 39, at 603 ("The essence of the purchaser-provider split within
an internal market was to emphasize market imperatives in decision making rather than purely
medical imperatives."); see Gary J. Maxwell, Changes in Britain's Health Care An American
Attempts to Revisit 'From the London Post', 10 J. AM. MED. ASS'N. 789, 792 (1996) ("There is
concern that marketization of health care risks the undermining of the principles of uniform,
universal care.")
146. Maynard, supra note 122, at 262. In a market where doctors act as advocates for the
patient, who demands health-care, consumer capacity to access services is cost sensitive. Id. at
271. Insurers determine the reimbursement rules by examining and restricting use, while society
anticipates adverse risk ratings if insurers' costs rise as a result of services being used frequently.
Id. at 261.
147. Wilsford, supra note 39, at 601. The overall budget is fixed by the Treasury
Department and approved by Parliament. Id. The Regional Health Authority allocates funds
received from Treasury to the District Health Authority budgets and to the fund holding budgets
for General Practitioners. Id. See Whitehead, supra note 118, at 1284. The British system has
also imposed financial rationing by allowing limited charges to be imposed on prescription
medication, dental care and ophthalmic services. The percentage of total cost imposed upon the
consumer has steadily risen.
148. Richard Smith, Rationing: The Debate We Have to Have, 310 BRITISH MED. J. 686
(1995). Health-care rationing has been debated in the medical press for over a decade. Id. In
opening remarks for a 1993 national conference on rationing, the Secretary of State for Health
stated that the government had a role in determining strategic shifts of resources but that priority
setting was to be conducted on a local level. Id. Author Smith interprets the Secretary's
comments as a refusal to engage in "the broad, deep, informed and prolonged debate on
rationing that is needed." Id.
149. Whitehead, supra note 118, at 1284-85 (noting a disturbing erosion of entitlement to
free care at the sub-acute level). Changes to the Social Security regulations now make it possible
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individual's eligibility for service.15° The new funding schemes tip the
equitable balance away from the poor and the elderly.-
The physician has historically acted as a gatekeeper within the
NHS;'-2 however, the recent reforms cast the workings of the system in a
new light.'53 Doctors have been trained to attend to the needs of individual
patients, not necessarily to look at the opportunity costs that treating one
individual imposes on the entire system."- Working within the new
reforms forces .care providers to construe need as the capacity of the
patient to benefit at the margin rather than the capacity of the treatment to
benefit the individual patient. "1 The prioritization of resources has moved
from the almost invisible bedside rationing- to the very public forum of
political policy-making.
for private contractors to provide nursing home care. Id. The change in regulations transforms a
formerly free service into a means-tested one. Id. "[H]ard pressed NHS managers have been
only too willing to transfer patients into private homes to relieve the NHS budget." Id. at 1286.
See Becky J. Berke, Booknote, (reviewing Jane M. Orient, M. D., Your Doctor is Not In:
Healthy Skepticism About National Health Care (1994)), 24 Sw. U. L. REV. 501, 507 (1995).
Rationing is not working well. Id. The method of allocating resources is creating shortages. Id.
Almost one million patients experience waits of almost four years for treatment related to renal
dialysis, chemotherapy for cancer, coronary artery bypass surgery, and hip replacement surgery.
Id.
150. Whitehead, supra note 118, at 1285. The NHS has permitted the screenings since
1993. Id. Type and extent of screening varies regionally. Id.
151. Id. "The evidence of resulting hardship caused to some patients and their relatives is
mounting." Id. But see Klein, supra note 122, at 312. ("On balance, however, the dynamics of
the new NHS do not suggest that the poorer or more vulnerable groups in society will necessarily
suffer.")
152. Klein, supra note 122, at 311. The physician determines what treatment is needed and
clinical decision making is the basis of patient management. Id. "In a sense, therefore, in 1994
- as in 1948 - the scope of the NHS's services, the degree of its comprehensiveness, remains a
matter of professional convention and local decision making." Id.
153. Davies, supra note 131, at 142-43. Now, prospective funding will be based on
diagnostic determinations for the population to be served (similar to DRG's in the United States).
Id. The contracts will predetermine allocations according to projections of patients' acuity
levels. Id. at 142.
154. Id. at 143. The utilitarian focus of looking to the overall needs of the greatest number
of people shifts the focus of health-care priorities. Id. at 142. Problems arise when managers
prioritize which procedures will accomplish the greatest good for the most people. Id. at 143.
155. The NHS reforms force providers to balance cost and efficiency considerations against
the individual needs of each particular patient who seeks care and treatment in the system. See
Heasell, supra note 142, at 174. ("There are those who seem to doubt that a market and its
material incentives - in shorthand, money - will induce the appropriate choices to supply care
and to employ inputs that have the capability to contribute to the provision of health-care.").
156. Heasell, supra note 142, at 173. Some sectors of the population view the reforms as
imposing further constraints on the publicly financed resources provided by the NHS. Id. But
see Smith, supra note 148, at 686 (contending that "most people have not had an opportunity to
understand the scale of the problem and to give their opinion on issues such as trading off quality
against quantity of life. . . ."). Britain has not made an in depth investigation into rationing
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D. United States
America lacks a comprehensive health-care system.17  The system
is actually a complicated patchwork of assorted payors'18 that has been
described as expensive" and inadequate.' 6 The system is market driven;'' 1
consumers who possess sufficient financial resources may purchase
services while individuals who find costs unmanageable have limited, if
any, access to care.'16 High costs and large numbers of uninsured are
indicators that the system is in serious need of reform. 163  Although
practices. Id. Instead, debates are sparked whenever stories about denial of treatment surface.
Id.
157. Symposium, Securing Health or Just Healthcare? The Effect of the Health Care
System on The Health of America, 39 ST. Louis UNIV. L.J. 7, 17 (1994). The political debate
about universal coverage did not result in enactment of comprehensive health-care reform during
President Clinton's first term in office. Id. at 8. Several legislative enactments afford coverage
to certain groups of people. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(i) (1988) (mandating employer taxes fund
Medicare as well as workers' compensation, employee health insurance programs and
premiums). 42 U.S.C. § 1995(c) (1988) (establishing benefits through Medicare for disabled
individuals and persons over 65). See Barry R. Furrow, Forcing Rescue: The Landscape of
Health Care Provider Obligations to Treat Patients, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 31, 31 (1993). Many
other individuals lack coverage entirely, or are underinsured.
158. Kelli D. Back, Rationing Healthcare: Naturally Unjust?, 12 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
POL'Y 245 (1991). States and federal dollars support financially needy individuals through
Medicaid programs. Social Security offers assistance to persons who qualify under the plan;
Medicare addresses the needs of older adults; private sector programs are characterized by their
volume and incredible diversity. Federal regulations governing medical assistance programs are
found at 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.110, .117-18, .120, .122, .130-35, .139, .201 (1990).
159. Susan D. Goold, Allocating Health Care: Cost-Utility Analysis, Informed Democratic
Decision Making or the Veil of Ignorance?, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 69, 69 (1996). A
disproportionate amount of money is spent on health-care. See Mark A. Rothstein, Health Care:
Public and Private Systems in the Americas 17 COMP., LAB. L.J. 612, 615 (1996) (Fourteen
percent of the gross domestic product is spent on health-care, the highest percentage allocation in
the Americas.).
160. Furrow, supra note 157, at 31. Despite the fact that society values access to health-
care, many needy people are unable to obtain treatment. Id. The payment structures of most
American health-care systems foreclose the possibility of service to people who have insufficient
means to pay for treatment. Id.
161. Rothstein, supra note 159, at 614. Local, state, and federal taxes fund some programs;
employer and employee contributions, private insurance premiums, and other payors fund other
types of health care coverage. Id.
162. Jason B. Saunders, International Health Care: Will the United States Ever Adopt
Health Care for All? - A Comparison Between Proposed United States Approaches to Health-
care and the Single-Source Financing Systems of Denmark and the Netherlands, 18 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 688, 711 (1995). In discussing arguments for and against market-based
health care, the author further notes the inefficiency of current insurance schemes and the failure
of managed care to control runaway costs. Id. at 743-45. Financial considerations bar access to
millions of would-be consumers. Id. at 732.
163. Rothstein, supra note 159, at 619. "[Nlinety percent of the public believes that the
American health-care system needs reform and more than fifty percent believes that serious
problems exist." Id.
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academic, professional, and political forums continuously examine
possibilities for universalizing health-care,'" such drastic change is not
imminent.'"6 Unlike many industrialized nations where health-care is
considered a right,'" the United States government offers citizens no
universal guarantee to health-care. 6'
Some government programs do exist to assist the elderly
population to obtain medical care;1'" however, the government safety net
represents only a frayed lifeline extended to a small segment of the
population. 169 Government benefits packages provide very narrowly
defined services"0 with many gaps in coverage. 7' Although millions of
164. Gostin, supra note 157, at 43. Health care reform has been attempted since the post
World War 11 era. Id. at 42. President Truman recommended a comprehensive health program
in 1945, advocating the removal of financial barriers to care. Id.
165. Too much is at stake. Insurance companies fear tighter government regulation,
institutional providers fear the economic costs of comprehensive care. See David Blumenthal,
Health-care Reform - Past and Future, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 465 (1995). The inability of
private interests and of state governments to adequately address comprehensive health-care
reform invites continuing federal government involvement. Id. The author believes that the
success of federal legislative initiatives is contingent upon building novel alliances between front
line providers and managed care organizations and creating increased public awareness of health-
care issues. Id. at 468.
166. See, supra Part II.
167. No Congressional legislation has recognized health care as a right in spite of efforts of
several past administrations to craft such guarantees. See Gostin, supra note 157, at 8. The
Supreme Court of the United States has not found a fundamental right to health care. Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). Nor has the constitutionality of our present health-care system
been overturned on equal protection grounds. See Back, supra note 158, at 255 (discussing
constitutional issues of rationing under Medicare and Medicaid). But see Barry R. Furrow et al.,
HEALTH LAW § 12, at 1, n.3 (1995) (discussing selected state constitutions that may provide an
affirmative health-care right).
168. Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395-1395ccc sets forth the
governance provisions for Medicare. See Furrow, supra note 167, § 13-2 for a discussion of
eligibility. Medicare became a reality in 1966. Id. § 13-1. The program covers persons
experiencing long term disabilities, seniors over 65, and persons requiring renal dialysis. Id. §
13-4. Though Medicare remains a program, which is limited in eligibility and scope, it pays for
a significant share of health care in the United States because it covers the part of the population
most in need of medical care and the most expensive types of care required by this population.
See infra note 169.
169. Andrew H. Smith & John Rother, Older Americans and the Rationing of Health-Care,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1847 (1992). Thirty-four million people lack basic health insurance
coverage.
170. Medicare is composed of Part A (hospital) and Part B (supplementary medical) federal
insurance programs. See William G. Dauster, Protecting Social Security and Medicare, 33
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 461, 481 (1996). 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395d(a) (1988) identifies covered
services as semiprivate rooms, ordinary nursing care, social services, medications, supplies
durable medical equipment, and diagnostic or therapeutic goods or services normally provided by
the hospital to inpatients. Under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395x(b)(6) (1988), skilled nursing facility visits
and services may also be covered, but not for purposes of custodial care. Id. See Daniel
Callahan, Limiting Health Care for the Old, in AGING AND ETHICS 219, 222 (Nancy S. Jecker,
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seniors receive Social Security' 2 and Medicare funds,' 3 a majority of these
recipients verge on poverty.'14  Medicare and Social Security operate as
government administered social insurance programs, 7 -and they are in deep
financial trouble." Resources within the system are finite; however
demand for services appears infinite.7'"
ed. 1991) (stating Medicare does not cover long term care costs and requires recipients to pay
several hundred dollars towards the costs of hospitalization). Id. Length of stay is limited to 60
days. Id. Under 42 U.S.C.A. §1395x(m) (1994), home health services for visiting nursing
services and rehabilitative therapy professionals or assistants and durable medical goods are
covered. However, service delivery agencies may impose time restrictions on the number of
hours providers will visit each patient. See MEDICARE HOME HEALTH AGENCY MANUAL
205.1. For a listing of Part B covered services see Furrow, supra note 1, § 13-15. Medicare
excludes from coverage any services "not reasonably necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of
illness or injury or to improve the functioning of a malformed body part." 42 U.S.C.A. §
1395y(a)(1) (1994).
171. Rothstein, supra note 159, at 617. Elderly people covered under Medicare often
purchase Medi-gap insurance. Id. Long-term care insurance policies are also a popular purchase
with older Americans. Id.
172. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397e (1994).
173. Dauster, supra note 170, at 464, (citing government figures that reveal over 43 million
individuals receive monthly Social Security benefits and 32 million people over 65 are Medicare
recipients). See David Mechanic, Professional Judgment and the Rationing of Medical Care,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1713, 1716 (1992). "[Lless than half of the elderly's health-care costs are
covered by Medicare. . . ." Id.
174. Dauster, supra note 170, at 466. Statistical records indicate, "a vast segment of
America's seniors need Social Security and Medicare to remain above the poverty level." Id.
Social Security is the primary income for over half of the senior beneficiaries. Id. Of the small
percentage of Social Security beneficiaries receiving income from other sources, over 65%
realize less than $10,000 annually in non-governmental income. Id. Three-fourths of Medicare
recipients make less than $25,000 annually. Id.
175. Id. at 463, 464. The programs operate by matching workers' contributions to the
system with employers' contributions. Dauster, supra note 170, at 464. While Social Security
pays out retirement, death, and disability benefits, Medicare provides funds for health needs of
the elderly and persons experiencing long term disability. Id.
176. See Dauster, supra note 170, at 464, for a detailed discussion of the perils of funding
these federal programs. "[I]n the end, however, the choices are simple ones: cutting benefits or
raising taxes." Id. at 506. See also, Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 1996,Medicare Solvency: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Budget, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
309, 309 (1995).
177. A View of How Health Issues Might Play, 22 HEALTH LEGIS. & REG. WKLY., Nov.
7, 1996, available in ALLNEWSPLUS, File No. WL 11279477. Douglas Badger, aide to
Senate Majority Whip Don Nickles, said that the focus of health policy, once cost control, has
shifted to discussions about maintaining quality of care and consumer choice. Id. The
abundance of innovative, high technology treatment increases costs while the numbers of elderly
place heightened demands on limited resources. Id. See Steve Teske, Medicare Reductions
Threaten Access in Philadelphia Hospital Says Washington, BNA HEALTHCARE DAILY, Oct. 26,
1995 available in BNA-HCD, HCD d6 (reporting that the president of Albert Einstein Medical
Center fears devastating result should Medicare be cut in accordance with proposed legislation.
Reductions in Medicare will force smaller hospitals into financial ruin). Id. Larger institutions
will have to absorb patients from defunct small hospitals as well as deal with loss of federal
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IV. RATIONING RESOURCES
While the first shots of the opening rounds in the battle over
resource allocation have been fired, the rationing revolution is not fully
underway.", Unprecedented increases in longevity,' 9 a proliferation of
high technology medical care, and unrelenting demand for more and better
health-care in industrialized nations challenge existing social policies.'1
Financial considerations are of deep concern to government leaders.'8'
Health-care costs creep upward in some countries and soar in others. 82
funding. Id. This double whammy increases the financial burden on and demand for services
within the surviving institution. Id. But see, Charles Marwick, Longevity Requires Policy
Revolution, 273 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1319 (1995). In an interview with Robert H. Binstock,
Ph.D., Henry Luce Professor of Aging, Health, and Society at Case Western University School
of Medicine, Professor Binstock contended that withdrawing availability of technologically
advanced and costly procedures for patients 80 and older would have negligible impact on overall
health-care expenses. "Health-care as a percentage of gross domestic product is not associated
with population aging." Id. at 1318.
178. Jan Blustein & Theodore R. Marmor, Cutting Waste By Making Rules: Promises,
Pitfalls, and Realistic Prospects, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1543, 1569. While the term rationing
evokes fearsome images of forced choices "waste cutting . . . suggests saving people from
medical interventions that would not have done them any good." Id. at 1544. The author's user-
friendly term waste cutting encompasses both administrative and procedural aspects of medical
services. Id. Does putting a more benign face on the process of allocating scarce resources
make rationing decisions less problematic?
179. See Part II, supra notes 1-10 (discussing the demographic shift and the impacts of the
elderly on health-care service provision).
180. Dov Chernichovsky, Health System Reforms in Industrial Democracies: An Emerging
Paradigm 73 MILBANK Q. 339, 342 (1995). All industrialized democracies are implementing
health-care reforms, tailoring changes to cultural, social, historical, and political circumstances
unique to each nation. Id. at 339. The central themes of reform are directed at cost
containment, quality concerns, improving efficiency, and equitable distribution of services. Id.
at 339-40.
181. Goold, supra note 159, at 69. Resources are limited because society must also
purchase a wide range of other services, such as education, housing, national defense, food, etc.
Id. at 70. In order to allocate a finite monetary sum among a variety of competing services,
expenditures in one sector are necessarily limited. Id. The ability of society to purchase health-
care in sufficient quantity has strained finances; yet demand continues to escalate. Id. The
author articulates the question over which countries struggle: "Who shall decide how to ration
health-care, and how shall this be done to respect autonomy, pluralism, liberalism, and
fairness?" Id. at 69.
182. Blustein, supra note 178, at 1543. In 1970, Americans allocated only 7.4% of Gross
Domestic Product to health-care. Id. In 1990, the figure had almost doubled. Id. See
Rothstein, supra, note 159 at 615, for a listing of percentages of Gross Domestic Product spent
on Health-care. Canada spends almost 10%; the United States spends 14%. Id. "Most of the
countries report that health-care inflation is greater than the general inflation rate." Id. See also,
Dauster, supra note 170, at 474. The Social Security fund will stop running surpluses in less
than twenty years and will be exhausted in 2031. Id. at 480. Medicare is projected to run at a
deficit imminently. Id. at 486. "The Medicare HI Trust Fund is in worse condition than the
Social Security Trust Fund . . . in the short run, Social Security expenditures are currently
growing at roughly the same rate as the economy, Medicare costs are growing mush more
quickly, reflecting the rapid growth of medical expenses. .. ." Id.
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The potential of medicine to develop and offer innovative treatments
increases, yet payors' finances become increasingly constrained. In the
face of scarce resources, the question is not whether to ration health-care,
but how rationing is to be accomplished.
One focus of debate centers on the philosophical rationales
employed to ration scarce resources. Rationing determinations ideally
encompass principles of autonomy, fairness, and justice.'83 The application
of moral principles to health-care resource decision making poses a number
of problems. First, there is a lack of consensus on how to apply often
conflicting moral principles.1M Second, structural supports are inadequate;
the process of allocating resources is ill-defined.'85 Finally, substantive
criteria used for rationing are often based on sketchy data.8 6  Despite
183. Goold, supra note 159, at 71. The author defines autonomy as the right to make
independent decisions. Id. Justice requires allocating social resources fairly. Id. The concept
of fairness encompasses respecting all people equally, and regarding every person as deserving
and worthy. Id. The author supports private health system reform. Id. at 81. She contends that
policies that use moral criteria for rationing could be developed and enforced by institutional
authorities (Health Maintenance Organization's, other managed care entities, insurers, and
hospital boards). Id at 95. Further, the actions of these institutional authorities, if supported by
morally relevant criteria, should be upheld by the courts. Goold, supra note 159, at 95.
184. Goold, supra note 159, at 72. Which principle will prevail when conflicts occur?
Society lacks consensus on notions of moral reasoning and distributive justice. Id. Different
premises for rationing are advanced by various philosophical camps. Id at 76. Rawlsians
advance a theory of distributive justice to ensure equal opportunity among all consumers;
utilitarians argue for maximizing available quantities of health-care through the use of some cost-
effective standard; and libertarians assert the beneficence principle compels moral societies to
provide health-care for individuals who lack the means to obtain services. Id. at 72. See also
Shah Ebrahim, Public Health Implications of Ageing, 29 J. ROYAL C. PHYSICIANS LONDON
207, 209 (1995) (contending that the clinical ethical value of beneficence conflicts with utilitarian
principles). "One of the major tensions for professionals in management is to juggle these two
ethical principles of beneficence and utilitarianism, both of which have validity." Id. Ebrahim
cautions that favoring individual interests over the greater good would create "an insatiable
consumer of health-care." Id.
185. Goold, supra note 159, at 74. As opposed to defining and invoking substantive
matters to guide rationing allocations, "[a] practical advantage of a focus on the process of
decision making is its flexibility, its ability to change decisions as both facts and social values
change." Id.
186. Ebrahim, supra note 184, at 210. In Britain, where health-care policy is based upon
utilitarian principles, resources are distributed to ensure the greatest good for the largest number
of people. Id. The author contends that policy considerations should incorporate selective
provision of resources "where they will do the most good" rather than continuing distribution
according to historical patterns of use. Id. at 209. The paucity of outcome-based information
prevents redefining objectives according to health outcome. Id. See Edward Dickinson & Paula
Rochon, Commentary, Cochrane Collaboration in Health-care of Elderly People, 24 AGE &
AGING 265 (1995). The Cochrane Collaboration is a collaborative web of individuals who, since
1993, have worked to achieve three objectives, all having to do with disseminating health-care
data. Id. The group conducts literature searches to identify published randomized controlled
trials on the 25 topic areas currently under investigation. Id. The group produces Cochrane
reviews in keeping with explicit guidelines. Id. The Cochrane Collaboration also created and
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uncertainty in defining the objectives, principles of supply and demand
compel substantial change in the distribution of resources.
Several schemes for allocating health-care have emerged in the
past decade. The market-based approach'7 has been completely rejected
for its failure to address market imbalances, an inability to disseminate
information to consumers, a lack of accountability, and an overall absence
of fairness. "I Cost-benefit analysis presents both methodological and
interpretive problems.'89 Nor is entrusting health-care policy making to
government institutions without risk. Factionalism, pork-barrel politics
and the inability of under represented segments of society to access
legislative and administrative forums are factors which jeopardize equitable
outcomes in a democratic decision making process.1'9 Although regulatory
maintains a registry for the reviews together with an information distribution system for
individuals requesting information. Ebrahim, supra note 184, at 209. The Collaboration
established the Cochrane Collaboration in the health-care of elderly People in response to the
growing importance of investigations focused on geriatric populations. Id. One focus of the
group is to compile a specialized database relevant to health issues affecting the elderly.
Dickinson, supra note 186, at 265.
187. Goold, supra note 159, at 75 (describing this process as allocating resources on the
basis of a consumer's ability to pay for service).
188. Id. at 74. The effects of insurance and the presence of market monopolies as well as
the status of health-care as a public good create market imperfections. Id. at 75. Providers'
poor attempts at educational outreach and the efforts of some within the system to preserve
personal power by controlling the flow of information are communication barriers to the
consumer. Id. Furthermore, many argue ability to pay is neither a fair nor a just criterion for
rationing decisions. Id. Dr. Goold asserts that "the 'invisible hand' of the health-care market is
not accountable to the general population." Id. at 76.
189. Ebrahim, supra note 184, at 209, questions the definition of the term benefit in the
cost-benefit analysis. Utilitarians regard benefit to be that measure, which gives a population
value for the treatment that an individual receives. Id. The yardstick by which benefit is
measured is defined as the quality adjusted life year (QALY), years of life gained by virtue of
receiving treatment. Id. at 209. The utilitarian definition differs from the definition of benefit
according to a clinical perspective. Id. To a practitioner, a benefit enhances the life of the
individual patient. Id. A clinician's yardstick measures the personal benefit derived from each
intervention or course of treatment. Id. As each individual's response to disease and treatment
is unique, the outcomes measures are flexible and individually focused. Ebrahim, supra note
184, at 209. Which definition of benefit, population-centered or individualistic, should be
employed in a cost-benefit analysis? See also Goold, supra note 159, at 78. Outcome data may
exclude consumers' perceptions about aspects of service unrelated to medical improvement;
however, perceptions may greatly influence an individual's sense of well-being. Cost benefit
analysis fails for a number of reasons, which Dr. Goold discusses in detail. Id. at 77. Among
the reasons he discusses are the following: the outcome measurements derived from the entire
population are applied to individuals who may respond unconventionally, intangibles that impact
health are not included in the calculus of benefits as measured by outcomes, and there are
problems implicit in the method used to value benefits. Id. at 77.
190. Goold, supra note 159, at 82 (taking issue with allowing health-care decisions to be
made in the political arena for a number of reasons). The wealth and life experiences of many
politicians influence their exercise of power. Id. at 81. The voice of privilege is not necessarily
the voice of experience, best able to identify where resources should be allocated. Id. at 82. Dr.
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bodies develop frameworks which delineate reimbursable services,
technological growth and patterns of industry expansion, these types of
determinations are far removed from the exigencies of disease, the
expectations of patients, and the dilemmas of daily care. 19
Proponents of bedside rationing express confidence that physicians
are in the best position to allocate resources.'9 A system that preserves
physician control over resource-allocation decisions precludes
governmental entities from promulgating complex and detailed sets of
rationing rules for every conceivable factual contingency. '1 Despite the
insanity of rule-based rationing,' ceding rationing decisions over to
physicians has been opposed on moral and ethical grounds.' 95
Consequently, United States legislation severs cost considerations from
Goold points out that the ability of socially or economically powerful groups to sway decision
making does not contribute to reasoned decision making. Id. at 84.
191. David Mechanic, Professional Judgment and Rationing, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1713,
1721 (1992) (supporting the concept of a central authority that sets broad constraints on the
market but asserts that "the realistic contingencies of disease, the complexities of comorbidity
and the diversity personal and family situations," need to be addressed by the care giver). Id.
192. Id. at 1728. The doctor is in the best position to respond to unanticipated
circumstances. Id. Using clinical discretion builds in sensitivity to individual variances, which
is factored into the allocation process. Id. Ongoing communication between doctor and patient
promotes effective service provision. Id. Malpractice suits and internal organizational structures
such as peer review committees and grievance proceedings provide checks against abuse. Id.
193. Peter A. Ubel & Robert M. Arnold, The Unbearable Rightness of Bedside Rationing,
155 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1837 (1995). Bedside rationing is a necessity if cost
containment is to be accomplished. Id. It is one of several cost containment mechanisms
available to governments and other payors. Id. at 1839. The extensive scope of guidelines
required to capture the particulars of every case risks quality at the expense of possible clarity.
Id. at 1841.
194. Mark A. Hall, Rationing Health Care at the Bedside, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 702
(1994). "A complete and scientifically valid set of rationing rules would entail the impossible
task of developing rigorous empirical information for each of the almost 10,000 diagnostic
entries in the World Health Organization's International Classification of Diseases and the almost
10,000 medical' interventions listed in the American Medical Association's Current Procedural
Terminology." Id. Add to that daunting task of updating the rules each time a medical advance
occurs, and the fact that the rules do not account for consumer preferences. One can grasp the
extraordinarily challenging burden of developing such a system.
195. Id. at 703. Traditional medical ethicists find bedside rationing morally and ethically
indefensible. Id. Rationing poses a conflict of interest with the physician's obligation to heal the
sick. Id. The role of healer compels the doctor to provide every benefit, no matter how small to
an ailing patient. Id. at 705. Traditionalists argue that cost-consciousness falls within the domain
of policy-making, and should not taint medical decision making. Hall, supra note 194, at 706.
Minority viewpoints also exist. Id. Some accept bedside rationing, but only when providers are
not financially compensated on the basis of rationing decisions. Id. at 707. A small proportion
of ethicists regards rationing as an inescapable necessity. Id. But see Ubel supra note 193, at
1842. The moral problems have been overstated.
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bedside rationing for recipients of government funding,'" and Britain's
National Health Service educates physicians to internalize cost
considerations through the practice of conservative clinical decision
making. '19
Who should decide how to ration medical care? No easy, generic
solution exists. Physician-practitioners who must adapt to new practice
constraints imposed by rationing wrestle with the problem daily.
Dealing with human beings and their problems, we are
person and event oriented; our creed has always been and
is the best that can be done for an individual, at a point in
time. Increasingly, we must modify this traditional
approach by viewing episodic care of the individual as a
part of two continua, of the individual in relation to their
life span, and of the individual in relation to the
community and health-care system to which all belong.
We are not skilled or practiced in defining our overall
aims. '9
The general consensus is that bedside rationing, with all its faults, is a
clinical reality which practitioners must learn to tolerate.
To the increasing numbers of elderly health-care consumers, the
import of rationing will depend upon the objectives that the rationing is
designed to achieve. Should industrialized nations provide invasive
medical assistance for whatever stretch of years legislators determine to be
a "natural life span,"'" and thereafter finance only palliative care? The
underlying rationale supporting a policy of age-based rationing is the
equitable and cost-effective distribution of health-care services among all
196. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9313(c)(1)(E),
100 Stat. 1874, 2003 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(b)(1) (1988)) (prohibiting hospitals from
paying doctors as an inducement to ration care to Medicare or Medicaid patients). Hall, supra
note 194, at 708. Several state legislatures are considering whether to mandate that Health
Maintenance Organizations must reveal the basis of financial incentives.
197. Since British doctors within the National Health System [hereinafter NHS] are salaried
employees, there are no explicit cash inducements to ration care; however, the 1991 reforms
have introduced market competition into the System. The reinvention of British health-care
makes explicit rationing an emerging concern. Now, different units within the NHS compete for
the dollars that follow each patient, economic viability of particular NHS programs may not turn
on cost determinations. See discussion of the National Health Service, supra Part III.
198. Harry E. Emson, Health, Aging, and Death, 4 CAMBRIDGE Q. OF HEALTHCARE
ETHICS 163 (1995).
199. Daniel C. Callahan, Limiting Health-care for the Old, in AGING & ETHIcs 219, 224
(Nancy Jecker, ed. 1991). "The future goal of medical science should be to improve the quality
of old people's lives, not to lengthen them." Id. at 223. The author defines 'natural lifespan' as
seventy to eighty years but realizes that others may set different endpoints. Id. at 224.
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age groups of consumers.- Age-based rationing ends intergenerational
warfare over scant resources but creates its own set of problems.101
Current policy (or lack thereof) allows elders to consume services at the
expense of other age cohorts.m
But restricting elders' access to costly technology and aggressive
medical interventions in their final years, though intuitively appearing to be
a cost-saving strategy, is actually of only marginal economic
significance.203 The real costs are associated with chronic conditions,
which afflict the elderly and impair functional status.2'4 Allocating funds
for research into conditions such as Alzheimer's disease, Parkinsonism,
and osteoarthritis, promises to ultimately reduce the financial burden upon
the health-care system.205
The needs of the increasing numbers of elderly who are not
seriously ill but require expensive supportive care are of great concern.20
200. Id. at 224. Government-supported medical care should relieve suffering and avert
premature death rather than deliberately attempt to extend life beyond the natural life span. Id.
Three principles underlie this type of rationing. Id. at 225. First, the government should not
seek to extend life beyond the natural life span. Callahan, Supra note 199, at 225-26. at 225-26.
Second, the government's entitlement programs should finance medical technology necessary to
allow individuals a natural life span. Id. at 225-26. Third, the government should provide only
palliative care, not life-extending technologies, to individuals who exceed the limits of a natural
life span. Id. at 226.
201. First, how will one define a natural lifespan? Callahan, supra note 199, at 224
(suggesting the late 70s or early 80s). Insurance companies currently use actuarial tables to
accomplish the same objective. Demographic data, though, continue to push the edge of the
envelope to ever-higher numbers. See Laslett supra note 4. Second, we devalue the
contributions of the elderly if society merely juggles numbers in order to maximize returns on
our dollar investments. Disregard for individual contributions to the social network of family
and community transforms elderly people into little more than unprofitable investments.
202. Norman Daniels, A Lifespan Approach to Health-Care in AGING & ETHICS 227, 230
(Nancy Jecker, ed. 1991). The number of children living in poverty exceeds the number of poor
elderly, in part because the elderly are entitled to Social Security benefits and other government
spending programs. Id. at 230-31.
203. Smith & Rother, supra note 169, at 1850. Studies examining Medicare expenditures
during the final year of life, indicate that the proportion of money spent has been nearly constant
each year since the Medicare program began; "only 3% of Medicare decedents incur 'high costs'
• . . but saving this sum would have produced little of economic significance in the context of
health-care expenditures that reached nearly one-half of a trillion dollars." Id.
204. Id. at 1851 (pointing out that monies spent on government funded research in to
geriatric pathologies accounts for only a small fraction of expenditures associated with these
diseases). Prevention could radically decrease costs. Id.
205. Id.
206. Alison Barnes, The Policy and Politics of Community-Based Long-Term Care, 19
NOVA L. REV. 487, 491 (1995). "One of the most problematic aspects of health-care reform is
the absence of well-developed and funded plans for providing long-term home and community-
based care to aged and disabled persons." Id.
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Current supports in industrialized nations are woefully inadequate.m7 In the
United States, patterns of fraud and regulatory violations have been
reported frequently within the nursing home industry.m Changes in
Britain's National Health Service have shifted skilled nursing funding from
the public to the private domain.2 Private markets exist for home help,
housekeeping, and home companions for the elderly; however, non-
traditional supportive living arrangements afford few legal protections.' 0
The Japanese still regard the family as the primary source of care for the
elderly; however, that support erodes as the number of elderly in the
population increase.21 Even Canada has imposed explicit limits on certain
services and now requires co-payments for consumers of long term care. 22
In sum, industrialized nations need improved programs that serve older
individuals across a spectrum of care.
V. CONCLUSION
Around the globe, industrialized nations have failed to adequately
define the scope of care and to develop service mechanisms for elderly
consumers. Developing a comprehensive health-care system in which
207. Daniels, supra note 202, at 232 (characterizing the long-term care system as "the
clearest example of the failure to meet important needs"). Id. The author argues against
institutionalizing many of the elderly, preferring to strengthen home health outreach. Id. at 238.
"They will have more opportunity to complete projects and pursue relationships of great
importance to them, or even to modify the remaining stages of their plans of life." Id.
208. John Braithwaite, The Nursing Home Industry, 18 CRIME & JUST. 11, 12-14 (1993)
(discussing the nature of violations in the nursing home industry, and noting that Medicaid and
welfare fraud are increasingly common). Quality of care regulation is also subject to fraud. Id.
at 13.
209. See Whitehead, supra note 118, at 13.
210. Andrew Bainham, Shared Living Among the Elderly: A Legal Problem in Search of a
Home, in AN AGING WORLD, DILEMMAS & CHALLENGES FOR LAW & SOCIAL POLICY 426,
429 (John Eekelar & David Pearl eds., 1989) (noting that different types of for-profit services
are provided to elderly). However, "greater consideration needs to be given to the professional
organization of such services." Id. at 430. In addition, shared living arrangements that are
outside of the for-profit domain may place elderly individuals at legal risk. Id. at 431. English
law has not provided protections for the unconventional relationships formed when unrelated
elderly people reside in the same home. Id. at 432-36. Contractual arrangements may offer
some rights to individuals who wish to enter into an agreement regarding a supportive living
arrangement; however the current law does not favor such arrangements. Id. at 438. The author
concludes that more attention needs to be devoted to the legal implications of shared living
arrangements among the elderly. Id.
211. Maeda, supra note 57, at 313 (asserting that the family is paramount in providing
support for the elderly; however services "will undoubtedly need to be expanded" due to
anticipated increases in frail elderly and changes in family networks resulting from increasing
industrialization and urbanization of Japanese society). See also supra Part III, discussing health-
care in Japan.
212. See supra Part III discussing health-care in Canada.
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elderly consumers can obtain affordable care remains a daunting challenge
both in universal care systems and in the patchwork system of the United
States. However, targeting the health-care needs of the elderly must
become a priority.
The burden on health-care systems produced by the increasing
demands of growing numbers of elderly is a problem that will not soon
vanish. Governments grapple with the problem, but provide too little, too
late. Nor can care of the elderly continue to be delegated to families.
Families are no longer able to afford, both emotionally and financially, the
costs of caring for multiple generations of elders.
What will the health-care of tomorrow be, an E Ticket ride through
a maze of gatekeepers, a brave new world of institutional rationing, or
something more caring and less self-serving than a social system that
refuses to address the needs of those who are disadvantaged by age or
disability? The magnitude of the demographic shift occurring across
industrialized nations most assuredly is transforming health-care systems.
It is unclear whether the pressures of change will create diamonds from
disorder or leave the elderly in a situation where they have fallen and can't
get up.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Man's exploration of space is often analogized to his exploration of
the ancient oceans. Ancient sea-explorers faced obstacles of uncharted
oceans and land. They also faced difficulties in finding the means and
financing to make their discoveries. Space industrial development suffers
difficulties as well, however, many of the difficulties are legal obstacles.
This author' and numerous legal authorities2 have asserted that international
space law presently hinders the commercial development of outer space,
and thus, requires legal change. Vigorous space commercial development
is crucial, however, not for intellectual development alone.3 It offers
massive economic,4  medical,, industrial,6  and humanitarian rewards.7
1. Ty S. Twibell, Note: Space Law: Legal Restraints on Commercialization and
Development of Outer Space, 65 UMKC L. REV. 590.
2. See Glenn H. Reynolds, International Space Law: Into the Twenty-First Century, 25
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 225, 233 (1992). ("The United States should play a major part by
proposing amendments to the Treaty that recognize the important role played by private property
rights in promoting development of outer space."); Kurt A. Baca, Property Rights in Outer
Space, 58 J. AIR L. & COM. 1041, 1046 (1993) ("The successful development of space
resources requires meaningful property rights, allocation of those rights and recourse to some
power for the enforcement of those rights."); Heidi Keefe, Making the Final Frontier Feasible:
A Critical Look at the Current Body of Outer Space Law, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 345, 347-48 (1995) (asserting that space industrial development is inhibited by the
current body of international space law).
3. See Twibell, supra note 1, at 1.
4. "Mhe current space industry today is a multi-billion dollar industry with revenues of
$40 billion annually." Id. at 31. "Although these figures sound impressive, they are a result of
small-scale, isolated space ventures which merely scratch the surface of what can be achieved
given changes in the current legal regime." Id. at 32.
5. Advancements in the medical field have resulted from efforts in space endeavors such
as artificial skin, "accelerated development of hospital monitoring devices and similar paramedic
tools, heart pacemakers, and artificial skin. . . . In space biotechnology, purer biological
preparations have been obtained for manufacturing non-allergenic medicines, more active and
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Better vaccines and antibiotics can be produced in space in far greater
quantities than on earth.8 Mining the moons,9 asteroids, 0 and comets"
provides answers to future energy depletion and would provide enormously
less expensive construction of spacecraft and colonies than launching from
Earth. 2 Space industry also paves the way in addressing future crises both
manmade3 and natural."4
stable strains of antibiotics, vitamins for use in agriculture, and ultrapure serums and vaccines."
Id. at 39.
6. The electronics industry would benefit from space industry and some of these benefits
are already being realized on a small scale much for the same reasons as developments in
vaccines and antibiotics, see supra note 5, because of the vacuum and weightlessness of space
unmatched by any attempt to replicate a similar vacuum on earth. Ceramic oxide crystals grown
in space have lead to developments in "computer memories, optical communications,
optoelectronics, and ultrasonics . . . . " Id. at 42.
Another compound, gallium arsenide, used for switching on computers, is estimated to
have a worldwide market of $860 million by the year 2000. One company has
contracted with NASA to produce gallium arsenide aboard the space shuttle and
estimates $400 million could be realized with only ten percent of the market.
Id.
7. Humanitarian rewards would result from the societal benefit from the improvements
and products space industry has to offer. Space industry would also provide a strong foothold in
space able to solve near-future crises. See infra note 13.
8. "The [space] environment enables, as demonstrated by experiments on the space
shuttle, improved production over earth bound laboratories at seven hundred times the quantity
and four times the purity." Twibell, supra note 1, at 38 (citing NATHAN C. GOLDMAN,
AMERICAN SPACE LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC 25 (1996)).
9. The Moon has numerous resources available such as iron, aluminum, copper, and
Helium3. Id. at 44. Helium3, once nuclear fusion becomes controlled, exists on the Moon in
massive quantities and barely exists on Earth because of the solar wind and Earth's atmosphere.
Helium3 would enable fusion to have virtually no dangerous radiation unlike the current use of
fission.
10. A "one-kilometer-sized metallic asteroid will provide a billion tons of iron, 200
million tons of nickel, 10 million tons of cobalt, and 20,000 tons of platinum metals: net market
value, about $1 trillion." JOHN S. LEWIS & RUTH A. LEWIS, SPACE RESOURCES: BREAKING
THE BONDS OF EARTH 105, 394 (1989).
11. Hydrocarbons, similar to peterochemicals and fossil fuels, exist in massive quantities
throughout the solar system. For example, "Halley's Comet hydrocarbon stores are comparable
to Earth's entire reserves." Twibell, supra note 1, at 47 (citing A. Zuppero, Discovery of
Abundant, Accessible Hydrocarbons Nearly Everywhere in the Solar System, in STEWART W.
JOHNSON, 2 ENGINEERING, CONSTRUCTION, AND OPERATIONS IN: SPACE V 791 (1996).
Moreover, comets come closer to Earth than other celestial bodies and can be reached using
current rocket technology. See id. at n.330.
12. Launching payloads into space is very burdensome and cumbers construction of large
spacecraft. Mining celestial bodies is the key.
Mining extra-terrestrial bodies, such as asteroids and the moon, is crucial
for a substantive space industrialization, not for the immediate purpose of
exportation back to Earth to supplement our resources - that is a need not
to come for many decades or centuries - but for colonization and the
construction of large projects in space. Such mining is the only feasible way
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This paper seeks methods to overcome legal hurdles that inhibit
mankind's motivation to develop a vigorous space industry. It also seeks
to address concerns for endeavors that will ultimately challenge the current
weaknesses in space law including colonization, space stations, and new
to construct any space station, space ship, or other similar facility of any
significant size. It is to inefficient and expensive to launch large amounts of
raw materials into space. For example, it takes 100 tons of rocket
propellant to get one ton of payload into geostationary orbit. Whereas, a
mass driver - a sort of magnetic catapult already technologically feasible -
on the moon or an asteroid could hurl mined materials into orbit for
construction, lifting 100 times its own weight into orbit every year. This
would lower the cost of building space facilities near earth by an amazing
20,000 times.
Id. at 45.
13. Established colonies in space would obviously create an escape route for world-wide
man-made catastrophes such as nuclear holocaust. Space development would also pave the way
for the development of new technologies that could address needs here on earth. Overpopulation
is one inevitable problem. Nobel Laureate, Richard Smalley notes the population explosion as
one reason to invest in nanotechnology research. The human population explosion is unique
from any time in history. Smalley states that the human population has never decreased since
year 1 A.D. It has remained constant on a global level and has exponentially increased over the
past two centuries. Major wars and plagues that have been often cited as important in keeping
the human population at a controllable level and that a major third world war or viral epidemic as
inevitable in controlling the human population and that neither has existed for sometime.
However, that assertion is a myth. Neither wars nor the Black Death (which killed a third of
Europe) affected total world population levels. The total world population was approximately
one billion until the 1800s. It slightly rose until the beginning of the twentieth century to almost
two billion. The industrial revolution and advances in education were one of the main causes.
After World War II the population was almost 3.5 billion. Today it is over six billion. The
U.N. projects total world population levels by the middle of the next century to be approximately
twelve to sixteen billion before leveling off. Smalley goes on to state that "keep in mind, four
billion of today's six billion live a lifestyle that many of us in this room would find abhorrent."
That fact, relatively speaking, probably will not change. The concerns of feeding fifteen billion
are not such a problem, but energy consumption and carbon dioxide pollution resulting. See
Richard Smalley lecture, University of Missouri-Kansas City, March 26, 1997. Space industrial
development will be a necessary venture to help man's population problem.
14. Natural occurences, although perhaps far away and perceptively academic still merit
attention.
[T]he survival of mankind could ultimately depend on a well-developed foothold in
space and commercial development. One day the Earth will die. It could be
tomorrow or in a few billion years. Assuming the later occurs, the middle-aged sun
will swell up into a red giant and swallow the Earth before it contracts into a white-
dwarf or black hole. [But] there will also be environmental catastrophes beyond our
control. For example, there are about 2,000 asteroids or other similar objects that will
cross Earth's orbit, measuring at least one kilometer in size that threaten use with
collision and mass global destruction and at least a documented 400 of these will
certainly collide with Earth.
Twibell, supra note 1, at 31.
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technologies such as nanotechnology and replicating technology.', This
hurdle is treaty-made, therefore, international legal analysis is required to
jump over the hurdle. Dias, Gama, Columbus, Magellan, and Drake
sought the safest or the shortest passages to a desired destination.' 6
Similarly, this paper will first focus on the safest or the shortest passage in
jumping the legal hurdle of international corpus juris spatialis" before
proceeding to the longest and most difficult passage - circumnavigating
the entire globe. In this instance, circumnavigating the entire globe is
equivalent to the act of amending the treaty.
First, before exploring the best route of legal analysis, some
groundwork will need to be laid. This paper provides a brief overview of
the present body of international space law and will identify the
problematic portion of that body of law. Then, the basic principles of
international space laws primary source will be recognized while outlining
the full extent of the problem. Finally, this article will present and analyze
a series of vaccines (accepted methods for change in international treaty
law) to determine which vaccine is best for ridding international space law
of its virus.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL CORPUS JURIS SPATIALIS
The international corpus juris spatialis is a relatively new
emerging area of law beginning roughly in 1957.18 Soon thereafter, an
15. In 1982 NASA proposed an automated self-replicating lunar facility. NATIONAL
AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION & AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR ENGINEERING
EDUCATION, ADVANCED AUTOMATION FOR SPACE MISSIONS 189, NASA Conference
Publication 2255 (1982). If implemented, a self-replicating system would have profound effects
on law and society including displacing the entire global economy with cheap and accessible
goods and creating liability and property issues from an artificially intelligent machine that
converts res communis property into itself possible indefinitely. See infra text accompanying
notes 79-81 (discussing the res communis nature of outer space). Nanotechnology is a fairly new
field that deals with creating and manipulating substances and creating "machines on an atomic
or molecular scale." There is "wet" and "dry" nanotechnology. Living things are of the "wet
type." Living cells are "sacks filled with nanomachines." The dry kind, the kind most referred
to when using the term nanotechnology, seeks to create a similar biological process utilizing
molecular manipulation and artificial intelligence. Ralph Merkle, currently working for Xerox in
formulating molecular modeling for nanotechnology, has stated that molecular manufacturing
(basically nanotechnology) will replace the existing industrial infrastructure. For an article solely
addressing the legal implications of nanotechnology, see Glenn H. Reynolds, Legal Problems of
Nanotechnology: An Overview, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 593 (1994).
16. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE DISCOVERERS 286 (1983).
17. Derived from the Latin meaning body of space law.
18. Most commentators mark 1957 - the year the U.S.S.R. launched the first satellite,
Sputnik - as the year space law began to develop. See, e.g., GOLDMAN, supra note 8.
"Until then, the legal status of activities in space was a speculative matter rather than an
immediate practical problem." Twibell, supra note 1, at 9 citing C. WILFRED JENKS, SPACE
LAW 3 (1965)).
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immediate series of United Nations resolutions 9 and international treaties 2
swiftly emerged leading to the development of the 1967 Space Treaty. 2'
Even today, almost thirty years later, this is the primary space treaty which
is often referred to as "the cornerstone of international space law. "2
Three other treaties emerged soon after the 1967 Space Treaty's
passage, the last coming into being in 1975, which formed the main corpus
juris spatialis that exists today. 23 These three new treaties addressed more
19. BRUCE A. HURWITZ, THE LEGALITY OF SPACE MILITARIZATION 2, 18 (1986)
(referring to U.N. Resolutions 1721 A (XVI), 1962 (XVIII) and 1184 (XVIII) as some of the
resolutions leading up to the formation of the 1967 Space Treaty). The "1967 Space Treaty"
refers to infra, note 21.
20. See Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere in Outer Space and
Under Water, Oct. 10, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313.
21. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410
[hereinafter 1967 Space Treaty].
22. See Keefe, supra note 2, at 349. See also Twibell, supra note 1, at (9 citing
GOLDMAN, supra note 8, at 69). See also Barbara Ellen Heim, Note Exploring the Last
Frontiers for Mineral Resources: A Comparison of International Law Regarding the Deep
Seabed, Outer Space, and Antarctica, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 819, 832 (1990). Some
commentators even refer to the 1967 Space Treaty as the Mother Treaty of space law. See
Michael M. Bernard, Transformation of Property Rights in the Space Age, 7 AIR & SPACE L. 6,
11(1993).
23. See The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and Objects
Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570 [hereinafter 1968 Rescue and Return
of Astronauts Agreement]; The Convention of International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389 [hereinafter 1972 Convention on International
Liability]; Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28
U.S.T. 695 [hereinafter the 1975 Registration Convention]. Many commentators assert that the
main body is actually composed of five treaties. See, e.g., HURWITZ, supra note 19, at 2. They
include the 1979 Moon Treaty, United Nations: Agreement Governing the Activities of States on
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies opened for signature on Dec. 18, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1434, as
"one of the five stars in the constellation of space law." David Everett Marko, A Kinder Gentler
Moon Treaty: A Critical Review of the Current Moon Treaty and a Proposed Alternative, 8 J.
NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 293 (1993). However, this is a more popular notion of those
sympathetic to developing countries. Twibell, supra note 1, at 10 referring to HURWITZ, supra
note 19 (Israeli commentator), and CHARLES C. OKOLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SATELLITE
REMOTE SENSING & OUTER SPACE 42-50 (1989) (African sympathetic). The 1979 Moon Treaty
has not been included in this commentary because to date, "it has been ratified by only seven
states, whereas, the 1967 'Space Treaty' has been ratified by ninety-eight states." Twibell, supra
note 1, at 12 (citing Kurt Anderson Baca, Property Rights in Outer Space, 58 J. AIR L. & COM.
1041, 1069 (1993) (stating that the 1979 Moon Treaty is not binding as a treaty and "the claim
that it represents customary law is probably not credible")); and Eric Husby, Comment,
Sovereignty and Property Rights in Outer Space, 3 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 359, 361 (1994) (stating
that only seven nations have signed the 1979 Moon Treaty). Moreover, the signing of this
Treaty is not advocated because it would further negatively inhibit space investment.
If the space powers begin to sign the Moon Treaty, commercial investment will be
significantly inhibited more than it is under existing space law. Any present ambiguity
allowing some degree of property rights in space would be removed and those rights
along with it. Further, under the existing law, it is possible to interpret the proposition
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specific concerns than those of the 1967 Space Treaty. 24  For example, it
addressed liability for damage caused by space objects5 and the procedures
and protections afforded astronauts should they land or crash on foreign
soil.2 Accordingly, as time went on until now, both multilatera27 and
bilateral treatiesu were formed to meet the pressing needs of space
exploration 29  and a growing multi-billion-dollar industry,30
that non-state entities may be allowed to appropriate space property to themselves.
Intellectual property rights are also possible under existing law. However, the Moon
Treaty prevents ownership even [by non-state entities]. Intellectual property rights
would also be threatened and such innovations would be the property of all mankind,
and not of any particular person or nation. [I]f stripped of any exclusivity or their
outer space discoveries, companies are unlikely to invest resources in making such
discoveries.
Twibell, supra note 1. For a fuller understanding of property rights discussion as part of the
premise for seeking the change this paper advocates, see infra, text accompanying notes 29-44.
24. See infra, 1967 Space Treaty Discussion, text accompanying notes 38-44.
25. See, e.g., 1972 Convention on International Liability, supra note 23, art. V.
("Whenever two or more States jointly launch a space object, they shall be jointly and severally
liable or any damage caused.").
26. See, e.g., 1968 Rescue and Return of Astronauts Agreement, supra note 23, art. IV
("If, owing to accident, distress, emergency, or unintended landing, the personnel of a spacecraft
land in territory under the jurisdiction of any State, they shall be safely and promptly returned to
representatives of the launching authority.").
27. See Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization [hereinafter
INMARSAT], July 16, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 1. This treaty seeks to benefit all "ships of all nations
through the most advanced suitable space technology available, for the most efficient and
economic facilities possible consistent with the most efficient and equitable use of the radio
frequency spectrum and of satellite orbits." Id. preamble. It also seeks to "make provision for
the space segment necessary for improving maritime communications, thereby assisting in
improving distress and safety. . . ." Id. art. 3(1). See also Prohibition of Military or Any Other
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, Jan. 17, 1980, 31 U.S.T. 333 art. I, II
(regulating "environmental modification techniques" - the deliberate manipulation of . . .
natural process[es] - in outer space).
28. See, e.g., Agreement Among the Government of the United States of America,
Governments of Member States of the European Space Agency, the Government of Japan, the
Government of Canada on Cooperation in the Detailed Design, Development, Operation, and
Utilization of the Permanently Manned Civil Space Station, Sept. 29, 1988, 1992 WL 466295,
Article VII, available in USTREATIES database (entered into force Jan. 30, 1992)
(implementing aspects of criminal jurisdiction)[hereinafter European, Japanese, and Canadian
Space Station Agreement]; Agreement Between the United States and Italy for the Design,
Development, Operation and Utilitization of Two Mini Pressurized Logistics Modules and a Mini
Laboratory for Space Station Freedom, with Memorandum of Understanding, art. II, IV,
available in 1992 WL 466066 (entered into force June 1, 1992) (mandating that each nation will
retain jurisdiction over its nationals in its component of the space station)[hereinafter U.S./Italy
Space Station Agreement].
29. Although the 1979 Moon Treaty is not a main component of international space law
because it has been signed by so few countries, it serves as a good example of foreseen new
demands on the legal system caused by future space exploration. See 1979 Moon Treaty, supra
note 23. For example, the Treaty foresaw the eventual exploitation of the resources of the Moon
and other celestial bodies. See id. preamble.
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telecommunications' and the commercial launch industry 2 are two
examples. As a result, an immense body of international law has
developed in a span barely over thirty years. Its fast growth represents the
pace of modern society and the growth of communications and new
technology. This growth is unparalleled in authoritative doctrines and
institutional practices." This explosive growth is not limited to the
international realm; United States domestic law has also experienced an
equally explosive growth in its own corpus juris spatialis,3 and similarly,
the domestic law of other nations has experienced much growth.3
30. The current space industry is estimated to have revenues totaling upwards to $40
billion dollars annually. Twibell, supra note 1, at 30; see also, supra text accompanying notes
4-8.
31. See International Telecommunication Convention, Oct. 25, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 2497; see
also Operating Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization (hereinafter INTELSAT), Aug. 20, 1971, 23. U.S'T. 4091.
32. See, e.g., Memorandum of Agreement Between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China Regarding International Trade
in Commercial Launch Services, Mar. 16, 1989, U.S.-China, 28 I.L.M. 596.
33. Stephen Gorove, The Growth of Space Law Through the Cases, 24 J. SPACE L. 1
(1996).
34. Agency development, statutory law, and case law has flourished in the United States.
Major government agencies regulate outer space: The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (most famous regulator of space activity and forerunner of the United States space
industry), the Department of Defense (this department's space budget almost exceeds NASA's
entire budget), the Department of Transportation (regulates and licenses launching vehicles), and
the Department of Commerce (promotes the commercialization of space via its Office of Air and
Space Commercialization). See generally Twibell, supra note 1, at 2, 17. There has been an
appreciable amount of growth in the statutory realm as well. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C.A § 105 (West
1997) (regulating the patentability of inventions in outer space); 15 U.S.C.A. § 4201 (West
1997) (regulating land remote-sensing commercialization); 17 U.S.C.A. § 901 (West 1997)
(regulating the protection of semiconductor chips --such chips are produced efficiently in the
vacuum of outer space); The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-575,
(1984) (codified as amended in 49 U.S.C. § 70101 et. seq. (1984)); and the National Aeronautics
and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568, 72 Stat. 426 (1958) (codified as' amended in 42
U.S.C. § 2451 (1994) (forming NASA and instituting its directives and policies). See also
National Space Port Act Bill, 141 CONG. REC. H4915 (May 12, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Seastrand) ("a bill to encourage the development of the commercial space industry by promoting
State-run spaceports"); and The Space Business Incentives Act of 1995 (H.R. 1953) introduced
on June 28, 1995 (encouraging United States commercial space industry) as cited in
Congressional Notes, 23 J. SPACE L. 204 (1995). The ever slow developing United States space
case law is developing at a modest pace. Professor Stephen Gorove notes that United States
space case law began in 1946. See Gorove, supra note 33, at 3 (citing States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256 (1946) (hinting that the ancient doctrine cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelwn (he
who owns the land, owns it to the skies) may apply to outer space)). Since 1946, United States
space case law has developed in the areas of torts and contracts, environment (e.g., Fla.
Coalition for Peace and Justice v. George Herbert Walker Bush, Civil Action No. 89-2682-OG)
(D.D.C. 1989) (involving the Galileo spacecraft and environmentalists claiming it used
dangerously large amounts of plutonium), taxation (e.g. COMSAT v. Franchise Tax Board, 156
Cal. App. 3d 726 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1984) (holding that "satellites were 'tangible personal
property owned and used' in the state by the taxpayer"), intellectual property (e.g. Hughes
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Unfortunately, as stated in the forefront of this paper, despite the
immense growth and adaptation of space law to space activities, space law
lacks certainty and proper incentives, and, as a result, fails to effectively
promote aggressive space enterprise. Further, international law's failure in
these two respects will render it thoroughly incapable of regulating new
technologies that could take the world by storm?6
This brings the discussion of "International Corpus Juris Spatialis"
to its main issue - which part (or parts) of this immense body of space
law is the culprit? Fortunately, the culprit is one simple basic section -
the 1967 Space Treaty's no-sovereignty clause.17  This provision,
analogous to a computer virus, has spread throughout international law and
permeated every other subsequent agreement including United States
domestic law. How, and to what degree, this virus has spread is where
this paper now turns.
III. THE OVERARCHING EFFECT OF THE 1967 SPACE TREATY'S No-
SOVEREIGNTY PROVISION: IDENTIFYING THE DEGREE OF INFECTION
A computer virus spreads by replicating itself in other computer
programs until the programs are smothered by the overwhelming memory
storage requirements of the replicating virus. The no-sovereignty virus,
however, has only to replicate itself once to do its damage. And instead of
attacking computer programs, it attacks international legal documents.
Before discussing how to get rid of this virus, it is necessary to evaluate
what programs it has infected. But first, the virus itself will be discussed.
Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197 (1993) (holding that certain statutory claims did
not extend to outer space), id. at 5, 12, 15-16, and constitutional law (e.g., O'Hair v. Paine, 312
F.Supp. 434 (W.D. Tex. 1969) holding that religious activities, statements, and objects that
occurred or were placed aboard NASA's Apollo spacecraft did not constitute violations of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment). See Twibell, supra note 1, at 16.
35. Much of this development in foreign domestic law is attributed to the regulation of
growth in various country's space industrial infrastructure. Russia, China, the Ukraine, India,
Israel, Japan, Australia, Pakistan, and Brazil have established space industries. See Twibell,
supra note 1, at 1.
A multitude of other countries are involved in Space. For example, Canada has its
own space agency. Chile also has a space program. Some countries are becoming
involved in space for the sake of their own peoples' survival. Meterological satellites
are crucial for countries such as Ethiopia which need improved weather forecast and
early warning systems to [predict agricultural crises]. Kenya requires remote sensing
for many of the same reasons.
Id. at n.237.
36. See supra note 15.
37. See 1967 Space Treaty, supra note 21, art. II ("Outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means
of use or occupation, or by any other means.").
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The 1967 Space Treaty sought to instill into international law a
common consensus of views on the proper course for humanity to take in
space endeavors. The concepts it developed would permeate all
international law that followed." The basic concepts it instilled into
customary international law were the following:
1) Freedom of exploration and use of outer space and celestial bodies;
2) Non-appropriation of outer space or celestial bodies;
3) Exploration and use of outer space and celestial bodies in accordance
with the fundamental principles of international law, including the
basic principles of the United Nations Charter;
4) Partial demilitarization of outer space and total militarization of
celestial bodies;
5) Retention by states of sovereign rights over space objects launched;
6) International responsibility of states for national activities in space,
including liability for damage caused by space objects;
7) Prevention of potentially harmful consequences of experiments in
outer space and on celestial bodies;
8) Assistance to personnel of spacecraft in the event of accident, distress,
or emergency landing; and
9) International cooperation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer
space and celestial bodies.19
Most of these concepts will not be dealt with herein. However, it
must be noted that states retain jurisdiction and ownership of satellites and
spacecraft. Therefore, some level of property rights do exist, but only on
38. See 1967 Space Treaty, supra note 21, art. XIII which states that it would affect all
law and space activities as articulated in the following.
The provisions of this treaty shall apply to the activities of States Parties of the Treaty
in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, whether such activities are carried on by a single State Party to the Treaty or
jointly with other States, including cases where they are carried on within the
framework of international inter-governmental organizations. Any practical questions
arising in connection with activities carried on by international inter-governmental
organizations in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, shall be resolved by the States Parties to the Treaty either with the
appropriate international organization, which are parties to this Treaty..
Id.
39. GENNADY ZHUKOV & YURI KOLOSOV, INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 39-40 (1984)
(Professors Zhukov and Kolosov are former soviet scholars who played a role in the development
of international space law and have analyzed this treaty extensively).
40. See 1967 Space Treaty, supra note 21, art. VII. See also, text accompanying note 39.
It is this type of jurisdiction that is analogous to maritime law where states retain jurisdiction
over their ocean-going vessels in international waters. For a more extensive analysis of the
analogies between maritime law and space law, see GLENN H. REYNOLDS & ROBERT P.
MERGES, OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 27-47 (1989). There are also
analogies to the law regarding Antarctica. See Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 99 (1985)
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the spacecraft itself. Thus, a lunar colony or facility would likely have its
sender nation, or nations, retain jurisdiction over it. However, if it
becomes a mining operation, would the parameters immediately adjoining
the facility and the mined material, once it is removed, become the
property of the sender nation(s)? That is the issue where space
entrepreneurs become concerned. Hence, the main concept is the non-
appropriation of outer space or celestial bodies as Professors Zhukov and
Kolosov have termed the no-sovereignty provision.
The no-sovereignty provision is Article II of the Space Treaty. It
explicitly states that "[oluter space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by
means of use or occupation, or by any other means."4  This provision,
along with the other less- or non restraining concepts (regarding space
industrial development), has replicated itself throughout international law.
Most international multilateral 2  and bilateral agreements' 3  contain
references to the 1967 Space Treaty, and, invariably, the no-sovereignty
provision contained within the Treaty has spread, infecting all international
law and domestic law following it. Even if a treaty or law does not
contain reference to the 1967 Space Treaty or no-sovereignty provision, it
is still guided by it because the 1967 Space Treaty has become part of the
(noting that the legal framework governing Antarctica is frequently analogized to the law of outer
space). Moreover, not only are the principles analogous, but the wording from the 1967 Space
Treaty was borrowed from the Antarctic Treaty and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. See Twibell,
supra note 1, at 3.
41. See 1967 Space Treaty, supra note 21.
42. Most international legal multilateral treaty documents cited herein refer to the 1967
Space Treaty: 1968 Rescue and Return of Astronauts Agreement, supra note 23, preamble
(noting the importance of the 1967 Space Treaty and "desiring to develop and giver further
concrete expression of [those] duties. . ." within the 1967 Space Treaty); 1972 Convention on
International Liability, supra note 23, preamble ("recalling" the 1967 Space Treaty); 1975
Registration Convention, supra note 23, preamble ("recalling" 1967 Space Treaty and noting
how the 1967 Space Treaty reaffirms the idea that states bear responsibility for their spacecraft
(presumably referring to Article VII of the 1967 Space Treaty)); and the Convention on the
International Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), supra note 27, preamble ("considering the
relevant provisions" of the 1967 Space Treaty); 1979 Moon Treaty, supra note 23, preamble
("recalling" the 1967 Space Treaty and other space treaties--although it seeks to strengthen the
no-sovereignty provision). Although some treaties, such as The Operating Agreement Relating
to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), supra note 31, do
not explicitly refer to the 1967 Space Treaty, the Treaty is part of customary international law,
and therefore, if any of the aspect of such agreement still operates within the confines of the
Space Treaty. See infra text accompanying note 44.
43. See European, Japanese, and Canadian Space Station Agreement, supra note 28,
preamble (including the four major multi-lateral space treaties and specifically, the 1967 Space
Treaty); U.S./Italy Space Station Agreement, supra note 28, Preamble (recognizing the 1967
Space Treaty and specifically its Article III).
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customary international law." In conclusion, the virus is the no-
sovereignty provision in the 1967 Space Treaty and it has spread
throughout the global legal framework.41 Before addressing what vaccine
can be used to disinfect international law of this virus, some specific issues
and changes will be presented because if changes in the corpus juris
spatialis are to be employed, it is necessary to be specific about what
changes are needed instead of the simply calling for the elimination of the
no-sovereignty provision. Otherwise, where now there is some
44. It has been said that the formation of treaties itself is the result of customary practice.
See MARK E. VILLAGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 29 (1985).
Although developments and practices in regards to outer space can hardly be regarded as
customary, certainly the analogies and origins derived from the law of Antarctica and the sea
have customary origins. This paper advocates that indeed the 1967 Space Treaty and its no-
sovereignty provision are part of not only statutory international law, but customary international
law because, first, it is the cornerstone of four treaties that unanimously adhere to it in their
preambles. See supra note 42. Secondly, these four documents are considered to be the primary
corpus juris spatialis. See supra note 23. Although there was no "gradual hardening of practice
into law, " id., there was a formation of treaty law that now is common practice. The analysis
here may seem to be more proper in discussing the effect of a treaty (here, the 1967 Space
Treaty) over subsequent law, and indeed that is the next issue, however, space law development
is unique to over areas of law. It never had a chance to develop customary law before that
custom became ingrained in treaties. Unlike the oceans and polar regions, space was not being
explored and settled for centuries before the advent of law. Rather, space law practically arose
simultaneously with exploration. Technological and financial restraints made space travel a rare
occurrence allowing the legal system, in one of very few instances, to catch up or develop at the
at the same pace of an entirely new endeavor (although this paper advocates that it now, or will
very soon fall behind in space development). Therefore, space law has given rise to the
simultaneous formation of both treaty law and customary law. This conclusion is important
because it removes the additional analysis of determining whether the customary rule or the
treaty prevails. See cf. id. at 34.
Professor Verdross mentions one main process for a rule to go through in order to be
considered customary international law and it has three stages: (1) States engage in a given
practice or whatever reason; (2) states react to other state action in adhering or not adhering to
the practice "in the expectation that other states still again accord reciprocity;" and (3) the law
becomes customary law by states not only adhering to the rule but stating that it is a rule. Id. at
29-30. Have these rules occurred in respect to no-sovereignty? Well, that is difficult to
determine at least for the second two stages. It was stated as a rule first via treaty law and no
states have violated the Treaty, so it is difficult to determine how states will react. However, no-
sovereignty began the space age in the form of treaty law which has been adhered to for 30
years. It at the very least approaches customary international law. Finally, the 1967 Space
Treaty tends to state existing law from the analogous areas of law such as maritime law and the
law of Antarctica.
45. The United States Constitution mandates that "all Treaties . . .shall be the supreme
law of the Land." JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 51
(1996) (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2. In 1796, George Washington recognized that "every
Treaty [properly ratified] ...thenceforward becomes the law of the land." Id. See Edwin W.
Paxson, III, Note, Sharing the Benefits of Outer Space Exploration: Space Law and Economic
Development, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 487 (1993).
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uncertainty, without the clause and nothing to replace it, uncertainty would
be resoundingly present-'
The need for the industrialization of outer space has been briefly
established,'7 and if any argument remains, a thorough analysis of that
issue should be left for a separate discussion. ' At this point, the need for a
change in the legal framework supporting space industrialization is going
to be assumed. Accordingly, the legal discussion now turns to what exact
changes are desired to promote outer space development.
IV. DESIRED CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW:
IDENTIFYING THE VIRUS
The changes in international space law required for vigorous space
development can also be the subject of in-depth discussion. However,
since this paper focuses on how to implement changes, those changes are
going to be very brief and are hoped to be commonsensical, at least as it
relates to the premise of this paper. The following are the specific changes
generally recommended to be instituted in international space law:
1) Appropriation of celestial property to national or private entities at
some agreed upon level. The agreed upon level should, at a minimum,
include the ownership of mining operations, mining claims, mined
material once removed, and reasonable parameters of mining
operations;' 9
2) Determination of liability in automated and replicating systems;4' and
46. The counter argument of this proposition is that states or entities could own celestial
property after the removal of this provision. However, as discussed in supra note 44,
restrictions of ownership could be part of customary international law. Although if such a
provision's removal indeed perceived enough support to make its removal possible, certainly that
fact would support the creation of customary law. However, if it was not replaced even with an
affirmative approval of celestial property rights, the only clear indication would be uncertainty on
the status of property rights and thus, uncertainty would continue although property rights
advocate would have one more argument in their favor.
47. For an indepth discussion of the need for property rights in space and how they would
increase incentive for investment, see Twibell, supra note 1, and Keefe, supra note 2. See also
supra text accompanying notes 3-14.
48. See Twibell, supra note 1; Keefe, supra note 2. See generally Reynolds, supra note
2.
49. See supra note 2; Wayne N. White, Jr., Mining Law for Outer Space in SPACE
MANUFACTURING 8: ENERGY & MATERIALS FROM SPACE 83 (Barbara Faughnan & Gregg
Marniak eds., 1991).
50. See NASA CONFERENCE PUBLICATION 2255, ADVANCED AUTOMATION FOR SPACE
MISSIONS 189 (Robert A. Freitas, Jr. & William P. Gilbreath eds., 1982) (demonstrating the
feasibility, design, and implications of a self-replicating lunar factory); Ty S. Twibell,
Comment, Replicators and the Law: Analysis of the Legal Consequences of Replicating
Nanotechnology, UMKC L. REV. (forthcoming 1997). See also supra note 15 (discussing legal
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3) Formation of an international regime to oversee space activities,
address technical issues, and enforce international space regulation."1
V. ANALYSIS OF THE ALTERNATIVES IN INSTITUTING CHANGE IN
INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW: DEVELOPING A VACCINE
There are a number of vaccines available to rid international space
law of legal viruses. In international legal thinking, many vaccines are
available to combat, for whatever reason, treaty-made law. These vaccines
are variations of the terms modification or termination.2  Termination"3
could be used quite properly as a vaccine. However, it makes no sense to
simply terminate a provision when the true objective is to improve the law,
making it adaptable to new issues entirely unseen in human history. There
must be something to replace the no-sovereignty provision's absence. That
rationale is exactly the purpose behind the preceding section above 5 -
including changes that not only remove the sovereignty provision, but the
additional framework creating legal certainty for space industrialists and
perhaps, society as well. Therefore, legal attempts to remove the no-
sovereignty provision for its own sake are inadequate. However, since
United States unilateral action is one possible route for the 1967 Space
Treaty's modification, the United States could certainly terminate its own
obligations and provide answers to the additional issue through its
municipal law. Hence, a termination analysis will be provided as a
subcategory of unilateral action analysis below."
Fortunately, legal thought in this area is well-developed. This
obviousness is based on the fact that probably the most difficult issue in
international law's young history'- is enforcing state compliance57 to what
repercussions of replicating systems and nanotechnology); Thomas L. McKendree, Planning
Scenarios for Space Development in SPACE MANUFACTURING 10 (Barbara Faughnan & Gregg
Marniak, eds., 1996) (providing hypothetical situations involving "squatters" claiming celestial
property with great ease despite the property right constraints of international space law because
of technological advances in replicating nanotechnology). See generally Fredrick A. Fiedler &
Glenn H. Reynolds, Legal Problems of Nanotechnology: An Overview, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 593 (1994).
51. For authors asserting the formation of some sort of legal regime to oversee property
right distribution, see Keefe, supra note 2; Baca, supra note 2 (concluding that the "efficient and
equitable property system on Earth . . .should be extended into space for the exploitation of
celestial resources"); Paxson, supra note 45.
52. See generally LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 484 (3d ed. 1993).
53. See id.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 128-135.
56. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 52.
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little international law that exists.,' A survey of a variety of international
literature leads now to the following two commonsensical methods of
changing international space law:
1) United States unilateral action - including the subcategories rebus sic
stantibus (reinterpretation), and unilateral denunciation (termination of
treaty); and
2) multilateral action - developing a new treaty to supersede the 1967
Space Treaty; and Amendment to the 1967 Space Treaty. 9
Strategies for vaccination should first begin with the simplest and
less revolutionary of doctrines which require the least amount of state
concerted effort - United States unilateral action.
A. United States Unilateral Action
1. Vaccine I: Implementing the Rebus sic Stantibus Doctrine"
Rebus sic Stanibus is a doctrine that reminiscent of contract law in
that it states that circumstances of the contracting parties may change to
57. This proposition does not pertain to the seriousness of this problem, because for the
most part, nations do comply with international law. See Professor Oliver J. Lissitzyn, Preface
in BHEK PATI SINHA, UNILATERAL DENUNCIATION OF TREATY BECAUSE OF PRIOR VIOLATIONS
OF OBLIGATIONS BY OTHER PARTY XIX (1966); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enforcement and the
Success of International Environmental Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 47-48 (1995)
(noting the general view that "international law is a monument to successful laws, without
requiring much enforcement"). The widespread compliance with international law is probably
due to the fact that international law is simply an embodiment of what nations do and have done
over a long period of time. See HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW POLITICS, VALUES AND
FUNCTIONS, in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 52, at 1-2 (stating "International Law . . . is a
construct of norms, standards, principles, institutions, and procedures."). So, rather, the
proposition embodies the "difficulty" of the issue of enforcement. See generally O'Connell,
supra note 67 (discussing the difficulties of enforcing international environmental law).
58. This is comparatively speaking to state domestic law. Because of the increasing
development of international law and increasing global acceptance and participation in the United
Nations over the past twenty years, this proposition may soon be negated.
59. Multilateral action certainly could have the same subcategories as United States
unilateral action. However, the analysis of those subcategories demonstrates they would fail for
the United States. Correspondingly, multilateral actions would fail for the same reasons. See
infra text accompanying notes 62-136. Therefore, it would be impractical to repeat the analysis
for multi-lateral action.
60. The use of this concept in changing international law was taken from DANIEL PATRICK
O'CONNELL, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 296 (1965) (presenting the doctrine as a legal possibility
for "revision of treaties."). See also International Law Commission Report in HENKIN, supra
note 52, at 516, 517 ("[T]he acceptance of this doctrine [rebus sic stantibus] in international law
is so considerable that it seems to indicate a recognition of a need for this safety-valve in the law
of treaties."); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Iran, 1952 I.C.J. 93, 126 (stating that rebus sic stantibus
is a well-known concept in international law).
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such an extent that their obligation to each other ends.6 This doctrine
might provide the basis for interpreting the 1967 Space Treaty to allow
some degree of property rights in space. Professor Daniel Patrick
O'Connell claims Phillimore describes rebus sic stantibus best in the
following excerpt: "When that state of things which was essential to, and
the moving cause, the promise or engagement, has undergone a material
change, or has ceased, the foundation of the promise or engagement is
gone and their obligation has ceased."62
Although this is a valid doctrine, many commentators frown on its
use because treaty formation is largely based on political notions and
"changes in political circumstances are notoriously difficult to assess."63
Further, problems result from partially performed contracts and equitable
adjustment.' Most importantly, perhaps, is the risk to security of
treaties. 5 However, domestic courts have occasionally found in favor of
rebus sic stantibus under the use of executive abrogation." In more recent
cases, although its recognition is accepted, it seldom is the winning factor
for private parties.67 International courts recognize the doctrine, but have
never ruled in its favor."
Professor O'Connell is correct in his assertion regarding the
inequity and difficulty in determining change in political climates, which
should be obstacles against a proper decision favoring rebus sic stantibus.
61. See, e.g., O'CONNELL, supra note 60, at 296.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. International Law Commission Report, in HENKIN, supra note 52, at 516.
66. O'CONNELL, supra note 60, at 299 (citing Hooper v. U.S., 22 Ct. Cl. 408
(1887)).
67. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 52, at 519.
The U.S. Supreme Court [has] recognized that a party to a treaty might invoke
changed circumstances as an excuse for terminating its treaty obligations. However,
when the states continue to assert the vitality of the treaty, a private person who finds
the continued existence of the treaty inconvenient may not invoke the doctrine of
changed circumstances.
Id. (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint, 466 U.S. 243 (1984).
68. See id. (International Tribunals, while recognizing the principle of rebus sic stantibus
have generally avoided giving it affect, usually on the ground that it was not applicable to the
facts on hand (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, cmt. to art. 153 (1965)); O'CONNELL, supra note 60, at 299 (citing Russia v. Turkey,
Scott, 1 H.C.R. 297, 317 (1916)); Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco, 1925 P.C.I.J.,
(Ser. B) No. 4, at 29 (Feb. 7); Ser. C., No. 2, 140, 187 (1923); A.J., THE PERMANENCE OF
TREATIES (1928). The modern trend upholds O'Connell's assertion since his 1965 text. See
generally Denmark v. Norway, 1993 I.C.J. 38, 217 (June 14); Nicaragua v. United States, 1984
I.C.J. 392, 621 (Nov. 26); Belgium v. Spain, 1970 I.C.J. 3, 310 (Feb. 5).
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However, the situation of today's post-Cold War world is perhaps less
difficult. In fact, it is so drastically different from other political
environments, that it may give the strong, legally valid, although seldom
successful, rebus sic stantibus a fighting chance to receive credence.
In beginning the analysis of rebus sic stantibus, the definition to be
used will be the International Court of Justice's 1949 articulation of res sic
stantibus which, unlike Phillmore, is in much simpler terms. It states that
"[a] state may refuse to execute a treaty if the conditions have substantially
changed."6 9 To analyze the phrase substantially changed, the International
Court of Justice in Cambodia v. Thailand stated that rebus sic stantibus
"contemplates two different situations: the one existing when the treaty
was signed and the new one created by conditions and circumstances
posterior to the treaty."70
First, the circumstances during the time of the formation of the
1967 Space Treaty should be brought to light. The change from that
environment to today's environment is very clear. Only two superpowers
existed - the United States and the Soviet Union. Both nations possessed
massive military industrial complexes and economies 71 capable of vigorous
space programs, and were the only two space powers at the time. They
were already in conflict in many areas on earth - the Korean War, the
Vietnam War, and the Cuban Missile Crises were the most notable
examples of major Soviet Union/United States confrontations. Soviet
President Nikoli Krushev was famous for his mighty display at a session of
the United Nations General Assembly, where he removed his shoe and
struck it on the table, shouting that the Soviet Union would crush the
United States. This mood permeated well into the 1980s, when President
Ronald Reagan referred to citizenry of the Soviet Union as barbarians.
Star Wars was also a major issue during the Reagan Era and it epitomized
the extension of the Cold War confrontation into outer space. Never had
the world witnessed a political conflict guide world policy to such a
fantastic degree. It has been stated that the effect of the Cold War and
superpower rivalry was one of the principle reasons behind the
development of the no-sovereignty provision.
69. The Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4, 41 (Apr. 9).
70. Cambodia v. Thailand, 1962 I.C.J. 6, 42 (June 15).
71. The proposition that the United States has the largest economy in the world is
undisputable. However, in light of today's understanding of the Soviet Union's economic
condition throughout its brief history, especially since its weak economy substantially contributed
to its downfall, the proposition in regards to the Soviet Union. may seem less valid.
Nevertheless, this same Soviet Union had one of the most massive economies based on its sheer
size and total volume of currency regardless of how its relatively weak economy compared to
smaller nations.
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The no-sovereignty provision was viewed as the means of
preventing the spread of the Cold War into space, as well as resulting
territorial claims by the United States and the Soviet Union while non-
space faring nations stood idly by.7 2 Certainly times have changed. The
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics no longer exists. The Cold War is
gone and has been for some time. There could not be a clearer
demarcation of a change in the political arena. Certainly, Professor
O'Connell and others would agree. Further, other substantial global
changes have taken place since the advent of the 1967 Space Treaty. Not
only has the Cold War ceased, but more and more nations have developed
the technological and economic capability to become space faring nations. 7
Professor Reynolds has eloquently articulated the mood of this new era:
Today, space is not the sole preserve of the United States
and the Soviet Union (or its successor states). A potent
European space program now exists. Japan has a rapidly
growing program, and Third-World opinion leaders like
China, India, and Brazil have important space programs
too. Nor are these states the only ones. Although the
programs of the United States and the former Soviet Union
retain significant leads, those leads no longer appear
unassailable. When significant exploitation of space
resources begins, many nations will be participating . 7
It would seem that times have dramatically changed since the
signing of the 1967 Space Treaty. Political tides and economic boundaries
have shifted dramatically that fact is clear. However, substantial argument
exists against supporting the removal of the no-sovereignty provision via
rebus sic stantibus.
Although third-world economies have improved to the extent that
many have viable space industries,7 5 they are nowhere near approaching the
level of space infrastructure possessed by the United States, or the former
Soviet provinces - namely Russia. The People's Republic of China, at
least in potential, has already demonstrated a strong presence in the
commercial launch market. 76 Nations such as Kenya or Australia could
72. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 229-30.
73. See GOLDMAN, Supra note 8, at 110; Reynolds, supra note 2, at 231; Twibell, supra
note 1, at 33-34.
74. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 231.
75. The following countries have viable space industries: Brazil, China, India, Israel,
Pakistan, the Ukraine, Australia, Canada, and Japan. See Twibell, supra note 1, at 1, n.5.
76. See John C. Garcia, Heaven or Hell: The Future of United States Launch Services
Industry, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 333, 341-42 (1994).
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theoretically launch a spacecraft and claim part of the moon and perhaps
begin a mining operation, but what Kenya could do, the United States
would certainly be capable of doing many times over and faster. The
United States or other conglomerate of nations, such as the European
Space Agency would certainly begin reaping profits long before Kenya
ever would. Third-world nations are not in a different situation than thirty
years ago. They are certainly close equals to the space powers regarding
such space endeavors as telecommunications and spacecraft launching,
however, such participation in the space industry is minuscule in
comparison to the economic and technological requirements of an Apollo-
like mission to the Moon. The Apollo Missions were draining on the
massive United States economy and required the concerted effort of the
richest nation on Earth. Today, such an endeavor would still be very
expensive for the United States. Professor Reynolds is correct that third-
world countries have vigorous space industries, but in regards to a
situation existing where they would directly benefit from celestial property
claims, that notion is unrealistic - third-world nations are likely to be
equally as skeptical of space power domination of space as they were
twenty or thirty years ago. Moreover, there are four space powers which
exist today.78
The assertion that a third-world resistance to property rights in
space probably still exists should not be confused with the likelihood of
implementing changes in space law or policy or whether third-world
opinion should have such a substantial impact on the acts of the major
space powers. The assertion only demonstrates the argument that
circumstances may not have fundamentally changed in certain respects for
triggering the rebus sic stantibus doctrine.
There are two arguments remaining against rebus sic stantibus
which have not been put forth. The first is that the assumption that the no-
sovereignty provision being based on Cold War fears and superpower
domination of space may not be the only substantial reason for the
inclusion of the no-sovereignty provision in the 1967 Space Treaty. One
strong reason for its inclusion is the notion of peace in space - the desire
not to bring man's problems into space with him, and most notably, the res
communis doctrine.
77. Kenya has demonstrated a vital need for remote sensing for predicting disastrous
weather conditions for agriculture. See Twibell, supra note 1, at 34, n.237.
78. The four major space powers are the United States, Russia, Japan, and Europe (as the
European Space Agency). See Twibell, supra note 1, at 16 (citing GOLDMAN, supra note 8, at
15).
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Res communis means that certain property should belong to all
people of the world. 9 This concept applied to outer space is generally
accepted., Further, treaties and bilateral agreements seem to support this
notion. Truly, the great deal of expense involved in space activities is
likely to prevent one nation from acting in such a manner and violating the
res communis character of space. This fact allows the commonly held
perception of res communis to remain, perceptively leaving no room for
visible deviation from the doctrine. Thus, if the no-sovereignty provision
is rooted in the res communis doctrine rather that the then existence of the
two super powers and since nations have not appeared to deviate from that
doctrine, the fact that times have changed in regard to the Cold War may
have no meaning in the rebus sic stantibus analysis.'
79. Res Communis in international space law is a combination of res ominwn communis
(meaning community ownership rather than a general right-of-use law) and res extra
commercium ("applied typically to the peacetime use of the high seas without claims of
ownership, special exclusive interests, or unilateral control."). See S. HOUSTON LAY &
HOWARD J. TAUBENFIELD, THE LAW RELATING TO ACTvmTES OF MAN IN SPACE, 52-53
(1970).
80. See generally supra note 2.
81. Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and
International Organizations provides a basis for analysis for the use of "fundamental change of
circumstances" that is much more extensive than the International Court of Justice put forth in
Cambodia. It sets forth the following guidelines:
1) A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at
the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not
be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless:
a) The existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the
parties to be bound by the treaty; and
b) The effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be
performed under the treaty.
2) A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or
withdrawing from a treaty between two or more States and one or more international
organizations if the treaty establishes a boundary.
3) A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or
withdrawing from a treaty if the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party
invoking it either or an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation
owed to any other party to the treaty.
4) If, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a fundamental change of
circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty it may also invoke
the change as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations, Feb.
18-March 21, 1986, art. 62, 25 I.L.M. at 576-77
The end of the superpower struggle of demise of either the United States or the U.S.S.R. was
probable very unforeseen. It definitely shocked the world until very close to the time the Soviet
Union did fall. And certainly, the change was of "fundamental character." However, the third
prong of the Restatement test is where the argument above fails as well, see supra text
accompanying notes 71-85, that the change in circumstances must be "an essential basis to be
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The second argument against rebus sic stantibus is the most severe.
Both the International Court of Justice 2 and commentary agree 3 that the
presence of withdrawal provisions in treaties negates the need for rebus sic
stantibus because most modem treaties have a provision where states can
seek a legal out. The 1967 Space Treaty has such a provision: "any State
Party to the Treaty may give notice of its withdrawal from the Treaty one
year after its entry into force by written notification to the Depository
Governments. Such withdrawal shall take effect one year from the date of
receipt of this notification.""
With this clause, the contractual provision is instilled for proper
and internationally recognized denunciation. Simply, if the United States
bound by the treaty." The 1967 Space Treaty makes no mention of the superpower presence.
The superpower aspects seems, and probably rightfully so, to be a theory built on intuition. The
res communis character or reasoning behind the no-sovereignty provision seems to be more
firmly rooted in the actual text of the treaty, and certainly times have not changed in regard to
those principles. Note the following provisions from the Treaty:
Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and
use of outer space for peaceful purposes,
Believing that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried on for the
benefit of all peoples irrespective of the degree of their economic or scientific
development,
Desiring to contribute to broad international co-operation in the scientific as well as the
legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,
Believing that such co-operation will contribute to the development of mutual
understanding and to the strengthening of friendly relations between States and people.
1967 Space Treaty, supra note 21, preamble. "The exploration and use of outer space, including
the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the
province of all mankind." Id. art. I. As one can easily see, several references are made that
would seem to uphold the res communis basis for the no-sovereignty provision or any other
provision for that matter in the Treaty such as the words peaceful purposes, co-operation,
common interest of all mankind, and benefit of all people irrespective of the degree of economic
or scientific development. Economic and technological developments are still issues of today that
have not left with the absence of the Cold War and no where in the treaty is there any mention of
superpower domination.
82. Modern treaty provisions are inherently terminable. See cf. Nicaragua, 1984 I.C.J.,
392, 621 (Nov. 26). "It is only necessary to look at the texts of the large number of. . . treaties
.. . to see how almost invariably they are concluded either for a fixed term or for renewable
terms subject to right of denunciation, or are made terminable upon notice . . . ." Id.
83. International Law Commission Report in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 52, at 517.
The majority of modern treaties are expressed to be of short duration, or are entered
into for recurrent terms of years with a right to denounce the treaty at the end of each
term, or are expressly or implicitly terminable upon notice. In all these cases either
the treaty expires automatically or each party, has the power to terminate the treaty
and has the power also to apply pressure upon the other party to revise its provisions.
Id.
84. 1967 Space Treaty, supra note 21, art. XVI.
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decided that it should have property rights and wanted to exercise those
rights, it could do so a year after withdrawing from the 1967 Treaty.
However, the United States certainly might experience international
political repercussions if it behaved in such a way. These repercussions
will be dealt with in depth in a following discussion - United States
denunciation of the 1967 Space Treaty."
a. Conclusion and General Observations of Vaccine I
The rebus sic stantibus doctrine fails to be an effective vaccine for
the sought-after changes in international space law. Times have
substantially changed, however, those times may not be the reason behind
the no-sovereignty provision. If they were, it is not included in the
preamble. It only exists in the realm of scholarly thought. Also, many
third-world nations would likely object to the sudden creation of property
rights without some sort of structure development outside of simple
reinterpretation. Finally, the withdrawal provision negates the need in
modern times for the implementation of rebus sic stantibus.
2. Vaccine II: Reinterpretation of the No-sovereignty Provision" -
150 Year-Old Treaty Interpretation Analysis Applied to the Space
Age
Probably one of the easiest methods of reconciling the difficulties
of the 1967 Space Treaty is simply reinterpreting the Treaty, condoning a
certain level of celestial property rights. Reinterpretation would have
85. See infra text accompanying notes 128-136.
86. See MONSIEUR DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 260-61 (1852) (discussing
methods of treaty interpretation and exceptions to prior conceived interpretation of treaties (rebus
sic stantibus)); HENKIN ET AL., supra note 52, at 473, n.2, n.3 (a unilateral interpretation of a
treaty has an "advisory" effect (citing Ste. Ruegger et Boutet v. Ste. Weber et Howad, [1933-34]
Ann. Dig. 404 (No. 179) (Trib. Civ. de la Seine, France), whereas if most or all of the
signatories interpret a treaty in a certain way it is an authentic interpretation having almost the
binding effect of an additional clause to the treaty.) Cf. O'CONNELL, supra note 60, at 282-83
(referring to travaux pr'paratoires--looking to the intent of the parties at the time the document
was signed--while noting that its danger was that "[s]tates which adhere to a treaty after it has
been formulated are bound by an abstraction expressed in words independent of the intent of
those who shaped the treaty.") Thus, even if the intent of the parties at the signing of the 1967
Space Treaty was against any form of national property rights, the words themselves are the
deciding factor--if there is room for property rights in the words of the Treaty, there is room for
interpreting the Treaty in such a fashion regardless of the intent of the signatories.
The Restatement states that treaty interpretation depends on whether the parties have
agreed to accept a particular entity's interpretation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 148(1) (1965). Otherwise, it is not binding. d. §
148(2). However, as the Restatement indicates, it is the interpretation that affects the effect of
the agreement or treaty. See id. § 146.
280 [Vol. 4:259
Twibell
substantially fewer intricacies than amending the Treaty" or creating an
entirely new one.u In addition, it would pose fewer international
repercussions 9 and less time, which would be required for formulating and
passing a new legal regime with a global consensus. Moreover, treaty
reinterpretation is a generally accepted method of treaty modification. °
However, before a nation, or nations, can lawfully interpret a treaty, a
certain state of things is required. 9' What does certain state of things
mean?
Certain state of things refers to legal rules of treaty interpretation.
De Vattel recognized that certain maxims for treaty interpretation must
exist.Y Due to the lack of precision of the written word and language in
general.n Without these maxims, treaty interpretation would be subject to
much abuse by the selfish motives of the signing parties.9 The four
general maxims of treaty interpretation as designed by De Vattel almost
150 years ago are as follows:
I. Interpret only that which needs interpretation.
II. If a party has certain interpretations of a treaty or provision and they
had a full opportunity to assert such interpretations at the signing of
the treaty and did not, it is to their own detriment.
III. Signatories do not have a right to interpret treaties according to their
own "fancy."
IV. What is sufficiently declared is to be taken as true.
V. The interpretation ought to be made according to certain rules."
87. See infra text accompanying notes 143-47 (discussing Vaccine V - amending the 1967
Space Treaty).
88. See infra text accompanying notes 138-42 (discussing Vaccine IV - changing or
nullifying the 1967 Space Treaty by passing a new and different treaty).
89. As discussed infra, text accompanying notes 112-27, the accepted method of treaty
interpretation by its very nature should at the most create minimal negative international reaction.
90. See supra note 86.
91. See DE VATrEL, supra note 86, at 261.
92. See id. at 244-74.
93. See id. at 243-44.
94. "[F]raud seeks to take advantage even of the imperfection of language, and that men,
designedly throw obscurity and ambiguity into their treaties, in order to be provided with a
pretense for eluding them upon occasion." Id. at 244.
95. Id. at 244-46. The first three maxims were paraphrased from the originally written
following maxims: "lst general maxim: it is not allowable to interpret what has no need of
interpretation."; "2d general maxim: if he who could and ought to have explained himself has
not done it, it is to his own detriment."; and "3d general maxim: Neither of the contracting
parties has a right to interpret the treaty according to his own fancy." Id. at 244-45.
De Vattel's rules for treaty interpretation are used for illustration because it makes for
an interesting analysis of judging space age dilemmas with an analysis developed over 150 years
ago when automobiles did not even exist. His standards are still valid and virtually the same.
1997]
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De Vattel outlines some of the certain rules referred to in his fifth maxim.
For example, whenever obscurity in language occurs, one must look to the
ideas of those who drew up the deed, and interpret it accordingly.9
Regarding the meaning of terms, common usage guides." Interpretation
leading to absurdity should be rejected. 9 Absurdities would likely include
contradiction of one portion of a treaty to another portion rendering it
inconsistent or invalid.99 In terms of a rule relating to interpreting the no-
Note the similarity of the Restatement's criteria for treaty interpretation as compared to De
Vattel's analysis discussed herein (compare the general maxims and other rules required by the
fifth maxim infra text accompanying notes 112-27; see also DE VATrEL, supra note 86, at 267-
74 (establishing 10 more specific rules of treaty interpretation similar of the Restatement Second
as articulated below):
Criteria for Interpretation:
1) International law requires that the interpretive process ascertain and give effect to
the purpose of the international agreement which, as appears form the terms used by
the parties, it was intended to serve. The factors to be taken into account by way of
guidance in the interpretive process include:
(a) the ordinary meaning of the words of the agreement in the context in which they
are used;
(b) the title given the agreement and statements of purpose and scope included in the
text;
(c) the circumstances attending the negotiation of the agreement;
(d) drafts and other documents submitted for consideration, action taken on them, and
the official record of the deliberations during the course of the negotiation;
(e) unilateral statements of understanding made by a signatory before the agreement
came into effect, to the extent that they were communicated to, or otherwise known
to, the other signatory or signatories;
(f) the subsequent practice of the parties in the performance of the agreement, or the
subsequent practice of one party, if the other party or parties knew or had reason to
know of it;
(g) change of circumstances;
(h) the comparability of alternative interpretations of the agreement with (i) the
obligations of the parties to other states under general international law and other
international agreements of the parties, and (ii) the principles of law common to the
legal systems of the parties or of all states having reasonably developed legal systems;
(i) comparison of the texts in the different languages in which the agreement was
concluded, taking into account any provision in the agreement as to the
authoritiveness of the different texts.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 147 (1965).
96. Id. at 247
97. Id. at 248.
98. Id.
99. See id. This is an old concept forming the legal Latin phrase ornis interpretatio si
fieri potest ira fienda est in instrumentis, ut omnes contrarietatis amoveantur, or "[elvery
interpretation, if it can be done, is be so made in instruments that all contradictions may be
removed.* BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1087 (6th ed. 1990).
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sovereignty provision of the 1967 Space Treaty, interpretations should be
guided by the "reason of the ... treaty.'0
According to De Vattel, there is one main exception to these rules.
This exception is analogous to rebus sic stantibus, termed by De Vattel in
this instance as conventio omnis intelligitur rebus sic stantibus.'0' Recall
rebus sic stantibus: That state of things alone, in consideration of which
promise was made, is essential to the promise; and it is only by a change in
that state, that the effect of the promise can be lawfully prevented or
suspended.10n Therefore, if reinterpretation of the 1967 Space Treaty's no-
sovereignty provision cannot pass analysis under the rules of treaty
interpretation, the exception to the standard rules on treaty interpretation
remains. But first, the determination of whether the no-sovereignty
provision can be reinterpreted.
a. First General Maxim: It Is Not Allowable to Interpret What Has No
Need of Interpretation03
The no-sovereignty provision probably has plenty of room for
interpretation. Note the clause again: "outer space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim
of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means."'°0
The first part of Article II makes clear that all space objects - moons,
asteroids, comets - and even empty space itself, is the target of the action
or command. Issues will arise if objects are removed, such as by mining
or some other sort of extraction. The words "is not subject to national
appropriation" are vague. For example, appropriation could mean to
include a variety of celestial body utilizations. '0 It could mean merely
physical occupation or any other sort of taking. '-i However, the words
have a qualifier, by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation
and by any other means must certainly be descriptive of claim of
sovereignty because they define possible modes of claiming sovereignty.
Thus, a taking in the guise of a national taking - a national control at
some level over outer space or any celestial body is prohibited. These
100. DE VATrEL, supra note 86, at 255.
101. Id. at 261-62. The Restatement has the same exception. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) supra note 95, § 153 cmt. ("[Section 153] is often referred to as the doctrine of rebus
sic stantibus.").
102. Id.
103. Id. at 244.
104. 1967 Space Treaty, supra note 21, art. II.
105. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 101 (6th ed. 1990) (adhering to the general rule of
common usage of terms). See text accompanying notes 96-100.
106. Id.
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types of takings or appropriations are described with very broad, over-
inclusive terms. The provision basically in a sense states that states may
not exercise any control over empty space or any celestial body.
In a strict sense, this clause has already been violated in the past,
and will certainly be violated in a direct way in the future. Further it is
impossible not to violate the provision. The Apollo lunar landing for a
time took direct control by the United States of a very small portion of the
Moon for a very small amount of time. Realistically, even a strict
interpretationist of the no-sovereignty provision would probably not object.
Although the United States placed its flag there, it made no claim of
sovereignty - it was merely symbolic. However, future plans will do the
same, but the operation will be larger and will last over a longer period of
time. What would a strict no-sovereignty provision interpreter say then?
The coming international space station ° will in effect be taking up
a portion of empty space by use, occupation, and any other means -
although under the jurisdiction of a conglomerate of states instead of one as
the clause seems to semantically direct. If empty space is not clearly
demonstrative, imagine the implications of a lunar or Martian colony.
Those endeavors would undoubtedly challenge the no-sovereignty
provision. For one, it would be somewhat permanent. Even if it only
lasted for a few months or years, the effect would be taking a portion of
the Moon under United States claim of national sovereignty according to
the plain language of the Treaty. At first, retention of United States
jurisdiction would be less problematic if the first stage of the lunar colony
was launched from Earth. Then the vehicle as it first becomes a colony
could arguably retain a ship/vessel type of national jurisdiction consistent
with Article VII of the Space Treaty. However, gradually the line will
become more obscure as additional modules are built and connected to the
original earth-launched vehicle or as the original vehicle becomes
entrenched into the lunar surface. When does it stop becoming a lunar
vehicle and become a colony? Once it becomes a colony, does Article VII
cover those types of situations? Complicating matters further, what would
be the impact of replicating nanotechnology - a technology that does not
mine the Moon, but rather, converts lunar material into itself?
Thus, a situation develops where maritime-vessel type jurisdiction
might exist at the first launched component, but the component replicates
and converts non-sovereign material into sovereign material.
Macrotechnological replicating facilities likely could be classified as an
initial space craft, but the more probable implementation of
nanotechnology is more difficult. Nanotechnology functions at a molecular
107. See supra note 28 (bilateral agreements regarding space station).
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level. Would the introduction of nanotechnology on the Moon likely be
classified as a space craft, a man-made type of pseudo-biological
substance, or something else entirely?
Most commentators, space law theorists, and third-world interests
have predicted similar ambiguity in the 1967 Space Treaty and its difficulty
in applying to new realities of space development such as celestial mining,
therefore believing the 1967 Space Treaty requires revision or that a new
treaty should be implemented. The 1979 Moon Treaty is an example of
some of those concerns. Although maritime law analogy does not
effectively address space issues such as colonization, 1° Antarctic law could
foreseeably answer questions. Antarctica is a sovereignless territory and
many countries have installations not unlike colonies within which they
retain national jurisdiction. However, adjudication would only uncover
and implement such analogy because no reference to these procedures or
applicable Antarctic law is mentioned in any space treaty, much less the
1967 Space Treaty. Moreover, some other issues remain. For example,
when celestial mining becomes feasible, will mining countries have to split
the profits? Once a substantial portion of a celestial body has the potential
to be mined or begins to create large profits, could third-world nations cite
to the preamble and article I asserting that regardless of their economic or
technological status that they should be entitled to the benefits of the
exploitation? °0
In conclusion, the 1967 Space Treaty's no-sovereignty provision
does include much vagueness worthy of interpretation. This vagueness has
been demonstrated by both semantics and potential application to old and
new scenarios. At the time the 1967 Space Treaty was formed, mining
celestial bodies was viewed as a near-future event. However, now celestial
property issues will be imminent within the next ten or twenty years and
the time for reinterpretation is ripe.
108. Cf. Jefferson H. Weaver, Illusion or Reality? State Sovereignty in Outer Space, 10
B.U. INT'L L.J. 20 (1992) (stating that regions of the sea can be claimed by virtue of sovereignty
via fleet domination (or by use of power exercised from the adjacent coast)).
109. One might argue that third-world nations should have access to one or a few exploiting
nations' space industry profits or other rewards. However, since space investment carries much
risk and expense in comparison with other terrestrial investments, entities would even be less
likely to invest knowing they would have to split their hard-earned rewards with nations who
have stood idle. This argument is especially strong when space industry is in its infancy.
Otherwise, no nation may benefit from the rewards of space industry and humanity in general
will suffer a loss. On the other hand, if the United States or other conglomerate of nations
maintains a high-rewarding space industry for many years harming other nations economies with
some sort of monopoly, certainly adjustments may have to be made. But the key is getting hard-
to-start industry started, especially an industry that could be crucial for the survival of mankind.
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b. Second General Maxim: If He Who Could and Ought to Have
Explained Himself Has Not Done It, It Is to His Own Detriment
There is little analysis under this second maxim. If the United
States, or any other nation, had a different interpretation or desire for
property rights in space, there was no evidence supporting this notion.
Rather, almost all were strictly against such notions. Even if there was
any sort of prevailing view on property right concepts, it would be to their
own detriment and thus, ineffective as an excuse for reinterpreting the
Treaty.
c. Third General Maxim: Neither of the contracting parties has a right to
interpret the treaty according to his own fancy
If the United States was the only nation to benefit from a liberal
view of the 1967 Space Treaty's no-sovereignty provision, this third
general maxim would negate United States efforts at reinterpretation.
However, as stated above, the reinterpretation should favor all nations, not
just the United States. But many third-world nations would certainly view
the interpretation as only favorable to the space faring nations because of
the economic and technological status of third-world nations. While such
status prevents them from exploring and exploiting space, it is not a valid
argument in determining the why of a nation's own fancy. Thus, despite
potential third-world arguments, a pro property interpretation asserted by,
for example, the United States, would not necessarily be to its own fancy.
The interpretation would benefit all nations, especially when third-
world nations catch up technologically and economically. Further, the
lead taken by the space faring nations would make it easier for third-world
nations to enter the same endeavors. Today's space industry is a firm
example. Once, several nations took a lead in certain industries such as
telecommunications and the commercial launch industry, third-world
nations have entered and are becoming competitive; today, Europe takes a
greater market share of commercial launch contracts over the United
States. Third-world nations reap the benefits of remote sensing and the
Global Positioning System."10 Future space industry would be no different.
The creation of Solar Power Satellites"' would fuel the nations most in
110. The Global Positioning System, (hereinafter GPS), is a constellation of satellites
formerly used by the military that can be used to pinpoint any object's location on Earth within
only a few meters. See Twibell, supra note 1, at 35. BMW and Mercedes Benz, for example,
use the GPS systems for guidance systems in their cars which have detailed road maps with
extreme accuracy which keep track, via satellite, exactly where the car and driver are on the
maps. Id.
111. Solar Power Satellites are technologically feasible satellites that can gather larger
amounts of sunlight in space than on Earth and transmit the energy via microwave back to Earth
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need - third-world nations. Third-world space craft manufacturers could
contract to less expensive space craft or stations to be made in space by the
space faring nations. Hence, space could be more accessible to all nations.
d. Fourth General Maxim: What Is Sufficiently Declared Is to Be Taken
for True
This fourth general maxim analysis includes many arguments in
the first general maxim - if "it is sufficiently declared to be taken for
true" it is probably not overly vague, and therefore, not necessary to
interpret. However, if something is vague, it is difficult to take it for true.
While Article II states that there shall be no claim of national sovereignty
and this should be taken for true, it does not indicate what degree of
sovereignty should exist, such as in the case of colonization. Therefore, if
Article II cannot apply to a given situation with certainty, how can it be
taken for true? This is where any effort at reinterpretation will primarily
lie for it is the near-presence of space ventures and property issues for
which reinterpretation will be sought. However, if any reinterpretation
should happen to include claims for sovereignty where it was claimed a
nation could acquire a portion of the Moon and call it its own, Article II is
clear on this issue and it would certainly be taken for true that a nation
could not make such a claim.
e. Fifth General Maxim: The Interpretation Ought to Be Made According
to Certain Rules
It is not disputed that the interpretation of the no-sovereignty
provision commanding that no nation shall appropriate celestial property is
a valid interpretation (evidenced by. lack of dispute in scholarly work over
this interpretation), 12 but does an interpretation allowing national
appropriation violate certain rules? It probably does not.
For one, interpreting the no-sovereignty provision to include some
level of national appropriation would violate the 1967 Space Treaty's
Preamble and create absurdity and contradictions within the Treaty."3 The
preamble states that "space exploration and use of outer space should be
carried out for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of their economic or
scientific development."" 4  This seems to contradict any notion of the
United States or any other major space power taking a portion of a moon
or asteroid and reaping the rewards of their resources. Thus, this use of
in the form of simple electricity. Id. at 46. Third-world countries would tremendously benefit
from this inexpensive form of energy.
112. But see Reynolds, supra note 2, at 241.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 96-100.
114. See 1967 Space Treaty, supra note 21, preamble.
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outer space would likely be construed as not benefiting peoples in lower
economic and scientific development and therefore violative of the
provision.
Secondly, Article I would be contradicted.'" Article I transforms
the portions of the Preamble immediately discussed above into
commands."' It also states that all areas of "the moon and other celestial
bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without
discrimination of any kind on the basis of equality."" 7  A major mining
operation on the Moon retaining jurisdiction and ownership over mined
material certainly would easily entertain arguments that other states were
being deprived of their use and exploration of that area. The larger the
colony and the more lucrative the industry, the more likely the argument
would prevail. Thus far, the interpretation creating limited property rights
would seem to contradict other provisions in the Space Treaty, violating
general rules of treaty interpretation and the notion of omnis interpretatio
si fieri potest ita fienda est in instrumentis, ut omnes contrarietaties
amoveantur. However, this analysis is purely academic - using general
rules of treaty interpretation, semantics, and research. Some space law
academics disagree with this conclusion of the incompatibility of property
rights and the 1967 Space Treaty.
Professor Glen Reynolds believes that a minimal level of property
rights can exist as they do with the res communis character of the oceans. '
He asserts that a state can recognize national jurisdiction over commercial
recovery of mineral resources without violating accepted principles of
international law.1" This jurisdiction does not include any claim of
sovereignty over areas or resources in an area, only extracted resources
and the freedom to explore.' 20  Reynolds proceeds to assert that an
analogous scheme applied to outer space "would not constitute the
extension of sovereignty to outer space" nor does it "even constitute the
creation of full-fledged property rights."-1 Rather, such right would be
termed "an extraction right" - a "mineral right, or right of use."'a
Therefore, the no-sovereignty provision under Reynolds interpretation
115. See id., art. I.
116. "The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and is in the interests of all countries, irrespective of
their degree of economic or scientific development and shall be the province of all mankind." Id.
117. Id.
118. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 234; see supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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simply mandates that states "refrain from acts that involve national
appropriation" and that "methods of creating incentives for space
development involving [certain levels of property rights] and even
involving methods in which enterprises do acquire absolute title to land."",2
Despite Professor Reynold's valid assertions, it is very likely other
nations would disagree especially since such an interpretation of the no-
sovereignty provision creating some level of property rights in space would
seem to violate at least three of the general maxims on treaty
interpretation. However, there still may be a chance for such
interpretation to prevail, and this is the exception - omnis intelligitur
rebus sic stantibus.12 The rebus sic stantibus failed in the analysis above
regarding the Treaty as a whole, but would it prevail for only a particular
portion of the Treaty? Probably not.
The reason behind this conclusion is that if there was a violation or
a need to reinterpret the 1967 Space Treaty, the no-sovereignty provision
would probably be the only culprit. It would be difficult to imagine many
violations of the Treaty's other provisions with their humanitarian and
cooperative values that primarily encompass the rest of the treaty.
Furthermore, most nations encourage cooperation'21 and space exploration
for the whole of mankind.1'2 Much of this reasoning is often based on the
need to combine international ingenuity, technology, and financing for
expensive space projects never embarked on before. A simple change of
the Cold War climate might invoke some nations to argue De Vattel's
warning regarding the use of rebus sic stantibus:
[We ought to be very cautious and moderate in the
application of the present rule; it would be a shameful
perversion of it, to take advantage of every change that
happens in the state of affairs, in order to disengage
ourselves from our promises were such conduct adopted,
there could be no dependence place on any promise
whatever.' 27
Therefore, the analysis of the no-sovereignty provision in respect to this
special case of rebus sic stantibus has the same ill fate of the rebus sic
123. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 234; see supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 86-102 (discussing the exception to the general
rules of treaty interpretation).
125. See supra notes 42-43 (treaties and bilateral agreements supporting international
cooperation and freedom of space exploration in their preambles).
126. See, e.g., supra note 28.
127. DE VAT-rEL, supra note 86, at 261.
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stantibus applied to the Treaty as a whole since the no-sovereignty
provision is the only provision likely to be the provision violated.
f Conclusion and General Observations for Vaccine II
There is certainly much room for interpretation of the 1967 Space
Treaty's no-sovereignty provision as allowed by the general maxims of
international law. However, the particular interpretation that includes a
certain level of property rights is not so compatible with certain rules of
treaty interpretations under the fifth general maxim. The one exception to
these general rules, rebus sic stantibus, shows little likelihood for success
either. It fails for the 1967 Space Treaty in general and for the no-
sovereignty provision by itself because it is the only portion of the 1967
Space Treaty that would need reinterpretation or likely to be affected by
the substantial change in the state of things. Furthermore, it is unneeded
because of the withdrawal provision. Thus, this vaccine does not provide
the answer.
3. Vaccine III: United States Denunciation of the 1967 Space
Treaty - International Repercussions
This vaccine, because of the 1967 Space Treaty's withdrawal
clause,'2 is irrelevant in regards to the legality and international perception
of whether it was a proper withdrawal from the 1967 Space Treaty. If no
such provision existed, the United States could only legally withdraw from
the Treaty if other parties had breached the Treaty,'29 or only if such breach
was substantial.' 3 Some authorities believe a violation of a treaty by one
party never terminates the obligations of the other parties no matter how
significant the violations. 3 ' Other authorities believe nations always have
an absolute right to terminate a treaty no matter how significant the
violation. ,32 Today, there appears to be no grounds for the United States to
terminate its obligations under the Treaty under any sort of analysis of
these schools of thought. Absolutely no asserted breaches of the 1967
Space Treaty exist to even fall within the most liberal category of
permissible treaty denunciation. However, contractually under Article
128. See 1967 Space Treaty, supra note 21, art. XVI; see also supra text accompanying
notes 82-85.
129. See BHEK PATI SINHAI, UNILATERAL DENUNCIATION OF TREATY BECAUSE OF PRIOR
VIOLATIONS OF OBLIGATIONS BY OTHER PARTY 1 (1966).
130. Id. at 2.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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XVI, any signatory can withdraw from the Treaty. As previously
discussed, this is why treaty denunciation is becoming less common. 133
Thus, the United States can legally denunciate the Treaty. That is
not the issue.'1' The issue is the potential impact and negative repercussions
an Article XVI withdrawal would have on the international community. '3
If the United States properly withdrew from the 1967 Space Treaty, it may
not be free to act in violation of the Treaty's principles. The political
consequences of a proper unilateral withdrawal would not be the
withdrawal itself, but fear in the international community over what the
United States might do once it felt it had a right to allocate itself celestial
property. Nations today, including the mighty United States, operate less
in a vacuum than they did years ago. Every state action creates ripples in
the international community at an extremely higher rate than years ago.
Nations do not act or fail to act based on the military repercussions of their
actions. States are intricately tied transnationally via communication,
economics, and government. Note the United Nations' participation in
global conflicts since the breakup of the Soviet Union and the formation of
the European Economic Community. The United States must be very
careful when it takes any act that might have negative international
repercussions, especially with something such as space activities which are
so expensive and require substantial international cooperation.
Additionally, this Treaty and its accompanying principles may
have become ingrained in international law to such a degree that they have
become universally accepted as a rule of positive international law or even
customary international law.1 36 Finally, since most multilateral agreements
have embraced the 1967 Space Treaty in their Preambles, the United States
withdrawing from the 1967 Space Treaty might cause concerns that the
United States might be withdrawing or disaffirming its other agreements
that refer to the treaty.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
134. For some of the issues arising from denunciation where there is no withdrawal
provision, see SINHAI, supra note 129, at 2-3 (e.g., "Are all types of treaties subject to the rule
of unilateral denunciation?"; "Does a party to the treaty have the right or prerogative to act as
the sole judge and interpreter of the occurrence, the nature and consequences of a violation of an
obligation or part of another treaty?;" and, "Does an innocent party have the right to abrogate
the whole of a treaty, or only that part which is affected by violations?").
135. See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 233 ("[Tlhe possibility of the United States simply
repudiating the Outer Space Treaty's no-sovereignty provision . . . would probably lead to ugly
international repercussions.") However, Reynolds leaves to speculation exactly what those
repercussions are.
136. See supra text accompanying note 44; Weaver, supra note 108, at 230 (suggesting
some scholars assert that "the principle of freedom of outer space was 'universally accepted as a
rule of positive international has and has never been challenged by any state' [except for
geostationary orbit claims of empty space] by equatorial countries").
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a. Conclusion and General Observations of Vaccine III
Unilateral denunciation from a legal standpoint is not problematic
for the United States provided it uses Article XVI for withdrawal.
However, non legal repercussions may ensue from the international
community. These repercussions would not be in the United States best
interest in not only space commercialization, but in other non related
realms as well. Any nation embarking on space ventures likely requires
international support and cooperation. Further, withdrawal does not
implement a regime to govern property acquisition or questions concerning
liability of intelligent machines, replicating technology, or nanotechnology
utilization in space. The United States might certainly be negatively
affected by another nation's use of such technology. Every state has an
interest in certainty and a structured legal environment in space. Treaty
withdrawal accomplishes none of those things; it only removes barriers to
property right acquisition.
B. Multilateral Action
1. Vaccine IV: Nullification of the 1967 Space Treaty by
Ratification of a Subsequent Treaty11
This vaccine addresses the issue of whether the 1967 Space Treaty
can be simply ignored and another treaty passed that addresses the needed
changes in international space law. Can this be done? Would it be proper
for addressing needed changes in space law? It can be accomplished,
however, the key is getting the same parties who have signed the 1967
Space Treaty to sign the new treaty.'39 If they are the same parties, they
are clearly competent and in the position to address the problems of the
1967 Space Treaty. '"9 They must also make clear their intentions regarding
the prior treaty. Otherwise, the 1967 Space Treaty might remain in
effect.' °  The 1967 Space Treaty has ninety-eight signatories' and if
enough support was garnered to draw up a new treaty creating property
rights, enough support can be garnered to amend the 1967 Space Treaty.
137. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 52, at 505.
138. "Where the parties to the two treaties are identical, there can be no doubt that, in
concluding the second treaty, they are competent to abrogate the earlier one. . . ." Id.
139. Id.
140. Certain questions must be answered to determine whether the first treaty remains in
force. "This question is essentially one of the construction of the two treaties in order to
determine the intentions of the parties with respect to the maintenance in force of the earlier
one." Id.
141. See Twibell, supra note 1, at 8.
(Vol. 4:259
Twibell
If only some of the parties create the new treaty, it will remain
questionable whether the no-sovereignty provision remains in effect.142
a. Conclusion and General Observations of Vaccine IV
Thus far, Vaccine Four appears to be the most valuable in
implementing the needed changes in international space law. A document
can simply be created and passed that embodies the needed changes. This
creates some difficulties such as time constraints and may take some great
motivation to suddenly get the document to pass international scrutiny
before implementation of a high-level space industry or the advent of
nanotechnology. However, it provides the needed results. The main
problem with this vaccine is that the 1967 Space Treaty has permeated
international law at many levels via international agreement preambles and
possible international positive and customary law. Therefore, the 1967
Space Treaty itself will inevitably need to be addressed.
2. Vaccine V: Amendment of the 1967 Space Treaty'4
Vaccine Five does not suffer the same fate of the previous
vaccines. It is the most rational, although it will perhaps take more time
for generating its formulation and international consensus as was the
difficulty in the passage of a subsequent treaty (Vaccine Four). It may
even be more difficult because the no-sovereignty provision will be
addressed directly and the property rights issue will be directly subject to
criticism, especially with the large number of signatories to the Treaty.
However, in the long-run, it could be less time consuming because it could
be implemented much more efficiently than the United States trying to
enforce its vision of space economic theory via internationally destabilizing
means such as withdrawal or non-compliance. Furthermore, time may not
be a crucial factor as perhaps normal treaty amending processes - the
formation of the 1967 Space Treaty was rather immediate. It formed
through a series of resolutions immediately after the launch of Sputnik.
Hence, sudden advances in technology could make the amendment process
much faster. Since amendment is likely needed," an increased or
improved likelihood of the viability of space enterprise could easily
generate resolutions or actual binding international agreements addressing
property right issues and developing a legal regime. It must be conceded
that the principle argument against amendment and the drive toward
142. If the signatories did not intend to terminate or suspend the earlier treaty, the first
treaty has the priority of inconsistent obligations. See id. at 506.
143. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 52, at 456.
144. See supra text and conclusions accompanying notes 60-142.
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finding other means'4 5 for seeking change in international law is that it
gives grave disincentive to space industry now. Industry would be forced
to wait for legal development, or at least lack of legal incentive would slow
space technological development or industrial proliferation. However,
amending the 1967 Space Treaty solves dilemmas unanswerable by any
other vaccine. It would directly address the viral infection of corpus juris
spatialis and lend an opportunity for instilling a legal regime and certainty
into law without simply creating a void by ridding international law of the
Space Treaty's Article II. If such great effort is taken to reinterpret,
withdraw, repudiate, or create an entirely new treaty, that effort needs to
be directed at all the needed changes.
Unprotected property rights in space could cause more havoc for
space investors than no property rights at all. The United States might tell
investors to "go ahead and claim half of the Moon, but beware we will
have to militarily proteqt you because the rest of the world does not
recognize your rights." There could also be a mad rush toward staking
claims in space. Moreover, legal inaction and fast technological
development might cause a mad rush of squatters in space regardless of
international legal prohibitions.'"
Economic development in space will likely require a structured
environment such as the structure and regulation of industry terrestrially.
Amending the 1967 Space Treaty by removing the no-sovereignty clause,
elaborating it or perhaps removing it and creating another treaty, solves
many problems in implementing desired changes in space law. These
qualities make it the best vaccine available. It has its problems in not
creating motivation until amendment is completed and it is slow, but there
may be methods to improve the efficacy of this vaccine and ridding it of its
drawbacks. That key is United States domestic policy.
3. Improving the Efficacy of Vaccine Six - A Vigorous United
States Domestic Policy'14
Unlike Congress and state legislatures, the United Nations does not
have an analogous lobbying structure to implement legislative change.
People are not salaried solely for the purpose of wining and dining United
Nations ambassadors to have their views affect United Nations decision
making. United Nations lobbyists are the states themselves (although they
may be acting on behalf of internal or domestic lobbying interests). The
145. Referring to the four previous vaccines beginning with the simplest to accomplish.
146. See McKendree, supra note 52.
147. See Twibell, supra note 1, at 53, n.376 (stating that strong national policy may be the
key for changing space law and that some commentators outside the legal field firmly advocate
this course of action).
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United States could be a lobbyist for the space and property right cause by
promoting its own space industry and preparing to do so. Such maneuvers
of the world's largest economic and technological giant would not go
unnoticed, rather, it would send a message of an impending need for a new
international space regime. Other nations would observe the United States
preparing for massive space ventures that could question the 1967 Space
Treaty's no-sovereignty provision. They would then be extremely
motivated to act upon their concerns and address property right issues
before the United States foreseeably quashes their opportunities -
perceptively to them anyway. Further, other nations would necessarily and
inevitably work in conjunction with the United States in its space
endeavors, paving the path further or international legal change.
VI. CONCLUSION - CIRCUMNAVIGATING INTERNATIONAL SPACE
LAW
When the early space explorers dreamed of traveling from one side
of the globe to the other, they envisioned vast riches and short navigable
routes to reach those riches. Christopher Columbus sought a shortcut to
India, only to have found the longest route to what was really India.
Magellan took a route through the Straits of Magellan and the Pacific
Ocean only to find the Pacific Ocean was eighty percent larger than he
thought, resulting in Magellan practically circumnavigating the globe.141
Captain Cook's voyages took him around the world and he took no
shortcuts. 14 9 He was a great navigator and knew the oceans well. His
voyages were very profitable.1'1 In this paper, shortcuts were sought as
well in finding the best direct route to needed legal change in international
space law. Similarly to the early explorers, the best route was the direct
route often requiring a long path, or rather, circumnavigation of the world.
Some of the shortcuts, as the shortcuts sought by the ancient ocean
explorers, may really be the longest route to the desired destination.
Amendment of the 1967 Space Treaty may take us the long way around the
world, but it is the most direct route. Albeit the route is long and hard, it
is the best route for instituting needed legal change in the international
corpus juris spatialis. Further, it will be strong United States policy that
persuades Queen Isabella to fund and make the long voyage a reality - a
voyage that will not only bring economic and humanitarian prosperity to
Portugal or Europe, but to all the world.
148. BOORSTIN, supra note 16, at 264.
149. See id. at 278-89.
150. See id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most intellectually challenging legal question which
has baffled jurists might have been answered by the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.' It is the question of whether
Congress has the power to eliminate all the subject matter jurisdiction of
article III courts.2 Congress took a bold step in 1996 with the Anti-
* Orville McKenzie is a graduate magna cum laude of Orlando College, Orlando, FL
and is a Juris Doctor Candidate 1998, at Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law
Center. I dedicate this article to my grandfather, Lewis Parkes (Brother Lewis), who passed
away in January 1997. I would also like to thank Eddie Williams, III for his constructive
criticism of the many, drafts of this article.
1. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996).
2. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish .... . U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1.
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Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,3 which eliminates all judicial
review of a final order of deportation when an immigrant is deportable by
reason of the commission of a criminal violation.4 Obviously, immigration
law goes beyond the courts of any nation, and in fact affects the
international community in the form of migration and forcible repatriation.
This Comment examines this constitutional question from an
immigration perspective and breaks the analysis down into four sections to
give the reader a better means to understand this complex, yet ever
changing area of law. Section two provides rudimentary knowledge about
federal court subject matter jurisdiction and thus leads into the second
section which enumerates criminal ground for deportation in Australia,
France, Canada, England, and the United States. As will be evident from
the discussion infra, all five countries have different standards for
deportation of criminal aliens., The homogeneous characteristic among
Australia, France, Canada, and England is that a detached judiciary has
jurisdiction to review orders of deportation. The exception is the United
States. Is the American policy wise? Why is it that expeditious
deportation of criminal aliens trumps the procedural safeguard of having
one's case reviewed by a detached and independent judiciary?
Section four provides an in-depth analysis of the constitutionality
of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act as it relates to the
truncation of federal court subject matter jurisdiction. The impetus for the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act was the Oklahoma City
bombing. 6 Many lives were lost, people felt insecure, thus they concluded
3. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 110 Stat. 1214.
4. Id.
5. In Australia, a criminal alien is deportable if crime committed punishable by a
sentence of one year or more, Re S.J., No. T82/49 (Austl. Admin. App. Trib. Apr. 28, 1983);
an alien is deportable from France when the alien's presence on French territory constitutes a
serious threat to public order, Djeroud v. France, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. 68 (1991). An alien is
deportable from Canada if the alien has been sentenced to more than six months imprisonment
and five or more years could have been imposed for the criminal violation, Canepa v. Canada
[1992] D.L.R. 4th 589. An alien is deportable from England when the alien's deportation would
be conducive to the public good, R.v. Immigr. App. Trib., Imm. A.R. 227 (Eng. 1987). An
alien is deportable from the United States when the alien commits a crime of moral turpitude, 8
U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1251 (1996).
6. Representative Schumer stated,
Mr. Speaker, in America there have always been paranoid extremists, ... I have sat
face to face with the victims of terrorism and the families of the victims of terrorism,
from Pan Am 103 through the World Trade Center bombing to the atrocity in
Oklahoma City. I have met them all. When I compare that pain and that danger to the
exaggerated rhetoric I hear from extremists about this bill, I fear for America and I
fear for the lives of ordinary Americans.
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without evidence that the Oklahoma City bombing was the work of
criminal aliens.7  This consensus knew no boundaries, espoused by both
black and white, bourgeoisie, and proletariat.
It is difficult to take a dispassionate look at the Oklahoma City
bombing because criticism of remedial measures might make the critic a
Judas, among us. Taking that for what it is worth, can one securely say
that a law which promises deportation if one engages in terrorist activities
has even one iota of deterrence effect to a person who has an ardent
passion to disrupt the American diaspora? Can we say that criminal alien
X will no longer blow up a building or release poisonous gases because of
the severe punishment of deportation? It would be logical to answer no to
these questions with the explanation that deportation is irrelevant because
most likely the commission of such crimes are accompanied with the
penalty of death.' Now it becomes clear that deportation is not a threat to
the terrorists but a threat to immigrants who, for whatever reason, commit
a crime punishable by one year or more.
142 CONG. REC. H3605, H3611 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Schumer).
7. Under the heading Middle-Eastern Suspect/Witness Sought, the author wrote:
At least three suspects/witnesses have reportedly been tentatively identified by the
federal bombing task force and one or more may have been taken into custody.
Several sources are reporting that three males of "middle-eastern extraction" are being
sought in Texas and Oklahoma, and that some witnesses are being questioned at this
hour by federal officers ....
(July 27, 1997) <http://www.emergency.com/oklabomb.htm>.
Clark Staten, the Executive Editor of ENN noted in his editorial perspective:
How could any number of these "experts" quickly jump to the conclusion that the
perpetrators in Oklahoma City were "Moslem Extremists"? Most of the law
enforcement officials and counter-terrorist analysts, interviewed by ENN, indicated
that it was a matter of historic and analytical perspective not a quest to justify the
condemnation of any ethnic group. Some, including ERRI, said that they had
considered a domestic connection to the Waco Branch Davidian incident because of the
date of the event, but had discounted it ag details of the type of bomb and the tactics
used were discovered. Most said that the circumstances surrounding the deadly
atrocity in Oklahoma were just too similar to those seen in Lebanon, Israel, Egypt,
England, and elsewhere to lead them to believe that this was a domestic attack....
(visited July 27, 1997) < http://www.emergency.com/oklabomb.htm >.
8. See 26 Mathew: 47-49. One treacherous enough to betray a friend; one who disguises
treachery as friendship. THE NEW GROLIER WEBSTER INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 521 (encyclopedic ed. 1972).
9. The United States Sentencing Guidelines provide in part that, "[the Commission has
concluded that in the absence of capital punishment life imprisonment is the appropriate
punishment for premeditated killing. However, this guideline also applies when death results
from the commission of certain felonies. Life imprisonment is not necessarily appropriate in all
such situations." (visited July 27, 1997) < http://www.ussc.gov/guide/ch2ta.htm>.
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The final section points out the unfair effects the statute will have
on immigrants and the possibility and, most likely, certainty of abuse. The
past is not necessarily reflective of the future, but the United States has a
legacy of treating its own unfairly.10 Who will protect the immigrants?
II. FEDERAL COURT SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of the United States has original jurisdiction in
all actions in which ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, or vice consuls
of a foreign state are parties." The Supreme Court also has original
jurisdiction in all controversies between the United States and a state, and
all actions by a state against the citizens of the United States or against
aliens.'2 Pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitution, Congress
promulgated title 28 section 1251 of the United States Code.'3 Congress
10. Intermarriage prohibited; meaning of term "white person"-It shall hereafter be
unlawful for any white person in this State to marry any save a white person, or a
person with no other admixture of blood than white and American Indian. For the
purpose of this chapter, the term "white person" shall apply only to such person as
have no trace whatever of any blood other than Caucasian; but persons who have one-
sixteenth or less of the blood of the American Indian and have no other non-Cacasic
blood shall be deemed to be white persons. All laws heretofore passed and now in
effect regarding the intermarriage of white and colored persons shall apply to
marriages prohibited by this chapter.
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-54 (1960 Repl. Vol.) reprinted in WALTER WADLINGTON, DOMESTIC
RELATIONS 35 N.H. (1995).
Colored persons and Indians defined-Every person in whom there is ascertainable any
Negro blood shall be deemed and taken to be a colored person, and every person not a
colored person having one fourth or more of American Indian blood shall be deemed
an American Indian; except that members of Indian tribes existing in this
Commonwealth having one forth or more Indian blood and less than one sixteenth of
Negro blood shall be deemed tribal Indians.
Id. § 1-14.
11. U.S. CONST. art. III, §2, cl. 2.
12. In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those
in which the state shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction.
In all other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations
as the Congress shall make.
Id.
13. (a) The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all
controversies between two or more states. (b) The Supreme Court shall have original
but not exclusive jurisdiction of: 1) All actions or proceedings to which ambassadors,
other public ministers, consuls, or vice consuls of foreign states are parties; 2) All
controversies between the United States and a state; 3) All actions or proceedings by a
state against the citizens of another state or against aliens.
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has the power under article III of the United States Constitution to expand
or contract the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts within the
limitations of article 111.14 This plenary power was unequivocally exercised
when Congress gave the Supreme Court the right to issue writs of
certiorari to hear appeals on final judgments involving federal questions. 15
Federal courts obtain their jurisdiction when the cause of action
involves a federal question,'6 or when the cause of action is based upon
complete diversity.' Federal courts inherently have limited subject matter
jurisdiction. 8 In Owen, Justice Stewart writing for the majority said, "It is
a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.
The limit upon federal jurisdiction, whether imposed by the Constitution,
or by the Congress must be neither disregarded nor evaded." 9 Moreover,
even the federal courts themselves have espoused the idea of their limited
jurisdiction by imposing self-limitation.2 In Ankenbrandt'21 the Court said
that even though there may be subject matter jurisdiction by virtue of
diversity, the federal courts will not hear cases involving divorce, child
support, or alimony. 2 Thus the long stance of limited federal jurisdiction
is deeply rooted in the adjudicatory tradition of the federal courts.
28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1996).
14. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, Cl. 1.
15. The Supreme Court may review cases from the court of appeals by the following
methods: 1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or
criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree; 2) By certification atk
any time by a court of appeals of any question of law in any civil or criminal case as to
which instructions are desired, and upon such certification the Supreme Court may
give binding instructions or require the entire record to be sent up for decision of the
entire matter in controversy.
28 U.S.C.S. § 1254 (1996).
16. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West 1996).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1996).
18. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
19. Id. at 374.
20. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992).
21. Id.
22. "[Tlhe domestic relations exception, as articulated by this Court since Barber, divests
the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees." Id. at 703,
112 S. Ct. at 2214, 119 L.Ed 2d at 469.
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The United States Congress has plenary power over immigration
which arguably comes from article I of the Constitution,2n or which
emanates from the infinite number of penumbras to the Constitution itself.
This is manifested by the creation of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, an executive agency which determines the number of aliens that
can legally enter the United States. It has been said that Congress gives
and Congress takes. This holds true for immigrants who have committed
crimes of moral turpitude by virtue of deportation.u4 "Any alien who is
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years
or ten years [in the case of a lawful resident] after date of entry, and is
convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be
imposed, is deportable."n
Ill. CRIMINAL GROUNDS FOR DEPORTATION
A. Australia
An immigrant who has committed a criminal offense punishable
for a period of one year or more is deportable from Australia as mandated
by the Migration Act of 1958, section 13(a).26 While the Australian courts
have recognized that, "the Australian community may take the view that it
prefers not to accept the criminal into its society," 27 the courts have not
rigidly followed this rule. This holds true although the S.J. court noted
that "the decision to deport may be made, not because the criminal
represents any significant future risk to the Australian community if he
remains . . . ."28 The deportation process for a criminal violation seems to
take on a two-step process in Australia. First, the criminal violation must
be punishable for a period of one year or more.2 9 Second, the court must
analyze whether the violation was a violent or nonviolent crime.30 If the
offense was violent, "the damage to the community that would flow from
23. "The Congress shall have the power ... [t]o establish a uniform rule of naturalization,
and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. CONST.
art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
24. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1251 (1996).
25. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(H)(ii)(I) (1996).
26. Re: S.J., No. T82/49 (Austi. Admin. App. Trib. Apr. 28, 1983).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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recidivism is great and must weigh heavily in favor of deportation." 3'
However, if the crime was nonviolent such as false pretense, the order
granting deportation will be revoked because there is "comparatively little
damage likely to be suffered by any person in particular or by the
community in general." 32 This bifurcation between violent and nonviolent
crimes seems to be rationally based on a wise policy decision because it
would be safe to infer that violent criminals pose the most serious threat to
the community. However, this form of analysis is absent from American
jurisprudence. 31 In fact, one could be deported from the United States for a
nonviolent offense simply because it is punishable by one year or more.
34
Thus a legal immigrant could be deported for voting in a federal election.35
It is simply wrong to conclude that Australia has the more preferable
system. Deference and earned respect should be given to the American
Legislatures for their policy rationale of excluding, and when appropriate
deporting criminal aliens.
B. France
Criminal aliens are deportable from France when the alien's
presence on French territory constitutes a serious threat to public order
pursuant to the Order (Ordonnance) of 2 November 1945 on the conditions
for alien entry into and residence in France.
6
31. Id.
32. Re.: S.J., No T82/49 (Austi. Admin. App. Trib. Apr. 28, 1983).
33. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 110 Stat. 1214.
34. "Any alien who at any time after entry has been convicted of a violation of [or a
conspiracy or attempt to violate] any law or regulation of a state, the United States, or a foreign
country relating to a controlled substance ... is deportable." 8 U.S.C.S. § 1251(a)(H)(2)(B)(I)
(1996); "Any alien who is, or any time after entry has been, a drug abuser or addict is
deportable." 8 U.S.C.S. § 1251(a)(H)(2)(B)(ii) (1996); "Any alien who, within five years after
the date of entry, has become a public charge from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen
since entry is deportable." 8 U.S.C.S. § 1251(a)(H)(4)(D)(5) (1996).
35. Section 216 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 states in part that:
[it shall be unlawful for any alien to vote in any election held solely or in part for the
purpose of electing a candidate for the office of President, Vice President, Presidential
elector, Member of the Senate, Member of the House or Representatives, Delegate
from the District of Columbia, or Resident Commissioner . . . . Any person who
violates this section shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than one year,
or both.
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208
(1996).
36. Djeroud v. France, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 68 (1991).
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However, even though a criminal alien may pose a serious threat
to public order or public credit, it does not automatically mean that the
alien will be deported. For instance, an alien who is, 1) a minor under
eighteen; or 2) an alien who can prove that he or she has been a resident of
France for more than fifteen years; or 3) an alien who over the past twenty
years has not been definitively sentenced to a term of at least one year's
imprisonment without suspension, or without several terms of
imprisonment without suspension totaling at least one year, is not subject
to deportation." Moreover, a person cannot be deported if deportation
would result in degrading treatment or torture in the person's home
country.,, This comes with two exceptions. First, an alien "sentenced to
an unsuspended term of imprisonment of any duration for an offense
covered by section 4 and 8 of Act 73-548 of June 1973 concerning
collective housing is deportable." 9 Second, except aliens under eighteen,
an alien is deportable in a case of imperative urgency when it constitutes an
absolute necessity for the security of the state or for public safety.4
C. Canada
Criminal aliens are deportable from Canada pursuant to the
Immigration Act of 1976 where: 1) the immigrant has been sentenced to
more than six months imprisonment, and 2) five or more years could have
been imposed for the criminal violation.4'
In early English common law, some foreign born nationals were
classified as denizens.4 2 These are "aliens born, but who has obtained ex
donatione regis letters patent to make him an English subject: a high and
incommunicable branch of the royal prerogative."4 3 Canepa v. Canada"
involved an alien claiming a denizen status. The Canepa court rejected the
doctrine noting the absence of stare decisis, and espoused the idea that
alien rights must be found under the Canadian Charter . 4  The Canepa
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Canepa v. Canada [1992] D.L.R. 4th 589.
42. W.C. SPRAGUE, BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 65
(1895) reprinted in Canepa v. Canada [1992] D.L.R. 4th 589.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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court also noted that "[t]he most fundamental principle of immigration law
is that noncitizens do not have an unqualified right to enter or remain in..
[Canada]."" This logically extends to the court's conclusion that
deportation is not a punishment, and even if it was, it is not "cruel and
unusual" because it is not excessive as to outrage standards of decency .4
D. England
A person who is not a British citizen is subject to deportation from
the United Kingdom if the Secretary of State finds that his deportation
would be "conducive to the public good. "4 8 The actual definition of what
is "conducive to the public good" is unknown. However, House of
Common paper 159 states that "each case will be considered in light of the
relevant circumstances known to the Secretary of State . . . ."9
Furthermore, an alien ordered deported from the United Kingdom can only
be heard to argue that his deportation violates a treaty in which England is
a party if Parliament adopts the treaty5 ° This is because "[tireaties and
declarations do not become [English] law until they are made law by
Parliament. "I'
In deciding whether to execute a deportation order, the Secretary
of State must use
every relevant factor known to him, including: age; length
of residence in the United Kingdom; strength of connection
with the United Kingdom; personal history, including
character, conduct and employment record; domestic
circumstances; the nature of the offense of which the
person was convicted; previous criminal record;
compassionate circumstances; [and] any representations
received on the person's behalf ....
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. R. v. Immigr. App. Trib., Imm. A.R. 227 (Eng. 1987).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Imm. A.R. 277 (quoting House of Commons paper 156).
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E. United States
Aliens who have committed "crimes of moral turpitude" are
subject to deportation and exclusion from the United States.53 This is
because crimes involving moral turpitude are regarded as evil, and persons
committing such crimes have squalid moral sentiment towards the
community. The logic behind deporting aliens who have committed crimes
of moral turpitude stems from the notion that the United States was
generous and overly benevolent in opening its borders to foreign nationals
who have the opportunity to reap the benefits that the United States has to
offer.
An alien who is recalcitrant to the laws of the United States shows
disrespect to the American diaspora, and the establishment of civility.
Such aliens who commit crimes of moral turpitude constructively
relinquish all privileges to be domiciled in the United States. The crimes
that have been traditionally held as "crimes of moral turpitude" within the
meaning of United States immigration laws4 all seem to be specific intent
crimes. 5 The only exception is rape, a general intent crime,5' which is also
regarded as a crime of moral turpitude.
Prior to the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, aliens, whether convicted of a criminal offense or
not, could appeal a final order of deportation to the federal courts.17 On
April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act. 8  This Act truncates the federal court's power to hear
53. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1251 (1996).
54. Bribery is a crime of moral turpitude, see United States v. Esperdy, 285 F.2d 341 (2d
Cir. 1961), cert. denied 366 U.S. 905 (1961); Forgery and Embezzlement are crimes of moral
turpitude, Baer v. Norene, 79 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1935); Perjury is a crime of moral turpitude,
United States v. Uhl, 70 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied 293 U.S. 573 (1934); Murder is a
crime of moral turpitude, Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 162 F.2d 663 (9th Cir. 1947), rev'd on
other grounds 333 U.S. 6 (1947). But see Sallano v. Doak, 5 F. Supp; 561 (1933). Sex offenses
are crimes of moral turpitude, Marinelli v. Ryan, 285 F.2d 474 ( 2d Cir.1961). Even consensual
sodomy is a crime of moral turpitude, Velez-Lozana v. INS, 463 F.2d 1305 (D.C. 1972); Tax
offenses are crimes of moral turpitude, Costello v. INS, 311 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd on
other grounds, 376 U.S. 120 (1964); Weapon offenses are also crimes involving moral turpitude,
Re S 8 I & N Dec. (BIA 1959).
55. Specific intent designates "a special mental element which is required above and
beyond any mental state required with respect to the actus reus of the crime." State v.
Bridgeforth, 750 P.2d 3, 5 (Ariz. 1988).
56. State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836 (Alaska 1978).
57. Kladis v. INS, 343 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1965).
58. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996).
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deportation cases on appeal in which the deportee has been convicted of a
criminal violation.5 9
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE
DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996
The jurisdictional limitation section of the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which will instigate fervent
constitutional debate on the viability of immigration law, states in part that
"[any final order of deportation against an alien who is deportable by
reason of having committed a criminal offense covered by section
241(a)(2)(A)(i), shall not be subject to review by any court."6
Noteworthy, and perhaps what can be termed as a troubling
epiphenomenon, was an issue pointed out by Representative Velazquez.
Representative Velazquez remonstrated about the fact that the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act is rooted in a bill that was
rushed through Congress without adequate deliberation to meet the
anniversary deadline of the Oklahoma City bombing.6' Surely the Act does
not hide its meaning or purpose; 2 however, constitutionality of statutes are
judged on the basis of whether rights guaranteed by the Constitution are
deprived or unreasonably infringed, or whether Congress' action is within
the purview of the Constitution itself.63
The intriguing question now becomes whether the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 is a valid exercise of Congress'
power pursuant to article III of the United States Constitution, or whether
Congressional action usurps federal court subject matter jurisdiction. In
Marbury v. Madison, Justice Marshall said that the Supreme Court of the
United States is the final arbiter of the Constitution." Thus, it is upon the
established precedents of the Supreme Court that Congress' actions must
be judged.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 142 CONG. REc. H3612 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996). Representative Velazquez in
disgust said, "Mr. Speaker, rushing this bill to the floor to meet a publicity deadline is
irresponsible. Once again we are sacrificing our people to play election year politics.
Americans and their civil rights are too important to allow this." Id.
62. Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945). Justice Learned Hand writing
about deciphering the meaning and purpose of statutes wrote, "[Ilt is one of the surest indexes of
a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to
remember that statutes always have some purpose or objective to their meaning." Id.
63. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
64. Id.
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In Ex Parte McCardle, the Supreme Court explicated the
limitations that can be placed on the federal courts' subject matter
jurisdiction.0 McCardle involved a petitioner who filed for a writ of
habeas corpus alleging unlawful restraint by the military force." The writ
was issued and returned to the military commander. McCardle was not in
the military but was held in the custody of the military because he had
published articles allegedly incendiary and libelous. Upon a hearing,
McCardle was remanded to military custody. McCardle appealed to the
Supreme Court, and his case was heard before the Justices. Before the
decision was rendered, Congress repealed the February 5, 1867 Act which
gave the Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear the matter. Chief Justice
Chase, writing for the majority noted that "[wie are not at liberty to
inquire into the motives of the legislature. We can only examine into its
power under the Constitution, and the power to make exceptions to the
appellate jurisdiction of this Court is given by the express words. "67 This
opinion removed all obfuscation and doubt of Congress' power to limit the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. In fact, the opinion went on further to
say that the opinions or motives of Congress are irrelevant." Under the
McCardle framework, Congress could remove the subject matter
jurisdiction of the Federal Courts even if Congress was motivated by some
form of animus. However, Ex Parte McCardle does not stand for the
proposition that Congress' power is absolute in jurisdictional expansion
and limitation.
United States v. Klein involved a statute passed by Congress which
gave the President the power to grant pardons and return property to
individuals who were thought to be in opposition of the United States.69 On
August 12, 1863, the President granted Wilson a pardon; on January 1,
1867, the Act giving the President the power to grant pardons was
repealed. Three years later in 1870, Congress passed another Act which
stated that any pardons granted to any person by the President because
such persons were disloyal are invalid. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in the case shall cease and the court shall forthwith dismiss
the suit of such claimant.70 The Court reasoned that if the Act only denied
the right of appeal in a particular class of cases, there would be no doubt
65. Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 513.
68. Id.
69. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871).
70. See id. at 129.
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Congress' action was constitutional.71 However, the Court went on to say
that Congress ventured into another coordinate branch of the government
when it would ex post facto override an executive decision of the
President. The Court stated, "We must think that Congress has
inadvertently passed the limit which separates the legislative from the
judicial power."72 Therefore, although there is no doubt that Congress may
limit the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, Congress must be
certain that it does not step into the department of another coordinate
branch of the government. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 does not pose the separation of powers problem
illuminated in Klein. The Act, without usurping any executive power
simply states that a deportee will not have a right to review in federal
courts because of the deportee's deportable status as a convicted criminal. 3
This in no way infringes on the executive branch of the government, but
simply limits the federal courts' jurisdiction.
The principle of stare decisis answered the constitutionality of the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 in 1850 in
Sheldon v. Sill." In Sheldon, the Judicial Act prohibited the federal courts
from hearing cases in any suit to recover the contents of any promissory
note. The Supreme Court in upholding the constitutionality of the statute
said:
[I]f the Constitution had ordained and established the
inferior courts, and distributed to them their respective
powers, they could not be restricted or divested by
Congress . . . . [H]aving a right to prescribe, Congress
may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of
any of the enumerated controversies. Courts created by
statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute
confers. No one of them can assert a just claim to
jurisdiction exclusively conferred on another, or withheld
from all.75
This same linear form of reasoning was also expounded in Lauf v.
Shinner.76 Lauf involved a statute enacted by Congress which provided that
71. Id. at 145.
72. Id. at 147.
73. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 110 Stat. 1214.
74. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441 (1850).
75. Id. at 448.
76. Laufv. Shinner, 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
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no court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue a temporary or
permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor
dispute." The Court in upholding the constitutionality of the statute said,
"[T]here can be no question of the power of Congress thus to define and
limit the jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United States." 8
Likewise, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 falls within the same ambit of congressional definition and limitation
of the federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction. The Act affirmatively
limits the federal courts' jurisdiction to review cases involving deportable
aliens who have been convicted of a criminal violation. It is upon this
same principle that Ex Parte McCardle9 and its progeny are based. "[The
appellate powers of the [Supreme] Court are not given by the judicial act,
but are given by the Constitution," they are, nevertheless, "limited and
regulated by. . . acts [of Congress] . . . ."1 The Supreme Court and the
lower federal courts have long recognized that the federal judicial system is
inherently limited, and that Congress may define and limit the federal
court's subject matter jurisdiction within the purview of article 111.81
An alien who has been convicted of a criminal offense and
subsequently ordered deported cannot argue but for the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act he would have had a fundamental right to
appeal. 82 The right to appeal is not a fundamental right. It is a legislative
grace which can be given and taken away by Congress. In Ross v. Moffitt,
the Supreme Court said that the government is not obliged to provide an
appeal after a conviction." Moreover, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act only prevents judicial review of a deportation order.
The Act does not preclude criminal aliens from appealing their criminal
convictions. But even if the Act did, it would still not run afoul of the
Constitution because there is no fundamental right to judicial review.M
77. Id. at 327.
78. Id. at 330.
79. Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868).
80. Id. at 513.
81. U.S. CONST. art. III.
82. See McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894). The Court held that a state need not
provide any appeal at all. Based on this rationale, the same principle applies to the Federal
government.
83. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
84. Id. at 606.
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V. THE CERTAINTY OF FAIRNESS IS FOREVER GONE
Representative Scott in opposing the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act said, "[O]ur rights [will be dilapidated] if we have
secret trials where people can be deported, based on evidence presented in
private . . . ." At first glance the Representative's statement might seem
like a hyperbole. However, the practical effect of the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Act is that it will run into procedural irregularities. There
are no safeguards in the Act to decipher whether criminal aliens are given
fair deportation hearings.16 The fact that there is a deportation hearing
should not lead one to the conclusion that criminal aliens are afforded their
procedural safeguards under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. In
fact, what the Act has done is similar to what the lawmakers in Yick Wo v.
Hopkins 7 did. The Board of Immigration appeals will have plenary power
to determine which criminal alien gets deported, without their actions
reviewable by the detached judiciary u This leaves ajar the door for
possible abuses which will go uncorrected. The logical question one might
ask is, "What about procedural due process?" Procedural due process is
not guaranteed for a criminal alien facing deportation under this new Act. 9
This dogmatic condition has not always been the case.90 In
Mendoza, the defendants were arrested in Lincoln, Nebraska on October
23, 1984. They were deported on November 1, 1984. On December 12,
1984, they were once again separately arrested in Lincoln, Nebraska.
While being prosecuted for illegal entry into the United States, the
defendants asserted a collateral attack on their prior deportation hearing.
The defendants claimed that the Immigration Law Judge inadequately
informed them of their right to counsel at the hearing. The defendants also
contend that they unknowingly waived their right to a suspension of
deportation. The Supreme Court held that the prior deportation hearing
violated the aliens' procedural due process rights. 9 The Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act permanently precludes this type of
collateral attack on a deportation order. Abuses like that in Mendoza are
85. Supra note 6 (statement of Rep. Schumer).
86. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 110 Stat. 1214.
87. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), the ordinance gave certain counsel
members plenary power to issue licenses to operate laundry service. The counsel members used
this power to effectuate their racial animus towards the Chinese immigrants.
88. See Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 110 Stat. 1214.
89. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 110 Stat. 1214.
90. United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987).
91. Id. at 837.
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bound to occur in the application of this new Act. The only problem is
that the criminal aliens who are stripped of their procedural safeguards will
no longer have redress in the courts of law.
For illustration purposes assume X, an immigrant, was born in the
middle east. He is now twenty-five years old, and has been residing
legally in the United States for the last twenty-three years. In all respects
but for his nationality, X is a typical twenty-five-year-old American.
Recently, X's girlfriend broke up with him and as a result X has been
calling her continuously. She took umbrage to this and obtained a
protective order against X. Assume further that after the protective order
was issued, the court found that X was in violation. What result? Under
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
X is deportable.92 At the deportation hearing the trier of facts is Judge
Unfair who lives up to her name. She abused her power and discretion
and ordered X deported. What result? X is going back to the Middle
East.93 "Any final order of deportation against an alien who is deportable
by reason of having committed a criminal offense shall not be subject to
review by any court. "94
Stupified? Flabbergasted? This outcome is fundamentally wrong.
What about the length of X's residence in the United States? What about
the strength of X's connection to the United States? What about X's
personal history? What about the nature of the offense which X allegedly
committed? What about the fact that X has no previous criminal record?
These are all questions which should be answered before X, or any other
92. Any alien who at any time after entry is enjoined under protection order issued by
a court and whom the court determines has engaged in conduct that violates the portion
of a protection order that involves protection against credible threats of violence,
repeated harassment, or bodily injury to the person or persons for whom the protection
was order was issued is deportable. For purposes of this clause, the term 'protection
order' means any injunction issued for the purpose of preventing violent or threatening
acts of domestic violence, including temporary or final orders issued by civil or
criminal courts . . . whether obtained by filing an independent action or as a pendente
lite order in another proceeding.
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208
(1996).
93. The author intentionally omitted the sentences, "X is going back home." This is
because it cannot reasonably be said that the Middle East is X's home. He has been away for
almost all his life; he grew up in a different setting, culture, values, norms and traditions. In all
respects, X is an American.
94. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 110 Stat. 1214.
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immigrant, is deported. A sound immigration policy is necessary, a fair
one is paramount."
VI. CONCLUSION
Federal court jurisprudence has laid the principle that Congress,
pursuant to article III of the United States Constitution, may define and
limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, though dogmatic to some, effectuates
this well established principle. In essence, this is the same type of
limitation that the federal courts have upheld since time immemorial.
What remains is the lost cries of immigrants wrongly deported. The
United States Constitution guarantees many things, the notable exception
being moral fairness. The Australian, French, Canadian, and English
cases all point out a process which is no longer available in the United
States: review by the independent judiciary.
One cannot blame the American legislatures for abhorring criminal
aliens, and their efforts to get them out of the United States as quickly as
possible. One also should not question the Legislatures' motive;9 but this
paper questions the wisdom of the termination of judicial review by the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. We can be tough on
criminal aliens without trampling on and rampantly traversing the Due
Process Clause.
95. The author offers no conclusion or opinion as to whether the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act is fair, but made statements so that the reader can ponder and
conclude without influence as to fairness.
96. See generally supra note 6.
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